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Through an ethnographic study of the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) – 
an organisation renowned for its persistent fight against corruption in India – this 
thesis explores the aspirations and tensions of anti-corruption activists. In their 
commitment to improving governance structures by means of campaigning for 
transparency and accountability laws and policies, these activists ultimately aspire to 
strengthen democratic practice and to improve statecraft. By studying in detail the 
forms of actions, dynamics, politics and relationships among anti-corruption 
activists, the thesis explores how ideas of the state and democracy come to be 
internalised and addressed by civil society actors. 
 
The context is the nation-wide anti-corruption agitation that swept the country 
through most of 2011. This agitation gave rise to friction between civil society actors 
otherwise working for similar ends, leading to tension and competition on what 
constitutes democratic process and procedure. Based on extensive fieldwork, the 
thesis examines the ways in which MKSS responded to the shifting political 
landscape of anti-corruption activism. Drawing on the notion of relationality, I argue 
that political positions and identities are shaped and consolidated circumstantially 
through an oppositional stance and through processes of ‘othering’.  
 
In considering the diverging understandings of democracy among civil society 
actors, this thesis seeks to expand ethnographically the theoretical concept of 
‘agonistic pluralism’ (Mouffe 1999), that postulates that political conflict and 
disagreement is not only integral, but, moreover, crucial to democratic debate. Based 
on this conceptualisation, the conflict over the meaning of democracy among the 
anti-corruption activists is considered here as creating space for the expansion and 
enrichment of democratic debate. The very essence of democracy in India, as will be 
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AAP Aam Aadmi Party 
BJP Bharatiya Janata Party 
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IAS Indian Administrative Service 
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MKSS Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan 
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NAC National Advisory Council 
NCPRI National Campaign for People’s Right to Information 
NREGA National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 
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RSS  Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh  
SMS Short Message Service 
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aam aadmi common man 
Abhiyan Campaign 
Angrezi English, foreign 
anpadh   Uneducated 
arya samaj Hindu reform movement 
Bache Children 
bankia  trumpet-like instrument 
Benami transaction, contract, or property 
Bhajan Hindu devotional song 
bharat mata Mother India 
bhay  Fear 
bhuk  Hunger 
Brashtachar Corruption 
Chamcha literally, spoon; idiomatically, sycophant  
chapati unleavened flatbread 
Chokidar night guard 
Chula burner made out of clay 
Crore unit of measure that equals ten million 
Dan donations, gift 
dharma 
 
(Indian religion) the eternal law of the cosmos, 
inherent in the very nature of things 
dharna  sit-in demonstration 
dholak  hand drum 
gram panchayat  local self-government institution at the village level – 
the base of the three-tier decentralised system 
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gram sabha committees of all the adult citizen voters of the village 
gram sansad village parliament 
jan sunwai public hearing 
Janmadin Birthday 
janta durbar public hearing 
Kheer rice pudding 
lakh  unit of measure that equals one hundred thousand 
lasan chutney garlic chutney 
lok sabha lower house of parliament 
Lokpal ombudsman (in Sanskrit: ‘caretaker of people’) 
ma-bap Parents 
Mazdoor wage labourer 
Mela fair, gathering, meeting 
mohalla sabha  neighbourhood committees 
Nalayak Incompetent 
Neta Politician 
Nirvana a spiritual place of perfect peace and happiness 
pajama kurta  garments worn by men 
panchayat  village council 
panchayati raj local system of government 
Pandal tent, makeshift roof structure 
Ramarajya divine raj, kingdom of god 
Rozgar employment, wage labourer, earning 
sangathan  organisation, union 
Sanyas Renunciation 
Sarpanch elected village headman 
sati  former Hindu practice of a widow throwing herself on 
to her husband’s funeral pyre 
Seva selfless service 
Shramdan voluntary work 
Swadeshi self-sufficiency, domestic production 
swaraj  self-government 
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tamasha  spectacle, an entertainment, a phenomenon, a farce 
tilak  mark worn on the forehead by Hindus  
vande mataram hymn to the Mother Land 
varnashrama dharma system of classification, according to Hindu text 
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On the night of 15-16 January 2014, Delhi Law Minister Somnath Bharti attempted 
to raid the home of African nationals in the Khirkee Extension area of south Delhi. 
Residents of Khirkee Extension – a part of Bharti’s constituency – had complained to 
the Law Minister that the “Nigerians or Ugandans” living there were, they suspected, 
members of a prostitution-and-drug ring.1 Bharti arrived on the scene, accompanied 
by party volunteers and a TV crew. He ordered the Malviya Nagar police to arrest 
the suspected foreign nationals and to search their home, which the residents of 
Khirkee Extension had identified as ‘a den of vice’. The police refused to do so on 
the grounds that they did not have a warrant authorizing the raid. The police cited the 
rules that prohibited such unwarranted search, upon which Bharti is reported to have 
said: “If the police do not even listen to the law minister, what will the common man 
do?”2 
 
Following this controversial attempted midnight raid, Bharti’s party leader and 
Delhi’s Chief Minister, Arvind Kejriwal, asked the Union Home Minister to suspend 
four police officials on the grounds that they had disobeyed orders from the Delhi 
Law Minister. In conjunction, Kejriwal demanded that the Delhi government be 
given control over the Delhi Police, which currently falls under the jurisdiction of the 
Union Home Ministry.3 Kejriwal set a deadline, threatening to sit in protest outside 
the Union Home Ministry if no action on his demand was taken.  
 
A few days later, defying prohibitory orders, Delhi’s Chief Minister and six of his 
cabinet colleagues attempted to reach the Union Home Minister’s office. Blocked by 
                                                 
1 “Two Delhi ministers, Somnath Bharti and Rakhi Birla, turn vigilantes” Indian Express, 17 January 
2014 [accessed 26 February 2014] http://indianexpress.com/article/india/politics/two-delhi-ministers-
turn-vigilantes/  
2 Ibid. 
3 This is because Delhi is a union territory and not a federal state. 
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the police, Kerjiwal and his colleagues and supporters stopped near Rail Bhavan, in 
an important arterial avenue of the capital city, from where they staged their sit-in 
protest.4 Kejriwal announced to the largely young, white-cap wearing supporters that 
had gathered around him, that the protest could well extend to 10 days and that he 
would in the interim run the city government from the protest site. Adhering to his 
word, Kejriwal and his ministers started official work in the middle of the road by 
Rail Bhavan, studying and signing files. The protest attained much public attention, 
not least because it blocked traffic and forced the Delhi Metro to shut four major 
stations, threatening to bring the national capital to a standstill, just days before the 
country’s major Republic Day parade was due.  
 
Kejriwal had been in power as Delhi’s Chief Minister for only three weeks preceding 
the protest. His party, the Aam Aadmi Party (the ‘Common Man’s Party’ – 
abbreviated to AAP, which in Hindi reads as ‘you’) had won a landmark election 
victory in the December 2013 Delhi Legislative Assembly elections. AAP had only 
been formed the year before, and it took everyone by surprise when it ousted, by no 
meagre margin, the Congress Party that had been in power in the national capital for 
three consecutive terms. AAP’s major election promise had been to fight corruption 
and to bring in a Jan Lokpal, or an anti-corruption ombudsman, within 15 days of 
being voted into power. The demand for a Jan Lokpal had been at the centre of a 
nation-wide agitation in 2011, of which Kejriwal had been one of the principal 
exponents (more on this agitation will be delineated below). From the day the Aam 
Aadmi Party had received the vote of confidence from the Delhi electorate, politics 
in India’s capital took on an unprecedented, often theatrical turn. 
 
The first expression of AAP’s spectacular politics was when election results had just 
been announced and the party discussed whether they should form the next 
government in Delhi. With the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) – the victor of the Delhi 
Assembly elections, yet still short of the majority seats – refusing to form the 
government, the Congress Party had offered its unconditional support to AAP. In the 
                                                 
4 Rail Bhavan is the headquarters of the Indian Railways. It is located at Raisina Road No. 1, New 
Delhi, near the Parliament House. 
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past Kejriwal had spoken out vehemently against Congress, slamming it as a party 
steeped in corruption. In order to get out of the political dilemma of whether to form 
a government with the party it had so bitterly opposed previously, Kejriwal sought 
time to conduct a referendum. In accordance with his broader agenda of fostering 
forms of ‘direct democracy’, he wanted to seek the people’s own verdict on whether 
AAP should form a government with the support of the Congress. Over the span of a 
few days, citizens of Delhi had the option of either going to public meetings that 
would return a single “yes” or “no” answer by popular vote, or of sending in their 
answers through SMSes or missed calls. Through this means, AAP claims to have 
reached out to voters in all 70 constituencies of Delhi. The verdict given by the 
people of Delhi was that AAP should form the government. On 28 December 2013 
Arvind Kejriwal was sworn in as Delhi’s (youngest) Chief Minister.  
 
Aside from fighting corruption, one of Kejriwal’s major election promises had been 
to bring politics closer to the people by allowing more participatory and direct forms 
of democracy. He endorsed the politics of swaraj – local self-governance as 
famously promoted by Gandhi. AAP’s manifesto promised setting up mohalla 
sabhas (neighbourhood communities), and holding regular janta durbars (public 
hearings) as a way of making democracy more participatory and as a means of 
decentralising decision-making. Shortly after coming into power, Kejriwal and his 
entire cabinet held their first janta durbar outside Delhi’s Secretariat. It was intended 
as a public feedback session, where people could voice their grievances and make 
suggestions for the governance of Delhi directly to the Chief Minister. Exceptionally, 
the gates of the Secretariat, usually traversable only by VIPs, were opened to the aam 
aadmi (common man).5 The hundreds of people streaming in, jostling with each 
other to speak to the ministers, lead to a situation of increased chaos and 
mismanagement. Midway into the durbar, fearing a crowd stampede, Kejriwal had to 
flee the event and address the crowd from the roof of the Secretariat. This marked the 
end of the inaugural exercise of participatory democracy within the grounds of 
Delhi’s Secretariat.  
                                                 
5 The term aam aadmi is so common in everyday parlance in North India, that it is even used in 
English. It is for this reason that the term ‘aam aadmi’ crops up repeatedly in this thesis, used 




A series of further tumultuous events and dramatic turns in AAP’s politics then 
followed, most of them covered to the hilt by newspapers and TV channels. Then, on 
its 49th day in power, on 14 February 2014, Arvind Kejriwal announced the 
resignation of the AAP government. The reason given was that the Congress and BJP 
had thwarted his government’s agenda by preventing it from tabling the Delhi Jan 
Lokpal bill (or, a Citizen’s Ombudsman bill) in the legislative Assembly. Bringing in 
the Jan Lokpal to fight corruption had been a key election promise made to the voters 
by AAP. Abiding by his word, a few weeks into power, Kejriwal had presented his 
Jan Lokpal bill to the Delhi Cabinet. The bill was immediately criticized by many as 
disproportionate, for it sought to cover all public servants – from chief ministers to 
lower-level ‘Group D’ employees – and proposed to penalize those found guilty of 
corruption with life term imprisonment as maximum punishment. Despite the 
criticisms, Kejriwal had stated that he intended the bill to be enacted at a public 
session of the Assembly in the following week. However, he was informed that the 
Delhi government and legislature does not have jurisdiction to make laws covering 
central government officials, and that the Jan Lokpal bill had to be sent to the Union 
Ministry of Home Affairs for approval. Fearing that the bill would thereby get stuck 
or delayed, Kejriwal questioned the constitutionality of seeking the Home Ministry’s 
clearance. Defiantly refusing to submit to legislative procedures, AAP brought its bill 
before the Delhi Assembly anyway, wherein it was fully squashed by both the 
Congress and BJP. A few hours after the Assembly impediment, Kejrwial announced 
his resignation as Chief Minister of Delhi.  
 
Kejriwal framed his decision to quit government as a principled one, on the grounds 
that he was ‘sacrificing’ his power as Chief Minister in the name of anti-corruption. 
He stated that he did not have the right to stay in office if his promised Jan Lokpal 
bill did not get approval by the assembly. However, many commentators viewed his 
resignation as a staged calculation that would allow AAP to transform itself into a 
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national party and emerge as a serious force to contest the forthcoming general 
elections.6   
 
 
Democracy yes, but what type?  
 
The Aam Aadmi Party’s brief dance with governance brought fundamental questions 
about India’s political makeup and its democratic tradition to the surface. The 
unforeseen rise to power of Kejriwal’s government, and its particular experiments 
with governance, unleashed a polemic on the meaning and practice of democracy in 
India. While some celebrated AAP for being a ‘maverick force’ that was challenging 
the established political institutions, others related more cynically to AAP’s notion of 
democracy. There was no doubt that the rise of AAP had put an end to the bipartisan 
domination of Congress and the BJP, and that it had suddenly emerged as a viable 
and popular alternative to the established parties. However, for many others, the 
forms of politics and the notions of governance of the most recent party set alarm 
bells ringing, for they were seen to display a dangerous contempt for democratic 
institutions.  
 
While scant attention had been paid to AAP before the legislative assembly elections 
in Delhi, with most people doubting its significance in the political landscape, AAP’s 
unexpected election victory brought it into the centre of media limelight. Kejriwal 
and his party were receiving huge space and attention in India’s media, with news 
portals – particularly English-language newspapers and TV channels – indulging in 
the party’s actions and statements. The hype around AAP was a visible case of 
“mediatisation” of politics (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999), whereby the media were 
                                                 
6 One member of AAP even provoked a controversial dispute when he stated publicly that Kejriwal’s 
agenda had never been the Jan Lokpal bill in the first place, but that it had always been the upcoming 
Lok Sabha elections; according to this member’s logic, the Jan Lokpal bill had intentionally been 
presented in an undemocratic manner so as to arouse political havoc and attention, and to thus justify 
APP’s exit from power. See “Arvind Kejriwal’s exit was preplanned; eyeing Lok Sabha polls: Vinod 





not only representing, but shaping the political discourses and processes around 
AAP. The debates in mainstream media as well as other public platforms (such as 
blogs and discussion forums, largely of left-leaning intellectuals) were split into a 
polemical divide between those who endorsed AAP’s politics of ‘shaking the system’ 
and of leading the ‘crusade on corruption’, and those who were troubled by its 
ostensibly undemocratic strain.7 
 
The case of the attempted midnight raid and the ensuing protest with which we began 
the account of AAP, reflects some of the main points of discussion around the 
polemic. It illustrates the split views around the processes of governance that the 
newly formed AAP government was adhering to. Then Law Minister of Delhi, 
Somnath Bharti, had justified the raid on the African nationals’ home in Khirkee 
Extension on the basis that he was acting on the demands of the neighbourhood 
residents. It was thus in the name of the people’s will and local sentiment that the 
Law Minister had acted. This is in consonance with Aam Aadmi Party’s broader 
aspiration of advancing a system of direct democracy. AAP’s stated political agenda 
is the institutionalisation of swaraj, with the conviction that “good governance 
happens when people have the power to influence decisions that shape their life”.8 
Accordingly, the agenda envisions redrawing the organisational structure of 
governance, with maximum emphasis on people’s participation, such as through the 
institutionalisation of mohalla sabhas. Mohalla sabhas are neighbourhood 
committees whose decisions pertaining to the area are taken collectively by all 
residents at monthly meetings. Law Minister Bharti was acting in anticipation of 
such a notion of a mohalla sabha, with the intention of engaging residents of Khirkee 
Extension in participatory democratic decision-making processes. 
 
                                                 
7 Referring to anti-corruption activism and politics in India to a ‘crusade’ was common in the media. 
See for instance:  
“Corruption crusaders turn politician” in Washington Post, 1 July 2013 [accessed 26 February 2014] 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/corruption-crusaders-turn-
politicians/2013/06/30/ef5f0cd4-de85-11e2-ad2e-fcd1bf42174d_story.html or  
“Why is Indian anti-corruption party creating waves?” in BBC World, 29 November 2013 [accessed 
February 26, 2014] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-25135338  
8 As stated on AAP’s website. “Political decentralisation – Aam Aadmi Party” [accessed 26 February 
2014] http://www.aamaadmiparty.org/political-decentralization  
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However, this particular incident attracted much public flak, opening up broader 
questions and concerns with AAP’s notion of direct democracy. By catering to local 
sentiments and basing decisions on the views of the mohalla sabha, Bharti was 
accused not only of overt racism, sexism, moralism and vigilantism, but also of 
acting with disdain for the legal process. His demand that the police immediately act 
on his orders was criticised as an unabashed attempt to bypass law and procedure. 
AAP’s idea of bringing governance to the doorstep of citizens raised the question of 
who is the actual ‘voice’ of the mohalla sabha, and to whom it is accountable. It is a 
widely known dictate that in a society like India’s, where deep fault lines exist in the 
social fabric, decisions taken by the majority are bound to coerce minorities living in 
a community to fall in line with their command. Thus, although AAP’s radical 
democratic practice was acclaimed by some for posing a challenge to established 
politics and had attracted much public support, it was also registered by some as a 
signal of danger. This disquiet was captured, for instance, in an editorial piece in the 
Economic and Political Weekly, a left-leaning scholarly weekly magazine, when it 
stated: “it is only a thin line that divides direct democracy from mobocracy or 
majoritarianism. That ogre has raised its head in the actions of Bharti” (Editor of 
EPW 2014: 7). 
 
Similarly, controversial discussions ensued about the Chief Minister’s protest that 
immediately followed the raid. Some applauded the protest-activism of Kejriwal and 
his government for breaking free from conventions and for introducing a radical 
alternative approach to established political processes. With few precedents in 
India’s democracy, Kejriwal’s protest was seen as a creative combination of party 
and social movement politics and of thus prompting a new mode of conducting 
politics and governance in India.9 However, Kejriwal also came under heavy attack, 
with many questioning his interpretations and abilities in matters of governance. 
From many quarters, even from erstwhile supporters, the position was that once in 
government the political instruments of a social movement were no longer legitimate 
                                                 
9 One precedent that resembled this form of politics was the movement led by JP Narayan, also known 
as the ‘Bihar Movement’ or the ‘Total Revolution’ in the early 1970s, which led to the formation and, 
consequently, rule of the Janata Party. The JP Narayan Movement was driven particularly against 




methods and, instead, certain procedures and processes had to be followed. Kejriwal 
was accused, for instance, by the opposition party for being an ‘anarchist’ and of 
being clueless about running the government.10 This attitude was reproduced by 
Kiran Bedi, retired police officer turned social activist, who had, along with 
Kejriwal, been at the forefront of the anti-corruption movement. Bedi spoke out 
against Kejriwal’s protest saying “Delhi is under unruly political leadership!... He 
[Kejriwal] has remained an agitator, when he should have been an administrator. I 
think the habit of agitating hasn’t finished in them. They think that a solution to a 
problem can only be derived by staging a protest”.11 Bedi expressed the sentiment 
that the domains of party politics and of social movements had to be kept at bay from 
one another. 
 
Underlying the polemic around these particular incidences of AAP’s experiments 
with governance was a discussion about the parameters and implications of the 
country’s democracy. Although India is widely hailed as the world’s largest 
democracy, AAP arguably came into power precisely because of a widespread 
disillusionment with the state of democracy. AAP propagated hope in an atmosphere 
of deepening cynicism and suspicion of the political class, which was viewed as 
deeply corrupt and aloof to public concerns. AAP tapped into this frustration with the 
political system, by standing for a reanimated model of democracy, one that was 
truly ‘of the people, by the people, and for the people’. Accordingly, AAP’s version 
of democracy envisioned a paradigmatic shift from representative democracy to 
direct democracy. It claimed to address the lacuna in India’s nearly seven-decade old 
                                                 
10 The BJP leader, Arun Jaitley, spoke out against AAP for displaying “scant regard for the rule of 
law, political adventurism, extreme arrogance, lack of civility in public discourse and the least 
concern for established institutions… Its conduct is a challenge to constitutionalism”. In “BJP renews 
‘anarchy’ fire at AAP” in The Telegraph, 22 January 2014 [accesses 26 February 2014] 
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1140122/jsp/nation/story_17849851.jsp#.Uw8d9hCVyKI  
11 Bedi had previously expressed her reservations against Kejriwal’s formation of a political party, 
arguing that more pressure could be exerted as a movement, with politics being inherently dirty and 
corrupting.  
See “Kiran Bedi slams AAP government, says Delhi is under ‘unruly political leadership” in 





democracy that had failed to make its culture of democracy more participatory by 
giving ordinary people, or the aam aadmi, ownership of the political process.12  
 
Kejriwal’s idea of politics is based on the idea of popular sovereignty, where the 
people gain authority over parliament. It echoes Rousseau’s social contract theory 
that romanticises the idea of governance based on the consent of the people and 
government as constituted by the ‘general will’. AAP is premised on the idea that the 
people will drive the party and its forms of governance, rather than the other way 
around. This position led some observers to proclaim the emergence of AAP as a 
commencement of a new chapter in Indian politics and governance and as breathing 
new life into India’s stagnant democracy. It was seen as an alternative political 
instrument in the hands of the common man, rekindling hope to the many who had 
been disillusioned and disinterested in party politics. Its novel forms of doing politics 
was applauded, not least by Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen, as “an important 
departure” in politics and as posing a challenge to established institutions.13  
 
However, the overall exaltation, the ideas of politics and democracy of AAP were 
also a cause of concern amongst many others. Several commentators warned that 
AAP’s notion of direct democracy was mired in liberal vagueness and populist 
motives. The politics that the newly formed party promoted was seen to be reduced 
to a simple equation that portrayed the system and politicians as being ‘bad’ versus 
the people who were depicted as ‘good’. This rhetoric was read by some as being a 
catch-all populism that, relying on middle-class moralism, capitalized on popular 
discontent without providing a more sustained ideological coherence.  
 
This lack of a clear ideological position was another concern expressed in media 
discussions regarding AAP’s contribution to governance and democracy in India. 
                                                 
12 Based on the case of Porto Alegre in Brazil where street assemblies decide the key elements of the 
city’s budget, AAP propagated a system of handing decision-making on key governance and policy 
questions directly to the people, such as through the mohalla sabhas. 
13 “AAP’s rise has challenged established institutions: Amartya Sen” in Economic Times, 14 




AAP had openly resisted adopting an ideological position, and had instead focused 
on offering pragmatic solutions to widely felt problems. As the AAP website states: 
 
We are very much solution focused rather than ideology driven. There is 
an age-old tendency to pin down political parties as left, right, center etc. 
In the process everyone forgets the issues at hands and their solutions. 
Our goal is to remain solution focused. If the solution to a problem lies 
on the left we are happy to consider it. Likewise if it is on right (or in the 
center) we are equally happy to consider it. Ideology is one for the 
pundits and the media to pontificate about.14 
 
With AAP not displaying a coherent set of policies but acting and reacting ad hoc 
(such as with the attempted midnight raid and the follow-up protest), many were 
concerned that in the long-run this form of governance would have disastrous 
consequences. In articles and other public discussion, AAP’s overzealous outreach 
programme was criticized as an attempt to cash in on the simmering anger against 
the system, without offering direction. In this account, AAP’s appeal had been based 
on people’s disillusionment with the brand of politics which the Congress and BJP 
offered, yet it remained unclear how the party would channel the anger of its 
electorate into productive outcomes.  
 
What these split reactions to AAP’s political discourse indicate, is that regardless of 
the position taken, AAP had struck a chord amongst many sectors of society. The 
emergence of AAP was treated as a phenomenon by those who supported and 
endorsed their politics, just as much as by those who were wary of AAP’s 
implications for governance and India’s democracy. AAP had unequivocally brought 
a wind of change to the way in which elections, politics, governance and democracy 
was being discussed. 
 
 
                                                 




Metanarratives and Ethnography 
 
This brief overview of the ‘AAP phenomenon’ brings to light some of the ways in 
which politics manifests itself in contemporary India and the ways in which the 
nature of politics is discussed in public discourse. More specifically, it draws 
attention to the ways in which democracy is thought about, disputed and animated in 
India. Both the supporters and the critics of AAP shared the view that corruption was 
one of the most severe blemishes in the country’s democratic makeup, and that 
through improved modes of governance, democracy could be resuscitated. However, 
there were conflicting perceptions of the political modes and processes required to 
salvage India’s democracy. For some, the only meaningful approach to transform a 
political system so deeply steeped in corruption was a thorough systemic overhaul. 
According to such a view, democratic practice in India was so flawed that the 
entrenched institutions and parties needed to be rigorously challenged and 
democratic ideas fundamentally rethought and reformulated. Others, while agreeing 
that governance systems had to be improved, endorsed the view that this had to be 
done within the given democratic paradigms. Politics and governance had to abide by 
democratic processes and procedures, or else risk being unconstitutional and posing a 
threat to the country’s democratic makeup.  
 
What consolidates the opposing positions is an enduring and broadly spread 
commitment to the idea of India as a strong democracy. Despite all the evident 
contradictions – a political system permeated in corruption, governance structures 
impeded by inefficiency, a political class largely indifferent to the plights of the 
marginalised, a society fractured by inequalities and injustices, etc. – a faith in the 
idea of democracy continues to be ubiquitous in political discourse. The polemic 
around AAP reflects this faith, as much as it signals a basic tension on what the 
meaning and practice of democracy is. Underlying the conflicting views is a 
difference about the expectations made of democracy. For AAP and its supporters, 
democracy can be restored to its original idea only through a paradigmatic shift from 
representative to direct democracy. By handing over sovereignty and participatory 
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powers to the people, the essence of democracy can be truly animated. By contrast, 
for those critical of AAP’s approach, the essence of democracy lies in democratic 
processes and procedures, whereby compliance to the constitution and to the rule of 
law is taken as the paramount component.  What is seemingly at stake with these 
diverging understandings of democracy is the degree of conformity to processes and 
procedures. While for one camp the established procedural rules are the very obstacle 
to the unfolding of true democracy, for the other, democratic processes and 
procedures are the yardstick by which to diagnose the meaning and practice of 
democracy.   
 
Widely-held faith in the idea of democracy on the one hand, and on the other, the 
more or less polemical deliberations on what comprises democratic processes and 
procedures, constitute the ongoing metanarrative through which Indian politics is 
largely framed. It is these discussions on democracy in India that are at the heart of 
this thesis. The ethnographic material that this thesis deals with reflects this 
metanarrative by examining empirically ideas that people have of democracy and 
their aspirations in strengthening democratic practice. Specifically, this thesis 
considers anti-corruption activism in North India. It explores the endeavours of a set 
of civil society actors committed to improving governance structures by means of 
campaigning for transparency and accountability in laws and policies.15 By 
attempting to eradicate corruption from politics and make the state apparatus 
responsive to the needs of the citizens, the fundamental aspiration of these actors is 
to deepen the meaning and practice of democracy in India. While the several 
fractions of anti-corruption actors that this thesis explores are united by their shared 
commitment for a common end, divisions on the means of getting there run through 
their political ideology. They agree that corruption poses a severe impediment to 
governance and thus to the unfolding of India’s democracy, yet they disagree on 
what democracy means and how to advance the democratic process. They show that 
democracy is a contested terrain that is constituted by disagreement and conflict. 
 
                                                 
15 In a later section of this Introduction, I deal with some of the issues and problematics of the term 
‘civil society’ and explain how I use this contested category throughout this thesis.  
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In this context, the thesis explores the playing out of friction in the field of anti-
corruption civil society activism. It examines the various spaces in which tension 
arises amongst and within these actors as to what constitutes the correct processes 
and procedures in consolidating democracy. The main themes of this thesis are thus 
the aspiration of a particular idea of democratic governance and the tensions that 
arise out of the endeavours and expectations in bringing this aspiration into being. 
 
In exploring the diverging understandings of democracy among civil society actors, 
this thesis draws on the theoretical concept of ‘agonistic pluralism’. Agonistic 
pluralism, as proposed most notably by the political theorist Chantal Mouffe (1999, 
2000, 2005), postulates that political conflict is integral to democratic debate, and 
moreover, that it is a crucial ingredient for democracy to be deepened. In such 
conceptualisation, political disagreement and contention is constructive in that it 
produces space for rich and critical thinking. While Mouffe uses the concept of 
agonistic pluralism as a normative category – imploring that democratic debate ought 
to embrace conflict – I borrow the concept as an empirical category. In other words, 
‘agonistic pluralism’ here serves as an analytic tool with which to understand the 
dynamics at work in anti-corruption activism in India.  With this in mind, the 
conflicting understandings of democracy among the anti-corruption activists can be 
thought of as expanding the experience of democratisation in India. The tension 
between them over which processes and procedures constitute democracy does not 
lead to a fissure, but, on the contrary, is a crucial substance for rich democratic 
debate to emerge and for democratic practice to be deepened. The essence of 
democracy in India, as this thesis will show, is constituted by such a productive 
tension.  
 
At the core of the ethnography of this thesis is the work of a particular civil society 
organisation that has been at the centre of public debates on anti-corruption for over 
two decades. The Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS, translatable as the 
‘Organisation of Empowerment of Labourers and Farmers’) is known throughout 
India for being the leading civil society organisation in the fight against corruption 
and in the struggle to institutionalise transparency and accountability measures in 
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governance structures. Moreover, MKSS is celebrated for being the driving force 
behind the enactment of the Right to Information Act (2005), which empowers 
citizens to demand transparency from the government. With its aspiration of 
enforcing transparency and accountability measures in governance, MKSS is 
committed to making the state responsive to the needs of ordinary citizens and, by 
‘purifying’ the bureaucracy and the practice of statecraft, to deepen the experience of 
democracy for the common citizen in India. MKSS’s political conviction is in 
democratic processes and procedures and a reliance on the rule of law; it resorts to 
legal measures and institutionalised processes, with the expectation that this will 
purify the state from within and thus lead to the consolidation of democratic 
governance. In this, MKSS forms an integral part of the wider discourses on how 
democracy and the state are understood in India. The metanarrative on the nature of 
politics comes to be reflected in the aspirations and endeavours of MKSS. More 
specifically, MKSS is shaped by the prevailing ideas of democracy in political 




Tension among Interrelated anti-corruption actors 
 
This introduction began with an account of the Aam Aadmi Party not haphazardly, 
but because of AAP’s inextricable interconnection with MKSS. As will be explored 
in the following chapters, MKSS and AAP are linked both in terms of their 
commitment to making governance transparent and accountable through anti-
corruption legislation, and also in terms of overlapping actors and a shared history. 
The interlocked relationship between the two groups found heightened expression in 
a nationwide anti-corruption movement that swept through India during most of 
2011. As was alluded to earlier, AAP as a political party emerged out of a broader 
social movement that had demanded the institutionalisation of a Lokpal, or an anti-
corruption ombudsman. The agitation around the Lokpal is the central event framing 
this thesis, from where both the aspirations and tensions of anti-corruption activism 
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surfaced ostensibly. This Lokpal agitation will be delineated in closer detail in 
Chapter Three; however, in order to set the context and the political landscape within 
which this thesis is embedded, and in order to understand the interrelated relationship 
between the various actors involved, a brief overview of the movement is apt at this 
point.  
 
What is now referred to as India’s anti-corruption movement, gained momentum on 
5 April 2011, when Anna Hazare – a veteran anti-corruption activist from 
Maharashtra – began a fast-unto-death in New Delhi, demanding the enactment of a 
Jan Lokpal bill. Anna Hazare’s fast immediately attracted mass support, for the 
demand to fight corruption appealed to many people who had reached a pinnacle 
with their frustration against political corruption. The prominence that the Anna 
Hazare-led anti-corruption movement took in public discourse, even in international 
news, finds evidence in its identification by the Time magazine as one of the “Top 10 
World News Stories of 2011”.16 
 
Arvind Kejriwal, now leader of the Aam Aadmi Party, had been a key actor in the 
Anna Hazare movement. It is widely held that, although Anna Hazare was the public 
face of the demand for a Jan Lokpal bill, Kejriwal was the actual mastermind behind 
the orchestration of the movement. When the government failed to meet the 
movement’s demands, Kejriwal and Hazare parted ways, with the former starting a 
political party and the latter shunning any association with party politics. This rift 
between the two on whether it was more effective to press for political change by 
working from within the system or by exerting pressure from outside, would play out 
and be captured by media on repeated occasions in the months to follow.  
 
Members of MKSS were also involved in the anti-corruption movement of 2011. 
With their history of campaigning for transparency and accountability legislation in 
the past, they had their stakes in getting involved in the demand for the 
institutionalisation of an anti-corruption ombudsman. However, unlike most of the 
                                                 




public euphoria galvanized around Anna Hazare, members of MKSS were critical of 
the Jan Lokpal bill. They saw in it an undemocratic propensity that concentrated too 
much power in one single institution and that would cave in under its own ambitions. 
They disagreed with Anna Hazare’s demagogic approach of opposing politics and 
politicians unequivocally, and instead, championed an approach of applying due 
processes in their attempt to purify politics from within. In response, members of 
MKSS drafted their own version of a Lokpal bill, which they campaigned for before 
the government, presenting thus an alternative ‘civil society voice’ in the demand for 
an anti-corruption ombudsman. The political landscape that had already been 
permeated with tension between Anna Hazare’s movement and the government, was 
strained all the more with the emergence of another civil society demand.  
 
The tension between the civil society actors involved in the Lokpal agitation was 
primarily one over democratic process and procedure. The varying actors endorsed 
particular ideas of procedures of governance, clashing with one another over the best 
means to institutionalise transparency and accountability laws. There is a striking 
resemblance between the tensions that arose between MKSS and Anna Hazare, and 
the polemic discussion around the Aaam Aadmi Party. In both instances, the 
cornerstone of debate was on the appropriate democratic process and procedure 
required to fight corruption. The continuity of this tension suggests the centrality that 
the idea of democracy has for civil society actors who are committed to making 
governance in India more transparent and accountable. 
 
 
The politics of relationality 
 
In focusing on the articulated differences between the civil society actors contending 
in the Lokpal movement, this thesis suggests that identity is constructed in opposition 
to an ‘other’. This notion is informed by the concept of relationality, which 
highlights that a sense of identity alters according to the context and in relation to 
others. A sense of identity is constituted by being counterposed to others, resulting in 
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fluid, changing and dynamic identities. In this conceptualisation, identities emerge 
out of dialectic relationships and constellations that constantly redefine the substance 
and structures.  
 
The notion of relationality is evoked in an anthropological classic, The Nuer by 
Evans-Pritchard (1969 [1940]). Here Evans-Pritchard illustrates the role of 
relationality in the formation of the sense of self in his study of the segmentary 
lineage structure of the Nuer. Accordingly, a lineage in and of itself does not have 
inherent substance. It is only when it is counterposed to some other equivalent group 
that the contours of the lineage take shape. Thus, a group that is normally segmented 
and disunited, consolidates when confronted by an external power – only to separate 
again when the threat subsides. What is crucial in this oppositional stance is that 
alterity is relational and not absolute: for the Nuer, it is groups “who are in every 
respect most akin to themselves”, such as the Dinka, that trigger more antagonistic 
relations “than any other foreign people” (1969: 131). It is in relation to such 
equivalent groups that the Nuer identity becomes salient. Differences begin to matter 
and become the source of hostility when the people are actually similar and close in 
relation.  
 
As will be explored, although competing over spaces of civil society representation, 
MKSS and the other actors of the Lokpal agitation were united in terms of shared 
aspirations and by virtue of stemming from the same political class. It was precisely 
because of this similarity in background and aspiration, that difference was 
persistently emphasised. The greatest contention occurs when degrees of similarity 
are close and when contrast and comparison takes place amongst evenly matched 
opponents. It is, as Freud (2005 [1930]) pointed out, a case of the “narcissism of 
minor differences”. The narcissism between MKSS and the other anti-corruption 
actors, as the following chapters will explore, revolves around claiming higher 
democratic credentials and political integrity and authenticity. 
 
Applying such a relational approach to the relationship between MKSS and the other 
anti-corruption activists helps to explain many of the dynamics going on between 
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these two civil society groups: it is precisely because they have such similar goals 
and strategies that their relationship is premised on antagonism. Although they share 
the objective of combating corruption through campaigning for transparency and 
accountability legislation, it is the minor differences between them that create the 
major cleavages. In other words, although they are very similar organisations, with 
overlapping objectives and backgrounds, they are at loggerheads with each other 
over particular aspects. Echoing Freud, Bourdieu notes that it is the people most 
similar to the self that represent the greatest threat, and against whom the distinct 
social identity must be asserted (Bourdieu 1984: 479). The importance of similarity 
in creating difference is well encapsulated by Huntington, who, albeit referring to a 
different context, cautions:  
 
… we should not be naïve about the motives of disagreement. We need 
to remember that the harshest intellectual controversies are often not 
between adversaries of distinct persuasion… but between thinkers who if 
viewed from any distance look identical. (Huntington 2001: 6) 
 
Ideas of relationality in the formation of identity have been picked up in the study of 
ethnicity, and shed some degree of insight into the case of MKSS. Such studies hold 
that ethnic groups are not self-defined or pre-determinatively distinct, but come to 
exist in and through interactions with others. It is through processes of ‘othering’ that 
boundaries are put up and within which ethnic identity can be asserted (Cohen 1985). 
Group identities, so conceived, “must always be defined in relation to that which 
they are not” (Eriksen 1993: 10). This draws on Bateson’s notion that “it takes at 
least two somethings to create a difference” (Bateson 1978: 78). Identity taken in 
isolation is to Bateson analogically similar to the “sound of one hand clapping” 
(Bateson 1978: 78).17  
 
                                                 
17 Gladney’s ethnographic study of the Chinese Muslim minority, the Hui, aptly illustrates how ethnic 
identities emerge within the context of social relations. His study shows that no fixed hierarchy of 
segmentation exists, but is consistently altered according to the shifting local contexts and the specific 
power constellations. For instance, Shanghai and Beijing Hui who are normally in competitive 
business relations with one other, unite as a unified ‘Hui’ when a non-Hui poses a threat. Similarly, 
when Hui move out of China, it is their ‘Chinese-ness’ that may be asserted as their common identity 
(Gladney 1996: 456). Ethnic identity is thus always situational, relational, shifting and negotiated. 
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All this suggests that identities and positions are shaped in relation to others, where 
the ‘other’ is crucial for the formation of the ‘self’. However, the other not only 
presents a mirror image of the self, as scholars of ethnicity suggest, but actually 
constitutes and incorporates the self. Theories of ethnicity propose that ethnic 
identity depends on boundaries through which groups come to reflect off one 
another. By contrast, the relationship between MKSS and the group around Anna 
Hazare, suggests that in differentiating themselves from each other, they actually 
embody each other. Relationality, so conceived, is a dialectic and interdependent 
process.  
 
This analytical schema of relationality runs through the exploration of this thesis on 
the relationship and dynamics between MKSS and the other anti-corruption activists.  
It serves as a framework from which to understand their differences and from which 
to examine their contending understandings of democratic process. By keeping in 
mind the notion of relationality, we can comprehend the impetus of the civil society 
actors involved in the Lokpal movement. While they diverge on their understandings 
of the democratic processes and procedures needed to fight corruption, they are in 
overall agreement that structures of governance have to be ‘cleaned-up’ and made 
more transparent and accountable. This suggests that these actors share much more 
than first appears, and that it is precisely their shared aspirations and background that 
give rise to tension. In turn, drawing on Mouffe’s notion of agonistic pluralism, this 
tension can be thought of as the fuel that sustains their aspirations and actions. 
 
 





Suggesting that the aspiration to strengthen democratic practice and to improve 
statecraft lies at the heart of anti-corruption activism, should come as no surprise to 
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the scholar of India. Vast amounts of literature exist on democracy and the state, 
signalling the currency that these ideas have in contemporary political life. India is 
acclaimed to be the largest democracy in the world. In terms of sheer size alone this 
postulate holds true de facto, with universal suffrage institutionalised in a country 
with a population soaring at 1.2 billion. The presence of democracy in India can also 
be noted in its secular state institutions, its competitive multiparty system, the regular 
and typically fair elections, the overall observance of freedoms of expression and the 
press and an increase in politicisation by historically marginalised groups. Beyond 
these material manifestations, however, what makes the experiment with democracy 
particularly compelling in the case of India, is the putative entrenchment and 
internalisation of democratic ideas amongst ordinary people. As several scholars 
have noted, standing out amongst most other postcolonial countries, the idea of 
democracy in India has entered the political understandings of ordinary people and 
has deeply embedded itself in their consciousness (see Banerjee 2009; Hansen 1999; 
Jenkins 2007; Khilnani 2004; Kaviraj 2010; Michelutti 2008; Witsoe 2011). Political 
scientist Khilnani, for instance, notes:  
 
The democratic idea has penetrated the Indian political imagination and 
has begun to erode the authority of the social order and of a paternalist 
state. Democracy as a manner of seeing and acting upon the world is 
changing the relations of Indians to themselves. (Khilnani 2004: 17) 
 
This suggests that democracy does not exist as an abstract, or even extraneous, 
ideology, but is very much part of the political make-up of everyday life. In the 
context of India, democratic procedures and discourses are said to have gained so 
much depth, that they “profoundly modify and transform a society’s imagination of 
itself” (Hansen 1999: 9). In other words, democracy is not merely a form of 
governance implemented ‘from above’, but lies deeply entrenched in the “political 
imaginary of ordinary Indian people” (Kaviraj 2010: 68). The importance given to 
democracy by the civil society actors that this thesis deals with makes sense in the 
light of such conceptions of the social embeddedness of the idea of democracy. 
MKSS and the other actors involved in the Lokpal agitation were driven by an 
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aspiration to deepen democratic practice because the idea of democracy, as the 
above-cited scholars would have it, has ‘penetrated’ their ‘political imaginations’.  
 
What this line of reasoning implies is that democracy is not a structural or 
institutionalised system standing above society, but that it takes roots and becomes 
tangible in social processes. Democracy is articulated through specific historical 
trajectories and social grammars and in so doing, gets ‘provincialized’. One area in 
which the internalisation and ‘indigenisation’ of the idea of democracy most 
markedly manifests itself is in the rise of low-caste groups in electoral politics. Since 
the 1990s India has observed an upsurge in the political participation and 
assertiveness of previously marginalised caste groups and the astounding rise of 
lower-caste politicians. Kaviraj describes this novel form of subaltern politics as 
going against “all historical scripts”, and as being “impossible to classify as either 
traditional or modern” expressions of democracy (Kaviraj 2000: 156). The increased 
participation in party politics of the lower-castes is regarded as so consequential, that 
it has been referred to as ‘India’s silent revolution’ (Jaffrelot 2003), or as the ‘second 
democratic upsurge’ (Yadav 2000). This phenomenon has been explained by 
anthropologists as being part of a process by which democratic practices are 
internalised and imbued with cultural idioms by lower-caste members.  
 
Michelutti (2008), for example, shows that the popularity of democracy in India can 
be explained through the ‘vernacularisation’ of its values and practices by socio-
cultural groups. She focuses on a low-caste group in north India, the Yadavs, and 
how they have adapted democracy to meet their particular settings and needs. 
Through local norms and idioms, the Yadavs appropriate the values of democracy 
and thereby embed it in their cultural and social practices. By referring, for instance, 
to Lord Krishna – the Yadav caste patron deity – as the ‘originator of democracy’, or 
to Yadavs as being intrinsically a ‘caste of politicians’, the democratic values are 
internalised. Through such processes of vernacularisation, democracy becomes 
entrenched in their consciousness. Simultaneously, the vernacularisation produces 
new social relations and values, which in turn shape their ideas of the political. Thus, 
as Michelutti notes, democracy is both “the product and the producer of different 
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social political relations” (Michelutti 2008: 3). It is through such processes that 
democracy has acquired social roots in India.18  
 
Another approach to studying democracy ethnographically in India is put forward by 
Banerjee who studied electoral politics in a village in West Bengal. Banerjee focuses 
on the symbolic dimension of elections, noting that elections can be understood as 
“sacred expressions of citizenship” (Banerjee 2007: 1561). Elections, so conceived, 
not only serve the technical purpose of voting for politicians and engaging in party 
political processes; rather, for the villagers studied by Banerjee, elections also have a 
celebratory aspect in that they serve as festive social events and act as events in 
which the sense of democracy as sacred is fostered. Through the practice of voting 
and the festivities around it, elections serve to foster particular relationships and 
bonds. As Banerjee concludes: “From this [symbolic] perspective, democracy is 
really an untrue but vitally important myth in support of social cohesion, with 
elections as its central and regular ritual enactment that helps maintain and restore 
equilibrium” (Banerjee 2007: 1556). 
 
The ethnographic findings of Michelutti and Banerjee reinforce the above 
proposition that democracy in India has been internalised into the political 
imaginaries of ordinary people. The examples of the unique expressions that 
democratic practice takes among low-caste Yadavs and Bengali villagers, shows the 
extent to which democracy has embedded itself in people’s consciousness. 
Democracy does not exist as a singular coherent idea, but is articulated through 
particular social imaginaries and historical junctures.  
 
That democratic values are vernacularised finds confirmation in the fact that in 
contemporary Indian politics, it is the underprivileged groups who have become the 
staunchest supporters of the democratic system, and voter-turnout is highest in rural 
areas. It is the political participation and democratisation of low-caste and rural 
                                                 
18 Similar studies leading to similar conclusions have been made by Tanabe. Tanabe employs the term 
‘vernacular democracy’ to refer to processes whereby democracy is realised in local areas through the 
bottom-up employment of “both indigenous and exogenous resources” by subalterns themselves 
(Tanabe 2007: 558). See also Witsoe (2011) on an ethnographic study of Yadav’s interpretation and 
experimentation with democracy.  
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groups that is taken as an indication of the deepening of the democratic experience, 
as comes to be reflected in the ethnographic studies discussed above. This thesis 
expands on the anthropological body of literature on democracy in India, by focusing 
on the ways in which democracy is experienced and discussed by more ‘elite’ 
movements. What makes this research unique, is that it shifts attention away from the 
so-called subalterns, by examining how more ‘privileged’ individuals and groups 





The currency of democracy in political life in India is inextricably tied to the 
pervasiveness of the idea of the state and to procedural issues of statecraft. The 
modern state in India, with its gargantuan bureaucracy, its multi-tiered institutions 
and its innumerable laws, policies and programmes, is colossal both in terms of size 
and outreach.19 Although existing as a modern institution only since Independence 
from British colonial rule in 1947, the state has established itself as such a presence, 
that it comes to be experienced in some form or the other in most corners of the 
subcontinent. The Indian state is widely described as being all pervasive, making 
itself felt through its far-reaching bureaucracy even in the remotest areas of the 
country. Khilnani (2004) captures this pervasiveness of the state when he contends 
that the history of independent India is the history of a state, with democracy being 
its central political idea. Accordingly, the presence and significance of the state are 
the salient characteristics marking postcolonial India.  
 
The scope that the state has in contemporary India can be traced back to the 
nationalist movement leaders, who defined the political shape that India would take 
once independence from British rule was gained. According to Khilnani, Jawaharlal 
Nehru, India’s first prime minister, played the most significant role in establishing 
                                                 
19 The ‘modern state’ is here understood as defined by Kaviraj and Khilnani as “the expression of [an] 
entirely novel structure of historical experience, dealing with [a] concentrated power, [an] ability to 
affect people’s lives on an unprecedentedly large scale” (Kaviraj and Khilnani 2001: 5). 
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India as a modern nation state. Nehru was one of the most articulate and influential 
founding fathers of the new nation, and it was his vision of India as a diverse and 
composite society that would become the foundation of the idea and identity of the 
Indian nation state. Through planned development and industrialisation, Nehru 
attempted to build a robust and effective state. His efforts were so tenacious that he 
succeeded in establishing “the state at the core of Indian society”, so much so that it 
“etched itself into the imaginations of Indians in a way that no previous political 
agency had ever done” (Khilnani 2004: 42).20  
 
According to Khilnani’s historical analysis, as that of many other scholars of politics 
in India, both the state and the idea of democracy form the central imperatives of 
contemporary India. It is these imperatives that come into sight in the ethnographic 
material that this thesis examines. The aspiration of MKSS as well as that of the 
other civil society actors involved in the Lokpal agitation, was to enforce 
transparency and accountability measures onto structures of governance so as to 
make the state work, and, consequently, to revive democracy. The commitment to 
the notions of transparency and accountability by the civil society actors of this thesis 
is a reflection of the faith that they place in the state apparatus. Their aspiration to 
make governance serve the interests of the people is tied to an expectation that the 
state can and must work responsibly. 
 
This thesis contributes to the scholarly work on the state and democracy in India by 
exploring how these ideas come to be internalised and addressed by civil society 
actors. The rich literature that exists on post-colonial politics in India helps to 
contextualise the aspirations of the anti-corruption activists to deepen democracy and 
                                                 
20 While the legacy of Nehru is at the heart of Khilnani’s exploration of the Indian state, he also 
ascribes other stages in history to the (trans)formation of the idea of the state. For instance, the 
liberalisation of India’s market in the 1990s was another historical marker with momentous 
implications for the experience of the state. This shift from socialism to neo-liberalism would play out 
in ideological and material transformations in the ideas of the state. This is echoed by Gupta and 
Sivaramakrishnan who observe that the last 10 years since liberalisation have had more impact on the 
Indian state than the first 50 years since Independence (Gupta and Sivaramakrishnan 2011: 2). The 
neo-liberal economic reforms of liberalisation were accompanied by a new logic of decentralisation, 
whereby powers would be devolved to regional states as well as to the village level, such as through 
the constitutional amendments made to Panchayati Raj Act in 1993. This context of liberalisation and 
decentralisation, according to Gupta and Sivaramakrishnan, radically transformed the state and had 
substantial implications for the functioning of democracy.  
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strengthen the state. It suggests that the commitment of these actors to bring about 
transparency and accountability in governance forms part of a larger story in India. 
This story is about the social embedding of the ideas of democracy and the state, as 
they have been internalised by people. The aspirations and commitments of the anti-
corruption activists that this thesis deals with reflect this internalisation. 
 
 
Corruption: diagnosing India’s democracy and the state  
 
The trope through which MKSS and the other anti-corruption actors express their 
commitment to democracy and the state is ‘corruption’. Their immediate aspiration is 
to fight corruption, which, according to them, is the root of the impaired functioning 
of the state and the blemish in India’s democracy. All the civil society actors 
involved in the Lokpal agitation were united in their conviction that for democracy to 
be restored, corruption had to be removed from the structures of governance. They 
shared a faith that transparency and accountability laws would help erode corruption 
from the political system. To these civil society actors, corruption exemplified the 
antithesis of all that they expected democracy and the state to be.  
 
MKSS’s fixation on corruption thus serves as a lens through which to understand the 
meanings that they ascribe to democracy and the state. By examining their attempt to 
fight corruption, we have an entry point from which to diagnose their relationship to, 
and their faith in democratic practice. In other words, the standpoint and convictions 
they have on corruption give insight into their broader political understandings. 
While ideas of democracy and the state are rather abstract and elusive notions, 
commitments to fighting corruption are tangible and concrete. MKSS’s ideas of 
corruption can be studied empirically, for these are expressed in material form 
through their campaigns, demands, drafted laws and rhetoric. In such manner, the 
discourses of corruption of civil society actors offer a useful point of departure from 




At this point I wish to clarify that this thesis will not engage in a study of the 
meaning and practice of corruption. My interest lies in the commitments and 
aspirations of anti-corruption activists, and less on the implications of corruption 
itself.  Corruption, as an object of anthropological study, has fallen under much 
scrutiny, with many arguing against the ethnocentric connotations of the term. 
Harrison, for instance, notes that the anti-corruption discourse is closely tied to the 
recent trends in development paradigms that go hand in hand with policies of market 
liberalisation, decentralisation and privatisation (Harrison 2006: 17). Furthermore, 
the notion of corruption is argued to be premised on historically and culturally 
specific western notions of public service, which fail to describe the meaning and 
implication that corruption has in other parts of the world (see West and Sanders 
2003). Such cultural-relativist approaches warn about the applicability of the term 
‘corruption’ in non-Western contexts. However, in this thesis I do not problematize 
the notion of corruption for two reasons: firstly, the intention here is not to engage 
with definitions and understandings of corruption, but with the forms of politics of 
the anti-corruption activists and their commitments to transparent and accountable 
governance. The other reason for not engaging with the idea of corruption in depth, 
is that it did not appear as a problematized term for my informants or for the wider 
public discourse that informed my research findings. Corruption was defined by 
them largely as being an abuse of public office for private gain and thereby it fitted 
into their overall aspirations of strengthened governance, democracy and statecraft. 
 
Reflecting the prevasiveness of corruption in India, several scholars have examined 
the phenomenon of corruption and its implications for the democratic experience in 
India (see Gupta 1995, 2012; Jenkins 2007; Parry 2000; Ruud 2001; Shah 2009). 
Jenkins (2007), for example, examines the correlation between corruption and the 
faith in democracy. He notes that corruption – or, its flipside, accountability – is used 
as a yardstick with which to assess India’s democracy. While, according to Jenkins, 
India can be applauded for standing out amongst all other post-colonial countries for 
the durability of its liberal constitutional system, its democracy is impaired by the 
lasting pervasiveness of corruption. Jenkins identifies two components that are 
crucial for democracy to be deepened: inclusiveness and accountability. While India 
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has seen significant advancements in the former component, with its politics 
becoming more inclusive – as evidenced by the increased politicisation by 
historically disadvantaged communities, as discussed earlier – it has largely failed in 
the second component of making its state more accountable. Within this context, “the 
bribe-taking politician has become the preeminent symbol of India’s democratic 
malaise” (Jenkins 2007: 56).  
 
Despite this ‘democratic malaise’, Jenkins points out that the endurance of corruption 
does not undermine people’s faith in democracy. While some political scientists hold 
that in ‘less established democracies’ (i.e. those outside of North America and 
Europe) political corruption erodes public faith in democracy, Jenkins by contrast 
argues that corruption in India is not generally considered to be a threat to its 
democratic regime (Jenkins 2007: 57). Corruption is perceived widely as 
undermining the quality of governance produced by democratic politics, but not as 
undermining popular commitment to democracy per se (Jenkins 2007: 58). This 
argument holds true in the case of MKSS. Their drive to demand transparency and 
accountability laws is an effort to improve the quality of democratic governance, 
while their overall aim is to deepen democracy. The existence of corruption for them 
is not reason to give up on the ideas of democracy and their faith in the state; rather, 
corruption represents a defect that needs to be removed for democratic governance to 
unfold.  
 
A similar argument is made by Parry who takes discourses on corruption as a lens 
through which to examine how the state comes to be understood in everyday life. 
Through his ethnography on factory workers in the Bhilai steel plant in north India, 
Parry makes the compelling case that the prevalence that corruption has in Indian 
political discourse, is a reflection of the fact that people have “internalised the 
universalistic and impersonal values associated with modern bureaucracy” (Parry 
2000: 29). In other words, corruption is perceived as so widespread because people 
are committed to a particular idea of the modern democratic state that is expected to 




In contrast to cultural relativist readings that view corruption as part of the Indian 
folkloric make-up and as thus socially legitimated, Parry shows that employees of the 
Bhilai steel plant perceived corruption as a serious pathology and as a “galloping 
cancer” (Parry 2000: 29). People severely chided corruption and spoke of it as 
omnipresent and all-pervasive, often even exaggerating the existence and practice of 
corruption. This concern with corruption, Parry argues, reveals the high expectations 
people have of the state, indicating that norms of transparency and accountability 
have been widely accepted and internalised. The type of state the employees of the 
Bhilai steel plant evidently endorsed, was one based on a modern, rational 
bureaucracy. People condemned corruption on the grounds that it was the misuse of 
public office for private gain; they thereby demonstrated their understanding of the 
state in the Weberian sense as a rational bureaucracy premised precisely on the 
separation of the public from the private. These observations lead Parry to conclude 
that “corruption has seemed to get worse and worse not (only) because it has, but 
also because it subverts a set of values to which people are increasingly committed” 
(Parry 2000: 53). In this regard, discourses of corruption do not lead to discrediting 
democracy or destabilising the state, but on the contrary, they show the strength that 
the idea of the modern democratic state has.  
 
It is this very commitment to democracy that comes to be reflected in the anti-
corruption activism of MKSS. MKSS condemns corruption because it perceives it as 
an obstruction to democratic governance. Parry’s argument helps us understand the 
type of state MKSS calls for in its engagement to fight corruption. The idea of the 
state that MKSS aspires to is evidently one based on liberal values and norms of a 
modern rational-legal state. In condemning corruption, MKSS defines it as the 
misuse of public authority for public gain, reflecting the normative enterprise upon 
which the model of the Weberian bureaucrat is built: the bureaucrat as “the role-
fulfilling, disinterested professional occupying a particular location in an 
organisational structure based solely on professional competence and merit” (Gupta 
2012: 81). This understanding of the type of state that MKSS expects, helps to 
contextualise their aspirations and activities, as well as the tensions they have with 




Gupta makes a very similar argument to Parry’s, showing that the discourse of 
corruption “functions as a diagnostic of the state” (Gupta 2012: 100). Conducting 
fieldwork in rural Uttar Pradesh, Gupta notes the prevalence of discussions on 
corruption among villagers as well as in vernacular and English-language 
newspapers. Through their experiences and discourses of corruption, rural people 
gain knowledge about the state and insights into the functioning of democracy. What 
this is evidence of, according to Gupta, is that discourses of corruption are the key 
arena through which the state comes to be imagined and that they reflect “the degree 
to which the state has become implicated in the minute texture of everyday life” 
(Gupta 2012: 75). In this way, corruption is a mechanism through which the state 
comes to be discursively constituted and thus serves as “an essential lens for 
understanding the meaning of the state in the Indian context” (Gupta 2012: 78).  
 
Echoing Parry, Gupta argues that the fixation on corruption emerges out of particular 
conceptualisations of the state. An examination of discourses of corruption thus gives 
insight into the expectations people make of the state. These expectations, according 
to Gupta’s findings, revolve around values of right behaviour, standards of 
accountability and norms of conduct (Gupta 2012: 97). In this context, discourses of 
corruption can be understood as being the other side of discourses of accountability, 
which, in turn, can be traced to particular transitions in India’s postcolonial history. 
In contrast to their colonial predecessors who ruled through political control and 
subjugation, nationalist leaders of the recently independent subcontinent, sought 
popular legitimacy by placing new responsibilities on state employees and vesting 
new rights in citizens (Gupta 2012: 98). These modernist values of citizenship and 
rights were accompanied by the notion of accountability, whereby, unprecedented 
under colonial rule, state officials were conceived as being accountable to the people. 
The idea of accountability or its inverse, corruption, is thus the direct product of the 
modernist project of the postcolonial nation-state. Borrowing Parry’s argument, 
Gupta concludes that the sense of pervasive corruption in India is an effect of the 
postcolonial discourses of accountability. The independent nation-state of India is 
built on a system of electoral democracy that asserts that citizens have rights and that 
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the state is deemed accountable to the people. Corruption marks an infringement of 
these rights, which is why the discourse of corruption “acts to represent the rights of 
citizens to themselves” (Gupta 2012: 99). It is these very values of rights, citizenship 
and accountability that inform MKSS’s commitment to fight corruption.  
 
 
Ethnographies of the state 
 
To recapitulate the above, both Parry and Gupta argue that the state is constituted and 
imagined through discourses of corruption. Accordingly, an examination of the 
spaces and forms in which corruption is discussed gives insight into the ways in 
which people understand the state. Parry and Gupta thus propose that through the 
discourse of corruption the state can be studied ethnographically. An ethnographic 
study of the state focuses on the spaces in which the state comes to be experienced 
by people and the ways in which it is discursively constructed in public culture. What 
such ethnographies of the state propose to do, is to show the multiple and 
disaggregated meanings that are ascribed to the state, highlighting that the state does 
not exist as a unitary or coherent whole. Corruption, according to both 
anthropologists discussed above, offers an apt lens from which to approach such a 
study.  
 
With this in mind, this thesis on anti-corruption activism in north India can be 
classified as an ethnography of the state. It explores the ways in which the state 
comes to be imagined by the civil society actors in their fight against corruption and 
in their campaigns to institutionalise transparency and accountability laws. As 
already noted, through the discourses of corruption as held by MKSS, we apprehend 
the expectations they make of the state, highlighting the type of state they aspire to 
and the faith they have in the democratic process. The focus of this thesis on the 
work and ideas about corruption of these actors, thus serves as an ethnographic study 




Having such a looming presence in India, the state has been taken as an ethnographic 
object of study by several anthropologists (see Corbridge et al. 2005; Fuller and 
Harriss 2001; Gupta 1995; Ruud 2001; Tarlo 2003). As Fuller and Harriss (2001) 
note, the interest in the state by anthropologists has only emerged in recent years, 
with anthropologists previously shying away from studying ‘modern institutions’ 
(see also Vincent 1990). Here they echo Spencer’s observation that politics 
throughout most of the latter half of the twentieth century was considered by 
anthropologists as “determinedly unexotic, anti-cultural and dull” and thus as an 
unworthy area of study (Spencer 1997: 5). Politics, according to Spencer, was 
viewed as a dreary modern rational and transparent institution that was deemed 
diametrically opposed to the more challenging anthropological area of study of the 
‘cultural’ and ‘symbolical’ (Spencer 1997: 3). Since the turn of the millennium, the 
state, along with ideas of democracy and governance, has recaptured the 
ethnographic attention of South Asianists (Fardon et al. 2012: 374). ‘The state’ has 
emerged as an object of study, with several anthropologists interested in the everyday 
expressions that the state takes and the ways in which it comes to be experienced by 
ordinary people. What most of these studies show is that the modern Indian state 
does not exist as a discrete, unitary entity with a unified intentionality, but appears in 
multiple forms and as plural ideas with different faces (Gupta 2012, 1995; Fuller and 
Harriss 2001).  
 
Most of the ethnographic studies that exist on the state in India focus on local level 
state institutions and lower-level bureaucrats (Gupta 1995, 2012; Mathur 2012; Ruud 
2001). It is in these institutionalised spaces that it is believed that the operations of 
the state and its relationship to people are best revealed. Gupta, for instance, ‘sights’ 
the state in the lower levels of the bureaucracy in a north Indian town, which acts as 
a site wherein rural people come into direct contact with ‘the state’. People encounter 
the state when they engage with decentralised and disaggregated bureaucracies, 
where the quotidian practices of local level bureaucrats show the effects of the state 
in the everyday. The local officials act as the contact between rural populations and 
the state and their offices are where “images of the state are forged” (Gupta 1995: 
376). What the quotidian encounters with the state amount to, according to Gupta, is 
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the blurring of the boundaries between state and society, acclaimed so vigorously 
under western understandings of the rational bureaucratic order. 
 
Another approach to studying the state ethnographically in India is put forward by 
Mathur who studies the everyday life of a development bureaucracy in a district in 
the Indian Himalaya. By following the implementation of a piece of legislation on 
rural employment among lower-level state functionaries, Mathur contributes to an 
ethnographic study of the state. She examines how the discourses and critiques of 
lower-level bureaucrats on the practices and effects of development schemes, 
actually produce the developmental Indian state. In other words, “cynicism might 
dominate the environs of development offices, but it simultaneously shares the stage 
with the desire to develop that envelopes the Himalayan portion of this northern 
Indian state” (Mathur 2012: 206). 
 
 
‘Civil society’ and the state 
 
Drawing on the findings and line of reasoning of the above ethnographic studies on 
the state, I suggest that my research similarly constitutes an ethnography of the state. 
It explores the expectations that anti-corruption activists have of the state and how 
they aspire to improve its governance structures and the practice of democracy. By 
advocating for transparency and accountability laws as a means to eradicate 
corruption from the political system, the anti-corruption activists express particular 
expectations of the function and responsibility of the state. Through their anti-
corruption activism, they thus discursively construct the state and add to the public 
discourse on how the state is understood.  
 
What distinguishes my study from most other ethnographic studies that exist on the 
state in India, is that I explore the state from the perspective of civil society, without 
taking state institutions as the frame of reference. Most of the existing ethnographic 
work on the state in India focuses on lower-level state actors or on local-level state 
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institutions (as we have seen in the work of Gupta and Mathur). My focus on the 
state through the perspective of civil society actors is different in that it deals with a 
category that, in theoretical conceptualisations, is largely deemed to be diametrically 
opposed to the state. The discussion on the relation between state and civil society is 
particularly perplexing in the context of India, where there is a long and inextricable 
trajectory of debate on this relationship. Herewith, my thesis addresses substantial 
questions on the complex literature on the state and civil society. 
 
As Gupta notes, an ethnography of the state in a postcolonial context such as India’s 
must “come to terms with the legacy of Western scholarship on the state”, from 
where the term arguably derives (Gupta 2012: 77). Such scholarship is predicated 
largely upon the separation of the state from civil society. As Kaviraj and Khilnani 
note, this theoretical dichotomisation can be traced to the European tradition linked 
to John Locke, whose analysis of the social contract led to the clear distinction 
between ‘civil society’ and the state (Kaviraj and Khilnani 2001: 3). Out of this 
tradition of 18th century Enlightenment, Weber emerged with his conception of ‘state 
autonomy’, which assigns specific functions to the state, and consequently, places it 
above society. According to Weber’s definition, which has been highly influential in 
modern understandings of the state, the state depends on being recognised as a 
political organisation that has monopoly on the legitimate use of force. In this 
conceptualisation, for the state to be imbued with authority, it needs to clearly stand 
apart and be insulated from society (Skocpol 1985).  
 
While classical theories on the state are premised on the separation of the state from 
civil society, what exactly civil society is, is not self-evident and definitions are 
largely broad and indeterminate. In the contemporary world order, the term ‘civil 
society’ has become so widely embraced and employed, that the term has become a 
“fragmented and politically contested realm” (Fisher 2010: 250). Drawing on 
Wittgenstein’s idea that categorisation places constraints on understandings, Fisher 
contends that there is little analytic utility in terms like civil society “that are used in 
many different ways to mean whatever anyone seems to want them to mean” (Fisher 
2010: 252). The enthusiasm with which the term ‘civil society’ has been employed, 
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has rendered it an ambiguous and contested category, bearing little import in 
understanding the world. 
 
Most analysts treat civil society largely in normative terms, hinging it on abstract 
debates and essentialized categories. Normatively, civil society has been identified as 
a domain for the expansion and realisation of rights and freedom (Cohen and Arato 
1992), and as an alternative delivery system for services (Lewis 2010). 
Instrumentally, it is seen as a domain wherein the exercise and control of power are 
contested (Keane 1988; Chandhoke 1995) and as an area of ‘private’ activity into 
which government can shift responsibilities (Lewis 2010). For some, civil society 
encompasses all non-state aspects of social life and includes virtually all existing 
social institutions that lie outside the strict domain of the state. Here, civil society has 
been defined broadly as “that segment of society that interacts with the state, 
influences the state and yet is distinct from the state” (Chazan 1992 in Fisher 2010: 
253). For others, it applies specifically to established associations such as the 
voluntary sector, traditional social networks, and social movements. Kaviraj and 
Khilnani capture the ambiguity of the term civil society when they ask: “exactly what 
sort of thing is the idea of civil society? Is it a descriptive term for a certain type of 
social structure, mode of social behaviour, or political ideal?” (Kaviraj and Khilnani 
2001: 1).  
 
Although an ambiguous category, the concept of civil society has significantly 
increased in salience in contemporary democratic theory since the 1980s. In 
contemporary understandings, civil society is typically perceived to be an integral 
part of democracy, whereby, in line with Tocqueville’s interpretation, it is seen to 
perform the role of watchdog in a democracy (Tandon and Mohanty 2003: 11).  The 
increase in the employment of the category of ‘civil society’ can be linked to two 
recent theoretical trends. According to one trend, the conspicuousness of civil society 
can be correlated to theories of democratisation in the post-Cold War world order 
(Kaviraj and Khilnani 2001; Joseph 2001; Tandon and Mohanty 2003). Following 
the break-up of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe in the early 1990s, civil 
society as an independent space from the state was considered as a precondition for 
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establishing democratic institutions. In this logic of democratisation, civil society 
was seen as the sphere that would ‘free’ society from the overextended control of the 
communist state system and its stifling bureaucracy (Kaviraj and Khilnani 2001: 2). 
In a “simplistic teleological framework”, civil society was celebrated for bringing 
democracy to countries previously denied democratic freedom (Fisher 2010: 253). In 
this liberal view, civil society was presented as an arena that balanced state and 
market and thus epitomized the virtues of democratisation processes.  
 
Another explanation for the increased salience of the concept of civil society is 
linked to neoliberal theories that became prominent from the 1980s onward. 
According to these theories, civil society represents a sphere outside state control and 
one which gives maximum scope for individual freedom and self-determination. 
Neoliberal ideals are promoted by institutions such as the World Bank through the 
framework of ‘good governance’ that advocates civil society as a means to roll back 
the state. In line with neoliberal ideas that seek to loosen centrally held governmental 
control, civil society is here seen to mediate between state and society and to help 
contain state power (Joseph 2001: 300; Tandon and Mohanty 2003: 10).  Civil 
society gained prominence among international development donors in the 1990s 
who followed the agendas of good governance (Lewis 2010: 169). 
 
Amongst many scholars on politics in India, the analytical category of ‘civil society’ 
and its alleged separation from the state as postulated by liberal democratic theory, 
has been greeted with apprehension. Many have viewed this conceptualisation as a 
specifically Western theory that is alien and inapplicable in the context of India. 
Applying the distinction between state and society in India has been argued to 
amount to an “imperialism of categories” (Nandy 1990 cited in Gupta 2012: 78), 
seen as an attempt to universalise and naturalise an ethnocentric conceptual 
framework. In this context, Gupta cautions vigilance towards the “imperialism of the 
Western conceptual apparatus” and, instead, advises us to look at the “historically 
specific and ideologically constructed understandings of the state” (Gupta 2012: 106-
7). In other words, the notions of society and state that emerged out of a specifically 
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European history should not be taken as a premise to understanding these concepts in 
India.  
 
This unease towards the ‘alien’ categories of state and civil society, forms part of a 
larger theoretical trend in Indian scholarship – as promulgated largely by the 
subaltern studies and postcolonial scholars – that is critical of political ideas and 
institutions introduced by colonialism. Subaltern studies can be broadly characterised 
by its rejection of the universalizing categories of the Enlightenment and its anti-
essentialist approach to the study of ‘history from below’ in the postcolonial world.21 
Kaviraj, for instance, refers to liberal democratic institutions in India as being an 
“inescapable externality” in that they are foreign imports from Western political 
thought (Kaviraj 1997b: 11). Because of this externality, democratic institutions did 
not take root in India and remained restricted to the urban elite who absorbed and 
emulated the ways of the European rulers.22 Through such dynamics, civil society 
was always an exclusive domain, failing to incorporate the subaltern – the vast 
proportion of India’s population. According to Kaviraj, even the postcolonial state 
has not been able to modernise and transform society, with civil society being 
continuously an exclusive domain to the national elite.  
 
This enduring externality of Western ideas and concepts in non-Western countries 
has, according to Kaviraj and Khilnani, resulted in a historical paradox in the 
postcolonial experience. In postcolonial countries such as India, a ‘Western 
language’ (with the vocabulary of state, civil society, bureaucracy etc.) is used to 
express the experiences of politics, yet the actual political processes are incongruent 
with their western counterparts (Kaviraj and Khilnani 2001: 5). In other words, 
“[p]olitical institutions taken from the West are introduced into societies which have 
embedded forms of sociability that are very different from the common 
                                                 
21 The field of subaltern studies is voluminous and expansive, with shifting trends throughout its 
history. I do not here propose to provide a comprehensive overview. Rather, I have selected just a few 
authors that characterise a sense of the ideas of the subaltern studies group. (For a more expansive 
account of the work of subaltern studies see Guha 1997, Ludden 2001, Prakash 1994, Spivak 1988, 
Chakrabarty 2000; for a critique of subaltern studies see Chibber 2013). 
22 As Kaviraj and Khilnani describe, civil society was introduced by the colonial administration in 
order to justify their patterns of intervention, claiming that some matters were out of the jurisdiction of 




individualistic forms of the modern West” (Kaviraj and Khilnani 2001: 5). Spencer 
(1997) proposes that this paradox can be resolved by focusing on the cultural 
implications and the different imaginations which people make of the institutions and 
political vocabulary left behind by the British.  
 
Like Kaviraj, Chatterjee similarly speaks of the alien character of liberal democratic 
institutions in postcolonial countries.  He notes that the historical and cultural 
contexts that gave rise to the ideas of civil society in Europe were starkly different to 
those in India, so that the processes that generated such institutions in the west could 
not be replicated in the postcolonial world. The idea of civil society is premised on 
the values of “equality, autonomy, freedom of entry and exits, contract, deliberative 
procedures of decision-making, recognized rights and duties of members, and other 
such principles”, which stem from a particular western history (Chatterjee 2001: 172; 
see also Chatterjee 1997, 2009). In India, by contrast, when civil society was 
introduced by the colonialists, caste, family and community had precedence over 
state institutions, and the social and political order was not based on contractual 
relations and rights of citizens. Under colonial rule, only a handful of elites were 
recognised as bearers of modernity and thus met the criteria of full citizenship. Even 
after the departure of the British rulers, the nationalist elites are continuously driven 
by the desire to “replicate in its own society the forms as well the substance of 
Western modernity” that includes the “virtues of the Enlightenment and of bourgeois 
freedom” (Chatterjee 2001: 174). However, civil society remains restricted to the 
privileged strata, leaving out most of the population that does not live up to the 
standards required by civil society. Because of the limited scope of civil society in 
India, Chatterjee defines it as “the closed association of modern elite groups, 
sequestered from the wider popular life of communities, walled up within enclaves of 
civic freedom and rational law” (Chatterjee 2009: 4). 
 
Chatterjee proposes to solve the conundrum of the incongruity of the concept of civil 
society in the postcolonial world, by introducing the category of ‘political society’. 
Political society is a “domain of mediating institutions between civil society and the 
state” (Chatterjee 2001: 171) and refers to political transactions and social 
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interactions which take place outside the framework of formal institutions. The 
sphere of political society includes the vast domain that exists outside the designated 
spheres of modern politics that are grounded in the formal discourse of rights and 
individual citizenship. In other words, it comprises the subaltern that are excluded 
from the exclusive category of civil society. According to Chatterjee, most 
inhabitants of India are only tenuously rights-bearing citizens and so do not adhere to 
the formal grammar of rights and citizenship. However, although not recognised as 
part of civil society, political society is not thereby entirely excluded from the 
domain of politics. Rather than existing as citizens, they exist as ‘populations’ that 
come into contact with the state by being targets of policy through the numerous 
governmental agencies. The poor and the marginalised develop political channels 
and party connections to negotiate individual or collective advantages. Through such 
activities a political relationship is forged between these populations and the state, 




These debates on the relevance and meaning of civil society in the Indian context, 
shed some light on my research that deals precisely with the category of civil society. 
Throughout this thesis I employ the term civil society because it was under the 
banner of civil society that much of the anti-corruption activism was presented. 
Particularly during the Lokpal agitation, media drew heavily on the term ‘civil 
society’, emphatically characterising every actor and action that was not strictly the 
position of the government as ‘civil society’. Catchphrases were coined that alluded 
to the demand for a Lokpal bill as an “open war between government and civil 
society”.23 In a similar tone, the differences in opinion between Anna Hazare and 
MKSS were presented as a “divide within civil society” and a “rift in civil society”.24 
By assuming an active role in the representations of the Lokpal agitation, media 
                                                 
23 “Government and civil society in open war on Lokpal bill” in DNA India, 13 June 2011 [accessed 
17 March 2014] http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-govt-and-civil-society-in-open-war-on-lokpal-
bill-1554531  
24 “It’s Anna vs. Aruna as rift in civil society shows” in Business Standard, 21 August 2011 [accessed 




became an “important agent in the making of public life” (Navaro-Yashin 2002: 6). 
By drawing heavily on terms such as ‘civil society’, it shaped the frames through 
which the debates around the Lokpal came to be understood. In this regard, media 
came to construct public discourse. As Mosse and Lewis put it: “All actors (and not 
just sociologists) produce interpretations, and powerful actors offer scripts into which 
others can be recruited for a period” (Mosse and Lewis 2006: 7). In this form, though 
media’s broad employment of the term ‘civil society’ in describing the actors of the 
Lokpal agitation, the term became a ‘folk term’ that gained wide and accepted 
currency.  
 
During fieldwork, I did not come across any instance in which the category of civil 
society was questioned or problematized. In fact, I found the term to be widely 
embraced and referred to extensively by everyone who had a stake in the Lokpal. 
Typically MKSS refers to itself interchangeably as a people’s organisation, a social 
movement or, more broadly, as part of the non-political process, with its members 
being referred to routinely as social activists. However, during the Lokpal agitation, 
with the entire public discourse fixated on the term ‘civil society’, members of 
MKSS themselves drew on this category in reference to themselves. They were 
referred to widely in public culture as ‘civil society’, and increasingly assumed the 
category themselves in their own self-presentations. Within the overall climate, ‘civil 
society’ entered their political vocabulary seemingly unproblematically.  
 
Members of MKSS also referred to themselves as ‘social activists’. While during the 
Lokpal agitation they were drawn into the overall hype around the term ‘civil 
society’, before the Lokpal they had largely resorted to the term ‘activist’ in 
reference to themselves (see for instance their account of the MKSS history on their 
website, where the term ‘activist’ crops up profusely).25 With the ubiquity that the 
term ‘civil society’ gained in the discussions around the Lokpal, ‘activist’ was 
largely replaced by ‘civil society’ in the self-presentations of MKSS. Given that the 
                                                 
25 “The Non-Party Political Process Profile of a People’s Organisation” in Mazdoor Kisan Shakti 





Lokpal agitation is the key event framing the ethnography, this thesis therefore refers 
broadly to the term ‘civil society’, thus reflecting the overall public discourse 
through which the Lokpal agitation was presented. However, since ‘activist’ was also 
a term of self-reference for MKSS, I use both ‘civil society’ and ‘activist’ 
interchangeably throughout this thesis. As will be noted by the reader, the term ‘civil 
society’ emerges more prominently from Chapter Three onward, which are the 
chapters that deal with the events around the Lokpal agitation. By contrast, the first 
two chapters are on events preceding the Lokpal agitation, and so the term ‘civil 
society’ is invoked less frequently. 
 
By reproducing the ways in which members of MKSS themselves employed ‘civil 
society’ and ‘activist’ in their discourse and practice during the Lokpal, I attempt to 
be consistent with the categories as used by my informants. In such manner, I treat 
the terms ‘civil society’ and ‘activist’ as ‘categories of practice’. Categories of 
practice, according to Brubaker, are those categories that people use in their 
everyday practice as a way to self-identify and to order the world around them (in 
Curtis and Spencer 2012: 143). These are in contrast to ‘categories of analysis’ that 
are reflexive categories invoked mainly by social scientists. ‘Civil society’ operates 
both as a category of practice and a category of analysis, whereby it is used in the 
everyday lives of actors to make sense of their world, yet simultaneously exists as a 
normative category for analysis. However, in this thesis I draw on ‘civil society’ 
mainly as a category of practice: I am interested in understanding what the term 
‘civil society’ means to the anti-corruption actors and what work the term does for 
them. In other words, I treat ‘civil society’ as an ethnographic object of study, and 
less as an analytic category that seeks to demarcate what is and is not civil society. I 
provide an empirically based study on the relationships between and among actors 
who use the category ‘civil society’, in an effort to flesh out our understanding of the 
complexities of civil society in India (Fisher 2010: 255). 
 
Nonetheless, while the category of civil society did not appear to pose any 
conspicuous problems within the field that I studied, analytically it still requires to be 
questioned. Despite being a category that the actors that I studied themselves drew 
41 
 
on in their account of themselves and the world, it needs to be borne in mind that 
‘civil society’ is not an essential or natural entity. Being such an overused term, it has 
become an unwieldy concept laden with multiple, contradictory and problematic 
meanings. The same applies to the term ‘activism’, which, as Lewis points out, is 
“wide-ranging and […] can be unpacked in several different ways” (Lewis 2010: 
160). The risk in adopting the term as it appeared in the field-site as self-evident, is 
that it reifies and conflates such a category. A distinction must be made between 
treating civil society as a concept and as an actually existing ‘thing’.  
 
One conceptual approach through which to unpack the use of the term ‘civil society’ 
as related to MKSS, is Chatterjee’s characterisation of civil society and political 
society. His definition of civil society as an association of modern elite groups that 
adhere to values of civic freedom and rational law, holds some degree of truth in the 
case of MKSS. The MKSS leaders, as will be explored in closer detail in Chapters 
One and Two, stem from urban, highly educated, upper-class backgrounds. They 
endorse particular ideas of rights and citizenship, which, according to Chatterjee, 
derive precisely from their specific class positioning. Based on this class-based and 
ideological reasoning, MKSS conforms to the criteria of civil society as proposed by 
Chatterjee. However, unlike Chatterjee’s characterisation of civil society, MKSS is 
not removed from the ‘subaltern’, but, quite the contrary, it is committed to 
improving the plight of the poor. In fact, MKSS acts as a medium to channel the 
political demands of the marginalised to the state. According to this interpretation, 
MKSS resembles Chatterjee’s portrayal of political society. However, this category 
does not fully apply to MKSS either, because, according to Chatterjee, political 
society characteristically resists the ideology and strategies of a developmental state 
and challenges the liberal democratic model. This is quite the contrary to MKSS, 
who, as we have examined, aspire precisely to strengthen democratic governance.  
 
All of this shows that MKSS falls into the taxonomy of both civil society and 
political society. The elite background of its members, its work with the poor and 
marginalised, its commitment to democratic ideals and its faith in the state 
institutions blurs Chatterjee’s neat distinction between the ‘civil’ and the ‘political’. 
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What the work of MKSS suggests is that political associations cannot be classified as 
being either ‘elite’ or ‘subaltern’, nor as being either concerned with citizen rights or 
with the governmentality of populations. Rather, there is a middle ground where all 
of these spheres converge, as is evident in the case of MKSS. This corresponds to 
Gellner’s observation that the ‘Third Sector’ is a blurry category that in practice does 
not correspond to the ideal type definition of the ‘three sectors’ as designating a 
separation of state, market and society. Rather, the category is open to negotiation, 
contestation and mobilisation, whereby individuals move across the boundaries 
(Gellner 2010: 5). In a similar way, the work of MKSS crosses between the ‘civil’ 
and the ‘political’ and blurs the separation to the state.  
 
What my fieldwork suggests is that the term ‘civil society’, which is deemed to be an 
alien import by many subaltern scholars, is not all that alien in contemporary public 
discourses after all. In fact, its prevalence in public life and in media, and the 
naturalness with which it is referred to by the anti-corruption actors, intimates that it 
enjoys an endemic embeddedness. This pervasiveness of ‘civil society’ in India, as a 
practice and as an idea, can be explained as being part of a broader process of 
internalisation. Earlier I examined the ways in which notions of democracy and the 
state have gained currency among ordinary people by being vernacularised into their 
social and political grammar. If we take this premise, it follows that the idea of civil 
society, which forms an integral part of the conceptual tradition of state and 
democracy, is similarly embedded in people’s everyday political imaginaries. With 
ideas of democracy and the statist position being so strong in India, so does the idea 
of civil society gain wide prevalence. Civil society is projected as the space through 
which democracy can be deepened. In many other post-colonial countries the state is 
weak and thus the notion of civil society has little import (see for instance Lewis’s 
(2004) account of civil society in Bangladesh). However, the state in India is strong 
and omnipresent, and because civil society is interdependent with the state and with 
the modern concept of citizenship, civil society takes root in India (Béteille 2000 in 




Furthermore, while the notion of civil society may derive from a particular 
theoretical history in the west, in India it exists within a distinctive set of ideas and 
practices. Rather than being an imposition from ‘outside’, civil society can be 
thought of as a discourse that has been reconfigured and adopted to the particular 
context. Civil society as an idea may have been introduced through the colonial 
regime, and it may have increased in salience with the global trends in 
democratisation and neoliberalism, yet in India it comes into being in an exceptional 
way. As with the ideas of civil society in Bangladesh, as suggested by Lewis, civil 
society comes into being through “multiple local meanings and histories that are both 
politically contested and continually transformed” (Lewis 2004: 301). The particular 
expressions that ‘civil society’ can take in India, will be explored in this thesis 
through its playing out in anti-corruption activism.  
 
What this suggests is that the discourses of civil society do not operate 
homogenously across the world, but they “articulate with distinctive historical 
trajectories to form unique hybridizations and creolizations in different settings” 
(Gupta and Ferguson 1997; cited in Gupta 2012: 106). The use of the term ‘civil 
society’ amongst anti-corruption activists in India thus does not imply a strictly 
Eurocentric tradition. I reach this conclusion by drawing on a large amount of 
anthropological work that focuses on how concepts are decoded, renegotiated and 
localised in different contexts and by different actors as they flow throughout the 
world (see Appadurai 1996; Arce and Long 2000; Comaroff and Comaroff 1993; 
Eisenstadt 2002; Kahn 2001; Merry 2001; Mosse 2005; Tsing 2005; Wilson 1997).26 
 
 
                                                 
26 Another way in which the embeddeness of the term civil society could be understood, is that it has 
never been an alien concept in the first place. This fits in line with Chibber’s (2013) recent analysis 
that argues that the distinction between the west and the non-west so vigorously maintained by 
postcolonial theorists is based on a misapprehension. Supposedly western values of liberalism are not 







The two main themes of aspirations and tensions that run through the exploration of 
anti-corruption activism in this thesis, are introduced in Chapters One and Two 
respectively. Chapter One recounts the widely known story of MKSS, which 
describes a social movement that began with farmers and labourers fighting local 
cases of corruption in villages in Rajasthan, and that culminated in a national 
campaign for the enactment of the Right to Information (RTI) Act. This chapter 
explores the ways in which MKSS’s campaign to enforce transparency and 
accountability measures in governance, expresses its commitment in making the state 
responsive to the needs of the poor and of deepening the experience of democracy 
for the common citizen in India. This chapter focuses on the tropes through which 
the story of MKSS is typically told, suggesting that such tropes serve to translate the 
particular experiences in rural Rajasthan into a broader discursive field of 
governance, democracy and statecraft. 
 
Chapter Two continues with the history of the RTI movement by focusing on the 
tensions inherent in such a social movement. It argues that the demands for 
transparency and accountability legislation cannot emerge solely through grassroots 
activism by the rural poor, but require involvement also in a more ‘formal’ realm of 
campaigning. The technical and formal aspects of the RTI movement are explored in 
this chapter through the work of the National Campaign for People’s Right to 
Information (NCPRI), a campaign based in New Delhi that is spearheaded and 
dominated by MKSS. NCPRI is constituted of high-ranking members, whose access 
to crucial social networks and social capital leads to the blurring of boundaries 
between civil society and the state. The differences and tension between MKSS and 
NCPRI sheds light on the inherent tension in politics that Weber discusses in 
“Politics as Vocation” (1919). This chapter introduces the complex overlapping and 
interchangeable nature of MKSS and NCPRI. Most of the chapters in this thesis will 
refer mainly to NCPRI – as it was under this banner that most of the activities during 
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the Lokpal agitation were carried out – but MKSS will inevitably feature repeatedly, 
reflecting the fuzzy nature of the split between the two organisations.  
 
In Chapter Three I begin to explore the Lokpal agitation. The lens of exploration of 
this national anti-corruption movement, is through the perspective of MKSS/NCPRI, 
whose leadership was from the onset outspoken on its position on the Lokpal Bill. In 
this chapter the competitive relationship between MKSS/NCPRI and its contenders 
in the field of anti-corruption begins to emerge, whereby both groups were 
competing over spaces and discourses of representation of ‘civil society’. There were 
tensions around who best represented the needs of the people, who had the expertise 
and thus legitimacy to draft anti-corruption legislation, or who had initiated the 
debates on the Lokpal. What the heated debates and upheavals around the Lokpal 
agitation point to, is the importance given to notions of democratic process and to 
statecraft in civil society activism in India. The ethnographic material in this chapter 
suggests that competition, with the frictions and contestations that it engenders, 
provides opportunities for a reinforcement of political positions and commitments.  
 
The competitive relationship between MKSS/NCPRI and its contenders in the 
Lokpal agitation is also the foundation of Chapter Four. This chapter explores how 
members of MKSS/NCPRI attempted to set themselves apart from their opponents 
and to establish themselves as legitimate representatives of civil society. Operating in 
a relational field with their competitors, members of MKSS/NCPRI had to make 
their difference publicly visible . One way in which they did this was by enacting 
their positions and ideas of ‘civil society’ through a public convention. Through such 
a performance, they could make tangible their commitments and political ideas that 
had been carved out of their difference to their Lokpal contenders. In their 
competition over representing civil society, a performance enabled them to summon 
an audience, and thus to bring into being their constituency. This chapter explores 
how the two opposing teams of the Lokpal agitation were ultimately competing over 




While the previous chapters examined MKSS/NCPRI’s endeavours to present itself 
as legitimate civil society representatives externally, Chapter Five shifts focus to the 
internal aspects of credibility. It probes some of the inner organisational dynamics of 
MKSS/NCPRI, looking into the ideals, expectations and commitments held by the 
variously placed members.  The explosion of activities during the Lokpal agitation 
demanded heightened involvement and reactions from MKSS/NCPRI, consequently 
giving rise to critique and disappointment by some of the members. This chapter 
understands these disappointments as inverted expressions of commitment and as a 
reaffirmation of ideals. It was through the doubts articulated by some of the members 
on the inner workings of MKSS/NCPRI, that they restated their expectations and 
aspirations. This tension between expectations and disappointments emerges out of 
the lofty ideals that these anti-corruption activists set for themselves.  
 
Chapter Six continues exploring the conflicting relationship between MKSS/NCPRI 
and its contenders in the Lokpal agitation, zooming out to their conflicting ideas on 
democracy. The two teams diverged on their understandings of democracy, mirroring 
the split on conceptualisations of democracy as embodied by the two founding 
figures of the Indian nation, Gandhi and Nehru. This tension further reflects the 
inherently contested nature of liberal democracy. As in the previous chapters, this 
chapter contends that the political understandings held by the two teams are largely 
relational, whereby positions are modelled against those of the ‘other’. It is this 
relational conflict on political understandings that opens up opportunities for 










Tension is a central theme running throughout my exploration of anti-corruption 
activism in this thesis. This tension plays out in multiple spaces and forms, as the 
following chapters will explore, and emerges ultimately out of a friction between the 
nature of expectations and the nature of actions. Expectations made of and by the 
anti-corruption activists are so lofty and exalted, that, given the messy contingencies 
of political and social life, they come up against hindrances and disillusionment. This 
disillusionment from finding expectations unmet, was one that I observed among 
many of my informants throughout fieldwork. Moreover, it was a tension that I 
myself experienced in relation to my own expectations. Tension, as it were, 
manifested itself to me not only analytically but also phenomenologically.  
 
I had entered the field full of expectations. Without even having begun fieldwork, I 
was already breaking the ‘protocol’ of ethnography as postulated by Malinowski – 
the ‘father’ of modern ethnographic methods – who had stated that the goal of the 
anthropologist, is “to grasp the native’s point of view, his relation to life, to realize 
his vision of his world” (Malinowski 1961 [1922]: 25 (italics in original)). What 
Malinowski was establishing was that in order to understand another society, the 
ethnographer must put aside his own judgement and enter the field with a blank slate.  
My own ethnographic experience cast doubt on the possibility of adopting 
Malinowski’s axiom of non-judgmental openness.27 
 
Far from bringing with me a ‘blank slate’, I had arrived in the field with a series of 
preconceived assumptions about MKSS. I had distinct ideas about the type of 
organisation that MKSS was and the spaces in which I would find them. I had briefly 
                                                 
27 I found solace in my approach from other notable anthropologists who have noted the impossibility 
of adopting Malinowski’s goal (Geertz 1973), not to mention the posthumous publication of 
Malinowski’s diaries that revealed that he himself had been unable to abide by his own rule. 
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encountered MKSS in the past and had read up much about them, to the point that I 
had composed an unmistakable depiction of them. MKSS to me stood for a 
grassroots organisation that was deeply rooted in the lives and concerns of the rural 
poor. Their work of giving voice to the downtrodden was, in my portrayal, 
challenging entrenched structures of power, and thus appealed to me as an example 
of ‘radical politics’. What is more, by actually succeeding in getting the demands of 
the poor institutionalised through laws at the national level (as had been the case with 
the Right to Information Act, for instance), MKSS stood as an exemplar of the 
potency of the ‘power of the people’. In other words, MKSS answered to my 
romanticised ideal of an authentic form of radical politics. With my propensity to 
romanticize ‘resistance’, I was falling prey to a tendency wide spread amongst 
academics, as Abu-Lughod (1990) notes, and of thereby limiting my ethnographic 
perspective, as Ortner (1995) warns. Furthermore, with the idea of MKSS as an 
organisation grounded in rural Rajasthan, I had expected to carry out fieldwork in 
‘village India’ which similarly had a romanticized appeal to me. My research agenda 
was thus guided by ideologies that underlie academic political economy, whereby 
“the quest for the native’s point of view has now become a search for an authentic 
critical theory, embodied in the lives of those on the margins of capitalism” 
(Baviskar 2010: 5). 
 
However, as I embarked on my fieldwork mission to document the work of this 
authentic grassroots movement, I found it increasingly difficult to locate. I began to 
be confronted with the realisation that this ideal I had imagined MKSS to be, did not 
exist as such. The organisation based in a mud hut in rural Rajasthan that carried out 
relentless protests, campaigns and mobilisations through the mass support of poor 
villagers, seemed to exist more vividly in my imagination and in accounts written 
about it, than in reality. MKSS has been documented prolifically, with copious 
written and visual accounts existing of their activities (see Chapter One for an 
exploration of representations of MKSS). The documentation evoked similar images 
of MKSS as an exemplary grassroots movement. What I was beginning to fathom 
was that the ideal I had of MKSS was one existing in the past (or in representations 
of the past), but that things had changed by the time I began fieldwork. This personal 
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experience of disappointment at not finding my idealised expectations met, was one 
that I would find shared among several informants and friends that I would make in 
the months to come.  
 
In what follows I make a short excursion through some of my own fieldwork 
experience, in order to explore some of the tensions and contradictions that an 
organisation such as MKSS is confronted with. By tracing my trajectory through the 
field, we can approach an understanding of the gap that exists between an ideal and 
the actual playing out of things. My own experiences reflect some of the wider 
expectations that are made of MKSS and the disappointments that arise in finding 
these expectations unmet. The intention here is not to expose a ‘secret truth’ or to 
collapse the image of MKSS, but simply to highlight the type of organisation that 
MKSS is expected to be and the type of organisation that it is. The expectations and 
ideals that revolve around MKSS shed light also on the nature of anti-corruption 
activism in India.  
 
 
Searching for a social movement 
 
My first encounter with MKSS had been in 2005. At that point I had been 
volunteering at the ‘Barefoot College’ in northern Rajasthan, an NGO focused on 
issues of rural social and environmental advancement led by Bunker Roy. Bunker 
Roy is the husband of Aruna Roy, who is the de facto ‘leader’ of MKSS.28 During 
my one year stint in Tilonia, the village in which the Barefoot College is located and 
where Aruna and Bunker’s home is, I had built somewhat of a personal rapport with 
Aruna. She would invite me to her home in the neighbouring plot of land next to the 
campus of the Barefoot College, where we would chat, drink tea, walk through her 
garden in the evenings of the hot Rajasthani summer or listen to classical South 
                                                 
28 I put ‘leader’ in speech marks here, for leader is not a term employed by members of MKSS. 
However, as this thesis shows, MKSS, like most organisations of its sort, in effect does have ‘leaders’ 
in terms of individuals who have particular authority over decision-making processes and who have 
distinctive access to resources. In order to distinguish between MKSS as an organisation and MKSS 
as a few individuals, I employ the term ‘leaders’ throughout this thesis.  
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Indian music.29 On several occasions Aruna took me along to MKSS events, such as 
their annual May Day celebration that also commemorates the anniversary of MKSS, 
and which thousands of villagers attend for a day of speeches, songs, skits, and food 
stalls. I also partook in a 10-day mass social audit, that was the first of what would 
become a series of social audits on that scale organised by MKSS around the recently 
enacted National Rural Employment Guarantee Act.30 It was these events, with their 
colourful and festive spirit and their visible mass support, that planted the seed of 
enthrallment with MKSS in me. Having experienced MKSS in ‘full action’, I was 
deeply impressed by their mobilisation skills and their deftness in translating political 
demands into local idioms and terms to which rural populations could relate. Beyond 
my own encounters, MKSS appeared prominently in public debates and discourses, 
for 2005 was the year in which the Right to Information Act for which MKSS had 
been campaigning for nearly a decade was enacted.  
 
When I returned to India five years later, with the intention of researching the 
reverberations of MKSS’s work on rural people’s political understandings, I found 
the situation to be markedly different. Although I had assumed that my friendly 
rapport with Aruna would facilitate my access to MKSS, I could not track her down, 
nor Nikhil Dey (the other ‘leader’ of MKSS), for weeks on end. I came to find out 
that they were mainly travelling around the country and abroad, attending meetings, 
giving lectures at conferences, or politicking among government representatives. 
Even in Devdungri, the village in which MKSS is based, I could not find much 
MKSS-related action. On my initial trips to Devdungri, the only person I would find 
in the ‘home’ of MKSS was old Dauba, the so-called ‘caretaker’, with all other 
members of MKSS either travelling or in their own homes in their respective 
villages. Sometimes I would hang around in Devdungri for several days, waiting for 
                                                 
29 Aruna Roy is from Tamil Nadu, South India.  
30 In the third month of implementation of NREGA, MKSS and the recently formed SR Abhiyan 
conducted a mass social audit to develop a model of public monitoring of the NREGA. The social 
audit began with a ‘training’ in mobilisation techniques by members of MKSS for 658 participants 
from 13 States, who had been invited to participate in the mass social audit. This involved an 
orientation in communication through folk art, song, dance and puppetry, and a basic training in the 
process of social audits. The participants then split up into groups, and over the course of a week they 
walked across the district to spread awareness and to identify the problems in the implementation of 
NREGA. They did this through a process of social audit involving a verification of the different 
provisions of the NREGA. 
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members of MKSS to appear, yet this did not always bear fruit. The only real 
‘breakthrough’ I seemed to be making in my initial days of fieldwork, was to learn to 
make chapatis (unleavened flatbread) over an open-fire chula (clay burner), a skill 
that Dauba proudly taught me.  
 
I discovered gradually that over the five years since my previous engagement with 
MKSS, the political landscape had changed significantly. Amongst other 
consequential factors, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 2006 
(NREGA), had been enacted. Aruna and Nikhil, so I was finding out, had played a 
considerable role in this scheme by securing that social audits, based on MKSS’s 
model of ‘public hearings’, be institutionalised under NREGA. Since then, they had 
stopped conducting individual public hearings in their locality as they had been 
doing in the past, and instead, were focusing on monitoring the implementation and 
regulation of the government-mandated social audits. With individual public 
hearings being replaced by social audits of a national government scheme, the nature 
of MKSS’s work dramatically changed.  
 
While MKSS had previously been characterised by its grassroots work of mobilising 
and campaigning on the ground, its attention had now shifted predominantly to 
policy-making levels. Over the years, Aruna and Nikhil had been increasingly invited 
as ‘civil society representatives’ into government bodies and committees. With their 
successful involvement in the campaigning for the Right to Information Act, Aruna 
and Nikhil were widely perceived as civil society experts on matters of transparency 
and accountability. This shift had led to increasing amounts of time spent in meetings 
in government offices in the national capital and less attention to work in and around 
Devdungri. With activities such as public hearings no longer taking place, and with 
the MKSS leadership predominantly absent, the activities of MKSS on the ground 
had largely lulled.  
 
Given the changed landscape, it made little sense to persevere with my original 
research intention of examining the impact of MKSS on villagers’ political 
understandings. I had planned on approaching this through MKSS’s public hearings, 
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yet these hearings seemed now to be a thing of the past. In an effort to reorient 
myself to this unexpected turn of events, I decided to focus on the work of the 
Suchna evum Rozgar ka Adhikar Abhiyan (Right to Information and Employment 
Campaign – henceforth ‘SR Abhiyan’, where Abhiyan means campaign), an 
umbrella organisation comprised of various organisations, NGOs and individuals, 
including MKSS, that had been formed in 2006.31 The SR Abhiyan had as its central 
agenda the strengthening and advocacy of transparency and accountability measures, 
especially social audits, in NREGA works in Rajasthan. I travelled throughout 
Rajasthan intending to explore how transparency and accountability measures were 
being understood and realized by the several member organisations of the SR 
Abhiyan. However, I found that none of these organisations were giving much 
attention to NREGA social audits. Each of the organisations had their own areas of 
activities and projects and, as they told me, were swamped as it was with the 
management of all of these. SR Abhiyan-related action, I was increasingly working 
out, and hearing corroborated from several members, happened only when Aruna and 
Nikhil from the MKSS called for it. They were the effective decision-makers of the 
SR Abhiyan, and if they were not mobilising action, then the SR Abhiyan remained 
largely dormant. With Aruna and Nikhil busy with other activities, the NREGA 
social audits in Rajasthan had been temporarily abandoned.  
 
Given this, in the initial months of fieldwork I found myself attempting to do 
research in a field that seemed to consist largely of absences: the absence of MKSS’s 
public hearings or other MKSS activities on the ground, and the absence of 
consolidated work by the SR Abhiyan. This turn of events was largely due to the 
absence of Aruna and Nikhil, upon whose directives the two organisations hinged. 
With the work of these two individuals shifting from grassroots campaigning to 
policy-making on national platforms, so too the work of MKSS and the SR Abhiyan 
                                                 
31 Some of the main organisations involved in the SR Abhiyan include: Jan Chetna (meaning 
‘People’s Awakening’) in Abu Road, South Rajasthan, an NGO dedicated to tribal, rural and women’s 
development. Another organisation is Astha (meaning ‘Faith’), an NGO based in Udaipur working on 
raising awareness of the rights of citizens, mainly rural tribal people, and on making “the mass 
resources of the government available to the masses” (as stated in Astha’s website). Another 
important member organisation of the SR Abhiyan is Sankalp (meaning ‘Determination’), an NGO 
working mainly on the rights of the Sahariya, a tribal group categorised by the government as 
‘primitive’. The SR Abhiyan has approximately 25 other organisations and individuals that form part 
of the campaign.  
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was changing. The implications of this for my own research was that I had entered a 
field in which my ideal of a grassroots radical organisation was difficult to locate 
tangibly.  
 
And then quite unanticipated – and for me rather serendipitously32 – the Lokpal 
agitation broke out. From early April 2011 onward, national news was saturated with 
coverage on Anna Hazare who was conducting a hunger-strike demanding that the 
government enact his drafted Jan Lokpal Bill, a bill that sought the appointment of an 
independent body to investigate corruption cases. While media and many public 
platforms were galvanized around Anna Hazare and his demand for the Jan Lokpal 
Bill, members of MKSS were exceedingly apprehensive of this demand. For reasons 
that will be examined in closer detail in Chapter Three of this thesis, members of 
MKSS were in disagreement with the forms of protest of Anna Hazare and with the 
provisions of his Jan Lokpal Bill. Their response was to come up with their own 
version of a Lokpal Bill and to campaign for this by lobbying representatives of the 
government.  
 
Through the explosion of the Lokpal agitation, MKSS was now in full action. Yet the 
action was of a dramatically different sort to what I had been anticipating prior to 
setting out on fieldwork. My expectation of MKSS, based on images of ‘bottom up’ 
grassroots politics, had envisaged villagers and farmers collectively protesting 
through sit-ins and marches, accompanied by vibrant music, songs, puppets and 
theatre as I had seen MKSS perform in the past. Instead, the Lokpal agitation that 
MKSS got involved in, was playing out largely in closed meetings, in cramped 
offices where bills were being drafted, in press releases and statements, in phone 
                                                 
32 The role of serendipity in ethnographic research has been picked up elsewhere. Serendipity, as has 
been proposed by some scholars, should stand at the heart of an ethnographic project.  
Anthropological research, so conceived, is “the art of making an unsought finding” (Van Andel 1994, 
cited in Rivoal and Salazar 2013: 178) whereby the researcher is open and reflexive to unanticipated 
and unexpected discoveries. Like a nomad, argue Hazan and Hertzog, an ethnographer has “built-in 
elasticity”, whereby the incessant changes encountered in the field propel the researcher to constantly 
“reinvent fieldwork practices, research methods and theoretical orientations” (Hazan and Hertzog 
2011: 1). Such fluidity in research approaches gives rise to serendipity, understood not only as fortune 
and chance, but as the “masterful synthesis into insight by drawing novel connections” (Fine and 
Deegan 1996, cited in Rivoal and Salazar 2013: 178).   
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Fieldwork and thesis structure 
 
The reason I have described my fieldwork experience in such detail is because it is in 
this detail that the content and structure of this thesis can be apprehended. My 
experience, although undoubtedly a very personal encounter with the field, 
nonetheless is indicative of some ‘material’ and ‘actual’ things taking place. For 
instance, it sheds some light on the type of organisation that MKSS is expected to be 
and the type of organisation that it is. MKSS is well regarded throughout India, 
associated clearly with particular people (most notably Aruna Roy), with particular 
forms of politics (grassroots campaigning), with particular achievements (most 
notably the Right to Information Act), and with particular ideologies (generally 
transparency and accountability in governance). Although having clear definitional 
boundaries, the actual location of MKSS is ambiguous. For example as my fieldwork 
experience showed, although Devdungri is presented as the base and home of MKSS, 
this appears to be mainly symbolic or representative, because most of the time 
activities and people could not actually be found in Devdungri. Throughout a large 
part of my fieldwork, MKSS was more of an enigmatic entity that I would hear 
about, read about and speak about, yet could not quite unearth in actual terms. It was 
with the emergence of the Lokpal agitation that MKSS became locatable again, 
becoming more present in public events and public discourses. This suggests that 
MKSS emerges and comes into being in and through events. It is precisely for this 
reason that this thesis takes the Lokpal agitation as the backdrop and key event from 
which to explore the ethos and politics of MKSS. 
 
Another aspect of my personal journey through fieldwork is that it partially mirrors 
the trajectory of MKSS itself: my initial meandering through villages in Rajasthan 
and my expectation that this was where MKSS could be located, reflects the common 
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association of MKSS with rural India. MKSS is widely known to have begun its fight 
against corruption in a cluster of villages in central Rajasthan. However, my 
fieldwork experience showed that the situation had somewhat changed and that 
MKSS as an organisation, in terms of activities and people, could not be physically 
found in rural Rajasthan. It was through this that I came to realise that the nature of 
MKSS’s work had shifted from work on the ground to greater involvement at the 
policy-making level. By moving my field-site from rural Rajasthan to New Delhi and 
opening up my ethnographic gaze to city-based activities, I began to grasp where and 
what type of an organisation MKSS is, or had become.  
 
In this regard, the structure of this thesis physically mirrors my journey through 
fieldwork, as well as the trajectory of MKSS: the first two chapters deal largely with 
the historic work of MKSS starting with their campaigns at the village level, moving 
on to their related campaign at the national level. The MKSS portrayed in these first 
two chapters, particularly in the first, is the MKSS publicly known and the one I had 
been expecting to find. The following four chapters focus on MKSS’s involvement 
with the events of the Lokpal agitation, which was the MKSS I ended up finding. 
The chronology of the following chapters thus reflects the chronology of 
transformations of MKSS.  
 
The ‘thick description’ that constitutes this thesis is principally of two sorts. The first 
set of ethnographic material is based largely on participant observation in activities 
in and around MKSS during the Lokpal agitation. As MKSS drafted laws, and 
campaigned and lobbied for them in the government and the wider public, many 
spaces opened up in which MKSS was active. While I had set out to carry out 
research on MKSS’s work on transparency and accountability in rural Rajasthan, I 
ended up encountering the work of MKSS mainly in meetings, emails, phone calls, 
documents, reports, lectures and other urban public events. Being swamped in work, 
MKSS had welcomed my help and participation. The intensity with which the 
Lokpal agitation had flared up meant that there was much work to be picked up, so 
that I could easily position myself within this setting. Moreover, with work of this 
sort being conducted largely in English, I could actively and effectively play my 
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part.33 After months of patient lingering, the benefits of my personal rapport to Aruna 
was now playing out in my interest after all, whereby I was given access to exclusive 
spaces such as internal meetings, informal conversations and even passwords to 
email accounts.  
   
The other source of ‘thick description’ is from media. The Lokpal agitation was a 
highly publicized event that found much coverage in English-language media, both 
conventional media such as newspapers, weeklies and TV channels, as well as social 
media such as Facebook, Twitter and blogs. Media became a crucial platform in 
which the Lokpal agitation played out, with many of the rifts among civil society 
actors, and between them and the government, being actively broadcasted. Views 
and positions were often expressed publicly through statements and press releases 
presented to the media. It was also through such platforms that the heated and 
polemical debates that Anna Hazare’s protest and demands had given rise to were 
articulated. Media, in this regard, not only represented public events, but were the 
actual stage on which public events took place. While many actions taken by the 
anti-corruption activists during the Lokpal agitation had tangible forms – such as 
hunger-strikes, protests, meetings, conventions, etc. – a large part of the Lokpal 
agitation played out in print news and visual broadcasting. It is because of this 
central role played by English-language media that many of the debates discussed in 
this thesis derive from such sources. The ethnographic material of this thesis thus 
combines data collected in the face-to-face encounter in “the field”, adhering to the 
‘traditional’ approach of ethnography that attempts to understand another life world 
                                                 
33 Although I am fluent in Hindi and the previous months of fieldwork in the villages of Rajasthan had 
not posed any language barriers, I could engage more proactively in tasks based on English. 
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using the self as the instrument of knowing (Ortner 1995: 173), as well as data 
collected in ‘public culture’.34   
 
With the work of MKSS revolving largely around the leader figures, Aruna and 
Nikhil, particularly during the Lokpal agitation where work was of a particular 
technical and legal sort, this thesis has a strong focus on these two individuals.35 I 
had initially envisioned carrying out fieldwork principally on people at the 
‘receiving’ end of MKSS’s work – those farmers and labourers that MKSS famously 
stands for. However, there are no explicit accounts of so-called subalterns in this 
thesis, as my fieldwork encounter with MKSS suggested that work on the ground, at 
least during the duration of my fieldwork, was not a prime concern of MKSS. Rather, 
their priority lay in campaigning and lobbying for legal drafts and bills, an area of 
work that only Aruna and Nikhil, given their class and education background, had 
mastery over. Aruna and Nikhil spoke out as representatives of MKSS, resulting in 
an overall conflation of their views with MKSS as a collective. This conflation as 
well as my own experience in fieldwork as outlined above, suggested that oftentimes 
Aruna and Nikhil are the MKSS, with little occurring without their directions. 
 
This thesis focuses heavily on the voice of the leadership and the city-based work of 
MKSS. Tarlo suggests that the selection of which voices to include and exclude in an 
ethnography must not be thought of as authoritative control by the author, but, rather, 
as an indication of a researcher’s competence and familiarity in the field of study 
(Tarlo 2003: 17). As she notes, the essence of research is “to be able to follow leads 
                                                 
34 I am emboldened with this approach by Gupta who draws on newspapers in his analysis of 
representations of the state. As Gupta implores, we need to question what he calls the “ontological 
imperative” of traditional ethnography that takes fieldwork “as rite of passage, as adjudicator of the 
authenticity of “data”, and as the ultimate ground for the judgment of interpretations” (Gupta 1995: 
377). According to Gupta, this sense of superiority and authenticity associated with the face-to-face 
methods of ethnography clings to bounded notions of ‘society’ and ‘culture’, and fails to grasp the 
ways in which phenomena are discursively constituted. Drawing on representations that are 
distributed in cultural text, such as through media, helps to expand the method of ethnography. It is 
this approach with which I have persevered in my own research. This can also be linked to what John 
and Jean Comaroff call “ethnography and the historical imagination”, that focuses on reading 
historical sources ethnographically (Comaroff and Comaroff, cited in Ortner 1995: 173). In a similar 
way, in this thesis I have proposed to reading media sources ethnographically. 
35 Here I follow suit with many studies of NGOs that have focused on the role of leaders, as the 
central and most influential figures in the functioning of the organisation (Sheth and Sethi 1991; 
Morris and Staggenborg 2004).  
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intelligently, to select appropriately from different types of material, to recognise the 
difference between the person whose opinions are informative and the one who tries 
to lead them up the garden path” (Tarlo 2003: 17). It is based on my long-term 
acquaintance and engagement with MKSS that I claim to have selected my material 
and voices appropriately. It is the “built-in elasticity” (Hazan and Hertzog 2011: 1) 
expected of a researcher that allowed me to expand my expectation of MKSS from 
being a rural movement to being a city-based campaign.  
 
 
Positionality and Ethics 
 
As indicated, MKSS does not exist as a tangible or fixed organisation. Rather, it 
exists as an idea and in documented accounts of it, and comes into being 
momentarily through events and in particular actions. In order to locate MKSS, as a 
researcher I had to situate myself in a range of settings and be responsive to the 
different traces and leads that gestured toward MKSS. Fieldwork quickly taught me 
that MKSS is mobile and multiply situated, and that in order to fully comprehend it 
as an organisation, I needed to treat it as something “which is not stable, not re-
articulable, but which blinks, momentarily shows itself, and escapes” (Benjamin, 
paraphrased in Navaro-Yashin 2002: 15). Eventually MKSS manifested itself to me 
most visibly through the Lokpal agitation. It is for this reason that most of the 
ethnographic material of this thesis was gathered around the events of the Lokpal that 
took place largely in New Delhi, India’s capital city. However, the ethnographic 
material is also implicitly infused with insights collected during my months of 
fieldwork on MKSS prior to the Lokpal agitation. While at points my initial search 
for MKSS seemed fruitless, in these months I nonetheless learnt a great deal about 
the history, impact and expectations associated with MKSS. I met individuals and 
organisations of all ranks who were associated with MKSS and who had explicit 
views on MKSS, and through whom my picture of MKSS significantly expanded. I 
found MKSS as an idea and as an organisation to exist through all of these people 




Given the unfixed nature of MKSS, I was compelled to adopt a multi-sited approach 
to ethnography. Because of the type of organisation that MKSS is, I could not follow 
the single-sited method of traditional ethnography that would encompass staying in 
one locality and observing the entirety unfolding before me. Instead, I had to 
consider the complex network of factors affecting an organisation like MKSS, which 
entailed, “[e]mpirically following the thread of cultural process itself” (Marcus 1995: 
97). According to Marcus, multi-sited ethnographies no longer define their objects of 
study simply by a ‘face-to-face’ approach of ‘being there’ in a locality, but by 
techniques that involve ‘preplanned or opportunistic’ movement and by tracing 
complex cultural phenomenon within different settings (Marcus 1995: 106).36 I 
gained a complete picture of MKSS, by adopting a multi-sited approach that enabled 
me to “follow people, connections, associations, and relationships across space 
(because they are substantially continuous but spatially non-contiguous)” (Falzon 
2009: 2). This involved traversing localities and engaging in ‘polymorphous 
engagement’, which Guterson defines as follows:   
 
Polymorphous engagement means interacting with informants across a 
number of dispersed sites, not just in local communities, and sometimes 
in virtual form; and it means collecting data electrically from a disparate 
array of sources in many different ways. [It also involves] an eclectic mix 
of other research techniques: formal interviews of the kind often done by 
journalists and political scientists, extensive reading of newspapers and 
official documents, and careful attention to popular culture, for example. 
(Guterson 1997: 116) 
 
Engaging in multi-sited ethnography, entailed renegotiating my social identity in the 
various sites that I moved through. Dealing at the village level with the so-called 
‘subalterns’, as well as in the national capital with so-called ‘elite’ personalities and 
                                                 
36 The shift towards multi-sited ethnography was congruent to a broader shift in social sciences, 
namely that of postmodernism and the phenomenon of globalisation.  Within this shift, scholars have 
recognized the changing nature of the ‘field-site’ in response to an increasingly global, mobile, 
transnational world (Appadurai 1990, Hendry 2003, Hannerz 2003). Appadurai captured this analytic 
shift when he asked: “What is the place of locality in schemes about global cultural flow? Does 
anthropology retain any special privilege in a world where locality seems to have lost its ontological 
moorings? Can the mutually constitutive relationship between anthropology and locality survive in a 
dramatically delocalized world?” (Appadurai 1996: 178). 
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institutions, implies that I occupied diverse positions and roles. In the initial months 
of fieldwork, when I was still attempting to locate MKSS in rural Rajasthan, I 
assumed a more conspicuous role of a researcher. With little activity happening 
around MKSS that I could simply ‘observe’ and blend into, I had adopted a research 
approach of proactively seeking out informants and information. This approach, 
along with the highly visible traits that marked me out to everyone (white, single, 
female), positioned me as a discernible ‘outsider’. 
 
This positionality as an outsider was to change dramatically during the Lokpal 
agitation. In this period, with work levels of MKSS soaring, I was given an active 
role to play. I was drawn into the activities of MKSS and assumed increasingly the 
function of an active member rather than that of a researcher. My engagement in the 
Lokpal thus led to a blurring of my status as being either that of an ‘insider’ or an 
‘outsider’ (Marcus 1995; Mosse 2005, 2006) and collapsed the distinction between 
‘desk’ and the ‘field’ (Mosse 2006: 937). Although I had presented myself as a 
researcher, and it was this identity that explained my appearance in the scene, this 
identification often slipped into the background.37  
 
The ‘insider’ positioning which I assumed during the Lokpal agitation brought me 
closer to taking on the role of an ‘activist’. Marcus states that the nature of multi-
sited research forces ethnographers to take on numerous identities and to renegotiate 
identities in different sites, which “generates a definite sense of doing more than just 
ethnography, and it is this quality that provides a sense of being an activist” (Marcus 
1995: 113-114). In other words, multi-sited research entails cross-cutting and, 
sometimes, contradictory personal commitments, and thus brings about the 
conditions for ‘circumstantial activism’. Such circumstantial activism and 
commitment, according to Marcus, “provide a kind of psychological substitute for 
the reassuring sense of “being there”” (Marcus 1995: 114). By shifting back and 
forth between Rajasthan and New Delhi, and between the different levels of activities 
                                                 
37 Occasionally I felt compelled to restate my status as a researcher, knowing that not doing so would 





of MKSS, I was actively carving out my own space of engagement, and making my 
own connections of activism.  
 
This resonates with Scheper-Hughes’s approach that calls for a politically committed 
and morally engaged anthropology. Scheper-Hughes does not believe that an 
anthropologist should be a “neutral, dispassionate, cool and rational, objective 
observer of the human condition” (Scheper-Hughes 1995: 410) and, instead, urges 
that anthropology must be ethically grounded. Here she argues against positivistic 
approaches to research and maintains that politically engaged advocacy is not only 
morally correct, but theoretically valid and practically advantageous. Accordingly, 
we cannot flee “from local engagements, local commitments, and local 
accountability” but must use our ethnography as “a tool for critical reflection and for 
human liberation” (Scheper-Hughes 1995: 417-418). Being an active member of 
MKSS and engaging in many of the activities around the Lokpal agitation, I became 
fully engrossed in their positions and became a champion of their cause, discarding 
any sense of having to disassociate myself or act as an ‘objective’ researcher. 
 
This positioning, however, brought about its own set of ethical considerations. While 
during fieldwork I increasingly assumed the role of an insider, it was nevertheless 
known that I was there primarily out of scholarly interests, and that once I had 
gathered my material, I would pack up and leave. This, I could not fail but notice, put 
some constraint on my relationships with many of my informants. While I had built 
an overall good rapport with people involved with MKSS, and with some this rapport 
developed into closer friendship than with others, I was still regarded as one of the 
many researchers that would come and go. The work of MKSS has been studied 
extensively by a myriad of researchers, so that my being there was perceived as part 
of a larger trend. This was made clear to me at a very early stage of fieldwork, when 
Nikhil introduced me to a researcher who had just completed her extensive fieldwork 
with MKSS, jokingly telling us that since there were so many of us (i.e. researchers 
studying the work of MKSS), we should consider unionizing. Given this context, 





An ethical dilemma of research considered by many anthropologists is the 
relationship of power that exists between the researcher and the researched. Clifford 
draws attention to the power-laden relations between the ethnographer and the 
informant, when he notes “the historical predicament of ethnography, the fact that it 
is always caught up in the invention, not the representation of cultures” (Clifford 
1986: 2). This indicates that the practice of ethnography is an inherently hierarchical 
enterprise, with the power resting ultimately in the researcher who holds authority as 
the author of ethnographic texts. Baviskar, for instance, addresses the “fundamental 
inequality” that she confronted in her research when she states that “the social 
arrangements of class determined that I had mobility and freedom because they [her 
informants] did not” (Baviskar 2010: 10 (italics in original)). Such ethical 
considerations are premised largely on the notion that the ‘subjects’ being studied are 
voiceless and marginalised. However, while power relationships undeniably exist in 
any context, the notion that the researcher occupies a position at the top of the power 
ladder is not always pertinent. In my case, to a certain extent, the inverse applied: I 
was dealing largely with powerful individuals, to whom I represented an 
insignificant researcher. In the world of anti-corruption civil society activism, it was 
I who was low in the social hierarchy. What is more, some of my main informants 
were analytically astute and engaged in critical reflexivity, so that my work as a 
social scientist did not offer much of a contribution. In this light, my informants were 
like the networks studied by Riles, who share a ‘formal aesthetic’ with modernist 
academics, whereby they have already produced the perspectives of analytical 
enterprise for their own purpose. In other words, the aesthetic form of networks is 
‘inside’ the academic knowledge practice. When there is no outside, Riles points out, 
analysis is a replication of the same aesthetics, a turning ‘inside out’ (Riles 2000). 
 
Ethical considerations beset an anthropologist not just during fieldwork. The textual 
production of an ethnography that follows fieldwork has been an area of much 
deliberation in debates on the ethics of anthropology. Since the late 1980s with the 
publication of Writing Culture (Clifford and Marcus 1986), the authority of the 
anthropologist has fallen under serious scrutiny. The postmodern movement in 
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anthropology has stripped away concepts of objectivity and truth, and consequently 
deconstructs ethnography as “always caught up in the invention, not the 
representation, of cultures” (Clifford 1986: 2). The reflexive critiques of 
anthropological research to which this deconstructing trend has given rise, draw 
attention to the always subjective and partial nature of the ethnographic process.38  
 
Writing on organisations and institutions, particularly when they are powerful or 
renowned, as in the case of MKSS, poses another series of ethical considerations. A 
dilemma faced by many anthropologists is about how to represent organisations and 
actors when one’s own findings do not match the representations that the 
organisations themselves seek to present. To what extent does one have 
responsibility towards one’s informants and to the public representation of their 
organisation? Mosse’s famous ethnography of the workings of a powerful 
development institution displays the perplexing ramifications that critical 
ethnographic representations can trigger. Mosse’s monograph was challenged by his 
informants as being unfair, biased, defamatory and damaging to the reputation of 
individuals and institutions (Mosse 2006: 935). In questioning the widely held faith 
that development is produced by a singular and unified chain of events in the policy 
process, Mosse’s findings generated much reaction and objection. This raises 
questions about the ethics of anthropologists in terms of what should be revealed or 
silenced if it can harm people.  
 
In his defence, Mosse claims that he is not judging or evaluating the project itself, 
but rather looking at the relationship between policy and practice and the social 
construction of success, which can be relevant to all development projects in general. 
In a similar fashion, my account of MKSS is not intended as an evaluation or 
judgement. While my thesis does not present the story of MKSS as they themselves 
present it, and while aspects may appear as critical of the work of MKSS, my 
intention has been to bring forth an approach of ‘constructive criticism’. In exploring 
the tensions that arise out of the work that MKSS engages in, I have been guided by 
                                                 
38 Fardon and others have accused this deconstructive trend in ethnography of being “confessional 




an effort to understand what their aspirations and commitments are. I have attempted 
to strike a balance of engaging constructively and actively with MKSS, yet 
simultaneously employing critical reflection on their work.  
 
A related issue of consideration is how to engage with dissenting voices. No group or 
organisation is homogenous and unitary, and, even if not articulated, dissenting 
opinions are bound to exist. Thus, in order to depict an organisation in a way that at 
least partially reflects its complex reality, some of the varying opinions and 
perspectives must be attended to. However, this gives rise to serious ethical 
problems. Does such divulging have consequences on the public image of the 
organisation in question? What effects will it have on the individuals, whose 
dissenting views are being disclosed? Does one, as a (usually uninvited) researcher, 
have the right to poke around in the lives of others?  
 
After much uneasy deliberation on these questions, I have come to the decision that 
in this thesis I will give space to some of the dissenting voices. In doing so, I am 
motivated by a conviction that MKSS is a commendable organisation and that to 
fully understand it, all its shades must be examined. What is more, the dissenting 
individuals whose voices appear in this thesis are themselves convinced by the 
praise-worthy excellence of MKSS, and, as I show, it is precisely out of this 
conviction that their dissent arises. In line with my overall argument that conflict 
opens up productive avenues, I argue that the critique and dissent of certain 
individuals is constitutive of their commitments, and thus does not pose a threat to 
the integrity of MKSS. Nonetheless, I have chosen to give pseudonyms to some of 
my informants, in an attempt to safeguard their anonymity. This is not a straight-
forward effort, since deciding on whom to anonymise in itself leads to entanglement. 
Many of my informants cannot be anonymised since they are renowned figures who 
are widely known to the public.  By anonymising some voices in this thesis, I am 
suggesting who is and who is not publicly known, and thereby risking disclosure of 
who the possible ‘dissenters’ are. However, keeping in mind my overall argument 




A final point of reflection that sheds light on my positionality and on the possible 
ethical consequences of my research: the themes, voices, discussions and 
descriptions that appear in this thesis, more than anything, disclose my own 
ideological agenda. While I have attempted to describe events and occurrences as 
accurately and genuinely as possible, the selection of what to include and exclude is 
entirely my own. As stated earlier, I had chosen to do research with MKSS because it 
answered to my romanticised ideal of an ‘authentic’ politics of ‘resistance’. My 
selection of areas to discuss in this thesis are guided by that conviction. In such 
manner, my choice to bring out the dissenting and critical voices, reflects my own 
expectations – and, consequently, own critiques – of MKSS. Thus, while this 
research is a venture into the world of MKSS, indirectly, it is also a venture into my 













In the year 2000, Aruna Roy was awarded the Ramon Magsaysay Award for 
Community Leadership. The Magsaysay Award, sometimes also known as Asia’s 
Noble Peace Prize, pursues the mission of ‘honouring greatness of spirit in selfless 
service to the people of Asia’. The prestigious Award is given to groups and 
individuals engaged in purposeful social change in Asia. Aruna was elected for the 
Award because of her work with the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) in 
“empowering Indian villagers to claim what is rightfully theirs by upholding and 
exercising the people’s right to information”.39 The Magsaysay Award recognises 
Aruna’s role in assisting villagers to assert themselves against local power structures 
by employing the powerful weapon of information. Beyond the local-level work of 
MKSS, the Award also accredits the India-wide movement for transparency in 
governance and the enactment of the Right to Information Act (2005) to Aruna and 
the MKSS.40  
 
Awarding the Magsaysay Award to Aruna Roy was a reflection of the wider fame 
enjoyed by her and the MKSS. MKSS is celebrated throughout India, and beyond, as 
an exemplary grassroots organisation. It is extensively accredited for being the 
driving force behind the Right to Information movement that led to the drafting and 
                                                 
39 “Roy, Aruna Citation” in Ramon Magsaysay Award Foundation [accessed 15 October 2013] 
http://www.rmaf.org.ph/newrmaf/main/awardees/awardee/profile/19  
40 Aruna’s response on receiving the Magsaysay Award was to acknowledge MKSS as a collective. 
She said: “Though I have been singled out to receive the award, it in fact belongs to the many women 
and men with whom I have had the good fortune to share struggles and emerging visions for a better 
world. No individual, however endowed, can bring about social change on their own. Community 
work is a collective exercise, and the greatest potential and challenge of the human condition is to 
work together to realize dreams far beyond the barriers of individual limitations.”  




enactment of the national Right to Information (RTI) Act. Although the demand for 
transparency and accountability in governance had existed prior to MKSS, MKSS is 
credited with breathing new life into the concepts and of catalyzing broader 
discussions on governance and democracy (Jenkins and Goetz 1999: 607). What is 
typically emphasised as being the distinguishing trait of MKSS as an organisation 
committed to transparency and accountability in governance, is its groundwork in 
village communities. MKSS is widely acclaimed for being firmly rooted in the 
struggles and concerns for survival and justice of the most disadvantaged rural 
people. Accordingly, its demand for transparency legislation is seen to have emerged 
out of real needs and concerns of the people, which in turn confers strength and 
pertinence to its demand.  
 
The Right to Information Act itself is often described as one of India’s most 
progressive and empowering pieces of legislation, and one of the strongest 
transparency laws in the world.41 With the RTI, any citizen can now legally claim 
access to official government documents – denial of which will be monetarily 
penalised against the bureaucrat in question. Provisions within the RTI – such as the 
compulsory proviso to allow the general public to access and make photocopies of 
documents in a timely fashion – aim to ensure that bureaucrats at all echelons of the 
state apparatus are made to comply with the doctrines of transparency and 
accountability. As the RTI Act’s preamble states: “[D]emocracy requires an 
informed citizenry and transparency of information which are vital to its functioning 
and also to contain corruption and to hold Governments and their instrumentalities 
accountable to the governed”.42  
 
It is association with such a progressive law that accounts largely for MKSS’s 
reputation. MKSS’s efforts in bringing the RTI into being are celebrated for enabling 
“remarkable change in the lives of thousands of people, particularly in their 
                                                 
41 For instance, in a survey of information laws in 95 countries conducted by two human rights 
organisations — Access Info Europe (AIE) and the Canada-based Centre for Law and Democracy 
(CLD) – India’s Right to Information Act was ranked second (after Serbia).  
“Global Right to Information Rating” in Global Right to Information Rating [accessed 23 October 
2013] http://www.rti-rating.org/  
42 The RTI Act is available on the government website: “A Citizen Gateway: Information Service 
Portal” in Right to Information [accessed 23 October 2013] http://rti.gov.in/  
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consciousness regarding resisting injustice and struggling for the creation of a better 
world” (Dogra and Dogra 1998).43 Such laudatory observations find copious 
repetition, such as for instance, by the ‘Global Network of Freedom and Information 
Advocates’ that states: 
 
MKSS pioneered the right to information movement in India and is 
among the best examples in the world of a grassroots movement that has 
been successful in demanding increased transparency and accountability 
in government. Through the right to information campaign, MKSS and 
its partners demonstrated how government information could be 
leveraged by ordinary citizens to enhance their participation in 
governance and decision making and thereby improve their own lives. 
(Global Network of Freedom and Information Advocates 2004)44 
 
Also in scholarly works the MKSS and its role with the Right to Information Act 
features as an exemplary model of civil society activism. Political scientist Jenkins, 
for example, portrays MKSS as a “paradigmatic grassroots movement” (Jenkins 
2007: 59) that, with its sweeping support from poor and marginalised farmers and 
labourers, managed to force the government into bending to pressure from below. 
Anthropologist Baviskar notes the grassroots origins of the RTI when she presents 
MKSS as a “remarkable success of a campaign that started fifteen years ago in a 
cluster of villages in rural Rajasthan [that] managed to bring about a major piece of 
legislation at the national level” (Baviskar 2007: 15). In such accounts, MKSS is not 
only applauded for its grassroots campaigning and mobilisation, but moreover, for 
raising crucial discussions on the meaning and practice of governance and 
democracy in India. In an article on transparency and accountability in India, Jenkins 
and Goetz for instance accredit MKSS for its impact in addressing important 
questions, when they state: “The work of a small and unusual activist group in the 
north Indian state of Rajasthan has raised a series of practical and theoretical issues 
                                                 
43 Dogra, M. and B. Dogra (1998) “The Non Party Political Process Profile Of A People’s 
Organization: MKSS (Rajasthan)” in Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan: a Non Party People’s 
Movement [accessed 10 January 2014] http://www.mkssindia.org/writings/mkssandrti/the-non-party-
political-process-profile-of-a-people%E2%80%99s-organization-mkss-rajasthan-%E2%80%93-
madhu-bharat-dogra/ (Original text has no page numbers). 
44 “The Right to Know is the Right to Live: Profile of a Remarkable Peoples’ Movement in India that 
Links Information to Livelihood” in Global Network of Freedom and Information Advocates 




concerning the best means for combating specific instances of corruption, and for 
promoting accountability more generally” (Jenkins and Goetz 1999: 603). 
 
This chapter examines in closer detail the history of this ‘small and unusual activist 
group’. This story of MKSS grounds the broader debates on ideas of governance, 
democracy and statecraft in India that this thesis explores. Through the history of 
MKSS we get an up-close impression of the ways in which such ideas are 
internalised and configured by anti-corruption activists. By campaigning to enforce 
transparency and accountability measures in governance and to mitigate corruption 
from the bureaucracy, MKSS expresses its commitment to making the state 
responsive to the needs of the poor and to deepening the experience of democracy for 
the common citizen in India. This story illustrates that MKSS’s political conviction is 
in democratic processes and procedures and a reliance on the rule of law; their 
aspiration is to ‘purify’ the state from within by resorting to legal measures and 
institutionalised processes. Their story thus contextualises many of the discussions 
and issues around anti-corruption activism that will be the focus of later chapters. By 
knowing the story of MKSS, we can understand the larger history and context of 
transparency and accountability activism, within which the anti-corruption agitation 
of 2011 (see Chapters Three to Six) is situated. 
 
In order to convey their overall commitment, members of MKSS – particularly its 
leadership – typically recount their own story through a series of tropes. These tropes 
emphasise ‘participation’, ‘local knowledge’ and ‘empowerment’ and signal the 
ways in which they configure ideas of governance and democracy in the field of 
transparency and accountability activism. As we will note, through such tropes the 
MKSS leadership links their particular demands, born in rural Rajasthan, to their 
broader aspirations of improving systems of governance and deepening democracy in 
India. In other words, the tropes enable them to embed their story in a broader 
discursive field. By framing their story around particular tropes, the leadership 
interprets and makes meaningful the events and activities of MKSS to a wider 
audience. In such fashion, through the discursive frames of ‘participation’, ‘local 
knowledge’ and ‘empowerment’, the story of MKSS expresses the faith in 
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democracy of these anti-corruption activists. The following story of MKSS is thus 




History of a Social Movement for Transparency  
 
The story of MKSS, as already suggested, is one that is widely known throughout 
India and beyond. The renown of MKSS can be explained, in part, by the active 
dissemination of the story by members of MKSS, particularly its leadership. They 
tell some version of the story, for instance, in lectures that they give to college 
students and other national or international meetings and conventions. Or it is 
recounted by Aruna, or in biographical accounts of her in news journals, websites, 
scholarly works or in other public fora. It is the story that is told by the various 
members of MKSS to any visitor who visits Devdungri, the village in which the 
entire RTI movement began and that purportedly continues to be the base of MKSS. 
It is a story that makes its way into reports of international organisations, such as 
UNDP or the World Bank, where MKSS is often referred to as a ‘good practice 
showcase’.45  
 
The version of the MKSS story presented here is composed of a compilation of 
sources. During fieldwork I was exposed to countless situations, documents and 
individuals, all of which highlighted MKSS’s role in the enactment of the RTI. Over 
and over again – be it in public meetings, in casual conversations both in rural and 
urban settings, in government offices, in pamphlets on the application of RTI, etc. – I 
heard the same story repeated, that the existence of the RTI is owed to the 
campaigning carried out by MKSS. Nearly everybody I met during the course of 
fieldwork – from a wide spectrum of upper-class Delhiites to subsistence farmers in 
Rajasthan – had at least heard of Aruna and the MKSS. By drawing on the multiple 
stories that I heard and read, and by expanding on the particular details of inclusion 
                                                 
45 See for instance the report for the South Asia Rural Development Group of the World Bank (Shah 
and Agarwal 2005); or discussion paper of UNDP (Mishra 2003).  
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and exclusion by which they vary, I recount the story of MKSS. It is a collage of 
various accounts that I came across during fieldwork.  
 
Within this collage of representations, I place particular emphasis on texts written by 
the MKSS leadership. What emerges out of a close analysis of the texts written by 
the leaders, Aruna and Nikhil (the only two English-speaking members of MKSS), is 
the repetition of the tropes of participation and empowerment. Since the early days of 
MKSS, Aruna and Nikhil have been writing prolifically about the movement, largely 
to an English-speaking audience. Strewn within the story of MKSS as recounted 
below are extracts selected from some of the numerous texts written by Aruna and 
Nikhil. These are mainly taken from published and unpublished articles, notes from 
lectures and public presentations, recorded interviews, pamphlets and circulars. 
Many of these texts are in the public domain, but a large part I gained access to over 
the 18 months I spent with and around the MKSS. My “deep hanging out” (Clifford 
1997; Geertz 1998) with this group of actors, meant that I was allocated temporary 
‘duties’, one such duty being to sort through their old files and emails. I was to select 
the ‘important’ articles to put up onto their website. This gave me access to a wealth 
of texts written by them for a wide range of audiences.  
 
My time spent with MKSS not only facilitated my access to their writings and 
presentations, but, more crucially, it allowed me to contextualise these texts. During 
fieldwork I attended scores of public events organised by and with MKSS and heard 
members of MKSS – particularly its leadership – present their work on countless 
occasions. This enabled me to hear the repeated themes and to note the particular 
anecdotes and stories that found reiteration in their presentations. It is based on 
insights gained from my long-term engagement with MKSS, that I have identified 
the tropes of ‘participation’, ‘local knowledge’ and ‘empowerment’ as featuring 
centrally in MKSS’s account of themselves. These terms were not always employed 
explicitly, but it was the idea behind these terms that was invoked in implicit ways.  
 
The intention in recounting the story of MKSS and the accounts of it by its 
leadership is not to assess its truth or validity or to assess why the story and the 
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related tropes are constructed. Rather, the aim is to explore the discursive field that 
the MKSS produces through which it conveys its broader aspirations. The story of 
MKSS not only tells us of the trajectory of a fascinating social movement that 
campaigned for transparency and accountability legislation. Through the interpretive 
processes by which the story is told, we also understand how the particular 
experiences and experiments in rural Rajasthan link to broader notions of 
governance, democracy and statecraft. In the following account of the history of 
MKSS, emphasis is thus placed on the ways in which those telling the story interpret 
and produce meaning of the events and debates of the movement.  
 
 
Part I: Early Days in Rural Rajasthan 
 
The MKSS story typically goes that it all began in the late 1980s, when a group of 
social activists moved to Devdungri – a village in Rajsamand district in central 
Rajasthan. These activists – Aruna Roy, Shankar Singh and Nikhil Dey – came 
together with “a dream of building an organization for the rural poor” (Kalaw-Tirol, 
no date).46 Their initial years living amongst the villagers in order to grasp the 
ground realities of the poor, led them to a struggle for land redistribution and 
minimum wages, which would in turn instigate a fully-fledged campaign for the right 
to information. 
 
Aruna Roy, Nikhil Dey and Shankar Singh had met in the village of Tilonia at the 
Social Work and Research Centre (SWRC) – an NGO that addresses basic needs of 
the rural poor on issues such as water, housing, health, education and income. The 
approach of SWRC is to empower rural people by equipping them with livelihood 
skills and helping them to develop appropriate technology. Notably, SWRC was set 
up by Bunker Roy – Aruna Roy’s husband.  
 
                                                 
46 Kalaw-Tirol, L. (no date) “Roy, Aruna: Biography” in Ramon Magsaysay Award Foundation 
[accessed 17 October 2013] http://www.rmaf.org.ph/newrmaf/main/awardees/awardee/biography/19 
(Original text has no page numbers). 
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Prior to joining SWRC, Aruna Roy had worked in the Indian Administrative Service 
(IAS). The IAS is one of the most competitive and prestigious departments in the 
government services, considered a ‘plum’ vocation in middle class India for all the 
social, political and financial security it accords (Dogra and Dogra 1998). However, 
already within her first few years in this position, Aruna became disillusioned. 
Rather than catering to the welfare of the people, she found the structures of the IAS 
to be indifferent to the concerns of the poor. As Aruna herself writes of her 
experience at the IAS: “Officialdom is of course as faceless to the people as the 
aggregate of the poor is to the officers. I went to them [the poor] to sort out their 
problems as defined by us… we were trained to maintain our distance” (Roy, no 
date).47 After seven years in the civil service, she renounced the life of comfort that 
this offered her, and joined her husband, who had already set up SWRC in rural 
Rajasthan. Aruna spent the next nine years living and working in Tilonia, the village 
in which SWRC is situated. However, she became increasingly convinced that an 
NGO, such as SWRC, could not tackle deeply rooted structures of inequality, and 
she grew in her conviction that “development is politics and there can be no 
development without political will” (Kalaw-Tirol, no date).  
 
While at SWRC, Aruna met Shankar Singh and Nikhil Dey who would share her 
vision that social change could only come about through political mobilisation. 
Shankar, an extremely talented entertainer gifted with humorous and creative 
communication skills, was in SWRC setting up a ‘rural communication unit’. For 
this he was developing and experimenting with the art of traditional Rajasthani 
cultural resources, such as puppeteering and street-plays. Shankar is of a rural 
background himself but had worked himself up to get a bachelor degree. Before 
ending up in SWRC, Shankar had been through a series of mainly menial jobs, 
ranging from vending kerosene, to minding chickens, to being a chokidar (a night 
guard), to working in an oil mill, a slate factory and an ice factory (Singh 1993).48 At 
SWRC Shankar was able to develop his passion for infusing theatrics with social and 
                                                 
47 Roy, A. (no date) “Redefining Gurus” in Selective Writings, CD compiled and distributed by 
MKSS. Available also on MKSS website http://www.mkssindia.org/writings/mkssandrti/132-
2redefining-gurus/ (Original text has no page numbers). 
48 Singh, S. (1993) “Language of Change” in Seminar: Culture Communication and Change 408. 
(Original text has no page numbers). 
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political messages. However, he remained unconvinced with the overall impact that 
this was having. Shankar himself recounts this apprehension:  
 
We showed Suabai Mrityu Bhoy, a play on funeral expenses that pushes 
a poor family into bondage and further poverty. After 300 performances, 
we still hadn’t heard of a single case where there was resistance to the 
practice. So what was I doing for social change? (Singh 1993) 
 
Through such experiences, Shankar grew in his conviction that meaningful social 
change could only come about by organising people and tackling deeply rooted 
political problems (Singh 1993). His experience at SWRC had instilled in him the 
view that the structures inherent in an NGO would never permit it to go deep enough 
in addressing questions of power. It was this persuasion that drew him to work with 
Aruna.  
 
Nikhil Dey, a young postgraduate student was at that point volunteering in SWRC. 
He had a bachelor of law degree from the Delhi University but had broken off his 
postgraduate studies in the United States to find a ‘more meaningful path’ as a social 
activist (Dogra and Dogra 1998). He had volunteered at various local organisations 
before ending up at SWRC. Nikhil came from a background of privilege, with his 
father a senior Indian Air Force officer, and other family members in significant 
political positions. But Nikhil was driven by a dream of engaging in processes of 
sustainable social and political transformations. He wanted to move to rural India to 
learn about the reality and plights of the poor. His dream found resonance in the 
convictions of Aruna and Shankar who he coincided with at SWRC.  
 
With the “joint conviction that most of the answers to the questions we had lay with 
the people themselves” (Roy, no date), Aruna, Shankar and Nikhil moved to 
Devdungri, a village 160 kilometres south from Tilonia, in 1987.49 With no set 
agenda in mind, the trio endeavoured to live like and amongst villagers and thereby 
learn about the roots of social injustice. They lived frugally, living under the same 
                                                 
49  Devdungri was chosen because Shankar’s sisters in-laws had a house there, that they had 
abandoned as they had moved away in search for work elsewhere.  
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conditions and carrying out similar chores as their fellow villagers. They resolved not 
to take more than the minimum wage that an unskilled labourer received in the area 
(Dogra and Dogra 1998). Their initial stipend came from a research project grant 
they had received; in subsequent years and to this date, this would be replaced by 
private donations from individuals, by other cash awards or by honorariums received 
by members of MKSS for training they give to others. There are several 
sympathisers and supporters who donate to MKSS on a regular basis; other donations 
come sporadically, or when MKSS makes specific funding appeals for particular 
events or purposes.  
 
While experimenting with the type of organisation they would set up, they resolved 
not to operate as an NGO; they would not register as a conventional structure and 
they would not accept any institutional funding. Their experiences at SWRC as well 
as their encounters with other NGOs, had persuaded them that dependency on any 
institutional funding would constrain them from engaging in fundamental political 
change. In India, NGOs are notoriously associated with cover ups for self-serving 
interests and with being largely aloof to the concerns of the poor (Dogra and Dogra 
1998). As Jenkins notes, since the 1970s NGOs in India have been regarded as “a 
kind of lesser species of non-political or even depoliticized social action” (Jenkins 
2007: 64). Reflecting this antipathy towards the category of an NGO, MKSS was 
labelled a ‘people’s organisation’, committed to challenging the inequality and 
inequity of distribution of power in the socio-political structure (see the MKSS 
website). To this date, MKSS is not registered as an NGO but describes itself mainly 
as a non-party political organisation.  
 
The first struggle which Aruna, Shankar and Nikhil would engage in involved a 
dispute over land in the neighbouring village of Sohangarh (Dogra and Dogra 1998). 
Lal Singh from Sohangarh – who would later become one of the founding members 
of MKSS – had become acquainted with the recently arrived trio in Devdungri and 
had sought their support in his village’s ongoing struggle over land. The local 
landlord, from the upper-caste Rajput community, had usurped vast amounts of 
community land, and was levying a tax from residents for collecting wood or grazing 
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cattle on that land (Dey and Sampat 2005).50 Very much entrenched in feudalistic 
structures and practices, he retaliated against any challenges by villagers with force. 
Supported by Aruna, Shankar and Nikhil, the villagers of Sohangarh organised 
themselves as a collective to reclaim their land. They sent applications to government 
administrators demanding the reallocation of their community land. While their 
demand was agreed to on paper, the landlord responded by sending armed men to 
beat up the villagers and activists. Subsequently, the villagers collectively marched to 
the sub divisional headquarters of the area and raised slogans against the landlord. 
With mounting pressure, eventually the landlord was forced to concede. 
 
The confrontation with threats and violence in the struggle against the landlord 
impelled the three activists to form a sangathan (organisation), as a means to unite 
against embedded structures of power (Dey and Sampat 2005). The success in the 
dispute over land in Sohangarh village had bestowed the activists with a degree of 
credibility in the local area and afforded them sweeping support. On 1st May 1990, 
the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) took formal shape. Aside from Aruna, 
Shankar and Nikhil, all the other ten founding members were from the local area, 
themselves labourers or farmers. On this historic May Day, hundreds of villagers 
pledged their allegiance to the MKSS. To this day, MKSS consists of approximately 
ten full-time members who receive the minimum wage, and thousands of members 
from Rajasthan and beyond who assert their support.  
 
On the day that the MKSS was formed, all the villagers gathered made a pledge to 
not accept anything less than the minimum wage when employed in public works 
(Dey and Sampat 2005). This led MKSS subsequently to undertake a series of 
struggles around minimum wages. Typically, the state or central governments 
allocates funds to a panchayat (village council) for a particular development project. 
Particularly in Rajasthan, prone to severe droughts, the state has run regular drought 
relief programmes, whereby works are set up to provide relief through productive 
employment. Under the Minimum Wages Act, every state has to conform to its 
                                                 
50  Dey, N. and P. Sampat, (2005) “Bare Acts and Collective Explorations: The MKSS Experience 
with the Right to Information”, in M. Narula, S. Sengupta, J. Bagchi and G. Lovink (eds.) Bare Acts, 
Sarai Media Lab, New Delhi.  (Original text has no page numbers). 
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statutory minimum wage. However, on the rarest of occasions does a worker – even 
if working under a Government sanctioned programme – actually receive the 
minimum wage, with the allocated money being pocketed along the chain of 
government administration.  
 
Minimum wage issues started being raised more and more often, and the MKSS was 
constantly confronted with the need to secure workers’ livelihoods. By 1991 they 
held their first dharna (sit-in demonstration) in the sub divisional headquarters of the 
area, demanding their minimum wage (Dey and Sampat 2005). Workers who had 
toiled away on the construction of a water dam in the village of Dadi Rapat were 
being paid far less than what was their due. The Junior Engineer, who had been in 
charge of measuring and verifying the construction site, had closed the files and 
refused inspection – an obvious sign for the villagers that he was complicit in the 
extortion of the project funds (Mishra 2003). The dharna was lifted after a series of 
negotiations with the administration led to an agreement to raise the wages. Already 
in these early days of MKSS, their campaigning involved a combination of 
grassroots mobilisation with protests and agitations, as well as technical negotiations 
with government administration. This combination would continue throughout the 
RTI movement, whereby the latter would be escalated at later stages of the 
campaign.  
 
As the minimum wage struggles grew, the importance of access to panchayat records 
became ever clearer to MKSS members. When labourers demanded their minimum 
wages they were told that the records proved that they had not worked sufficiently to 
merit the full minimum wage. However, these records were not made available to 
them on the grounds that they were confidential, protected under the extant colonial 
Official Secrets Act (1923). When MKSS members sought to access documents, 
such as muster rolls,51 they were denied these on a range of ludicrous grounds such 
as that they had been “‘eaten by cows’, ‘disappeared with a strong gust of wind’, 
concealed inside the vest of a ‘mate’52 from where it could not be snatched, and very 
                                                 
51 ‘Muster roll’ is the term used both in English and in Hindi in India for ‘attendance register’. 
52 ‘Mate’ is the term used both in English and in Hindi in India for ‘worksite supervisor’. 
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often not there at all” (MKSS, no date, a).53 It was thus in fighting for minimum 
wages under the development programmes that the MKSS first understood the 
significance of transparency and the right to information. Accessing records was 
important so as to prevent corruption, obtain the minimum wage, and ensure that 
infrastructure actually got built (Jenkins and Goetz 1999: 604). 
 
It was out of these experiences of unyielding resistance by government officials that 
the demand to access government records and documents began to emerge. 
According to these accounts of the history of MKSS, it was the experiences of poor 
farmers and labourers themselves that led to the recognition that access to 
information would be indispensable in exposing the rampant corruption and 
anomalies in the implementation of government programmes. This recognition, as 
part two of the story will recount, would eventually lead to the formulation of 
transparency and accountability legislation and to the state-wide and later nation-
wide Right to Information movement. According to this account, notions of 
transparency and accountability emerged directly out of tangible encounters with 
corruption faced by villagers and farmers and was rooted in the action and 
participation of ordinary villagers. 
 
 
‘Participation’ and ‘local knowledge’ 
 
‘Participation’ of villagers is a trope that finds repetition in many accounts made by 
the MKSS leadership. This trope signals that the RTI movement stems from demands 
rooted in the grassroots, whereby it was poor and marginalised farmers and labourers 
who directly shaped the movement. What is emphasised in this account is that the 
struggle was born out of the fundamental livelihood and social justice concerns of the 
poor, who themselves identified access to information as a means to tackle 
exploitation and the abuse of power. This ethos is captured in one of the many 
                                                 
53 MKSS (no date, a) “From Information to Accountability: Reclaiming Democracy” in Selective 
Writings, CD compiled and distributed by MKSS. Available also on MKSS website: 
http://www.mkssindia.org/writings/mkssandrti/from-information-to-accountability-reclaiming-
democracy/ (Original text has no page numbers). 
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slogans that are repeatedly chanted in most MKSS events: ‘jaane ka haq, jeene ka 
haq’ (the right to know is the right to live). The participation of the rural poor in 
determining the contours of the movement comes out in public presentations by the 
MKSS leadership, such as in the following Narayan Reddy Memorial lecture given 
by Aruna in 2000:54 
  
It is [the poor] who speak with numbers and who have been willing to 
risk even their own fragile existence for change. More often than not, 
they are right. That is why, despite the astonishment repeatedly aired by 
outside observers, it has not surprised us that the radical postulates of the 
Right to Information movement in Rajasthan have been formulated and 
worked out by a group of poor, largely illiterate rural Rajasthani workers. 
It is they who have for the first time defined the right to information not 
only as part of the freedom of expression but also as part of the right to 
livelihood and survival. (Roy 2000)55 
 
What is noteworthy about the emphasis on the participation of ordinary villagers is 
that they are not merely presented as participants in the movement, but are portrayed 
as the actual architects of the demand for information. In this account, the demand 
for RTI was formulated as a means to tackle direct and tangible forms of corruption 
and is thus rooted in the real and urgent needs of the poor. Such accounts accentuate 
the grassroots nature of the movement. Not only did villagers contribute to the 
movement, but it was their local knowledge and experiences that gave substance to 
the demand for RTI. This elevation of ‘local knowledge’ by the MKSS leadership is 
another interrelated trope repeatedly used in their presentations of MKSS.   
 
Villagers are typically represented by the MKSS leadership as having deep 
understandings of questions of transparency and accountability. Being rooted in 
personal and practical experiences of injustice, rural populations are depicted as 
engaging out of true commitment and conviction. The attempt is here to show “how 
vital the perspective of the so called marginalised is for the health of a democracy” 
                                                 
54 Narayan Reddy was a poet and writer from Andhra Pradesh. A lecture in his memory is held every 
year at the Indian institute of World Culture in Bangalore. 
55 Roy, A. (2000) “Information, Democracy and Ethics” in Selective Writings, CD compiled and 
distributed by MKSS. Available also on: http://www.mkssindia.org/writings/mkssandrti/120-
2information-ethics/  (Original text has no page numbers). 
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(Roy and Dey 2001: 2). The championing of ‘local knowledge’ of the poor is  
repeated in several presentations by the MKSS leadership, such as the following one, 
describing the early days of the movement:  
 
The many meetings in which [the malfunctioning system of governance] 
was debated, led to the beginnings of the movement we now call the 
People’s Right to Information Campaign. Illiterate men and women in 
one of the more backward parts of Central Rajasthan sat and pondered 
over how this impasse could be met. No intellectual or university trained 
social activist found the answer. It was Mohanji, Narayan, Lal Singh, 
Chuni Singh, Sushila, and many others who steadfastly maintained that if 
the records did not see the light of day, no position we took could be 
vindicated by ‘objective’ data. (Roy 2000)56 
 
This excerpt suggests that it was simple, often illiterate villagers who conceived of a 
mechanism through which to enforce transparency and accountability in government 
structures. According to this account, no amount of intellectual deliberation on 
transparency and accountability could have contrived something as straightforward, 
yet as potent, as access to official documents and records. It was villagers, rooted in 
their daily local realities, who identified information as the tool with which to access 
their rights and entitlements. This elevation of local knowledge is further illustrated 
in the following excerpt: 
 
The question most often asked – by outside observers – is how is it that a 
set of largely illiterate and poor rural people have chosen to formulate, 
and so clearly articulate a demand for something as academic sounding 
as the right to information? The underlying assumption is that such a 
demand and its linkages to issues critical to the lives of the poor could 
only have been identified, formulated and articulated by intellectuals, 
politicians, and theoreticians – all of whom are the ‘real’ architects of 
political thought… To do so is a fallacy, which would amount to 
ignoring the roots of the movement. The potency of these demands have 
emerged because they have been rooted in a commitment to articulate 
paradigms of change through action and a healthy respect for the 
instincts of those with a vested interest in such change. (MKSS, no date, 
a) 
 
                                                 




Statements such as these highlight the importance which the MKSS leadership places 
on ‘local knowledge’ and the ‘participation’ of the rural poor. In these accounts, what 
granted the RTI movement its success was precisely the close participation of the 
rural poor. Accordingly, in the course of the RTI movement, citizens could actively 
participate in decision-making processes that affected their lives and shaped the 
demand for the RTI in ways that served their local needs. Herein ideas of 
participation feed into broader understandings of democracy. Making democracy 
work, so we are informed by much of the development literature, requires informed 
and active citizens who understand how to voice their interests, act collectively and 
hold public officials accountable. Participatory democracy typically emphasises the 
broad participation of constituents in the direction and operation of political systems.  
 
This emphasis on participation is reflected in contemporary development policy and 
practice, where, since the 1980s, a participatory approach has dominated the 
development agenda. Such approaches emerged as an alternative to previous more 
technocratic and top-down approaches to development that assumed the superiority 
of ‘specialist knowledge’ over ‘local knowledge’ (Yarrow 2011: 108). Instead, in a 
participatory approach, beneficiaries are regarded as active participants in the 
planning and implementation of a project. Participatory approaches to development 
postulate that the participation of beneficiaries is a mechanism by which to 
strengthen local accountability and democracy and thereby expand the “important 
goal of development in the context of ‘good governance’ aims” (Gardner and Lewis 
1996: 112). 
 
The participatory approaches to development are manifested, for instance, in 
Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) programmes that have been in vogue in the field 
of international development since the 1990s, and that are geared towards enabling 
rural populations to contribute to the planning of a programme with their own 
knowledge and insights. PRA has been criticized by anthropologists as being a 
‘quick fix’ solution (Gardner and Lewis 1996: 114) and as conceptualising ‘the local’ 
as a harmonious community and thereby as essentialising the poor (Mosse 2005; 
Cook and Kothari 2001; Nelson and Wright 1995). This resonates with other 
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critiques on the participatory approach to development. Particularly ‘post-
development’ critics and anthropologists have challenged some of the politics and 
complexities of participation of the so-called beneficiaries. Some have argued that 
participatory approaches in development employ vague notions of ‘community’ and 
thereby mask differences and inequalities between people (Gardner and Lewis 1996); 
others have shown that such approaches get co-opted from below as much as 
imposed from above so that they fail to deliver truly bottom-up approaches (Mosse 
2001: 32); yet others have argued that the emphasis on the micro-level of 
participatory approaches masks, and consequently fails to challenge, macro-level 
processes (Cook and Kothari 2001: 5) and that the rhetoric of participation is a 
restructuring of control (Ribot 1996).In other words, participatory approaches are 
viewed as a ‘softened top-downism’ that removes all radical connotations of 
participation (Rahnema 1992). 
 
The MKSS leadership equates the participation of the rural poor in processes of 
demanding transparent and accountable governance to increased democratisation. As 
they state in one of their accounts of the history of MKSS, the RTI movement “has 
shown that ethical issues when raised by even a small group of committed people can 
positively and fundamentally affect the democratic discourse… This debate has 
opened new possibilities in participatory democracy” (Roy 2000). In other words, 
because of the central involvement of the rural poor and illiterate, the RTI movement 
is presented as a truly democratic movement that expands the ways in which 
democracy is discussed and experienced in India.  
 
 
Part II: Public Hearings and the Campaign for RTI 
 
By 1994, MKSS had conceived of a novel strategy for bringing people together to 
expose public corruption in an open and participatory manner: it came up with the 
model of a jan sunwai (public hearing), wherein villagers became the principle actors 
in uncovering government malpractices. The concept of a jan sunwai was ignited 
when an old man requested MKSS’S support in getting the minimum wages due to 
84 
 
him for work done on a drought-relief related public work project in his village of 
Kot Kirana. To probe into this, MKSS members sought access to copies of the 
muster rolls of the work in question, but were refused these by the sarpanch (elected 
village headman) and secretary of Kot Kirana. However, the Block Development 
Officer, one level above in the administrative structure, serendipitously gave them 
permission to view the records and note down the details (Dogra and Dogra 1998). 
The discovery of rampant corruption that the records revealed prompted MKSS to 
come up with a method whereby the revelations of the information could be shared 
publicly with the entire village. Thus, on 2 December 1994 the first jan sunwai was 
organised in the village of Kot Kirana (Dey and Sampat 2005).  
 
At this first jan sunwai, MKSS presented the information they had collected to all the 
villagers gathered under the pandal (a colourful tent-like structure to provide shade) 
that had been set up for the occasion. Information from the obtained records was read 
out over a microphone to all those assembled, including the names of workers listed 
on the muster rolls, the amounts of money purportedly paid to them and details of 
various materials claimed to have been used in the construction. One by one the 
people whose names were called out as having worked on a particular project came 
forward to testify whether or not they had worked as stated on record. Many 
announced that they had never been at the work site. Some of the names listed on the 
muster roll could not be identified by any of the gathered villagers at all, while still 
other names were found to be of people long dead (Roy 2000). It was exposed that 
the names on the muster rolls had been copied from the electoral rolls of the village, 
as both rolls had the identical mistakes of names of non-residents and dead people. 
When bills for construction materials and labour were read out, people learned that 
certain buildings in the area had been listed as completed on official records, yet in 
reality they had been left half-built or had not been constructed at all (Dogra and 
Dogra 1998).   
 
With this experiment with their first jan sunwai, MKSS had hit upon a simple yet 
potent method of exposing corruption. They were bringing into being very tangible 
practices of transparency and accountability, made meaningful to villagers with their 
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recognisable idioms. What made this method effective, in the words of the MKSS 
leadership, was that “it has been conducted in a comfortable, informal idiom of 
conversation and exchange. Yet it has all the seriousness and impartiality of court 
proceedings” (MKSS, no date, a). The association with a court was generated 
through a panel of ‘judges’ that had been invited for the occasion. Individuals with 
eminence in public life that Aruna Roy knew from her past life at the IAS – mainly 
urban-based journalists, bureaucrats, academics, lawyers, activists etc. – had been 
invited to preside over the jan sunwai as ‘neutral’ observers. In all the jan sunwais to 
follow, the format of having a panel of ‘judges’ to observe the proceedings would be 
replicated.  
 
Following the jan sunwai in Kot Kirana, a series of further public hearings were 
held, based on any information members of MKSS were able to gather. Since a law 
granting access to information was not yet in place, MKSS had to rely largely on the 
goodwill of individual bureaucrats in providing records pertaining to government 
works in particular villages. Although most of these initial jan sunwais faced hurdles 
and acts of hostility of some kind, on the whole, they were proving to be effective in 
exposing the rampant corruption that village development projects were prey to (Dey 
and Sampat 2005). Furthermore, they were providing an unprecedented platform for 
villagers to speak up against those in power. The face-to-face dialogue that the jan 
sunwais enabled, brought home the need for accountability and the urgency and 
importance of citizens’ participation in matters of governance (Mander 2003). Jan 
sunwais not only demonstrated the importance of being able to access information, 
but also the critical need to have a platform controlled by citizens where this 
information could be put to use (Roy and Dey, no date).57 The politicising nature of 
such a public hearing is noted by Jenkins and Goetz who report: “jan sunwais not 
only exposed the misdeeds of local politicians, government engineers and private 
contractors – in a number of cases leading to voluntary restitution – but also 
demonstrated the potential for collective action among groups that tend to shun 
organised ‘political’ activity” (Jenkins and Goetz 1999: 605). 
                                                 
57 Roy, A. and N. Dey (no date) “Fighting for the Right to Know in India” in Global Network of 
Freedom and Information Advocates [accessed 17 October 2013] 





Figure 1 Villager ‘testifying’ at a jan sunwai (image courtesy of MKSS) 
 
 
It was with these direct confrontations and experiences with corruption in villages in 
central Rajasthan that MKSS began engaging in a broader campaign for the access to 
information. It had by now become evident to them that the most effective way of 
fighting corruption at the local level would be to provide people with the right to 
obtain copies of official records relating to rural development and anti-poverty 
programmes implemented in their areas (Dogra and Dogra 1998). They began to 
wage a legal battle with the government to enact a right to information law. Their 
endeavours appeared to have a ray of hope when in April 1995 the Chief Minister 
announced in the State Legislative Assembly that Rajasthan would be the first state 
in the country to grant citizens the right to obtain photocopies of documents of local 
development works for a fee (Dey and Sampat 2005). However, an entire year later, 
this promise had still not been implemented.  
 
In response to the failed implementation of the Chief Minister’s promise, in May 
1996, exactly one year after the assurance had been stated, MKSS decided to launch 
a fully-fledged campaign for the Right to Information. The campaign began with a 
40-day dharna in Beawar, a small town strategically located in the centre of 
Rajasthan. The demand was for the issuance of an administrative order to enforce the 
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right to information allowing citizens to obtain certified photocopies of any 
documents in local panchayat offices (Dogra and Dogra 1998). The dharna in 
Beawar created quite a stir and received widespread attention. Harsh Mander, then a 
high-ranking civil servant officer and friend of Aruna’s, had attended the site of 
protest to lend his support. His impassioned account of what he observed in the town 
of Beawar is worth citing at some length:  
 
Each day since the launching of the dharna meanwhile witnessed an 
unprecedented upsurge of homespun idealism in the small town of 
Beawar and the surrounding countryside.  Donations in cash and kind 
poured in daily from ordinary local people, including vegetables and 
milk from small vendors, sacks of wheat from farmers in surrounding 
villages, tents, voluntary services of cooking, serving cold water, 
photography and so on, and cash donations from even the poorest. … 
Even more significant was the daily assembly of over 500 people in the 
heat of the tent, listening to speeches and joining in for slogans, songs 
and rallies.  Active support cut across all class and political barriers.  
Rich shopkeepers and professionals to daily wage labourers, and the 
entire political spectrum from the right wing fringe to communist trade 
unions extended vocal and enthusiastic support. (Mander and Joshi 
1999)58 
 
The dharna was finally called off when the government agreed in principle to the 
formulation of the law and to setting up a committee to work out the details of 
implementation (Dey and Sampat 2005). However, this again proved to be a hollow 
promise. When the committee submitted its report, the government, unperturbed by 
the blatant paradox, declared it a ‘secret’ document (MKSS, no date, a). 
 
By this time MKSS had scaled up its campaigning for the RTI legislation to a state-
wide level. It had stepped up efforts to establish state level and national level 
linkages with other activist groups, lawyers, officials and media persons so that the 
struggle for the right to information could be broadened (Dogra and Dogra 1998). 
With public meetings, rallies and truck yatras (popular mobilisation journeys) being 
conducted by MKSS throughout the state, widespread support was amassed. In 1997 
another indefinite dharna was held, this time in Jaipur, the state capital (Dey and 
                                                 
58 Mander, H. and A. Joshi (1999), “Article 4: The Movement to RTI in India: People’s Power for the 
Control of Corruption” in Selective Writings, CD compiled and distributed by MKSS. (Original text 
has no page numbers). 
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Sampat 2005). The specific demand was again the right to make photocopies of 
government documents, along with the general demand for a Right to Information 
law. This dharna in Jaipur was to attract national attention and a surge of support for 
MKSS (Dogra and Dogra 1998).  
 
As was common practice by then at all MKSS public events, this dharna also 
employed the various modes of mobilisation that MKSS had been refining over the 
years, combining ‘education’ with ‘entertainment’. Shankar Singh, who had begun 
experimenting with his talent for performing at the SWRC, had over the years since 
then been developing various cultural modes of communication. Songs, skits, slogans 
and puppets were used to convey their message and attract people. Lyrics of popular 
folk songs, for example, were adapted using satirical texts, so that the tune was 
recognisable by rural populations, yet the meaning had been given a political twist. 
 
At the dharna in Jaipur a novel satirical performance was conceived, one that was to 
be repeated many times in the years to come.  It was contrived in direct response to 
LK Advani, president of the nationalist party BJP, who had entered Rajasthan as part 
of his national rath yatra (chariot pilgrimage) with a call to wipe out ‘bhay, bhuk’ 
and ‘brashtachar’ (fear, hunger and corruption).59 It was Advani’s party – the BJP – 
that had refused to implement Rajasthan’s Chief Minister’s assurance on the right to 
information and Advani himself had shown disdain for the demand for RTI (MKSS, 
no date, a). In response, MKSS came up with the ghotala rath yatra (chariot of 
scams), a dramatic and satirical spoof on the nation’s mis-governance and an ironical 
celebration of the spirit of corruption. The ghotala rath yatra combined politics, 
bureaucracy and theatre in a creative and captivating form. Here is an illustrative 
description of such a ‘chariot of scams’ as described by members of MKSS 
themselves: 
 
                                                 
59 A rath yatra is a form of political mobilisation used on numerous occasions by L.K. Advani to 
spread his party’s message. A rath yatra has religious undertones, deriving from a yearly Hindu 
festivity in which deities are paraded through the streets on chariots. The most infamous rath yatra of 
Advani was the Ram rath yatra that was linked to the dispute over the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya.  
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In contrast to Advani’s air conditioned Rath, the “Ghotala Rath” was 
erected on a handcart that vendors use to sell their wares. Placed on the 
handcart was a garishly adorned chair topped by an umbrella. This served 
as the canopy, from which hung several cardboard placards enlisting the 
notorious scams of the last ten years. A swashbuckling Kamdar 
reminiscent of the feudal past of Rajasthan marched at the head of the 
procession. The neta sat on the chair, wearing a white pajama kurta, and 
a saffron scarf. (MKSS, no date, a)60 
 
As the procession drew in the curious crowds, the archetypal neta (politician), acted 
by Shankar, would revel in his power by shouting out his sarcastic election promises: 
“Public schools are defunct so I promise more private schools!”; “Drought areas will 
be provided with bottled Bisleri water!”;61 “I promise free alcohol for all!”, and other 
such promises that touched upon the heart of corruption and political hypocrisy. The 
ghotala rath yatra and the entertainment it sparked was yet another indication of 
MKSS’s (particularly Shankar’s) mastery in mobilisation and theatrics.  
 
 
Figure 2 Shankar as the corrupt neta (photo courtesy of MKSS) 
 
 
                                                 
60 This is the emblematic attire of politicians in India, symbolized through India’s first Prime Minister, 
Jawaharlal Nehru.  
61 Bisleri is a brand of bottled water in India. 
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The 53-day sit-in in Jaipur ended with the government of Rajasthan announcing that 
people would be entitled to access panchayat accounts and to procure certified 
copies. Despite falling short of a comprehensive RTI law, the MKSS welcomed this 
new development and seized the opportunity. They mobilised people to make use of 
the recent entitlement and set about conducting another spate of public hearings.  
 
Concurrently, MKSS’s demand for a comprehensive Right to Information law 
persisted. In 1999, the Congress party came to power in Rajasthan with the promise 
to implement the law at the top of their party manifesto (MKSS, no date, a). With a 
new Chief Minister receptive to the RTI, the process of lawmaking began. A 
committee was formed to draft the RTI legislation. Initially this committee consisted 
exclusively of bureaucrats, but after sustained negotiations and demands, MKSS 
members were included to make recommendations and identify essential features for 
a transparency law. The Right to Information Act of Rajasthan was finally passed in 
2000. The Act fell short of various provisions that MKSS had vehemently been 
insisting on, but nonetheless, the legal entitlement to access and photocopy 
information that Rajasthan’s new RTI Act authorized was greeted by MKSS as a 
move in the right direction (MKSS, no date, a).62  
 
While MKSS was campaigning for a state-level RTI law in Rajasthan, a national 
campaign was taking shape, making a similar demand of the Central Government. 
The National Campaign for People’s Right to Information (NCPRI) was formed in 
1996, with Aruna and Nikhil from the MKSS as its backbone figures. Other members 
included urban-based social activists, journalists, lawyers, professionals, retired civil 
servants and academics. NCPRI drafted a national RTI legislation that was submitted 
to the government and would form the foundation of the final RTI Act. The NCPRI 
would continue to play a central role in putting sustained pressure on the government 
to enact a nation-wide RTI law, which it finally did in 2005. (A more detailed 
account of the campaigning of NCPRI at the national level will follow in Chapter 
Two). 
                                                 
62 The provisions MKSS had insisted on included, amongst others, a stipulated time limit for 
providing information, regulated penalties imposed on any officials denying information, and the 





Trope of ‘empowerment’ 
 
The RTI Act is widely presented as a progressive and emancipatory piece of 
legislation that gives power to the aam aadmi to ask questions from the government. 
The MKSS leadership, in its accounts of the RTI Act and the movement that brought 
it about, consistently emphasises the empowering nature of the RTI. It attributes the 
success of the RTI movement to being both the product and the producer of 
empowerment of rural populations. ‘Empowerment’, along with ‘participation’ and 
‘local knowledge’, constitutes another key trope that finds reiteration in the accounts 
of MKSS by its leadership. Through this trope of empowerment, the enactment of the 
Right to Information is portrayed as a catalyst of broader engagement with political 
debates. In this light, the specific demand for access to records and documents is 
presented as permitting villagers to raise larger questions on democracy, 
participation, citizenship, power etc. This increased political empowerment enabled 
through the RTI comes out, for instance, in the following statement by the MKSS 
leadership: 
 
The Right to Information movement in Rajasthan has developed into a 
spearhead which has opened up the possibility of a new kind of political 
activism, sown the seeds of fresh political alternatives, and has become 
part of an emerging political ideology. The people of Rajasthan have 
engaged the State in a historic struggle, which has begun to withdraw the 
power structures of Governance. It has provided a vibrant new definition 
to democratic functioning, especially from the point of view of the poor 
and the oppressed, seized the initiative in the battle against corruption, 
and perhaps most importantly, pointed out that the framework of 
citizenship and democracy can be so defined that the ordinary, oppressed 
and poor can be at the nerve centre of governance. (MKSS, no date, b)63 
 
                                                 
63 MKSS (no date, b) “Beyond Information: Breaching the Wall of State Inaction”, in Selective 
Writings, CD compiled and distributed by MKSS. Available also on MKSS website: 
http://www.mkssindia.org/writings/beyond-information-breaching-the-wall-of-state-inaction/ 
(Original text has no page number).  
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The demand for the RTI is thus presented by MKSS as an empowering tool and a 
substantive mechanism for addressing questions of governance and democracy. More 
than simply being a means to tackle corruption, RTI is a medium for people to 
participate in questions of governance and to shift entrenched power structures. The 
right to access official information “begins the process of shared decision-making, 
and consequently the sharing of power” (Roy 2000). This ethos is further 
encapsulated in the following extract:  
 
One of the features of the struggle for the Right to Information is that it 
has facilitated the narrowing of the gap between precept and practice in 
our public and private lives. It has provided a framework where all of us 
are encouraged to participate more overtly in politics and governing 
ourselves. It has shown us that in this vast Democracy what we do, can, 
and does matter. (Roy 2000) 
 
The RTI is thus presented as a tool for the just distribution of power. An aphorism 
often repeated by Aruna in lectures and public presentations in relation to this is: “we 
must speak truth to power, make truth powerful and power truthful”. This emphasis 
on the empowering nature of the RTI is further asserted by Aruna and Nikhil who 
state elsewhere:  
 
The RTI is finally a demand for an equal share of power. But it is at the 
same time, a fetter on the arbitrary exercise of power by anyone. Its 
legitimacy in a democratic set up gives it the potential to keep extending 
the borders of struggles for empowerment and change. This legitimacy is 
further strengthened by its capacity to make transparent and accountable 
the user of the right as much as the power centre it is being used against. 
(Roy and Dey, no date)64 
 
The trope of ‘empowerment’ signals that the success of the RTI movement lies in its 
engagement with broader questions of governance and democracy. The term 
empowerment in development literature typically conveys the idea of people 
becoming agents of their own development, whereby they gain the necessary 
                                                 
64 Roy, A. and N. Dey (no date) “Fighting for the Right to Know in India” in Freedom of Information 





resources, assets, and capabilities to demand accountability from those who hold 
power. Such literature premises that the increased participation of beneficiaries in 
development intervention will lead to their sense of ownership and, consequently, to 
their empowerment. Empowerment is a largely elusive term, but is typically defined 
as a reworking of social relationships in favour of the less powerful. The World 
Bank’s 2002 Sourcebook, for instance, makes the links between participation and 
empowerment explicit, when it defines empowerment as “the expansion of assets and 
capabilities of poor people to participate in, negotiate with, influence, control, and 
hold accountable institutions that affect their lives” (Bebbington et al. 2007: 602).  
 
In this way, there is a conceptual linkage between empowerment and democratic 
governance, in that both share a concern with citizens’ ability to exercise control 
over state power. By emphasising empowerment of the rural poor in their account of 
MKSS, the MKSS leadership is thus inferring its ideas of democratic governance. 
The story of MKSS is a story of empowered citizens who deepened democratic 
processes by demanding and shaping better policies, expressing grievances, seeking 
justice and holding political leaders to account. 
 
 
The Discursive Field of MKSS 
 
To briefly recapitulate the story of MKSS as recounted above: MKSS is a grassroots 
movement that used innovative modes of struggle and constructive action to improve 
the lives of its primary constituents – the rural poor. It is an organisation that grew 
from mobilizing demands for the access to details of public expenditure at the local 
level in central Rajasthan, to eventually spearheading the national Right to 
Information movement in India. MKSS famously used the demand for access to 
government records as a tool to draw attention to the underpayment of daily wage 
earners and farmers on government projects, and more generally, to expose 
corruption in government expenditure. MKSS used many innovative strategies to 
achieve its goals of bringing social justice and dignity to the rural poor, such as 
conducting sit-ins, rallies, and campaigns, as well as creative communication through 
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music, puppets, and street theatre. MKSS came up with the model of jan sunwais 
wherein official records of state development projects were exposed to the scrutiny 
of the beneficiaries. The public hearings proved very successful in drawing attention 
to corruption and exposing leakages in the system. As we heard through the words of 
its leadership, in demanding a law for the Right to Information, MKSS was 
establishing the importance of being part of the democratic framework in which 
people would be assured accountable and transparent forms of governance.  
 
In this account of the history of MKSS, emphasis was placed on the discursive 
frames used by the MKSS leadership in telling their own story. We noted a series of 
tropes that ran through their accounts of the history of MKSS, including those of 
‘participation’, ‘local knowledge’ and ‘empowerment’. The MKSS leadership drew 
on such tropes and anecdotes in order to translate their particular experiences in rural 
Rajasthan into a broader discursive field of governance, democracy and statecraft. By 
highlighting the central participation of the rural poor in the formulation of ideas of 
transparency and by emphasising the empowering nature of their movement, they 
could convey their broader aspirations of improving systems of governance and 
deepening democracy in India. Through such tropes, the story moved beyond being a 
description of particular activities and demands by labourers and farmers in rural 
Rajasthan, to reflecting on more extensive questions of governance and democracy.  
 
In order to understand the work that the tropes do in MKSS’s story, we may draw on 
Snow’s (2004) notion of ‘discursive fields’ and ‘master frames’. Discursive fields, 
according to Snow, provide the framework through which social movement actors 
can frame several disparate ideas and events, weaving them together into an 
integrated and coordinated interpretation. In other words, discursive fields contain 
the genres that actors can draw on to construct and contest meaning in a contextually 
related terrain. Similarly, master frames are elastic and flexible frames that move 
beyond particularised and contextual meaning; they can be deployed in a diversity of 
settings by aligning to wider discourses. Master frames thus link the specific 
activities and beliefs of a social movement with a broader terrain, or discursive field. 
In this conceptualisation, ideas of governance and democracy can be thought of as 
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the ‘master frames’, or as the ‘discursive field’ through which the story of MKSS is 
interpreted. Through such frames, the MKSS leadership can present its story by 
moving beyond the particular occurrences in Rajasthan and ascribing to a broader 
discursive terrain. The discursive field of democratic governance allows the 
leadership to produce and maintain meaning to a broader audience.  
 
In framing the particular events and occurrences in rural Rajasthan within broader 
discourses of governance and democracy, the MKSS leadership is doing similar 
work to the development actors studied by Mosse who invest their energies in 
maintaining coherent representations of their projects, regardless of whether these 
correlate to actual practice. For instance, as participatory models that are employed 
by development actors “are often more part of the way projects work as systems of 
representation, oriented upwards and outwards to wider policy goals and institutions 
that secure reputation and funding (or inwards as self-representation), than part of 
their operational system” (Mosse 2004: 657). A development project’s ‘success’ thus 
derives from intelligible representations, rather than from actual outcomes. This idea 
draws on Latour, who notes that success derives from constant work of composition 
in which heterogeneous ideas “are tied together by translation of one kind or another 
into the material and conceptual order of a successful project” (Latour 2000, cited in 
Mosse 2004: 647). The crucial role of translation and representation in the work of 
development is developed further by Lewis and Mosse when they state:  
 
The overall system can be stabilized only when actors are able to 
reconstruct the network of interactions through the creation of coherent 
representations, which they do through a process of ‘translation’ that 
permits the negotiation of common meanings and definitions and the 
mutual enrolment and cooperation into individual and collective 
objectives and activities. (Lewis and Mosse 2006a: 14)  
 
Such a focus on translation enables an understanding of the ways in which actors 
operate to stabilise interpretations and to produce meaning. By framing their story 
within the broader discursive fields of democratic participation and empowerment, 
the MKSS leadership is making its story intelligible and meaningful. Similar findings 
are made by Webb in his study of the ‘success stories’ used by RTI activists in Delhi. 
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Success stories, according to Webb, are a narrative technique used by activists to 
persuade the public of their effectiveness and to make their work known. By 
reproducing these stories in a wide range of public spaces, the stories themselves 
“become artefacts, tools for and symbols of the movement” (Webb 2010: 297). 
Similarly, the tropes that are reiterated in the account of MKSS can be thought of as 
a technique through which the credibility of MKSS as an organisation committed to 
the public good is constructed. By embedding their story in the ‘broader enveloping 
context’ of democratic governance, their story can be interpreted and rendered 
significant to a wider audience.  
 
 
Brokers of meaning 
 
It is important to remind ourselves at this point of who exactly is doing the work of 
translating and framing the story of MKSS. While assertions are typically made on 
behalf of MKSS as a whole, it is predominantly Aruna and Nikhil, the leaders of 
MKSS, who are engaged in most of the framing processes. This point is significant, 
for, as has been pointed out in much of social movements literature, leaders are 
critical to social movements in that “they inspire commitment, mobilize resources, 
create and recognise opportunities, devise strategies, frame demands and influence 
outcomes” (Morris and Staggenborg 2004: 171; Diani 2003). It is the privileged 
background of leaders, typically from the educated middle and upper classes, that 
facilitates their role as translators, and that provide them with the intellectual skills to 
frame their work for wider audiences. In development literature, such leaders have 
been referred to as ‘interface actors’ or as ‘brokers of meaning’ (Bierschenk et al. 
2000; Hilhorst 2003; Lewis and Mosse 2006a; Long 2001; Olivier de Sardan 2005).  
 
Aruna and Nikhil, with their elite upper-class background, represent such 
intermediary figures, in that they are able to interface between more than one social 
configuration (Long 2001). In their capacity as interface actors who are able to 
translate the demands that arise on the ground into broader discursive fields, the 
97 
 
MKSS leadership can be thought to function as ‘brokers of meaning’. Brokers of 
meaning, according to Hilhorst’s definition, are able to bridge different life worlds 
and to forge social relations (Hilhorst 2003: 189). In the context of development, 
they are actors who derive their power from their knowledge of international 
discourses and their ability to transform these to fit their own political agendas. The 
social standing of brokers allows them to master a range of development discourses 
and to thus act as development interfaces. Brokers mediate between different 
knowledge systems, such as the language of development and the local language 
(Olivier de Sardan 2005). Bierschenk et al. (2000) coined the term ‘development 
broker’, referring to intermediaries who contribute to the influx of external resources 
from the development sector to a locality, where they play a significant political role.  
 
As Lewis and Mosse (2006a) point out, the ‘broker’ is a classic figure in the history 
of political anthropology. Brokers have been variously studied as social actors who 
serve as a link between two cultural systems, and who can thus be thought of as 
‘interstitial brokers’ (Wolf 1958). Brokers thus fill a ‘gap’ between clients, such as 
local populations, and patrons, such as political office-holders or candidates bearing 
status. Particularly in India, the existence of a particular type of broker has been 
associated with the blurred boundaries that exist between ‘state’ and ‘society’. Bailey 
(1960) who wrote on brokerage in the then recently Independent India, saw brokers 
as actors who employ their skills and knowledge to mediate between villagers’ 
demands and the Indian state. It is only through brokers that many people come to 
experience the state at all. This is complemented by Bierschenk et al. who 
contextualise brokerage within the politics of a postcolonial state, where “power is 
exercised both through formal bureaucratic logics and through a diverse range of 
“supra-local” associations and networks, in which there is a flourishing of 
intermediate actors and organisations” (paraphrased in Lewis and Mosse 2006a: 12). 
Brokers thus play a powerful political role in that they have “the capacity to 
construct and purvey meanings concerning a variety of relationships and 




Development brokers, as much development literature points out, create their 
indispensability out of their capacity to manage meanings or, to continue in the 
terminology used so far, to frame and translate meaning. They attain their position by 
being able to ‘speak the right language’ and by drawing on appropriate discourses. 
The qualification of brokers depends not only on their technical knowledge, but also 
on their possession of organisational, linguistic, presentational and relational 
competencies (Lewis and Mosse 2006a: 16). In other words, brokers require social 
and cultural capital that they can apply in various social fields. Mosse has referred to 
such actors as “skilled brokers” who “read the meaning of a project into the different 
institutional languages of its stakeholder supporters, constantly creating interest and 
making real” (Mosse 2005: 9).  
 
Given this conceptual framework, Aruna and Nikhil, the leaders of MKSS, can be 
conceived as brokers of meaning. They are strategically placed at the interface 
between the realities of rural Rajasthan, and the broader development discourses, 
with particular understandings of governance and democracy. With their privileged 
social background, they have a vantage point that enables them to bridge several ‘life 
worlds’: they are able to stand for the interests of the rural poor and simultaneously 
manage broader discursive fields. Furthermore, their ability to ‘speak the right 
language’ and their familiarity with particular development discourses allows them 
to manage meaning and to create practices. Through their translation and framing of 





The history of MKSS is fascinating and revealing on several accounts, some of 
which have been explored in this chapter. For one thing, the story chronicles the 
events and activities of a grassroots movement that succeeded in pressurising the 
government to enact the progressive Right to Information Act. Through this story we 
learn about the forms of campaigning and mobilisation of a group of activists who 
connected specific demands for government records and information to broader 
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questions of transparency and accountability. By being rooted in rural Rajasthan, 
MKSS could put forward the needs and concerns of the poor, and thereby connect up 
to broader discussions on governance and participatory democracy. The story tells us 
of an extraordinary grassroots movement that is widely acknowledged as being the 
driving force behind the national RTI Act.  
 
However the story is more than a narration of events and occurrences of a social 
movement. Embedded in the story lies an expression of the aspects deemed 
important by MKSS in anti-corruption civil society activism. By focusing on the 
discursive frames used by the MKSS leadership in conveying their story, we can 
understand the discursive field within which they embed their story, ideas and 
activities. As noted, the discursive frames through which the story is told are shaped 
around the tropes of ‘participation’, ‘local knowledge’ and ‘empowerment’; 
combined these signal the commitments and beliefs of MKSS towards improving 
governance and deepening democracy. It is through these tropes that the MKSS 
leadership act as brokers of meaning and attempts to interpret and make meaningful 
the events of MKSS’s history to a wider audience. For this, they embed the tropes 
within a more comprehensive and recognizable discursive field.  
 
This discursive field of MKSS, as noted, echoes several aspects of development 
policy and practice that similarly emphasise participatory approaches to 
development. By drawing on terms and tropes from mainstream development 
discourse, an account can be interpreted and rendered meaningful to a broader 
audience. As several scholars of development studies have suggested, certain 
buzzwords in development are so wide in circulation that they are accorded 
recognition as ‘legitimated terms’ (Brown and Jagadananda 2007). Cornwall and 
Brock point out that these “fine-sounding words that are used in development 
policies do more than provide a sense of direction: they lend the legitimacy that 
development actors need to justify their intentions” (Cornwall and Brock 2005: 
1044). Development agencies, including MKSS as I argue for this purpose, are said 
to employ key terms of development “for the ideological legitimacy it brings” 
(Gardner and Lewis 1996: 113). In this conceptualisation, employing terms such as 
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participation and empowerment, allows civil society actors to convey their message 
within a recognisable discursive framework.  
 
The story of MKSS in this chapter emphasised the grassroots nature of the RTI 
movement and the central participation of empowered rural populations. The 
following chapter explores some of the tensions that lie in the RTI movement, 
suggesting that MKSS’s aspirations of improving governance and strengthening 
democracy cannot occur solely through ‘bottom up’ forms of grassroots activism. 
The nature of the demand of MKSS – technical transparency and accountability laws 
and policies – requires work and engagement of a particular legalistic and procedural 










How to engage in democratic politics in campaigning for anti-corruption laws is a 
contested terrain. I noted this tension in the introduction to this thesis in the 
discussion about the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP). The polemic in public discussions 
that the newly formed ‘common man’s party’ had given rise to, was, as noted, 
principally around diverging understandings of democratic processes and procedures. 
For AAP and its supporters, the only meaningful approach to transform a political 
system so deeply steeped in corruption was a thorough systemic overhaul and a 
radical rethinking and transformation of democratic paradigms. By contrast, those 
critical of AAP’s approach aspired to restore governance and democracy though 
abiding by democratic processes and procedures and complying with the constitution 
and the rule of law. These different standpoints signified a split between a concept of 
politics that positioned itself outside established institutionalised norms and 
practices, and an approach that believed in strengthening and consolidating those 
very institutions from within.65 
 
A similar discord around modes of political engagement ran through the Right to 
Information movement. In the previous chapter I examined the RTI movement 
through the lens of MKSS. The story of MKSS, as described, is a story of a particular 
‘ideal’ type of social movement. It is a social movement that began at the grassroots 
                                                 
65 What is interesting to note here, is that AAP positioned itself in an ambivalent arrangement between 
the two extremes of whether to work from within or outside the state institutions. The Lokpal 
movement, out of which AAP emerged, had followed a clear politics of being a force outside the 
system. Members of the Lokpal movement, including Arvind Kejriwal now leader of AAP, had stated 
repeatedly in public that they shunned party politics, believing that a social movement has more power 
in effecting systemic change if it exerts pressure from outside (more on this in Chapter Three). When 
the Lokpal movement tapered off and members parted ways, AAP was formed as a political party, 
thus entering the stage of the institutionalised state system. However, as I explored in the introduction, 
it did so through unconventional and transgressive modes. AAP thus blurred the difference between 




level and that campaigned its way up to the policy-making level. According to this 
story, the enactment of the Right to Information Act was due to the active 
participation of the rural poor and to the resolute mobilisation skills of MKSS. 
Accordingly, it was the poor who were the true architects of the RTI, and who, based 
on their own experiences with corruption and injustice, themselves identified access 
to official documents as the solution to their problems. The images of protests, 
dharnas and colourful banners and puppets, contribute to the characterisation of 
MKSS as an ‘authentic’ social movement.  
 
However, as this chapter will explore, there is an underlying tension with such an 
authentic social movement, in that the nature of its demands commands a particular 
type of engagement that removes it from its very authenticity. Such a pure form of 
politics, led by the rural poor, and entirely uncontaminated by party politics and state 
involvement, does not and cannot exist. In campaigning for the enactment of 
transparency legislation, with the procedural and technical aspects that this entailed, 
the RTI movement dealt with legislative matters and, as a matter of course, entered 
the purview of state institutions. In demanding improved governance and statecraft, it 
itself needed to engage directly with the state apparatus. The demands for 
transparency and accountability legislation cannot emerge solely through grassroots 
activism by the rural poor, but require involvement in another, more formal realm of 
campaigning. In other words, while the RTI movement was depicted widely as an 
‘authentic’ social movement strictly outside the realm of the state through vibrant 
collective citizen action, its aspirations for legal transparency measures compelled it 
to engage directly with the government. 
 
While in the previous chapter the emphasis was on the grassroots aspects of MKSS, 
strewn amidst the story there were indications of its involvement in a more formal 
realm. Over the span of more than ten years, one notes some evidence of MKSS 
acting beyond its grassroots mobilisation in activities involving technical legal 
drafting and lobbying the government. This becomes noticeable, for instance, in the 
inclusion of members of MKSS in the committee to draft the RTI law in Rajasthan, 
and in the drafting of a national RTI law by a national campaign, of which Aruna and 
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Nikhil are founding members. This type of work intimates that beyond the more 
bottom-up forms of mobilisation taking place in rural Rajasthan, there is also a 
technical and formalistic aspect to MKSS’s demand for transparency and 
accountability in governance. What this suggests is that there is more to the RTI 
movement than the ideal of a grassroots politics set in rural Rajasthan with farmers 
and labourers conducting characterful protest and direct action. The RTI movement 
also entailed procedural and bureaucratic politicking.  
 
This tension between an ideal and a ‘mundane’ form of politics in the RTI movement 
reflects the classical problem raised by Weber in his seminal piece, ‘Politics as 
Vocation’. According to Weber, political action is underpinned by a fundamental 
tension. Sound politics emerge only through a synthesis of a commitment born out of 
passion, a sense of responsibility toward the cause, and a sense of measured 
proportion (Weber 1919: 76). To achieve this, a politician must be able to marry the 
two types of ethics of politics, an ‘ethic of ultimate ends’ and an ‘ethic of 
responsibility’. An ethic of ultimate ends resembles a faith-based conviction that 
holds absolute and unambiguous positions, with pure intentions as the ultimate end. 
By contrast, an ethic of responsibility involves a sense of proportion and a 
measurement of the possible consequences that one’s actions have.  
 
Politicians, according to Weber, are faced with an inherent tension because 
combining an ethic of ultimate ends with an ethics of responsibility is challenging 
and difficult. Without passion and a vision for an ultimate end, a politician lacks 
charisma and devotion for a cause. At the same time, without a sense of proportion 
and responsibility, politicians risk acting blindly by “intoxicat[ing] themselves with 
romantic sensations” (Weber 1919: 33). The world according to Weber is pervaded 
with irrationality and unpredictability, with “diabolic forces lurking” in all political 
actions and corroding pure intentions (Weber 1919: 32). It is only an ethic of 
responsibility that can take into consideration “the average deficiencies of people” 
and “stand up under the ethical irrationality of the world” (Weber 1919: 29-30).  
Politics cannot stem from ardour or conviction alone, but must involve “a strong and 
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slow boring of hard boards” (Weber 1919: 34).66   
 
The two type of ethics identified by Weber are constitutive of one another, in that 
passion without responsibility leads to stifling ‘romantic sensations’, while 
responsibility without passion “endangers the ‘salvation of the soul’” (Weber 1919: 
33). In other words, someone who wants to engage in politics as a vocation, must 
embody an ethic of ultimate ends and an ethic of responsibility by bringing both into 
consonance with one another. The dialectic aspect of the tension identified by Weber 
will be examined in closer detail in the conclusion.  
 
This chapter sheds light on the Weberian tension that confronted the RTI movement. 
MKSS represents a type of politics that is driven by ideals and passions, or, by an 
ethic of ultimate ends. However, for its politics to be sound and effective, the RTI 
movement must also involve an ethic of responsibility and measured proportion. This 
aspect is realised through the formal component behind the movement for the Right 
to Information, which is the centre of attention in this chapter. Focus here is on the 
work of a Delhi-based organisation that emerged out of MKSS in order to campaign 
for transparency legislation at the national level. This organisation – the National 
Campaign for People’s Right to Information (NCPRI) – was constituted by high-
ranking individuals who were well connected to prominent figures and to influential 
networks. It was these members of NCPRI who could push for the demand for the 
right to information in policy-making spaces, and thus institutionalise the demands 
that MKSS was making on the ground.  
 
The following account of NCPRI is mainly about ‘important’ people, in ‘important’ 
places doing ‘important’ things: assembling professional expertise, building on 
                                                 
66 Particularly in times of social upheaval, Weber argued, there is a propensity for an ethic of ultimate 
ends to prevail. A social upheaval inflames passion and consequentially relinquishes any sense of 
responsibility and proportion. The context in which Weber formulated his analysis on politics as 
vocation helps to explain his views on the two types of ethics. Weber gave his seminal lecture to 
students at the University of Munich in 1918, when Germany was on the brink of a social revolution. 
In this lecture, Weber was warning students about being enticed into the revolution, driven exclusively 
by their passion and losing thereby any sober perspective. He explained that absolute imperatives, 
stemming from the religious gospel commandments, reappear in periods of social upheaval where 
they retain their revolutionizing force (Weber 1919: 31). The peril of acting exclusively out of 
absolute imperatives, Weber warned, was the failure of considering the consequences of one’s actions. 
He appealed to students to fuse their passion with an ethic of responsibility. 
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contacts and connections, networking and lobbying. Much of this takes place in the 
‘backstage’. The story of NCPRI does not circulate as widely in accounts of the RTI 
movement as does the story of MKSS in Rajasthan. As Sharma notes, the story of 
MKSS appears as the ‘singular dominant narrative’ in most of the literature 
describing the history of the evolution of the Right to Information Act, ignores the 
non-grassroots elements of the RTI movement and thus leads to an overall 
‘flattening’ of the events (Sharma 2012a: 85). However, some detailed reports and 
investigations do highlight the crucial role played by NCPRI in the Right to 
Information movement and it is largely from these sources that the following account 
of NCPRI’s history is made (Baviskar 2007; Mishra 2003; Puddephatt 2009; Sharma 
2012a; Singh 2011). With a few exceptions, the existing sources of the history of 
NCPRI are largely in the form of official studies and working papers for leading 
institutions, such as the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme 
and the Indian Institute of Public Administration. The authors of these studies are 
themselves either members or personal acquaintances of NCPRI. In this regard, the 
high-ranking nature of the sources mirrors the eminent nature of NCPRI itself. The 
following account of NCPRI’s history is drawn up largely from these sources, as 
well as from the official website of NCPRI and from disparate accounts collected 
during fieldwork.  
 
An exploration of MKSS and NCPRI combined, suggests that there is a tension 
between a social movement ‘ideal’ as represented in the form of MKSS, and the 
actual contingencies of a social movement as embodied by NCPRI. Another way of 
formulating this tension is as a disparity between ‘order’ and ‘disjuncture’, as 
proposed by Lewis and Mosse in the context of development. While ‘order’ refers to 
the ‘ideal world’ that development actors intend to bring about, ‘disjuncture’ refers to 
“the gap between these ideal worlds and the social reality they have to relate to” 
(Lewis and Mosse 2006b: 2).67 Such a fixation on ‘ideal’ versus ‘social reality’, as 
Lewis and Mosse point out, fits into a longer tradition in anthropology that focuses 
on the contradictions between what is said and what is done in development. By 
                                                 
67 This can also be thought of in terms of Abrams (1988) famous distinction between the ‘state-idea’ 
as a projected and believed idea, and the ‘state-system’, as constituted by existing institutional 
structures and practice. 
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examining the tension within the RTI movement, as illustrated by MKSS and 
NCPRI, this chapter contributes to the characteristic concern in anthropology.  
 
This chapter begins with a description of the events around the formation of NCPRI 
and of the work carried out in campaigning for the RTI. It should be read in direct 
sequel to the MKSS story recounted in the previous chapter, whereby both constitute 
one and the same social movement, albeit coming to expression through different 
registers. A grasp of the interrelated and interlocked nature of MKSS and NCPRI is 
crucial in understanding the tension inherent in this convergence. While one can be 
said to comprise the ideal aspect of a social movement, the other represents the 
technical toil. By emphasising the high-ranking background of the members of 
NCPRI and their access to crucial social networks and social capital, I suggest that 
the opposition between civil society and the state is more blurry than is often 
maintained. In conjunction with the story of MKSS as recounted in the previous 
chapter, the following account of NCPRI’s involvement in the historical Right to 
Information movement additionally contextualises its future role in the Lokpal 
agitation, which will be the focus of the remaining chapters. 
 
 
The ‘Silenced’ Story of NCPRI  
 
 
The formation of an elite campaign 
 
While MKSS was campaigning for a state-level RTI law in Rajasthan, a national 
campaign was taking shape, making a similar demand of the central government. The 
National Campaign for People’s Right to Information (NCPRI) was formed in 
August 1996, drawing together urban-based actors who converged in their 
commitment to the adoption of a comprehensive transparency law. The inspirational 
source for this campaign was allegedly MKSS’s work for the RTI in Rajasthan, 
where the grassroots forms of mobilisation against corruption and the experiments 
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with jan sunwais, appealed to the urban intelligentsia (Mishra 2003: 26). In fact, 
NCPRI would be modelled on the MKSS model, with Aruna and Nikhil of the 
MKSS acting as the backbone members of NCPRI. It was these two figures, with 
their experience in grassroots campaigning and with their mobile and connected 
backgrounds, who would, in effect, become the leaders of NCPRI.  
 
What characterises NCPRI, and what distinguishes it from MKSS, are the high-
ranking public figures that constitute its membership. The very idea of NCPRI 
emerged out of discussions between the MKSS leadership and certain eminent 
individuals, largely known to Aruna from her past in the Indian Administrative 
Service, who had been sympathetic to her work with MKSS. As several members of 
NCPRI recounted, they had watched in awe as Aruna had renounced her position of 
privilege at the Administrative Service and dedicated herself entirely to the plights 
and needs of the poor. In his study of the history of MKSS, Sharma similarly finds 
that this trope of ‘giving up’ resources and privileges is emphasised in “almost 
ritualised fashion” (Sharma 2012a: 128). Coining it the ‘currency of sacrifice’, 
Sharma notes that the repeated discourse of Aruna’s self-abnegation of her 
comfortable position in the administrative service works by “adding greater 
legitimacy to the cause and its leadership” (Sharma 2012a: 129). The ‘currency of 
sacrifice’ is insightful in that it points to the significance of the notion of 
renunciation associated with leadership figures in India. Mahatma Gandhi is the best 
known embodiment of this notion of ‘personal morality’ associated with a leader. 
One of Gandhi’s most enduring legacies that continuously reverberates through 
social life in India is that of moral purification and modesty of the self.68 The most 
recent renunciation from the post as Chief Minister by Arvind Kejriwal, leader of the 
Aam Aadmi Party, has similarly been portrayed as a ‘sacrifice’ and as an indication 
of political and moral virtue (see Introduction).69 In this context, Aruna’s own 
                                                 
68 Gandhi’s ethics will be further developed throughout the thesis, particularly in Chapters Five and 
Six. 
69 Keriwal’s resignation has been portrayed as “a matter of political principle instead of settling down 
to milk the State. Renunciation is a powerful gesture in desi [national] politics”.  
“Blessed are the righteous: the political charisma of virtuousness” in The Telegraph, 13 March 2014 
[accessed 4 April 2014] http://www.telegraphindia.com/1140313/jsp/opinion/story_18072391.jsp  
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sacrifice of bureaucratic privilege for rural simplicity can be read as lending 
legitimacy to her cause.  
 
From the onset of the Right to Information movement, right through to the present 
day, Aruna is publicly recognized, and even venerated by many, as the principal 
figure of MKSS and NCPRI. It is Aruna who features prominently in most accounts 
of the RTI movement or of any other activities of MKSS and NCPRI. This sole 
attention to a singular figure can be explained both practically and symbolically: in 
practical terms, Aruna is effectively one of MKSS and NCPRI’s most active 
members, representing their cause eloquently in a range of settings; symbolically, 
attention is focused on Aruna because she represents the publicly revered figure of a 
righteous leader who sacrificed privilege for the wider good. It was thus Aruna’s 
trajectory from the high echelons of India’s bureaucracy to the heart of rural 
Rajasthan, combined with the struggles and efforts of MKSS to confront corruption 
that had convinced many urbanites to support and expand the RTI movement.  
 
The first significant antecedent to the formation of the NCPRI illustrates the high-
ranking constitution of NCPRI. This was a meeting held in October 1995 at the Lal 
Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration, a government institute that 
trains all recruits to the elite higher civil services (Mander 2003: 157). Harsh 
Mander, then Deputy Director of the Academy of Administration, was, as he told me, 
an age-old friend of Aruna’s. Similar to Aruna’s career trajectory, Mander had begun 
his career in the Indian Administrative Service; however, the rampant corruption that 
he had found to be endemic in the governance system, prompted him to leave the 
civil service and become an anti-corruption activist. Over the years, Mander had 
visited MKSS in Rajasthan and had attended many of their events, which convinced 
him that MKSS “has struck upon something of national and international 
importance” (Baviskar 2007: 14). Mander became ever more committed to 
campaigning for right to information legislation. Prompted by the Director of the 
Academy of Administration, N.C. Saxena (who would later also become a founding 
member of NCPRI), Mander organised an RTI meeting at the Academy of 
Administration, inviting from his broad network of acquaintances that ranged from 
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activists, bureaucrats, lawyers, academics and administrators. Representative guests 
were Aruna and Nikhil from the MKSS. It was at this meeting that a Right to 
Information Bill began to be drafted. At this point it was decided that a national body 
must be set up to collectively formulate and draft a national RTI legislation (Singh 
2011: 55). Many of the attendees at this meeting would become founding members 
of NCPRI, and the RTI Bill that began to be drafted in this meeting would shortly 
become known as the ‘NCPRI draft’. This RTI Bill, as founding member and then 
convenor of NCPRI Shekhar Singh told me, was among the first pieces of legislation 
to be drafted entirely by ‘civil society’ actors.  
 
In 1996, yet another high-powered meeting was held in the Press Council of India 
(Baviskar 2007; Puddephatt 2009; Singh 2011). The Press Council of India is a 
quasi-judicial body set up by Parliament to safeguard the freedom of the press and to 
maintain and improve the standards of the press. The then Chairperson of the Press 
Council, Justice P.B. Sawant, had been active in extending freedom of speech to a 
comprehensive Right to Information law (Singh 2011: 54). Being personally 
acquainted with Aruna, Justice Sawant had attended the first major dharna held by 
MKSS in Beawar in 1995 in solidarity with their cause. It was at this dharna that he 
had begun urging for a national campaign for a transparency law to be set up (Singh 
2011: 54). By having the institutionalised and reputed Press Council of India on 
board in the campaign for the RTI, significance and salience was lent to the demand.  
 
The meeting at the Press Council was attended by Delhi-based intelligentsia, 
including lawyers, judges, bureaucrats, editors, journalists, academics and activists. 
Some of the prominent participants included editors of leading English and Hindi 
newspapers such as Ajit Bhattacharji and Prabhash Joshi; retired Judges such as 
Justice P.B. Sawant from the Supreme Court and Justice H. Suresh from the High 
Court; lawyers, including the then Attorney General and renowned Supreme Court 
lawyer Prashant Bhushan; activists such as Medha Patkar, ‘leader’ of the Narmada 
Bachao Andolan; civil servants such as the Chief Secretary of the state of Madhya 
Pradesh; politicians such as the ex-prime minister of India V.P.Singh, and Chief 
Minister of Madhya Pradesh, Digvijay Singh; and various other such eminent 
110 
 
individuals (Puddephatt 2009: 24). It was in this meeting that the RTI Bill as it had 
been conceived in the National Academy of Administration was re-drafted and 
finalized. 
 
Following these two crucial meetings – the first in the National Academy of 
Administration, the second in the Press Council of India – the NCPRI was formed on 
the back of the campaigning carried out by MKSS in Rajasthan, with the intention of 
strengthening and furthering their cause (Mishra 2003). Other founding members 
who did not attend the Press Council meeting, but who would play a crucial role in 
the NCPRI campaign, included S.R. Sankaram, a former bureaucrat who retired as 
Secretary of the Ministry of Rural Development in 1992, and Shailash Gandhi, 
entrepreneur-turned-RTI activist, who would later become an exemplary Central 
Information Commissioner (Baviskar 2007: 13). It was the backing of these two 
illustrious and prominent institutions that would give significant leverage and 
legitimacy to NCPRI and to their RTI Bill.  
 
NCPRI was set up as a non-registered group with the principal aim of campaigning 
for national right to information legislation. Based on the MKSS model, it was 
resolved that NCPRI would not receive institutional funding, either from India or 
from abroad, and instead rely entirely on individual contributions and donations. The 
official structure of NCPRI is constituted by a working committee of maximum 21 
members, which makes policy decisions and raises resources. The working 
committee nominates a campaign committee, comprised of people with a background 
in RTI-related activities. Every two years, the working committee selects one or two 
convenors. The convenors and working committee are assisted by a full-time 
secretary, who is the only NCPRI member to receive a salary.70 This composition is 
possible by virtue of its members having the financial means to afford voluntary 
association. They are active out of commitment and ideology and not out of 
economic necessity. Compared to MKSS, where the rural members depend on their 
                                                 
70 This was the structure of NCPRI at the time of my fieldwork. In the meantime, this structure has 
changed. In 2013 NCPRI held a convention in Hyderabad, wherein the structure of NCPRI was 
reformed, now constituted by ‘state campaign committees’ and ‘national campaign committees’. They 
now also have seven rather than two convenors. 
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wages for subsistence, members of NCPRI have the flexibility and leisure to move 
between their engagement with NCPRI and their respective positions of privilege.  
 
Beside the ‘senior’ members, there are also a number of ‘base’ members that make 
up the NCPRI membership. Base members I identify as those who do most of the 
organisational and logistical work of NCPRI. This is in contrast to the senior 
members who lend symbolic credence to NCPRI through their high status and 
connections to decisive decision-makers, yet are not  active in practical activities. 
The base members are all based in Delhi, and are typically aged in their 20s or 30s. 
For reasons of anonymity, I do not spell out here their specific backgrounds, but 
most of these members are of middle class backgrounds (defined here in terms of 
education and levels of mobility) and work in the field of social work, in the broadest 
sense of the term (including NGOs, academia, journalism). When asked why they 
joined NCPRI, all of these base members told me that it was because of their 
admiration for the work of MKSS.  
 
The very strength of NCPRI lay from the onset in its illustrious membership – those 
members often referred to within NCPRI as the ‘senior’ members. These senior 
members were in a position to promote and push the proposed RTI legislation in 
their respective fields and thus to broaden the spectrum of engagement. As Mander 
and Joshi (1999), both members of NCPRI themselves, recount, each member of 
NCPRI played a significant role in pressing for the RTI in their spheres of influence: 
the serving civil servants and activist lawyers were particularly crucial in working 
out the specifics of the drafting and operationalisation of the RTI; members from the 
press, such as journalists and retired editors, used their platform of the media to build 
up public opinion on the importance of a RTI legislation; the academics of the 
NCPRI expanded the debates of transparency to questions of the nature of 
democracy. With many members familiar with the proceedings of bureaucracy and 
savvy about legal technicalities, NCPRI members collectively were engaged in 
tactical lobbying. As Shekhar Singh recounts, NCPRI could successfully agitate at 
multiple levels, including by regularly briefing media; by gathering support amongst 
senior civil servants and other “prominent citizens”; and, not least, by meeting and 
112 
 
appealing to the Prime Minister and other political leaders (Singh 2011: 61-62).  
 
 
NCPRI in action for the RTI 
 
Made up of such prominent individuals, NCPRI set about campaigning for RTI. The 
first action taken by NCPRI in 1996 was to send its draft RTI Bill to the Government 
of India (Mishra 2003). With the backing of illustrious institutions and individuals, 
the government had to attend to the demands of NCPRI. The government responded 
seemingly in favour of NCPRI’s demands by constituting a working group, chaired 
by consumer activist H.D. Shourie. The Shourie Committee was to examine the 
‘NCPRI draft’ and make appropriate amendments. However, the revised Bill finally 
submitted by the Committee to the government was a severely watered-down version 
of the original NCPRI draft. In response to NCPRI’s sustained lobbying, various 
political parties had pledged their support to a Right to Information law, but in the 
corridors of actual decision-making the law was evidently being greeted with 
hostility (Mishra 2003: 27). Although formally the government spoke in favour of a 
transparency law, it was becoming increasingly evident to members of NCPRI that 
there was resistance from a range of political leaders and bureaucrats (Singh 2011: 
59). 
 
A breakthrough seemed in view when in 1999 one cabinet minister ordered access to 
information in his Ministry (Singh 2011: 59). However, the Prime Minister 
immediately reversed this order. At this, Prashant Bhushan, NCPRI member and 
noted Supreme Court lawyer, filed a petition in the Supreme Court, challenging the 
Prime Minister’s right to reverse a minister’s order. After two years of litigation, this 
resulted in the Freedom of Information Act, 2002. At first sight, in the words of 
Singh, this Act appeared to signify “that the will of the people, supported by the 
might of the Supreme Court of India, had finally prevailed and the representatives of 
the people had enacted the required law” (Singh 2011: 60). However, this hope was 
soon to be shattered, for the Freedom of Information Act was not only severely 
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watered-down, but it was never to be implemented. 
 
After years of continuous impasse, suddenly the political climate shifted drastically 
in favour of NCPRI: in 2004, the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance 
Government replaced the National Democratic Alliance led by the right-wing BJP. 
The newly formed Congress-led government promised in its manifesto (the 
‘Common Minimum Programme’) that: “The Right to Information Act will be made 
more progressive, participatory and meaningful”.71 This favourable development in 
the Congress election manifesto did not develop entirely serendipitously, but can be 
linked to NCPRI’s involvement. As a senior member of NCPRI recounted to me, 
prior to the elections in 2004, NCPRI had been in direct contact with crucial 
members of the Congress Party and not least with the Chairperson of the Party, Sonia 
Gandhi. According to this account, the Congress Party had been aware of the 
heightened demand for Right to Information legislation throughout the country, and 
had consulted NCPRI for guidance during its election campaign. Shortly before the 
elections, a Congress Party leader had called certain members of NCPRI, asking 
them to draft a statement on the RTI law that the Congress could include in their 
election manifesto. Contrary to expectations, according to the senior member, the 
very statement drafted by NCPRI became part of the Common Minimum 
Programme. It was therefore directly out of consultation with NCPRI that 
transparency was given primacy in the Congress election manifesto (this account of 
NCPRI’s role in the formulation of the Congress election manifesto is also reported 
by Baviskar 2007: 19; Chopra 2011: 96; Puddephat 2009: 25). The association 
between the Congress and NCPRI is corroborated by Yamini Aiyar, director of the 
Accountability Initiative at the Centre for Policy Research, who said in this context: 
“The Congress interacted with MKSS [i.e. NCPRI] activists when preparing its 
manifesto for elections; as a result, the intention to legislate on a right to information 
went into the manifesto” (Dubochet 2011: 2). 
 
In order to oversee the implementation of the government’s Common Minimum 
Programme, the National Advisory Council (NAC) was set up, with Sonia Gandhi as 
                                                 
71 “National Common Minimum Programme of the Government of India, May 2004” in Dr 
Manmohan Singh: Prime Minister of India [accessed 3 November 2013] http://pmindia.nic.in/cmp.pdf 
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its Chairperson. Acting as the interface between expert ‘civil society’ and the 
government, the task of NAC, as its website proclaims, is “to provide inputs in the 
formulation of policy by the Government and to provide support to the Government 
in its legislative business”.72 NAC occupies the ambivalent position of being both 
within and outside of the conventional boundaries of the state. It is not part of the 
executive domain, yet it has the bargaining power to draft policies and to have these 
deliberated in government (Chopra 2011). Crucially, three members of the NCPRI 
were selected to join the NAC, one of whom was Aruna Roy.73 It was access to this 
semi-legitimate body that opened the floodgate for non-state actors to affect policy 
making.  
 
Through the NAC that enjoyed bargaining power over crucial decision-makers – 
largely on account of Sonia Gandhi, who was also Chairperson of the Congress party 
and thus held direct sway over the Prime Minister – the NCPRI had a platform from 
which to push its Right to Information Bill anew to the government. As soon as the 
NAC was formed, NCPRI seized the window of opportunity and revamped a draft 
RTI Bill that it submitted to the NAC (Puddephatt 2009: 26; Singh 2011: 60).74 
Immediately following, Sonia Gandhi sent the NCPRI draft RTI Bill to the Prime 
Minister, calling him to urgently prioritize its enactment. It is allegedly standard 
procedure in the NAC, that if the Chairperson endorses a decision taken by the NAC 
members, she communicates this directly to the Prime Minister, who stands under 
moral compulsion to take action. In this period, the NAC became the official channel 
through which the specific demands, drafts, recommendations, and amendments by 
NCPRI were passed directly on to the government. Aruna Roy and the other NCPRI 
members who formed part of the NAC became the embodied interface between non-
                                                 
72 “National Advisory Council” in National Advisory Council of the Government of India [accessed 12 
May 2014] http://www.nac.nic.in/  
73 The other two NCPRI members to be included in NAC were N. C. Saxena, a bureaucrat, who while 
serving in the Planning Commission, had recommended in the 10th Five Year Plan that the 
administration make access to development-related information a legal entitlement; the other was 
Professor Jean Dreze, an economist and social activist, and leading figure in the campaign for the right 
to food and work (Puddephatt 2009: 26). 
74 For strategic purposes, NCPRI decided not to submit a new Bill altogether, but to make 
amendments to the already existing Freedom of Information Act (Singh 2011: 60). This draft had been 
sent for feedback to international fora such as the International Task Force on Transparency, initiated 
by Stiglitz as a part of the International Policy Dialogue, to which Shekhar Singh, founding members 
of NCPRI had connections (Baviskar 2007: 19). 
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state actors and the government.  
 
However, even with the NAC as the ‘intermediary’, the government continued to 
oppose the passing of a transparency law. The months to follow saw NCPRI 
continuously using NAC as a platform from which to exert pressure on the 
government. It also intensified its campaigning and lobbying with political leaders 
and MPs. In these months, NCPRI members were able to establish a close rapport 
with the chairman of the parliamentary standing committee that would oversee the 
RTI Bill (Puddephatt 2009: 26).  
 
According to an anecdote recounted to me by Shekhar Singh, the ultimate sway that 
NCPRI had over the government boiled down to Aruna Roy’s charisma.75 Although 
many of the NCPRI members had contacts with high-ranking government officials, it 
was Aruna’s personality, and her credibility as a grassroots activist in Rajasthan, that 
had the final clout. According to this anecdote, it had been agreed by the government 
that the RTI Bill was going to be passed in the Parliamentary winter session of 2004. 
However, a few days before the end of the Parliamentary session the Bill had not yet 
been tabled and there were no signs of it happening. There was a sense amongst 
NCPRI that if the Bill was not passed in that session, it would linger on for many 
years to come. That is when Aruna employed her good rapport with previous Prime 
Minister V.P. Singh (in office as Prime Minister from 1989-1990). She rang him 
personally, urging him to put pressure on then current Prime Minister Manmohan 
Singh. Shekhar recounts that it was Aruna’s charisma, and the esteem with which she 
was held in the ex-Prime Minister’s eyes, that convinced V.P. Singh to answer the 
phone call. Had it been any other member of NCPRI, the phone call would in most 
likelihood have gone unanswered. V.P. Singh organised a meeting with the Prime 
Minister for the very next day, which Aruna, Shekhar and Nikhil attended. 
Collectively they requested the Prime Minister to ensure that the RTI Bill be 
presented to Parliament. On the following day the Bill was tabled before Parliament.  
 
However, the RTI Bill that was finally introduced in Parliament in December 2004, 
                                                 
75 The importance of charismatic authority has been famously laid out by Weber who defines such 
leaders as displaying “exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character” (Weber 1978: 215). 
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was again severely diluted and had omitted some of the critical clauses that had been 
recommended by NCPRI and endorsed by NAC (Puddaephatt 2009: 26; Singh 2011: 
62). This caused outrage amongst NCPRI and other groups involved in fighting for 
the RTI, who exerted pressure on the government to review the changes. The NAC 
also reacted by sending a letter to the Prime Minister, expressing the Council’s 
unanimous support of the original recommendations (Singh 2011: 62). This pressure 
resulted in the RTI Bill getting referred to a Parliamentary Standing Committee, 
before which NCPRI members were invited to depose. Allegedly it is thanks to 
NCPRI’s convincing arguments before the Parliamentary Standing Committee and 
its previous sustained lobbying amongst committee members, that most of their 
provisions were eventually reintroduced (Puddaephatt 2009: 26; Singh 2011: 62). 
The Right to Information Act was passed by Parliament in May 2005 and finally 
notified on 13 October 2005. India’s Right to Information Act is considered among 
the most progressive pieces of transparency legislation in the world. 
 
 
Temporality of the Political Landscape 
 
As this account of NCPRI suggests, and as will be explored in closer detail below, it 
was largely the social positioning of members of NCPRI that contributed to the 
enactment of the RTI.76 However, the broader political landscape in which they were 
located must also be considered in order to grasp more comprehensively the 
overlapping forces behind the enactment of the transparency legislation. While the 
astute campaigning and lobbying by members of NCPRI without doubt played a 
crucial role, there were also elements of contingency and timely opportunities in their 
demand.77 It is the temporality of the RTI movement that is briefly explored here. 
 
                                                 
76 I thank Luke Heslop for pointing out the importance of considering the aspect of temporality in my 
analysis of the RTI movement.  
77 For a comprehensive study on the multiple forces behind the enactment of India’s Right to 
Information, see Sharma. As he notes, the ‘dominant narrative’ on the enactment of the RTI focuses 
exclusively on the grassroots elements of the movement, presenting it thus as an entirely ‘home-
grown’ process and as having no external influences (Sharma 2012a: 240). Accordingly, the role of 
international actors and processes in the account of the evolution of the RTI Act are widely ‘silenced’. 
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Even before the emergence of NCPRI, or MKSS for that matter, corruption had been 
a theme in political discussions in India. Corruption had been a theme of public 
vilification throughout most of Independent India’s history, with allegations of 
scandals already plaguing India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s 
government (Jenkins 2007: 58).78 Over the years, corruption became ever more 
extortionate, reaching a climax with the Bofors scandal in the 1980s and 1990s that 
implicated Prime Minster Rajiv Gandhi, and which saw kickbacks in defence 
procurement on a scale unprecedented in India. It was out of this political climate of 
built-up discontent with corruption that NCPRI had been formed and which gave 
their demand for a Right to Information law wider support and approval. It was 
embeddedness in a wider anti-corruption climate that lent credence to their demand 
for the Right to Information.  
 
Beyond the national mood against corruption, the political constellations at an 
international level also provided favourable conditions for the enactment of 
transparency legislation. The enactment of the Right to Information in India 
coincided with a period marked by heightened promotion of ‘good governance’ in 
global development discourse. Leading transnational organisations, such as the 
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and Transparency International, 
foreground notions of efficiency, accountability and transparency, and prescribe a set 
of technical prerequisites as the solution to many deficiencies and irregularities 
within public institutions. The proliferation of agendas of good governance in 
development discourse and practice is perceived to be an outcome of shifting trends 
that accumulated in the 1980s and 1990s. Corbridge et al. (2005) point out that the 
inception of good governance advancements dates back to the debt crisis of the 
1980s. This crisis was widely condemned as being a result of state failures, largely 
due to practices of government misrule such as rent-seeking and other forms of 
corruption (Kiely 1998). Politicians as representatives of the state were thus 
conceived of as impediments to a prospering market and, consequently, to effective 
development. With the World Bank at the forefront, the initial stages of the 
promotion of good governance saw the advancement of a set of structural adjustment 
                                                 
78 Jenkins notes that two of Nehru’s ministers resigned because of allegations of corruption and that 
Nehru himself was accused of indulging corrupt allies (Jenkins 2007: 58). 
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programmes that aimed to free the market from the burdensome control of 
government.79 
 
In the context of India, the liberalisation of its market in the early 1990s marked a 
heightened point in the promotion of good governance agendas. Facing an economic 
crisis, various stabilisation and structural adjustment plans were implemented to 
enliven the market. In 1991, the World Bank supported India’s economic policy 
reforms through a ‘structural adjustment operation’ (SAL) worth $500 million.80 A 
range of conditions, in line with the Bank’s agenda, accompanied the SAL, including 
the liberalisation of trade, by promoting exports, abolishing import licensing and 
introducing cuts in subsidies. Beyond the Bank’s conditions-tied loans, the 
government of India introduced its own economic reforms with the incentive of 
‘slimming down’ the state and its welfare institutions by emphasising managerial 
forms of economic rationality and cost-benefit. It was within this wider configuration 
in development discourse, with transparency and accountability high on the 
development agenda, that the pressure to enact the Right to Information in India had 





The account of NCPRI, as we noted, recounts the trajectory of an organisation that 
carried out its campaign for the right to information principally though bureaucratic 
jockeying and technical manoeuvring. Being constituted by high-ranking individuals 
with contacts to influential figures within the polity, NCPRI could push for the 
enactment of transparency legislation through its connections within the ‘system’. 
The NCPRI story is essentially a story of social networks and social capital. As we 
                                                 
79 Since 1999, the World Bank has shifted its approach from Structural Adjustment Programmes 
(SAP) to Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP). PRSP are distinct from SAPs in that they no 
longer focus exclusively on macroeconomics but include microeconomics and social policies oriented 
towards poverty reduction. Principles guiding PRSPs include participation by civil society, a poor-
oriented approach, and long-term perspective for poverty reduction.  





noted, NCPRI was called into existence by high-ranking individuals who were 
known to Aruna through her previous career in the administrative services. Aruna’s 
time serving in the highest tiers of India’s bureaucracy had provided her with 
contacts and connections to prominent individuals and to influential acquaintances. 
On top of this, it was Aruna’s charismatic personality that had mustered support 
amongst differently placed individuals. People who had been drawn to Aruna and to 
the work of MKSS, and who had their own commitment to the enactment of 
transparency laws, became the founding members of NCPRI. These members in turn 
had access to further influential figures within the polity, who could be appealed to in 
their demand for the Right to Information. NCPRI was thus constituted by a social 
network of individuals with privileged access to influential resources and to high-
level decision-making. 
 
The forms of campaigning of NCPRI – that constituted primarily meetings, reports, 
councils and parliamentary proceedings with government officials and politicians – 
suggest that the separation between ‘civil society’ and the state is more blurry than is 
commonly presumed in abstract theories of civil society. In the Introduction, we 
noted that traditional scholarship on civil society is predicated upon a 
dichotomisation of state and society. By contrast, the case of NCPRI illustrates that 
so-called ‘civil society’ actors are interlinked with state actors in numerous ways, 
either by virtue of having once been state functionaries themselves or by having 
contacts and exposure to influential figures in the government. Unlike the 
campaigning of MKSS that agitated for the Right to Information largely outside the 
state structures, NCPRI lobbied for it from within through its networks and 
connections. The type of work that NCPRI engaged in suggests, as does Mitchell, 
that the boundary between the state and society is “elusive, porous and mobile” 
(Mitchell 1991: 77) and that actors cut across both fields.  
 
That boundaries between ‘civil society’ and the state are ambiguous and permeable 
has been noted by others, such as White who argues that the separation between 
NGOs and the state is largely ‘mythic’. According to White’s findings in 
Bangladesh, the two realms are often closely linked “through family ties, contracting 
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relationships and an often overlapping dependence on foreign donors” (White 1999, 
cited in Lewis 2004: 313). Others, such as Chandhoke, note the blurriness between 
‘civil society’ and the state by focusing on the patronage relations that interlink the 
two (Chandhoke 2002, cited in Lewis 2004: 319). This view maintains that informal 
and personal mechanisms of a type of ‘patron-client system’ bring ‘civil society’ 
actors and state actors into a mutually obligatory arrangement.81  
 
The social networks that connect members of NCPRI to important figures in the 
government similarly indicate a blurring of the boundaries between ‘civil society’ 
and the state. Through social networks, vertical social relations exist between NCPRI 
and state actors, thereby collapsing a stark separation between the two realms. The 
social networks that NCPRI has access to bring it in direct contact with state actors, 
which in turn lends significance to its demand. In fact, the effectiveness of NCPRI in 
pushing for the enactment of the RTI Act can be accounted for in large part by its 
embeddedness in influential social networks. Through such social networks, NCPRI 
blurs the boundaries between itself and the state and is thus able to push for its 
demands in crucial decision-making spaces. 
 
Social networks, as several social movement theorists have noted (Diani 1997, 2003; 
Knoke and Wisely 1994; McAdam 2003; Snow et al. 1980), are a pivotal component 
of social movements. Social movement literature often correlates the impact that a 
social movement has with the degree in which it is embedded in a network. What is 
taken as decisive in the literature on social networks is the degree of contact by the 
social movement actors with elite circles. As Knoke and Wisely (1994) point out, it 
is the social movement’s leaders’ integration among political elites that accounts for 
the overall influence of a social movement. When movement actors are firmly 
integrated in social networks and are linked to influential figures, they have greater 
                                                 
81 Another study on the blurred boundaries between state and society is presented by Gupta. His 
ethnography shows how lower-level bureaucrats collapse the distinction between their roles as public 
servants and as private citizens, so that “[o]ne has a better chance of finding them at the roadside tea 
stalls and in their homes than in their offices” (Gupta 1995: 384). The Weberian notion of the 
rationalised and autonomous bureaucracy as clearly distinct from society does not play out in the 
everyday operations of the state in India. Furthermore, the assumption that civil society exists as a 
mutually exclusive social space does not capture the diverse ‘social groupings’ that take place in India 
(Gutpa 1995: 393; 2012: 107). 
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influence over significant decision-makers, thereby significantly increasing their 
impact. NCPRI’s installation in an influential social network comprised of Delhi-
based intelligentsia – premised largely on Aruna’s prior social ties – is a significant 
factor affecting its levels of influence. While the ‘dominant narrative’ (Sharma 
2012a) credits mainly the grassroots campaigning of MKSS for the enactment of the 
Right to Information Act, the story of NCPRI suggests that it was advantageous 
positioning in a social network that also contributed significantly.  
 
According to social movement theorists, the key element that enables certain social 
movement actors to position themselves centrally in a network and to build up strong 
linkages is their ‘social capital’ ties. Through social capital, actors get embedded in 
relationships and networks of mutual acquaintance, and it is through such social 
relations that “resources circulate, and trust and norms are generated and 
reproduced” (Diani 1997: 133). Accordingly, a social movement’s impact is greater, 
the broader the range of its social capital ties.82  
  
Conceptualisations of social capital are helpful in understanding the dynamics of 
NCPRI, and in noting the ways in which they blur the boundaries between 
themselves as non-state actors and the state. In the story of NCPRI, we noted social 
capital ties working through the various layers of engagement of NCPRI. The social 
capital of the members of NCPRI gives them access to advantageous resources, 
                                                 
82  Social capital as a concept has featured in the analysis of many social scientists who examine the 
productivity of resources, particularly intangible resources to which certain individuals or groups have 
access. Typically, social capital refers to the benefits that actors can derive from their web of social 
relationships and ties to social structures. Bourdieu and Wacquant famously define social capital as 
“the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of 
possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance 
and recognition” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 119). Their notion of social capital is associated with 
class, with a focus on how dominant classes retain their positions and thereby reproduce social 
structures (Bourdieu 1986). Others have ascribed a less instrumental and more productive force to 
social capital, arguing that social networks help to bond and bridge people (Dekker and Uslaner 
2001), or to provide crucial information, influence and solidarity (Adler and Kwon 2002). Putnam 
conceives of social capital as a constructive element in social relations that comprise “features of 
social life – networks, norms and trust – that enable participants to act together more effectively to 
pursue shared goals” (Putnam 1993: 664). Such a conceptualisation of social capital views it as a 
facilitating force that enables greater participation and communication. Coleman similarly sees social 
capital as something that generates networks of relationships, reciprocity and trust and that thereby 
“facilitates certain actions of actors” (Coleman 1988: 98). Whatever view on social capital is taken, 
what they all have in common is that they identify social capital as a resource embedded in social 
structures that can be used and mobilised for purposive action. 
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including contacts, social standing, a diversity of platforms, know-how on technical 
proceedings, familiarity in bureaucratic manoeuvring, legal expertise, etc. All of 
these resources together enable members of NCPRI to gain access to influential 
figures in the bureaucracy and the government and to permeate political decision-
making processes. Through such means, they obscure their role as social movement 
actors and their role in actual law-making. These roles are further confounded by the 
diverse backgrounds of the NCPRI members – bureaucrats, civil servants, lawyers, 
judges, journalists, editors, academics, activists – that facilitate access to crucial 
decision-making spaces.  
 
It is thus the social capital enjoyed by members of NCPRI that enabled their access 
to social networks, which in turn gave them entry into the bureaucratic and 
governmental realm. Through such processes, the boundaries between NCPRI as 
non-state actors and the state were blurred. Herewith, NCPRI resembles more the 
category of civil society as defined by Gramsci (2006 [1948]), that sees civil society 
as a sphere that is separate and yet simultaneously enmeshed with the state. 
According to Gramsci, through struggles for power among different interest groups, 
civil society blurred the boundaries between state and society (Lewis 2010: 171). In 
this light, civil society was the public sphere that gained concessions from the 





What emerges out of the story of NCPRI, read in conjunction with the previous 
chapter on MKSS, is the analogous nature of the two organisations. Both 
organisations are indistinguishable from each other in terms of their objectives, their 
ideological inclinations and some of their membership. With the leadership 
overlapping in both organisations, they are in fact the same organisation that faces 
different directions. MKSS is presented as a people’s organisation that carries out 
radical politics from the ground up, and that exerts pressure on the government by 
means of collective citizen action. By contrast, NCPRI is known to consist of well-
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established and influential members, who have a degree of bargaining power over 
crucial decision-makers. It is through the platform of NCPRI that the demands of 
MKSS that arise at the ground level are pushed forward. Simultaneously, it is the 
renowned grassroots actions of MKSS that lend credibility to NCPRI. Both 
organisations are thus interwoven in a dialectical relationship. 
 
Following Weber’s notion of ‘politics as vocation’, MKSS can be thought of as the 
‘ethic of ultimate end’, whilst NCPRI represents the ‘ethic of responsibility’. The 
existence of NCPRI allows the idea of MKSS as an authentic movement to 
persevere, whereby both constitute the same social movement, with one representing 
the technical aspects, and the other the ideal. Combined they complement each other, 
leading to the overall success of the RTI movement. MKSS needs the existence of 
NCPRI, just as NCPRI relies on the ideal of MKSS, whereby both together constitute 
the “strong and slow boring of hard boards”, which, as Weber notes, is the 
prerequisite for politics as a vocation. 
 
Weber, in highlighting the tension between the two types of ethic that he identified, 
does not conclude that they are entirely incommensurable. On the contrary, he holds 
that individuals who have a true ‘calling for politics’ can bring passion, responsibility 
and proportion into congruence. A person with a calling for politics will understand 
that one type of ethic cannot exist without the other, and that passion or 
responsibility in and of themselves lead nowhere. An ethic of ultimate ends and an 
ethic of responsibility are dialectically intertwined. Weber describes it as “immensely 
moving” when “a mature man – no matter whether old or young in years – is aware 
of a responsibility for the consequences of his conduct and really feels such 
responsibility with heart and soul” (Weber 1919: 33 (emphasis in original)).  
 
Expanding on Brecht’s (1985 [1943]) moral in The Good Person of Szechwan, where 
virtuous and ‘good’ actions can only survive if protected by a ruthless alter ego, 
NCRPRI can be thought of – with some literary exaggeration – as MKSS’s alter ego. 
While MKSS embodies the grassroots elements, and thus the virtues of purity and 
simplicity, engagement in the technical aspects of campaigning and lobbying is left 
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to NCPRI. In this light, NCPRI is the other end of the spectrum of the RTI 
movement; it is an extension of MKSS, representing the high-brow end of the 
movement. Connections and networks, as the social movement literature suggests, 
are crucial for a social movement, for which NCPRI was compelled to come into 
existence in order for MKSS’s demands to have an impact. The grassroots demands 
of MKSS depended on the social networks of NCPRI; simultaneously, NCPRI’s 
social networks attained force and recognition because of MKSS’s work on the 
ground. The dialectical interdependence of both MKSS and NCPRI symbolise the 
marriage of an ethic of responsibility and an ethic of ultimate ends as Weber would 
have it, and thus constitute the success of the RTI movement.  
 
These inherent tensions between ideals and practice in a social movement, as 
embodied (and resolved) in the dual form of MKSS and NCPRI, will become all the 
more evident in the Lokpal anti-corruption agitation that will be the focus of 
attention in the following chapters. The Lokpal agitation set in motion a series of 
heightened debates and controversies as to the meaning of a social movement, and 
what the degree of separation between ‘civil society’ and ‘politics’ should, or could, 
be. Underlying the Lokpal agitation, and, consequently, underlying the following 
chapters, there was inherent tension as to what anti-corruption activism entails. The 
following chapter begins to explore this tension by describing the emergence of the 










On 5 April 2011 Anna Hazare, a veteran anti-corruption activist, began his ‘fast onto 
death’ in Jantar Mantar, the demarcated area for protest in central New Delhi. He 
was demanding the speedy enactment of the Jan Lokpal Bill – an independent 
ombudsman bill.83 Hunger strikes are a popular political tactic in much of Indian 
social activism and invoke the memory of those famously undertaken by Mahatma 
Gandhi.84 Anna Hazare’s hunger strike, combined with his Gandhian attire of white 
clothes and white cap, quickly lent him the honorary title of the ‘new Gandhi’. With 
his air of Gandhian austerity and his simple anti-corruption message, Anna Hazare’s 
fast unexpectedly unleashed a nation-wide mass movement. Thousands of people 
flocked to Jantar Mantar to gather around the new fasting ‘Gandhi’. Within days the 
anti-corruption agitation being staged in New Delhi became the talk of the town, 
with  eminent public figures even coming out in support of Anna Hazare, not least a 
number of Bollywood stars and legendary spiritual gurus. Across the country, hunger 
                                                 
83 As I have indicated in the Introduction, civil society is analytically a loaded and complex category, 
whereby its normative connotations are generally far removed from the actual ways in which civil 
society operates on the ground. For this reason, the term needs to be employed with caution. However, 
drawing on the term as a ‘category of practice’, in this chapter I use ‘civil society’ as a category 
through which the actors defined themselves. The extensive invocation of the term in this chapter 
reflects the broad use of the term as it appeared during the Lokpal agitation.  
84 Some of the most publicised hunger strikes in recent years have included those of Irom Sharmila, 
who has been on a continuous hunger strike since 2000, demanding the repeal of the Armed Forces 
Special Powers Act (AFSPA) in the North East. The imposition of AFSPA has been described as  
synonymous to militarization, leading to gross civil and political rights violations including enforced 
disappearances, extra-judicial execution, torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, rape and other 
forms of sexual violence. Sharmila has been in solitary confinement in a hospital prison, on and off, 
for over 13 years, where the doctors force-feed her a liquid diet. Sharmila is charged with attempted 
suicide — a crime carrying a one-year prison sentence. She is released every year on the completion 
of her sentence, but is arrested again for attempting to commit suicide as she resumes her fast, 
refusing even liquids. Another social activist famous for her hunger strikes is Medha Patkar who is 
best known for her active role in the Narmada Bachao Andolan.  Patkar has carried out several hunger 
strikes on a range of issues, such as slum demolitions and the construction of dams. 
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strikes and other forms of protests, such as candle-lit vigils, were orchestrated in 
major cities in solidarity with Anna Hazare. 
 
A significant explanation for the instant garnering of wide-scale support for Anna 
Hazare and his demand for an anti-corruption Jan Lokpal Bill, was that he had tapped 
into many people’s long-simmering grievances against corrupt politicians. Multiple 
corruption scandals at the highest levels of government had recently hit the headlines 
in both national and vernacular newspapers. Amongst the most extraordinary of 
scams, and one that has been called India’s largest corruption scandal of all times, 
there was the ‘telecom scandal’. This had involved the deliberate underselling of 
telecom licences by the Ministry of Telecommunications, costing the exchequer 
allegedly over 1.76 lakh crore rupees (£24 billion) in potential revenues.85 Another 
major scam to receive widespread media coverage was the 2010 Delhi 
Commonwealth Games that had seen exorbitant misappropriation of funds. Although 
corruption is endemic to the everyday practices of politics in India, the recent 
extortion of public funds to line the pockets of senior officials and cabinet ministers 
had hit a public nerve amongst many Indians. ‘Team Anna’ – as media coined the 
group organised around Anna Hazare – and its demand for anti-corruption 
legislation, had tapped into this very nerve.86 
 
Team Anna’s success in mobilizing public indignation with corrupt politicians lay in 
its adept employment of social media and PR campaigns. Only days before Anna 
Hazare’s fast, his team had sent out SMS messages at random, asking people to give 
a ‘missed call’ on a certain number to express their solidarity.  More than two crore 
such missed calls were registered.87 Team Anna’s use of platforms for social 
networking such as Twitter and Facebook brought them regular followers and more 
than 800,000 Facebook ‘friends’ within a few days (at the moment of writing this, 
                                                 
85 Lakh and crore are units of measure used in South Asia; lakh equals one hundred thousand, while 
crore equals ten million. 
86 Officially the civil society formation around Anna Hazare was called ‘India Against Corruption’ 
(IAC). However, throughout this thesis I refer to them as ‘Team Anna’, as they were widely and 
publicly known. 
87 Garnering support for the enactment of the Lokpal bill, Team Anna launched a unique drive where 
supporters of the movement could give a missed call to 022-61550789 to express their support. It was 
described as a national missed call drive to help citizens raise their voice against corruption. 
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the number of Facebook ‘friends’ of Anna Hazare has reached 1.3 million).88 Such 
social media targeted mainly urban-based youth, which accounted for Team Anna’s 
largely middle-class constituency.  
 
Beyond electronic media, Team Anna brought high visibility to their campaign by 
printing messages on caps, t-shirts, placards and banners. Throughout cities and 
towns in this period, many people could be found wearing the caps that marked the 
Anna Hazare campaign: white politician-style caps (as worn iconically by Gandhi 
and Nehru) with the letters ‘mai Anna hu’ (I am Anna). Shop keepers, bus drivers, 
and college students could be seen with this new accessory to their daily attire. Anna 




Figure 3 Protesters wearing the distinctive ‘Anna cap’ 
 
 
Media also played a significant role in prompting the wide scale support for Team 
Anna’s cause and for amplifying the Lokpal tamasha (spectacle or phenomenon).89 
In a media-saturated political culture, Anna Hazare with his Gandhian appearance 
                                                 
88 28 October 2013 
89 Tamasha is a Hindi word used to describe interchangeably a spectacle, an entertainment, a 
phenomenon, a farce. It is a word that cropped up often, even in English media, during the height of 




presented an irresistible figure. His anti-corruption message targeting politicians was 
a ‘sexy story’ for a media ravenous to lay into the faults and misdeeds of the political 
class. The overall euphoria was caught in statements such as calling the Lokpal 
agitation ‘India’s second Independence struggle’, ‘South Asia’s Tahrir Square’ or ‘an 
inflection point in India’s history’. Anna Hazare was generously dubbed the ‘anti-
corruption crusader’ and his movement demanding the Jan Lokpal Bill was often 
eulogized as a ‘crusade’. News channels’ ratings – particularly those of national 
English-language channels – shot up with coverage of Anna Hazare’s dramatic fast, 
with one TV channel continuously broadcasting the fast at Jantar Mantar twenty-four 
seven. Propelled by an excitable media, Hazare brought corruption onto the centre-
stage of public discussions. 
 
The buzz around Anna Hazare and his Jan Lokpal Bill spilled well beyond the 
national borders and caught the attention of international news media. The world 
looked on as the new Gandhian anti-corruption crusader took on corrupt politicians 
and brought people around India out into the streets. The Guardian, for instance, 
reported regularly on the events occurring around Anna Hazare, with columns such 
as this:  
 
The Jantar Mantar in New Delhi is a hot favourite of the average tourist 
in the summer. But since 5 April 2011, the astronomical observation site 
has become a focus of an anti-corruption campaign that has never been 
seen before, thanks to Anna Hazare. After decades of utter frustration, 
this one man, a veteran Gandhian, has emerged as the champion for 
tackling the menace of corruption. His crusade is a measure of the pent-
up anger, especially among the young, springing from the manner in 
which politicians of all hues are taking the country for a ride through 
misuse of office and naked corruption. With the gap between the haves 
and have-nots widening, there is a sense of frustration among the 
diminishing tribe of honest Indians which is ready to explode… Over the 
past six decades, the four pillars of democracy, the legislature, judiciary, 
executive and the press, have all developed serious problems in India.90  
 
                                                 
90 “Waking India – one man’s campaign against corruption” in The Guardian, 8 April 2011 [accessed 




This chapter explores the phenomenon of this anti-corruption movement that 
exploded in 2011. MKSS and NCPRI, with whom I had already been doing research 
for a few months, found themselves right in the middle of the nation-wide agitation 
around Anna Hazare’s Lokpal Bill. It is from the perspective of MKSS and NCPRI 
that I here approach the key episodes of the Lokpal agitation. As examined in the 
previous two chapters, MKSS and NCPRI combined had gained nation-wide 
standing for being the leading activist force behind the enactment of the national 
Right to Information Act 2005, which aims at curbing corruption through increased 
transparency. With questions of transparency and accountability in matters of 
governance their primary focus, members of MKSS/NCPRI soon became involved in 
the Lokpal agitation, initially under the banner of MKSS but thereafter in the name 
of NCPRI.91 However, with the emergence of Team Anna on to the anti-corruption 
playing-field and with the media hype around them, MKSS/NCPRI was relegated to 
a mere side role. It was no longer a protagonist in the field of transparency, but had 
to compete for recognition against the widely popular Anna Hazare.  
 
This chapter examines how MKSS/NCPRI positioned itself in the anti-corruption 
movement that swept the country throughout most of 2011. It explores the heated 
public upheavals and contentious debates that arose in conjunction with the demands 
to set up a law for an anti-corruption ombudsman. MKSS/NCPRI, being in 
disagreement with Team Anna’s demands and forms of protest, came up with its own 
public responses and alternatives, thereby confounding the debates and representing 
an alternative ‘civil society voice’. Rather than being united in a demand for an anti-
corruption Lokpal, ‘civil society’ was presented widely as being fraught with tension 
and competition. There were fervent debates as to what constitutes ‘civil society’ 
engagement, what the role of democratic institutions is and how much power should 
be vested in an anti-corruption ombudsman. These disagreements were ultimately 
about conflicting ideas of democratic process and procedure and diverging 
                                                 
91 A note of clarification to the reader: in the very early days of the Lokpal agitation, it was not yet 
apparent whether action would be taken under the banner of MKSS or NCPRI. It is for this reason that 
at this point of the chapter, reference is made to ‘MKSS/NCPRI’. However, as the positioning 
clarified over the duration of the Lokpal agitation, so the overlapping terminology of the two 
organisations will be clarified at a later stage of this chapter.  
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expectations of statecraft. It is this disagreement and competition within ‘civil 
society’ that frames this chapter.  
 
The competition between Team Anna and MKSS/NCPRI amounted to a competition 
over the category of ‘civil society’. The contested terrain of the Lokpal agitation 
made the category of ‘civil society’ up for grabs. Each group claimed ownership over 
the term, insisting to be better suited to speak on behalf of ‘civil society’. This 
upholds Fisher’s definition of civil society not as a sector that either contests or 
supports the aims of governments but as a “vector of agonistic contentions over 
governmental relations” (Gordon 1991, cited in Fisher 2010: 255). In this 
conceptualisation, civil society is not an institution, but a process that grows through 
a fuelling of ongoing contentions. The relationship between MKSS/NCPRI and 
Team Anna was premised on an oppositional stance, with each one claiming to 
represent a more ‘authentic’ form of ‘civil society’. Lewis notes similar oppositional 
forces in the identification processes of activists, who define themselves as 
constituting a “less compromised, ‘purer’ form of political or social action” in 
contrast to international aid and the NGO world (Lewis 2010: 161). Categories such 
as ‘civil society’ and ‘activism’, are value-loaded and evaluative, whereby each 
practitioner denies having anything in common with the other (Gellner 2010: 3). It is 
such a competitive and fragmented arena of civil society that explains the 
competitive relationship between MKSS/NCPRI and Team Anna.  
 
The ethnographic material in this chapter suggests that competition, with the frictions 
and contestations that it engenders, provides opportunities for a reinforcement of 
political positions and commitments. A competitive playing field brings together 
conflicting opponents who contend with one another for recognition. Consequently, 
through such processes, positions and commitments can be fashioned and 
rearticulated. The Lokpal agitation gave rise to friction between ‘civil society’ actors 
otherwise working for similar ends, leading to tension and competition on what 
constitutes democratic process and procedure. In other words, while MKSS/NCPRI 
shared the overall aspiration with Team Anna of fighting corruption from structures 
of governance, they were split on the means of getting there. This fissure between the 
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two ‘civil society’ groups, as we will explore, came into being through processes of 
differentiation and ‘othering’. As it entered into a relationship of confrontation with 
Team Anna, MKSS/NCPRI consolidated its position on how to campaign for anti-
corruption legislation. As I discussed in the introduction of this thesis, identity is 
constituted circumstantially and in relation to others.  
 
The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part provides an overview of the main 
occurrences around the Lokpal agitation, and MKSS/NCPRI’s response. Through 
written articles and public presentations MKSS/NCPRI, particularly its leadership, 
established what they deemed to be the undemocratic and unrepresentative nature of 
their contender’s politics. This in turn enabled them to define their own 
understandings of democratic processes and ‘civil society’ engagement. The second 
part of the chapter provides a deeper exploration of the competition between the two 
main ‘civil society’ organisations involved in the Lokpal agitation. The ethnographic 
account shows that competition was a crucial driving force behind the campaign for 
anti-corruption legislation.  
 
 
Publicised Discord: Team Anna as Undemocratic 
 
The Lokpal agitation that became the sensation in Indian politics for months on end, 
had erupted relatively quickly. What emerged as a wide-scale national campaign had 
not been preceded with much public notification. It appeared as though from one day 
to the next, the entire country suddenly began talking about an anti-corruption 
Lokpal. Team Anna had only recently been formed, and Anna Hazare, although 
having a profile as a long-time anti-corruption and rural development activist in his 
state of Maharashtra, had never previously been a household name. Mobilisation in 
support for their Jan Lokpal Bill had only started a couple of weeks before Anna 
Hazare’s fast was scheduled. Although discussions on a Lokpal had been around in 
India for over 50 years – with the concept of a constitutional ombudsman first 
proposed in parliament in the early 1960s – they had been largely dormant of late, 
lacking political will or civil society initiative to push them. That Anna Hazare and 
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his team would become the face of the demand for a Lokpal Bill had not been 
foreseeable.  
 
The relative abruptness with which the Lokpal agitation had escalated caught most 
people off guard, including members of MKSS and NCPRI. Although usually at the 
forefront in public discussions around corruption, and considered pioneers in the 
field of campaigning for transparency laws, this upheaval had excluded 
MKSS/NCPRI. Because the Lokpal agitation had caught MKSS/NCPRI unprepared, 
their initial reaction came in somewhat disjointed ways. From the onset, Aruna and 
Nikhil, the leaders of MKSS/NCPRI, had been deeply disturbed by Anna Hazare and 
his Jan Lokpal Bill. However because of the speed and scale with which events had 
happened, they did not conduct public events or activities of direct action, as they 
typically had been doing when campaigning for an issue, nor did they discuss as a 
collective the positions that MKSS/NCPRI would take. Rather, their initial response 
came in the form of written statements and presentations. Aruna and Nikhil were 
unequivocal about their concern about the public euphoria over Anna Hazare that 
had suddenly arisen and they expressed this view publicly. Although they wrote 
many articles on their positions, in the early days of the Lokpal agitation they 
remained largely marginalised from mainstream public discourse, with media 
consistently mesmerised by Anna Hazare.  
 
The first piece written by Aruna and Nikhil that was to circulate publicly was a 
feature article published in the national weekly magazine Outlook, shortly after Anna 
Hazare had ended his fast in April 2011.92 This article was in response to the recent 
developments around Team Anna and was a public warning by the MKSS/NCPRI 
leadership on what they perceived to be the perils of the Lokpal agitation. The 
immediate demand of Anna Hazare’s fast had been for inclusion in government 
processes of drafting a Jan Lokpal Bill. With media attention on Anna Hazare’s fast 
so heightened, within 98 hours of the start of the fast the government conceded to 
this demand: a Joint Drafting Committee was set up, comprised of five members 
                                                 
92 Roy, A. and N. Dey (2011) “Make Sure the Cure isn’t Worse than the Disease” in Outlook, 25 April 
2011, [accessed 29 April 2013] http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?271400 (Original text has 
no page numbers). 
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from Team Anna – as representatives of ‘civil society’ – and five members from the 
government.  
 
Every step of the Joint Drafting Committee was covered by the English-language 
national media, with any disagreement or accusation from either the government or 
the ‘civil society’ side presented in soap-opera style. It was in this climate that Aruna 
and Nikhil first made public their views on the Lokpal agitation. Their principal 
concern was with Team Anna’s mode of protest and with the content of their 
demands. The thrust was on the perils that Team Anna posed to the meaning and 
practices of democracy, and on the perceived unconstitutional dangers of the Jan 
Lokpal Bill. Team Anna was denounced by Aruna and Nikhil as acting 
undemocratically.  
 
A key disquiet voiced in the Outlook article was the haste and prematurity with 
which the demand for a Jan Lokpal Bill had been launched. This haste had precluded 
wide consultative processes and public drafting – processes deemed crucial by Aruna 
and Nikhil for a law to be truly a ‘people’s law’. ‘Jan’ means ‘people’ and by calling 
their Bill the ‘Jan Lokpal Bill’, Team Anna was signifying that it was espousing a 
‘people’s law’. However, Aruna and Nikhil argued in the article that the ‘people’ had 
been entirely excluded, and instead, the drafting of the Bill had taken place in haste 
by a select few. By taking discussions to the Joint Drafting Committee, Team Anna 
had forsaken opening up the drafting of the Jan Lokpal Bill to public consultation. 
The effect of this, according to Aruna and Nikhil, was that people remained 
uninformed on the details of the proposed Bill. Team Anna had “raised expectations 
to epic proportions” by tapping into the extensive indignation with corruption, yet its 
followers remained largely ignorant of the details they were actually supporting. The 
article stated that “a demand for democratic representation (even of ‘civil society’) 
comes with the responsibility of commitment to democratic practice” (Roy and Dey 
2011). Such a commitment, according to Aruna and Nikhil needed to include wide 




The haste of the Lokpak campaign, Aruna and Nikhil furthermore warned in this 
article, implied that the poor, who bear the true brunt of corruption, had been 
excluded from the campaign. The concerns of bharat – inferred in the article as 
referring to rural India – were left out. This agitation had been reduced to urban-
based middle-class followers who had been galvanized by means of media and 
communication through social networking. Yet it did not speak to people in rural 
India, who constitute the vast majority of India’s population. The failure to engage 
with the concerns of the poor, according to Aruna and Nikhil, divorced the fight 
against corruption of the Lokpal campaign from real struggles for justice. What was 
presented as an all-encompassing nation-wide social movement, was, according to 
Aruna and Nikhil, in fact limited to an urban, mainly young middle-class 
constituency that left rural populations out of the equation. Team Anna did not 
represent ‘the people’, Aruna and Nikhil asserted.  
 
Furthermore, the understanding of corruption as endorsed by Anna Hazare and his 
team was described in this article as hollow and bereft of substance. By accusing 
exclusively politicians of being corrupt, citizens themselves were morally absolved 
from any responsibility in corruption. The irony of this, according to Aruna and 
Nikhil, lay in the fact “that many in the middle class who expressed angst are an 
integral part of processes where speed money, tax evasion and benami transactions 
contribute to the black-money economy berated so much at Jantar Mantar” (Roy and 
Dey 2011).93 Corruption, furthermore, needs to be thought of beyond monetary 
extortion, to include more broadly the unjust and arbitrary system of governance, 
especially as experienced by the poor. Aruna and Nikhil’s definition of corruption 
extended to include “the arbitrary use of power for undemocratic, anti-people 
policies, legislation and providing support to corporate houses” (Roy and Dey 2011). 
A simplistic blaming of the corrupt politician as the sole cause of the decay of the 
system would not lead to any substantial transformations, they argued.  
 
                                                 
93 Merriam-Webster dictionary defines benami as: “made, held, done, or transacted in the name of 
(another person) —used in Hindu law to designate a transaction, contract, or property that is made or 
held under a name that is fictitious or is that of a third party who holds as ostensible owner for the 
principal or beneficial owner”. 
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The provisions of the Jan Lokpal Bill were also concern for great alarm, the article 
confirmed. The Jan Lokpal Bill, as proposed by Team Anna, purported to create an 
independent institution that would deal with corruption at all levels – from the 
common man’s grievances to the Prime Minister’s Office. Such a Jan Lokpal would 
have power to exercise jurisdiction over the executive, legislative and judiciary. It 
would combine in itself executive powers to formulate sentencing policies, as well as 
judicial powers to appoint its own judges who could award punishments from six 
months to life imprisonment. The perils of the independent anti-corruption 
ombudsman as proposed by Team Anna would be that it was unelected and therefore 
not accountable to the people. Aruna and Nikhil warned that the authority vested in 
the Jan Lokpal would make it an unconstitutional all-powerful body that would 
subvert the bedrock principle of the democratic separation of powers. By centralising 
so much power in a single institution, the proposed Jan Lokpal Bill disempowered 
the citizen whose role would be “confined to the right to file a complaint and be 
heard”. There was the further question of the accountability and integrity of the Jan 
Lokpal, whereby the draft Bill of Team Anna proposed that selection processes could 
be transparent by being based on ‘good faith’. The article’s warning was that “we 
need to make sure that the cure is not worse than the disease, and not end up with a 
Frankensteinian structure” (Roy and Dey 2011). 
 
The underlying message of the article was an appeal to Team Anna to respect due 
democratic processes. It reminded members of Team Anna that with their 
membership in the Joint Drafting Committee as self-claimed representatives of ‘civil 
society’, it was their duty to act responsibly and democratically in the processes of 
law-making. It prompted them to be open to the multiple opinions and dissenting 
viewpoints that existed. The appeal was emphatically summarised with the caution: 
“Democracy is much too complex to become a personality debate, a media campaign 
or an event, however remarkable” (Roy and Dey 2011). 
 
With this article, Aruna and Nikhil were plainly laying out their understandings of 
democratic process and of the politics of representation. In accusing Team Anna of 
failing to conduct wide public consultation and of excluding the poor from their 
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campaign, they were establishing how they considered a social movement ought to 
comport. The article juxtaposed the Jan Lokpal Bill with the RTI Act – with which 
MKSS/NCPRI is famously associated – emphasising that the latter was a truly 
‘people’s law’ in that it empowered the common person to hold every wing of the 
state accountable. Doing politics, Aruna and Nikhil were professing, involves wide 
representation and inclusiveness, particularly of the needs of the poor.  
 
In the subsequent months a whole range of such articles and criticism was to follow, 
in which Aruna and Nikhil publicly spelt out their misgivings about the Lokpal 
agitation. As the weeks progressed, and as their involvement intensified, they 
decided to embark on the Lokpal debate, not as members of MKSS, but under the 
banner of NCPRI. This, they explained to me, was because NCPRI had been the 
primary drafting and lobbying body of the RTI movement, and thus enjoyed a 
reputation in matters of law and policy-making. While MKSS was characterised by 
its mass mobilisation and campaigning, NCPRI was associated with the technical 
drafting of and campaigning about transparency and accountability legislation, which 
the current Lokpal agitation demanded. Furthermore, being based in Delhi, it made 
most sense for NCPRI to engage in the Delhi-based Lokpal agitation.94 In the name 
of NCPRI, Aruna and Nikhil were promulgating their critiques on the Lokpal in 
numerous published articles, as well as in the many public and internal meetings that 
they attended over this time.  
 
One of the main areas of concern voiced by Aruna and Nikhil in the name of NCPRI, 
and one that was shared by many other critics, was Team Anna’s claim to represent 
all of ‘civil society’. Team Anna was exerting pressure on the government on the 
ground that it was speaking on behalf of India as a whole, so that the government 
must listen to the will of the people. It was with this claim to represent ‘civil society’ 
that five members of Team Anna had entered the law-making stage through the Joint 
Drafting Committee. In several public presentations and articles, NCPRI questioned 
the self-appointed and unelected nature of this select group and asked why only the 
                                                 
94 It is for this reason that the chapters that deal with the Lokpal agitation in this thesis refer mainly to 
NCPRI, rather than MKSS. However, as noted in the Introduction, the boundaries between these two 
organisations are very blurry.  
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drafters and defenders of the Jan Lokpal Bill were acting as representatives of the 
people. What was being referred to publicly as a ‘citizen’s movement’ was, 
according to NCPRI, actually the preserve of a few and could thus not be called a 
movement at all.95  
 
Members of NCPRI were also concerned by the tactics of protest used by Team 
Anna. The repeated public utterances that Anna Hazare’s fast amounted to a form of 
‘blackmail’ (as was most vehemently pronounced by certain government officials), 
found reverberation amongst members of NCPRI. By demanding that their Jan 
Lokpal Bill be enacted within a time frame specified by themselves, Team Anna was 
accused of dictating to parliament. Members of NCPRI condemned this as a 
disregard for democratic procedures and as being “tantamount to hijacking the 
democratic system”.96 Several members of Team Anna had openly said that they 
considered parliament to be defunct and that it was a waste of time to pass legislation 
through it. Instead, they urged, the government should directly enact the Jan Lokpal 
Bill, because, by virtue of the mass support that the movement received, it was a 
‘people’s law’. This assertion that parliament must listen to ‘Us the People’ led 
NCPRI and other critics to term Team Anna’s tactics as falling nothing short of 
populism. Above all, members of NCPRI deplored the precedent that Team Anna 
was setting with their form of protest. They warned that Team Anna was presenting a 
scenario wherein right-wing groups such as the RSS could gather mass support, and 
insist on nationalist and communalist demands. There was a further sensed danger 
that the government would no longer listen to the demands of protests after the 
experiences with Team Anna, and therefore any future civil society effort would be 
discredited. In a private conversation Aruna complained to me that “even the honest 
                                                 
95 This critique by NCPRI unleashed a series of related retaliations. Arvind Kejriwal, core member of 
Team Anna, was cited in several newspapers as expressing his reservations on the unelected nature of 
the National Advisory Council. Aruna and several other NCPRI members are often presented publicly 
as members of the NAC (see Chapter Two), so that Arvind’s statement could be read as a direct attack 
on Aruna. For instance, the Facebook page of Team Anna posted that the “NAC is a group of 
unelected people who are dictating a law to the parliament…”, echoing the language used by NCPRI 
against Team Anna. The question of representation and ‘civil society voice’ was quickly becoming 
fraught with tension and competition.  
96 Reported for instance in:  




democratic space for protest that we have carefully carved out over the past 60 years 
has been corrupted by Anna Hazare”.97 
 
Another area of great disquiet amongst NCPRI, as well as many other critics, was the 
unmistakably right-wing edge to the Lokpal movement. Renowned Hindu spiritual 
leaders had supported Team Anna, either by sharing the dais with Anna Hazare 
during his fast or by speaking out for his cause. This included the likes of Sri Sri 
Ravi Shankar, the spiritual teacher and founder of the ‘Art of Living’; Swami 
Agnivesh, a scholar of arya samaj (a Hindu reform movement) and social activist; 
and Baba Ramdev, known throughout India for his mass yoga camps and his 
teachings of yoga on TV. These were all individuals with a markedly Hindutva 
leaning, largely associated with nationalist ideology and anti-minority politics. This 
‘saffron’ and nationalist character was further substantiated through imagery and 
symbolism employed during the first fast at Jantar Mantar. National flags were 
assertively waved around on stage, and chants such as vande mataram (hymn to the 
Mother Land) and bharat mata ki jai (Victory to Mother India – a slogan used by 
Hindu groups and the Indian army) were chanted by the participants. A massive 
depiction of bharat mata (the national personification of India as a mother goddess) 
served as the backdrop of the stage on which Anna Hazare sat on his fast. It was this 
conspicuously Hindu symbolism and imagery that led sceptics to wonder about Team 
Anna’s political leanings and to suspect an ‘RSS plot’. When Anna Hazare praised 
Narendra Modi – Gujarat’s Chief Minister accused of initiating and condoning 
violence in the communal riots in Gujarat in 2002 – for his efforts in rural 
development, accusations of Hazare’s right-wing leaning mounted. His defence that 
he had only referred to the development work of Modi and that he did not want to get 
into politics, did not appease his critics, including those at NCPRI. 
 
 
                                                 




Figure 4 Anna Hazare before the image of Bharat Mata 
 
 
Constructing the Self through the Other 
 
Underlying all these critiques of Team Anna by NCPRI was their disquiet with the 
undemocratic nature of the form and content of protest. Team Anna was accused of 
derailing democratic procedures and of being illegitimate civil society 
representatives. By way of their critiques, members of NCPRI were demanding that 
civil society function within the bounds of democratic procedures and institutions. 
The emphasis on the perceived danger that Anna Hazare’s form of protest was 
posing to democratic process said as much about Team Anna as it did about NCPRI. 
Embedded in the critiques by members of NCPRI of their opponent, lay a reflection 
of their own positions regarding notions of civil society engagement. Through their 
accusations, members of NCPRI were professing their own faith in the democratic 
procedures of the Indian state and in democratic institutions. In so doing, they were 
delineating their normative understanding of democratic engagement by civil society 




This competitive engagement in the Lokpal agitation thus enabled NCPRI to 
articulate and reinforce its normative understandings of doing politics. The 
emergence of a contender in the field of anti-corruption legislation forced members 
of NCPRI to reposition it in a field previously considered its own turf. By having an 
opponent to differentiate from, members of NCPRI could carve out their own 
understandings of political engagement. Civil society, according to the portrayal 
presented by NCPRI, must act within the frameworks of democratic institutions and 
the Indian constitution. As NCPRI’s own experience with the RTI had shown, civil 
society plays a crucial role in law-making by exerting pressure on the government, 
yet this must occur within the confines of due democratic process. Based on the 
identified shortcomings and undemocratic nature of their civil society opponents, the 
contours of NCPRI’s own ideas of democratic civil society engagement could be 
consolidated. This suggests that conflict and competition provide opportunities for a 
reinforcement of political positions and commitments.  
 
This idea that an organisation’s political commitment is shaped vis-á-vis an 
opponent, correlates to the theoretical conception that an ‘other’ is required to 
establish the existence of the ‘self’. Through processes of ‘othering’, identity comes 
to be shaped around distinction and exclusion and of being that which the Other is 
not. This philosophical tradition was arguably set by Hegel (1977 [1807]), who in his 
examination of the master-slave dialectic, noted the importance of the Other for the 
development of self-consciousness and selfhood. Both master and slave are 
interrelated in a relationship of dependency, whereby the juxtaposition to the Other 
ascertains the existence of the self. De Beauvoir (2009 [1949]) applied this Hegelian 
theory of the Other to gender, arguing that a man establishes his superior identity by 
establishing the category of woman as his inferior Other. ‘Man’ is set as the norm, 
with ‘woman’ always constituting the lacking and deviant Other. 
 
Theories of Othering have been most notably advanced by Said. In Orientalism, Said 
explains how colonialism and empire building were justified through discourses and 
narratives of Othering, through which dichotomies between the self and the Other 
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could be created and maintained. By constructing the Orient as ‘strange’ (read: 
exotic, inferior, lazy), the West could define itself as superior and civilized. As Said 
wrote:  
 
The development and maintenance of every culture requires the existence 
of another different and competing alter ego.  The construction of 
identity… whether Orient or Occident, France or Britain… involves 
establishing opposites and otherness whose actuality is always subject to 
the continuous interpretation and reinterpretation of their differences 
from us. (Said 1995: 332) 
 
Many theories on the construction of identity have advanced the logic of Othering. 
Derrida, for instance, approaches it through the notion of ‘différance’, a term he 
composes of both ‘difference’ and ‘deferral’. In the context of language, following 
on from de Saussure, Derrida contends that meaning does not lie in words and signs 
in themselves, but derives only out of the relation to other words and signs. Meaning 
is deferred because “the circulation of signs defers the moment in which we can 
encounter the thing itself, make it ours, consume or expand it, touch it, see it, intuit 
its presence” (Derrida 2000: 87). True original meaning does not exist as such, but 
emerges out of processes of difference and deferral. Meaning only exists in a 
relational system. This notion of différance is equally germane in the context of the 
construction of identity: no essential identity exists absolutely in itself, but comes 
into being in a relational system through process of difference and exclusion.  
 
Drawing on Derrida, Hall contends that identification necessarily operates across 
difference whereby it “requires what is left outside, its constitutive outside, to 
consolidate the process” (Hall 2000: 17). No essential pre-given identity exists, but is 
constructed through differentiation, through exclusion and in relation to the Other. 
Identities shaped around difference, Hall highlights, are inherently unstable and must 
be enacted performatively to continuously reaffirm themselves. Elsewhere Hall and 
Du Gay expand on the notion of exclusion as central to the construction of identity 




Identities are constructed through, not outside, difference. This entails the 
radically disturbing recognition that it is only the relation to the Other, 
the relation to what it is not, to precisely what it lacks, to what has been 
called its constitutive outside that the ‘positive’ meaning of any term – 
and thus its ‘identity’ – can be constructed. … Throughout their careers, 
identities can function as points of identification and attachment only 
because of their capacity to exclude, to leave out, to render ‘outside’, 
abjected. Every identity has at its ‘margin’ an excess, something more. 
(Hall and Du Gay 1996: 4-5) 
 
These theoretical arguments help to explain how members of NPCRI constructed 
their political positions. Their ‘identity’ as an organisation was reinforced by means 
of exclusionary lenses through which the Other was defined. By constructing Team 
Anna as an ‘aberrant Other’, NPCRI could set itself apart, and establish its own 
notions of civil society engagement in policy-making. In emphasising the 
undemocratic nature of Team Anna, NCPRI could reinforce its own commitment to 
democratic processes. Furthermore, Anna Hazare’s Jan Lokpal Bill that was deemed 
by NCPRI as unconstitutional, became the contraposition against which NCPRI 
drafted its own anti-corruption laws.   
 
 
NCPRI’s ‘basket of measures’ 
 
Having established its oppositional stance to Team Anna and their Jan Lokpal Bill, in 
the weeks following the end of Hazare’s fast NCPRI came out with its own set of 
anti-corruption laws, a total of five laws that were to become known as NCPRI’s 
‘basket of measures’.98 These were presented as being a response to the danger of 
                                                 
98 The ‘basket of measures’ comprised five concurrent anti-corruption measures, four of which were 
recommended amendments to already existing or pending legislation, whilst one (the Grievance 
Redress Bill) was entirely drafted by NCPRI. The basket of measures included the following set of 
laws: 1) an anti-corruption Lokpal (ombudsman) to tackle corruption only of higher-level officers 
(Prime Minister, Ministers, Members of Parliament and senior bureaucrats); 2) an amendment of the 
already existing Central Vigilance Commission Act to control mid-level bureaucracy; 3) strengthening 
the pending Judicial Accountability and Standards Bill to ensure that the judiciary is made 
appropriately accountable, without compromising its independence; 4) the strengthening of the 
pending Whistleblower Protection Bill; 5) setting up a Grievance Redress Commission for common 
citizens to make the government answerable in terms of its functions, duties, commitments and 
obligations towards citizens. NCPRI advocated that these concurrent laws would tackle corruption, 
without compromising democratic processes. 
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vesting too many powers and functions in a single Lokpal institution as advocated by 
Team Anna. In contrast to the latter, NCPRI’s ‘basket of measures’ advocated a 
multiplicity of bodies. The premise for this was that corruption and grievances 
needed to be addressed separately by different legal measures. One single institution, 
as proposed by Team Anna, could not possibly address corruption at all levels of the 
state apparatus as well as redress the grievances of each and every citizen. 
Furthermore, whistleblowers needed to be protected by a separate law, as the many 
experiences of coercion and even death of RTI activists around the country in recent 
years had made starkly apparent. To emphasise the importance of separating 
grievances from corruption and from the protection of whistleblowers, Aruna often 
cited a saying from rural Rajasthan in this context: lasan chutney (garlic chutney) 
and kheer (rice pudding) are both very important and desirable, but you cannot mix 
the two. For this reason, NCPRI proposed identifying the different types of 
corruption and grievances and dealing with them with respective legal measures. It 
was also their response to abiding by the bedrock of democracy: the separation of 
powers.  
 
NCPRI’s ‘basket of measures’ gradually emerged as a recognised alternative to 
Team Anna’s Jan Lokpal Bill and the government’s Lokpal Bill. On some fronts, the 
emergence of an alternative was praised for widening debate and pluralizing opinions 
in the vexed situation around the Lokpal. On other fronts, NCPRI’s ‘basket of 
measures’ was denounced as an act of splitting a unified civil society and as thus 
playing directly into the Congress government’s hands. Whether one supported or 
opposed NCPRI’s emergence, the fact remained that with their ‘basket of measures’ 
NCPRI came to take an increasingly centre-stage position in the Lokpal agitation. 
They were now no longer acting only through reactive articles and presentations, but 
had their own anti-corruption laws that they would campaign and lobby for. With the 
entry of NCPRI and their ‘basket of measures’, the political field of civil society and 





Personalised Discord: Internal Rivalry 
 
This section explores further the contested landscape around the Lokpal Bill. It looks 
into the interaction between members of NCPRI and members of Team Anna and 
how this was premised on a contentious and competitive relationship between the 
two groups. What in the previous section appeared as ideological differences on what 
the role of civil society in law-making should be, in this section gets a personalised 
twist. The competitive relationship between NCPRI and Team Anna was not only 
posited on diverging ideas of democratic means and processes, but also derived from 
a personal and emotional rift. The shared commitment to anti-corruption 
campaigning between the two groups was not coincidental, but was on account of 
personal relationships and overlapping membership. In fact, it was the competitive 
relationship between NCPRI and Team Anna that was a significant component of the 
Lokpal agitation. It was in part the friction that arose out of the competitive nature of 
the relationship between the two teams that gave rise to the Lokpal agitation (Tsing 
2005). By competing with each other, members of each of the teams could more 




NCPRI becomes the ‘third voice’ 
 
On 16 August 2011, Anna Hazare began his second hunger strike, staging it this time 
in Ramlila Maidan.99 This was in response to the failure of the Joint Drafting 
Committee to adopt all the provisions for the Lokpal Bill suggested by Team Anna. 
The Lokpal Bill that had been passed by the Joint Drafting Committee to the 
government to table before parliament was attacked by Team Anna as being weak, 
and as lacking all the provisions proposed in their own Jan Lokpal Bill. Anna Hazare 
had consequently threatened to carry out another fast-unto-death if the government 
did not introduce the Jan Lokpal Bill, as drafted by his team, into parliament during 
                                                 
99 Ramlila Maidan is a large ground in central Delhi that is used for major political rallies, religious 
festivals and entertainment events. 
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the upcoming ‘Monsoon Session’. The Monsoon Session in parliament had started; 
the government had not introduced the Jan Lokpal Bill; and so, in accordance with 
his threat, Anna Hazare began his second fast. The condition was that he would not 
end his fast until the government conceded to introducing his Jan Lokpal Bill into 
parliament.  
 
With the revived public commotion around Anna Hazare and the Jan Lokpal Bill, 
NCPRI had mounted its own campaign for its ‘basket of measures’. Because Anna 
Hazare’s conditions were strictly time-bound, time was ticking against NCPRI, 
forcing it to act and react hastily. Ever since Anna Hazare had begun his second fast, 
NCPRI was inundated in finalising drafts and campaigning for these by lobbying the 
government. Given this intensity in workload, I was asked to join them in Delhi to 
help out. Eager to be involved, I took the next bus from Jaipur to Delhi and thereby 





I arrived in the NCPRI office in Hauz Khas – an uptown residential area in South 
Delhi – to find it packed with people and in a highly charged commotion. Multiple 
tasks and activities were going on simultaneously: some people were crowded 
around the two computers, either watching the online news broadcast or drafting 
emails; others were sorting through the many versions of Lokpal-related bills that 
NCPRI had drafted and amended over and over again; another group of people were 
sitting around someone who had just come back from Ramlila Maidan and was 
recounting with amazement and horror the scene of the galvanized masses around the 
fasting Anna Hazare; someone else called on Nikhil to get ready to go to the NDTV 
studio, where he would be presenting the ‘NCPRI approach’ in a debate on the 
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Lokpal bill. Outside the office, three OB vans were parked; they were from English 
and Hindi news channels, waiting to interview Aruna.100  
 
Not yet quite sure what task I could take over, I joined Ushma and Purnima who 
were crouched in one corner of the office working amendments into the Grievance 
Redress Bill drafted by NCPRI.101 They told me about a meeting they had had the 
day before at the Ministry of Rural Development (MoRD). The Minister of Rural 
Development, Jairam Ramesh, had shown great enthusiasm for NCPRI’s Grievance 
Redress Bill and had offered to press for it through his ministry. Over the years of 
NCPRI’s engagement in drafting laws and campaigning for transparency measures, 
they had established a friendly relationship with Jairam Ramesh.102 When he was 
made Minister of Rural Development several months previously due to a cabinet 
reshuffle in July 2011, the appointment was greeted with great enthusiasm by 
members of NCPRI, who now had a favourable avenue through which to advocate 
their ‘basket of measures’. From amongst the five bills in their ‘basket of measures’, 
it was the Grievance Redress Bill that addressed questions of rural development most 
directly, making the MoRD the most likely platform through which to champion for 
it. The Grievance Redress Bill aims to tackle daily delays in government offices. 
Under the Bill, each pubic authority must issue a statement of obligations, including 
a list of all the services and goods it provides, and the means by which redress can be 
obtained when the obligations are not met. Public authorities are monitored by 
designated Grievance Redress Officers (GROs), who receive and dispose of 
complaints and fix responsibility for the grievance. Each district has a District 
Grievance Redress Authority (DGRA) exercising appellate powers over the GRO. 
                                                 
100 OB vans parked in front of the office-garage in the Hauz Khas Apartments Colony were no rare 
sight over the weeks of the Lokpal agitation.  Typically there were several vans from various 
broadcasting channels queuing up to interview Aruna on the NCPRI approach to the Lokpal. Fellow 
residents of the colony no longer stopped and stared at the commotion of reporters and cameras as 
they initially did – such scenes seemed to have entered their daily frame of vision. The journalist from 
Zee TV that day had also come to interview Aruna. His news channel was following the trajectory 
followed by so many other channels: after months of monomaniac broadcasting of each and every 
action of Team Anna, there was now an eagerness to bring in alternative voices into the Lokpal 
tamasha. Aruna and the NCPRI were prime targets for this.  
101 Ushma and Purnima are pseudonyms I have given to two of my informants. 
102 In a personal interview with Jairam Ramesh, he told me that he respected the demands and 
positions of NCPRI for they represented honest activists, committed to the cause of the poor. The 
views of the Union Minister indicate the widely reproduced conflation of MKSS and NCPRI. 
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An appeal against the DGRA lies with the State or the Central Grievance Redress 
Commission. The Grievance Redress Bill also envisions the establishment of 
independent information and facilitation centres in every block, in which all the 
details of the government schemes would be available. 
 
In the meeting that NCPRI had had with Jairam Ramesh on the day before my 
arrival, the Minister had made some recommendations and suggestions about 
NCPRI’s Grievance Redress Bill. He had agreed to put the bill up on his ministry’s 
website to go through the process of open consultation, once NCPRI had 
incorporated his suggested amendments. When I joined Ushma and Purnima they 
were in the process of doing this.  
 
I began to realise that that was the state in which things had been in the NCPRI 
office, ever since Hazare had started his second fast a few days earlier. The media 
were at that point obsessed with Anna Hazare, with every newspaper and every news 
channel reporting on Ramlilia Maidan. But a conspicuous shift had taken place, 
whereby the publicity bombardment on Team Anna had now made some space for 
other groups and opinions to be covered. While during the first fast, only select 
publications had published the position of NCPRI on the Lokpal – mainly those 
whose editors were on friendly terms with Aruna – now the entire spectrum of media 
was eager to report on the ‘NCPRI approach’. Reporters were rushing to the Hauz 
Khas office, journalists incessantly called Aruna on her phone, and NCPRI 
representatives were requested in TV debates on a daily basis. Although Aruna is the 
most prominent public face of the NCPRI, and initially all reporters wanted 
exclusively her coverage, over these days of media frenzy, other ‘senior’ NCPRI 
members increasingly began to appear as public figures.103 Interest in the ‘NCPRI 
approach’ to the Lokpal was growing at an unexpected scale. In fact, the NCPRI was 
surging as the ‘third voice’ in the Lokpal drama, with media coining it as a 
contention between ‘Team Anna’ versus ‘Team Aruna’.  
 
                                                 
103 The members of NCPRI to appear most frequently on TV channels or to issue press statements, 
were, aside from Aruna Roy: Nikhil Dey, Anjali Bhardwaj, Shekhar Singh.  
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I was told that what had sparked off this sudden attention to NCPRI and their ‘basket 
of measures’ was a press conference that they had held at the Press Club of India a 
few days after Anna Hazare begun his second fast. They had apparently been 
prompted to do so by Vinod Mehta, editor of Outlook, and a friend of Aruna’s, who 
had urged them to publicise their alternative to Anna Hazare’s Jan Lokpal Bill. 
Mehta had told them that there was growing public disquiet with the demands of 
Team Anna, and that it was NCPRI’s ‘public responsibility’ to come out with its 
sounder and more convincing alternative. It was apparently after this press 
conference that NCPRI began to enter the limelight. TV channels and newspapers 
that had previously swarmed exclusively around Team Anna, now were anxious to 
get coverage of the NCPRI approach. For the media this was fuel for its fire, as the 
entry of ‘Team Aruna’ brought with it a dramatic twist to the Lokpal spectacle.  
 
Even in international news, the entry of NCPRI to the scene of the Lokpal agitation 
was noted. While previously attention had been exclusively around Anna Hazare, it 
was around the time of his second fast that coverage started opening up to alternative 
views. The New York Times, for instance, reported the following on 23 August 2011:  
 
Aruna Roy’s two cellphones were ringing before breakfast on Tuesday as 
she braced for another day in the media storm of the Anna 
Hazare anticorruption movement. Ms. Roy, a pillar of India’s civil 
society who has fought for greater government accountability, has been 
appearing on television to talk about Mr. Hazare’s populist campaign, 
which includes his current hunger strike.  She might seem a natural ally. 
She is not. 
Ms. Roy opposes the negotiating stance taken by Mr. Hazare and his 
advisers, and opposes their solution to official corruption. Nor is she 
alone. Much of India’s intelligentsia, if sympathetic to fighting 
corruption, has greeted the Hazare movement with unease or outright 
hostility, with one critic describing some elements of the flag-waving, 
middle-class supporters as an Indian incarnation of the Tea Party. 104 
 
                                                 
104 “Many in India see danger in Hunger Striker’s Anticorruption Plan” in The New York Times, 23 




This extract captures the way in which the Lokpal agitation was being covered. This 
tone was repeated in countless other media reportages, wherein the anti-corruption 
movement was presented as a live drama, replete with tensions and rivalry. The 
conflict between NCPRI and Team Anna was increasingly a focus of publicised 
scrutiny. Accusations made by one team against the other immediately made it to 
national headlines, as did a number of exchanges of letters between members of each 
team. In so doing, the media were not only presenting but, moreover, accentuating 
the rift between NCPRI and Team Anna. It was making publicly visible a 
personalised conflict. In other words, the media were not only playing a significant 
role in the reproduction of public life but in its very creation (Hall et al. 1978; 
Herzfeld 1992; Navaro-Yashin 2002). Here, the public discourses raised by the 
media can be thought of in terms of what Navaro-Yashin calls the ‘culture of news’, 
which works by “inciting a political structure of feeling” and constituting thereby an 
“important agent in the making of public life” (Navaro-Yashin 2002: 6). Herzfeld 
notes that news coverage can be thought of as “analogous with the play of gossip and 
reputation in the local community” (Herzfeld 1992: 132). This parallel between 
publicised news and internal gossiping, as the following account illustrates, was quite 
literally played out in the Lokpal agitation.  
 
 
Discord expressed through gossip 
 
The work of NCPRI during the days of Anna Hazare’s fast evolved mainly in 
making NCPRI’s position on the Lokpal known within the government, among 
political parties and with the wider public. For this, numerous activities were being 
undertaken simultaneously: the bills from their ‘basket of measures’ were 
continuously amended and re-drafted; internal meetings were held to discuss 
strategies of action; letters delineating their proposed ‘basket of measures’ were sent 
out to leaders of all opposition parties; Members of Parliament were met to inform 
them on the ‘NCPRI approach’ to the Lokpal; regular meetings took place in the 
Ministry of Rural Development regarding the Grievance Redress Bill; conferences 
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and lectures were attended in Delhi and other parts of the country to represent the 
alternative ‘civil society voice’; interviews and TV debates were continuously held.  
 
Over this time I had established myself as a constant presence in the office. Work 
arose in an ad hoc manner and increased and decreased in intensity in unforeseeable 
waves. Much of the work involved technical skills and detailed understanding of the 
amendments and drafts being proposed by NCPRI, for which I was of limited use. 
However, my eagerness to help out, regardless of the intensity of work and 
regardless of the intellectual levels entailed, meant that I was appreciated as the ‘odd-
jobber’ who could be called upon whenever so required. The effect of this was that 
my presence was justified and that my sticking around in a range of settings did not 
appear as too peculiar. Through this role, I was able to attend many of the internal 
NCPRI meetings, get access to their email accounts, be around as spontaneous 
decisions were taken, overhear ‘important’ phone-calls, and be part of the many 
sessions of chatting and gossiping that arose during work, tea and lunch breaks, or 
while driving through the city from one of the many meetings to another.   
 
It was through these casual conversations and informal gossip that I began to better 
comprehend NCPRI’s position. Through the jokes and entertaining chatter, the 
complexity of the Lokpal agitation began to unravel for me. What at first appeared  
to be light-hearted tattling, soon revealed itself as an expression of a charged and 
personalised relationship between NCPRI and Team Anna. Much of the gossip 
within the NCPRI office revolved around members of Team Anna, with specific core 
members being targeted. Remarks and anecdotes ranged from humorous and 
harmless, to more bitter and resentful.  
 
With the media broadcasting so many of Team Anna’s moves, particularly from the 
stage in Ramlila Maidan where Anna Hazare was holding his second fast, several 
gaffes by some of the members reached public light. Each time a new blunder was 
covered, members of NCPRI did not fail to catch them and to comment jeeringly on 
them. A favourite source of ridicule was Kiran Bedi (a retired Indian Police Service 
officer turned social activist), whose vaudeville-like performances and obscene 
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statements were often televised live. She was often caught on TV waving the Indian 
flag fervently next to the fasting Anna Hazare, or covering her face with a scarf in 
mock of politicians, who she said were all ‘double-faced’ and ‘wore masks’. She 
accused Members of Parliament of being anpadh (uneducated) and nalayak 
(incompetent). Such incidents gave rise to much laughter in the NCPRI office. 
Comments by Bedi that “all politicians as a class are corrupt” or that anyone who is 
“anti-Anna is pro corruption” lead members of NCPRI to mark her out as holding 
naïve and populist political views. This was further consolidated by her remark that 
“Anna is India and India is Anna” – a slogan that echoed disturbingly with the calls 
during the period of ‘Emergency’ in the 1970s that “Indira is India and India is 
Indira”.  
 
Another repeated figure of ridicule was Anna Hazare himself. Although he was 
portrayed publicly in nearly messianic light, at NCPRI he was described as a 
simpleton, with conservative and nationalist propensities. According to members of 
NCPRI, Anna Hazare was entirely incompetent in drafting laws and should never 
have been permitted to join the Joint Drafting Committee. Just because he could fast 
and appear as an ascetic and moral voice, that did not credit him with the technical 
know-how to draft a complex piece of legislation. Members of NCPRI alleged that 
Anna Hazare was being used by the Lokpal campaign simply to appear as its mascot 
and draw in mass support, and that beyond the ‘personality cult’ that had formed 
around the figure of Anna Hazare, there was little substance in his role. Moreover, 
members of NCPRI greeted with contempt the general veneration of Anna Hazare as 
the ‘new Gandhi’. They responded to such proclamations by drawing attention to 
Hazare’s authoritarian tendencies exemplified in his assertions that any politician 
caught in an act of corruption should have his or her hands chopped off, or even be 
hung. By exclusively blaming politicians as corrupt, Anna Hazare was accused by 
members of NCPRI and others of depoliticising the debate on anti-corruption and of 










Figure 6 Candle-light procession By Anna Hazare supporters 
 
 
Other members of Team Anna were derided in the NCPRI office with significantly 
less humour than with the likes of Kiran Bedi and Anna Hazare. Those who were 
commented on with a tone of disappointment were members who had a longer 
history of connection with NCPRI.  It was the personal nature of the relationship 
amongst these members that triggered resentful remarks. Prashant Bhushan, for 
instance, a core member of Team Anna, had been a long-term member of NCPRI. 
Bhushan, Supreme Court lawyer and social activist, was renowned for his Public 
Interest Litigation and for taking up contentious cases and speaking up on 
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controversial matters.105 The ways in which members of NCPRI spoke of Prashant 
Bhushan, showed great fondness and respect for him and, consequently, 
disappointment that he had gone over to the ‘other camp’. How a fervently left-
leaning and legally astute lawyer could be advocating the Jan Lokpal Bill, which 
according to NCPRI was straightforwardly undemocratic, entirely perplexed and 
dismayed NCPRI members. A similar disappointment was shown toward Medha 
Patkar with whom members of NPRI had worked in the past and had held in high 
esteem until she had joined Team Anna.106 The conflict over the Lokpal Bill had 
deep undertones of personalised division.  
 
The greatest rancour in the NCPRI office, however, was targeted at one particular 
individual in Team Anna: Arvind Kejriwal. What I heard repeatedly was that the 
single mastermind behind the entire Lokpal agitation was Arvind. It was he who 
orchestrated the moves of Team Anna, deciding the contours of the bill and 
determining the lines of negotiation with the government. Arvind was satirically 
referred to as ‘Anna’s General’ in the NCPRI office. On several occasions during 
internal meetings, various NCPRI members indicated their suspicion that Arvind’s 
real aspiration was not to get the Jan Lokpal Bill enacted, but to get into the limelight 
so as to ultimately enter politics. The ‘evidence’ of Arvind’s political intentions, it 
was argued, could be found in the Jan Lokpal Bill itself. Some members of NCPRI 
postulated that the provisions of the Bill were so blatantly flawed and legally 
untenable, that only one possible conclusion could be drawn: Team Anna was not 
actually committed to the Jan Lokpal Bill – its provisions were simply too absurd to 
be meant seriously. Instead, they were guided by ulterior motives and a concealed 
agenda. “This is blatant politicking, not law-making” uttered one NCPRI member at 
a public lecture. That Arvind Kejriwal has since formed a political party – the Aam 
Aadmi Party – makes the speculations of NCPRI members somewhat prophetic.  
 
                                                 
105 Public interest litigation is defined as the use of litigation, or legal action, which seeks to advance 
the cause of minority or disadvantaged groups or individuals, or which raises issues of broad public 
concern. 
106 Medha Patkar is a social activist, most famous for her activism around the Narmada Dam.  
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Since 2001 Arvind had been an active member of NCPRI and closely allied to 
MKSS. The NGO Parivartan (Change) that Arvind had set up in 2000 to facilitate the 
implementation of the RTI amongst people in East Delhi, was modelled on MKSS. 
In 2002 Parivartan had conducted a major jan sunwai on development works in 
Delhi, with the help of MKSS and NCPRI. The influence that MKSS had had on 
Arvind was evident when he referred to Aruna as his mentor and his ‘guru’ in 
matters of RTI –“Arunaji taught me everything about democracy”, Arvind 
announced publicly.107 The strained relationship between Arvind and Aruna was 
captured by media through descriptions of them as ‘friends turned foes’, or of Aruna 
as at once Arvind’s ‘mentor and eventually detractor’.  
 
With the long-term acquaintance between members of NCPRI and Arvind, his 
idiosyncrasies were well known to the NCPRI team and were a source of much 
discussion. He was described as a shrewd, self-righteous and megalomaniac 
personality with a lust for power. Along these lines of argument, the Lokpal 
campaign, under the umbrella of India Against Corruption, had been set up by 
Arvind to give him a platform from which to find a place in the limelight. In fact, the 
covert explanation that I heard from several members of NCPRI was that Arvind had 
stepped out of NCPRI and formed his own campaign, because as long as he did not 
do so, he would remain in the shadow of Aruna. Aruna’s stature and public 
celebration would keep Arvind on the margins of publicity if he continued to work 
with her. According to this view, Arvind separated from NCPRI not so much because 
of a clash of opinions but because of his desire to personally enter the centre-stage in 
public debates. It was Arvind’s ego, according to several members of NCPRI, that 




The role of gossip in the NCPRI office indicated several things. Firstly it made 
apparent how personalised was the rift between NCPRI and Team Anna. It illustrated 
                                                 
107 “Arvind Kejriwal: a genial face hiding a shrewd political mind” in Hindustan Times 25 January 




that the competitively charged relationship between NCPRI and Team Anna was not 
based simply on ideological grounds, or on political differences, but derived from 
personal antagonism and a clash of personalities. Competition here was 
unequivocally about entering the limelight, about accessing the public, about being 
the face of civil society. It was about Arvind competing with Aruna for publicity. 
Furthermore, the act of gossiping enabled members of NCPRI to distinguish and 
differentiate themselves from Team Anna. By characterising members of Team Anna 
as holding politically naïve views and as acting undemocratically, NCPRI emerged 
as an organisation that adheres to democratic processes.  
 
This highlights that gossip plays an important social function. Gossip, according to 
Gluckman (1963), helps to maintain the coherence and unity of a group, whereby a 
group’s social values, customary rules, moral and ethical judgements come to be 
expressed through the act of gossiping. Other anthropologists, such as Paine (1967), 
have eschewed focusing on the function of gossip in society, and instead view gossip 
as a type of informal communication amongst individuals. Through gossip, 
individuals attempt to bend the moral order so as to protect their self-interests. 
Gossip, according to Paine, allows individuals to control and access the flow of 
information and thus to enhance their social status. Gossip and informal chats 
amongst NCPRI members illustrated these two analytical strands: by accusing Team 
Anna of acting undemocratically, members of NCPRI were setting themselves apart, 
thereby adhering to Paine’s understanding of the psychological dimension of gossip. 
At the same time, the act of gossiping created a sense of unity or shared identity 
amongst members of NCPRI, who were able to identify with the values and positions 





The roots of the tension and competition between NCPRI and Team Anna, as the 
informal conversations in the NCPRI office indicated, were largely premised on the 
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question of who initiated the debates for a Lokpal. Members of NCPRI repeatedly 
reinforced (in private as well as in public presentations) that discussions on 
institutionalising a form of Lokpal had been initiated by them, which, accordingly, 
bestowed on them a particular claim on the debate. According to NCPRI, the 
trajectory of the Lokpal debate had begun at an NCPRI meeting in mid September 
2010, six months before Anna Hazare’s first fast. The meeting had been convened to 
discuss the serious issue of acts of violence and even death faced by many Right to 
Information activists. A government-drafted Whistleblower Protection Bill was at 
that point (as it is now at the time of writing) still pending before parliament, 
implying that to date no comprehensive legal protection existed for RTI activists. In 
this September meeting, NCPRI had decided that they would revamp and redraft the 
Whistleblower Protection Bill. It was also decided that an anti-corruption 
ombudsman post needed to be set up, for which an anti-corruption law would be 
drafted. Arvind Kejriwal was selected as convenor of this working group.  
 
One month later in a closed meeting in October, Arvind had presented his first draft 
of a Lokpal Bill that he had single-handedly been working on over the past month. 
At this stage, allegedly no other member of NCPRI objected. In a private 
conversation, Shekhar Singh, a founding member of NCPRI, admitted that at that 
point most members of NCPRI were preoccupied with other concerns and were not 
‘switched on’. Consequently, nobody really engaged with Arvind’s proposals nor did 
they react to his Bill. It was only in the following months, when Arvind became 
increasingly assiduous with his Jan Lokpal Bill endeavours and had even set up a 
separate ‘India Against Corruption’ campaign, that alarm bells started to sound in 
NCPRI. When in March Anna Hazare announced that he would soon begin a fast-
unto-death for the Jan Lokpal Bill, NCPRI called an emergency meeting. 
Disagreeing fundamentally with various aspects of the provisions of the Jan Lokpal 
Bill, NCPRI requested Arvind to postpone Anna Hazare’s fast so as to allow for 
comprehensive discussions on the bill. But, as NCPRI members often recounted, by 
this point it had become evident that Arvind was set on his bill and his campaign and 







As the Lokpal agitation continued to grow in scale, members of NCPRI increasingly 
went about establishing publicly the central role that they had played in initiating 
discussions on the Lokpal Bill.108 They had been accused of coming up with their 
‘basket of measures’ at a late state and thereby splitting  the civil society voice. By 
diverging from Anna Hazare, NCPRI was accused of helping the government to 
resist enacting the Jan Lokpal Bill. This fell in line with a wider critique that 
circulated in some public forums, which held that members of NCPRI were on too 
‘chummy’ terms with the ruling national party, the Congress, a criticism 
corroborated not least by Aruna’s membership in the NAC.109 Within this climate of 
accusations, NCPRI wanted to legitimise its positioning in the Lokpal debate. 
Discussions on the Lokpal had begun within NCPRI, and this needed to be made 
publicly known so as to justify their involvement in the debates.  
  
Over this period, members of NCPRI (particularly Aruna and Nikhil, but also other 
‘senior’ members) significantly increased the number of their lectures and public 
presentations. While before they had mainly attended public events to which they 
had been invited, they now proactively sought out spaces in which to present their 
positions on the Lokpal. This was mainly in colleges and universities in and around 
Delhi. In many of these public meetings and lectures, they not only discussed their 
views on Anna Hazare’s Jan Lokpal Bill, or presented their version of the ‘basket of 
measures’, they also emphasised that they had been part of the process from the very 
beginning and that it had been internal disagreements that had resulted in the rift. To 
a significant degree, members of NCPRI were attempting to counter accusations and 
to establish their credibility as civil society representatives for anti-corruption 
legislation. 
                                                 
108 See for instance interview by Aruna in Tehelka news magazine: “The Third Flight Path” in Tehelka 
Magazine 13 August 2011 [accessed 20 November 2012] 
http://archive.tehelka.com/story_main50.asp?filename=Ne130811COVERSTORY.asp  
109 During the media frenzy, Aruna complained on several occasions of having been called Sonia 




A crucial method by which they sought to establish their legitimacy over Team Anna 
as civil society representatives, was to draw on their past experience in social 
activism. In many of their public lectures and in many of their articles and in 
interviews that they gave, a message that seeped through was the important role that 
they had played in the RTI movement. As noted earlier, the RTI movement is a 
reputed success story in India, with MKSS and NCPRI widely celebrated for being 
the driving forces behind the enactment of the progressive transparency legislation. 
By emphasising their history in the RTI movement, members of NCPRI could 
remind the public of their expertise in the field of transparency. They could position 
themselves as civil society pundits in the campaigning and drafting of anti-corruption 
legislation and thus as having a stake in the ongoing Lokpal agitation.  
 
The reiteration of their experience in the RTI movement further served to underline 
what members of NCPRI deemed to be the undemocratic aspects of Team Anna’s 
approach. Their critiques of Team Anna were often juxtaposed to their own modes of 
protest and mobilisation during the RTI movement. For instance, in contrast to Team 
Anna’s haste in drafting the Jan Lokpal Bill, members of NCPRI repeatedly 
emphasised that the Right to Information Act had taken nine years to formulate, thus 
allowing for extensive and broad-based public consultation. Furthermore, NCPRI 
maintained that they had adhered to all the due processes of law-making in their 
campaigning and lobbying for the RTI. In contrast to Team Anna demanding the 
immediate adoption of their proposed Bill, members of NCPRI reiterated that they 
had not attempted to bypass parliamentary procedures in their own campaigning for 
the RTI. On the contrary, they had used institutionalised platforms, such as the 
Parliamentary Standing Committee, to push for their demands (NCPRI’s reliance on 
democratic institutions will be elaborated on in Chapter Six). 
 
What the emphasis on NCPRI’s involvement in the historic RTI movement in public 
presentations allowed them to do, was to differentiate themselves from Team Anna. 
Their campaigning for transparency legislation, proven successful by virtue of the 
implementation of the RTI Act, served as a ‘benchmark’ for how civil society ought 
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to work. By juxtaposing their own experience with what they identified as Team 
Anna’s undemocratic flaws, members of NCPRI were in a better position to 
articulate their own positions on political activism.  
 
NCPRI entered the scene of the Lokpal agitation to contest against Team Anna.  
They opposed Anna Hazare’s form of protest and the content of the Jan Lokpal Bill, 
and, given their own successful campaigning for the RTI, saw it as their obligation to 
get involved. They formulated their own ‘basket of measures’ against the Jan Lokpal 
Bill, and spoke out against Team Anna. NCPRI’s involvement in the Lokpal was 
thus triggered by its conflicting and competitive relationship with Team Anna. 
However, Team Anna also stemmed from the same set of competitive relationships. 
If the stories told by members of NCPRI as explored in this chapter hold any worth, 
it was in direct competition to Aruna that Arvind Kejriwal had left NCPRI to form a 
separate civil society group. He wanted recognition as a civil society representative, 
which he would not attain as long as he worked with Aruna, who till then was the 
most prominent face in anti-corruption activism. In this light, the campaign around 
Anna Hazare and the demand for a Jan Lokpal was formed and ignited by a 
personalised clash in civil society personalities. It was a politics of competition that 





This chapter has examined the competitive landscape of the Lokpal agitation. It 
explored the nation-wide anti-corruption movement through the complex web of 
frictions and charged relationships that shaped it. Focusing on the perspective of 
NCPRI, this chapter illustrated how strained and divided anti-corruption civil society 
activism in India became in respect of the formulation of a Lokpal Bill. There was 
competition about who best represented the needs of the people, who had the 
expertise and thus legitimacy to draft anti-corruption legislation, and who had 
initiated the debates on the Lokpal. NCPRI, which had previously played a central 
role in campaigning and drafting transparency legislation, had been side-lined in this 
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movement. In order to re-enter the stage of civil society involvement in anti-
corruption law-making, members of NCPRI drafted their own version of a Lokpal. 
To campaign for these drafts, they had to swim against the tide of hype surrounding 
Anna Hazare. Pointing out publicly what they deemed to be the undemocratic nature 
of Team Anna’s form of protest and the unconstitutionality of the demands of their 
Jan Lokpal Bill, was one way in which the campaigning by NCPRI played out. It was 
their way of repositioning themselves in a scene from which they had been 
outflanked in the bid to dominate the scene. 
 
What the heated debates and upheavals around the Lokpal agitation point to, is the 
importance given to notions of democratic process and statecraft in civil society 
activism in India. Both Team Anna and NCPRI had diverging ideas of what their role 
as civil society actors should be in enforcing anti-corruption, yet both shared a 
conviction that they had a role to play. They were essentially in competition over the 
category of ‘civil society’. That civil society engages directly in the drafting of laws 
and policies, and that the government must make room for this, seemed to be 
axiomatic for both groups. According to the logic of both, while diverging on their 
understandings of the means of getting there, civil society was a crucial element in 
deepening the experience of democracy in India. Both groups also shared the 
persuasion that anti-corruption legislation was crucial to improving governance 
structures in India and to strengthening the practice of statecraft. The notion endorsed 
by both was that if transparency and accountability was legally enshrined then the 
state could be ‘cleaned-up’ and become responsive to the needs of India’s citizens. 
Through some version of a Lokpal bill (either through Anna Hazare’s Jan Lokpal 
bill, or through NCPRI’s ‘basket of measures’), faith in the state could be restored. 
That the Lokpal agitation received such mass support and media hype, suggests that 




4. Performing ‘Civil Society’: 





If man is a sapient animal, a toolmaking animal, a self-making animal, a 
symbol-using animal, he is, no less, a performing animal, Homo 
performans, not in the sense, perhaps that a circus animal may be a 
performing animal, but in the sense that a man is a self-performing 
animal – his performances are, in a way, reflexive, in performing he 
reveals himself to himself. (Turner 1986: 81) 
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, the Lokpal agitation that dominated public 
discourse for months on end throughout most of 2011, raised a series of crucial 
questions on civil society’s involvement in democratic processes in India. Whilst the 
most conspicuous topic of discussion was corruption, another extensive area of 
debate was on the role of civil society. Team Anna’s movement’s demands for 
greater civil society involvement in the governing of the country gave rise to a debate 
on the meaning and scope of civil society in democratic politics. Although there was 
lingering confusion as to who makes up civil society, the term nonetheless gained 
wide political currency during the months of the Lokpal agitation. Media and public 
debate was full of discussions on whether Team Anna could speak on behalf of 
India’s civil society and, for that matter, of all Indians.110 
 
Particularly when members of Team Anna were included in the Joint Drafting 
Committee as a result of the demand of Anna Hazare’s first fast in April 2011, 
disputes flared up as to what exactly constitutes civil society. Team Anna had 
entered upon the official drafting platform with the reasoning that they represented 
the people of India and therefore civil society as a whole. Arvind Kejriwal, one of the 
                                                 
110 As in the previous chapter, this chapter draws on the term ‘civil society’ as a category of practice, 
and not as a category of analysis. In other words, ‘civil society’ here is used to refer to the category 
that my informants themselves used in describing themselves and their environment. The intention is 
not to analyse the term ‘civil society’. 
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five members of Team Anna in the Joint Drafting Committee, had justified their 
position as civil society representatives by claiming that “civil society means this 
country’s 1.2 billion people”.111 According to this conceptualisation, the mass 
movement around Anna Hazare signalled that they had sweeping support from the 
Indian population and they could thus speak on behalf of ‘the people’. While many 
did salute Team Anna for their force in tackling the government, and for asserting 
people’s power, there was nonetheless controversy about their notion of an all-
encompassing unitary civil society voice.  
 
Niraja Gopal Jayal, professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University, for instance, expressed 
her scepticism about Team Anna’s claim of representing civil society when she 
asked: “Is civil society accountable to anyone at all, or does the virtuous glow of its 
very existence accord it exemption in perpetuity?” (Jayal 2012).112 On a similar note, 
academic Pratap Bahnu Mehta opposed Team Anna’s assertion of comprehensive 
representation, stating that 
 
Anyone who claims to be the “authentic” voice of the people is treading 
on very thin ice indeed. It is a form of Jacobinism that is intoxicated with 
its own certainties about the people. It is not willing to subject itself to an 
accountability, least of all to the only mechanism we know of designating 
representatives: elections. (Mehta 2011)113  
 
The controversy over Team Anna and the Jan Lokpal Bill thus exhibited a deep- 
rooted disagreement about the role of civil society in politics. Several commentators 
expressed publicly their perturbation with the increased influence in politics of this 
unelected civil society group. Anna Hazare’s hunger-strikes, and the claims to 
represent ‘The People of India’, were seen by some critical voices as a populist 
tactic. Such claims were seen as infringement of the legitimacy of civil society as a 
                                                 
111 “Anna Hazare & Co. Up the Ante” in India Real Time, 8 June 2011 [accessed 23 June 2013] 
http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/06/08/anna-hazare-amp-co-up-the-ante/  
112 Jayal, N.G. (2012) “Annus Civicus: the Year of the Citizen?” in Seminar 629 [accessed 9 January, 
2014] http://www.india-seminar.com/2012/629/629_niraja_gopal_jayal.htm (Original text has no page 
numbers). 
113 Mehta, P.B. (2011) “Of the Few, by the Few” in Indian Express 12 April 2011 [accessed 9 
January, 2014] http://www.indianexpress.com/news/of-the-few-by-the-few/772773/0 (Original text 
has no page numbers). 
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realm separate from the institutions of the state. While consensus in the debates 
promulgated by media seemed to be that an active civil society was an important 
force in exerting pressure on the government, there was growing concern that Team 
Anna was going too far. By threatening to fast-unto-death unless the parliament 
immediately passed their draft of the Jan Lokpal Bill, they were interfering in the 
legislative domain. Professor Jayal stated in this context:  
 
Giving civil society the legitimate prerogative of formulating the law is 
not just procedurally dubious, it is a slippery slope, for there are no 
principled arguments that can be used to deter others, whether less well-
intentioned leaders or industry bodies, from demanding the same 
privilege. On what basis can we arbitrate the representational claims of 
one segment of civil society as against another, or say that one is 
legitimate and the other is not? (Jayal 2012) 
 
The underlying question framing the heated debates in the period around the Lokpal 
agitation was whether civil society activism as practised by Team Anna impaired 
democratic processes, or whether it was reconnecting Indian democracy with popular 
sentiment. Although it was widely agreed that an active civil society is a crucial 
component of India’s democracy, Team Anna’s form of protest aroused concerns 
that civil society could well cripple India’s democracy and undermine the country’s 
constitution. Mehta, for instance, warned in this context that “sometimes a sense of 
unbridled virtue can also subvert democracy” (Mehta 2011). The question lingering 
over many discussions was: Should Team Anna be welcomed for opening up a space 
for a non-political people’s movement, or did they represent an extra-constitutional 
authority assuming the role of anti-democratic vigilantes?   
 
This controversy over the meaning and practice of civil society was echoed amongst 
members of NCPRI. They were explicit about their reservations with Team Anna’s 
form of protest and with the content of their demands. They contended, as we have 
seen, that Team Anna did not represent civil society because they catered exclusively 
to an urban-based middle-class constituency and thereby ignored the interests of the 
vast portions of the population, namely the rural poor. Furthermore, they criticized 
Team Anna for failing to conduct wide scale public consultation before drafting their 
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Jan Lokpal Bill and thus being unrepresentative of the people’s interests. Team 
Anna’s claim that they represented the will of the people and that therefore the 
government must immediately enact their Jan Lokpal Bill, was denounced as being 
un-constitutional and anti-democratic. For demanding that their Jan Lokpal bill be 
passed by government without going through parliamentary procedures, Team Anna 
was criticised by members of NCPRI as derailing democratic processes and 
procedures. According to members of NCPRI, Team Anna did not follow due 
process and procedure and thus could not speak on behalf of civil society.   
 
Underlying their critiques of Team Anna’s undemocratic nature, were NCPRI’s own 
ideas of what civil society’s role should be. This was premised on all that Team 
Anna was not. That is to say, in NCPRI’s version, civil society must conduct wide-
scale public consultation, it must include the voice of the rural poor, and it must 
comply with democratic processes. Based on its experience in the RTI movement, 
NCPRI had enjoyed a reputation of being precisely that: inclusive, consultative and 
procedural. Through its interchangeable association to the MKSS that is reputed for 
its grassroots work, NCPRI had been known as a civil society organisation deeply 
connected to the needs and demands of the poor. Over the years of campaigning for 
the RTI, NCPRI had amassed a ‘tool-kit’ of methods and procedures on how to 
campaign for its demands. One central component had been extensive public 
consultation; allegedly, over the nine years between NCPRI’s first draft of the RTI 
Bill in 1996 and the final enactment in 2005, NCPRI had reached out to a wide range 
of audiences, gathering people’s views and opinions that were then incorporated into 
its RTI Bill. For NCPRI, public consultation thus constituted one of the pivotal 
components of due process and procedure for civil society actors.  
 
The sudden emergence of Team Anna onto the scene of anti-corruption campaigning 
and the public hype around them had dislodged NCPRI from its previously 
uncontested position in matters of transparency and accountability. The exigencies of 
the Lokpal agitation forced members of NCPRI to reposition themselves as civil 
society actors. With the emergence of Team Anna, NCPRI now had to contest for 
recognition and to differentiate itself from its contenders. Members of NCPRI thus 
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needed to refashion their sense of organisational identity and to define their 
positioning in the field of anti-corruption campaigning. In order to speak out on the 
Lokpal, and to be recognised as a contender in the debates specifically over an anti-
corruption ombudsman, NCPRI had to present itself as a legitimate organisation able 
to speak in the people’s interest. It did this by emphasising its commitment to ideas 
of due process, particularly regarding public consultation.  
 
This chapter further explores NCPRI’s ideals of civil society. It examines how these 
ideals, consolidated in its oppositional stance against Team Anna, were expressed in 
tangible form. In the previous chapter I examined how members of NCPRI 
differentiated themselves from Team Anna at a discursive level through written 
articles and public lectures; in this chapter I explore the ways in which this 
differentiation was ‘enacted’. After establishing that the crucial component of civil 
society engagement involved public consultation, NCPRI needed to make this 
publicly visible. Their commitment to broad public consultation and to the inclusion 
of the rural poor had to be made discernible and concrete again. It was along these 
lines that they could position themselves as legitimate civil society actors in the 
drafting of anti-corruption laws. To bring to life their ideals of civil society, it was 
important to publicly present these very ideas.  
 
This chapter is divided into two sections: the first section explores the preparatory 
meeting for NCPRI’s upcoming public event, in which the definitions and 
boundaries of the type of organisation that NCPRI is, or should be, were determined 
and demarcated. The second section focuses on how these ideas of what civil society 





One day, during the period of frenzy surrounding the Lokpal agitation, Nikhil 
announced at the NCPRI office that it had occurred to him that NCPRI must organise 
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a public convention on its position on the Lokpal. This should happen as soon as 
possible, he  said, while public attention on the Lokpal was still high. Over the weeks 
around the time of the Lokpal hype, Nikhil had become the prime mover within the 
NCPRI in pushing for their ‘basket of measures’. It was he primarily who lobbied 
government representatives and who orchestrated action on behalf of NCPRI. 
Quickly a few emails were sent and calls were made to most of the Delhi-based 
members of NCPRI, with the invitation to a meeting to plan an urgent public 
convention. 
 
A few days later the planning meeting was held, to which both ‘base’ and ‘senior’ 
members turned up.114 Nikhil introduced everyone to his idea of holding a public 
convention. He mentioned that with the urgency of events of the past months, as 
propelled by Team Anna, NCPRI had been pushed into a reactive position. This had 
meant that NCPRI had had to draft and campaign for its version of the Lokpal 
according to the time-scale dictated by Team Anna.  Nikhil admitted that this had 
come at the cost of forsaking procedures of public consultation. Nikhil argued that 
NCPRI needed to urgently organise an event of public consultation so as to reverse 
the position it had got itself into. Over the weeks, members of NCPRI had repeatedly 
accused Team Anna publicly for failing to conduct public consultation on their 
proposed Jan Lokpal Bill. However, with his call for a public convention, Nikhil was 
admitting that NCPRI had not been participatory or consultative with its own draft 
bills either. It was in this context that Nikhil had decided to urgently organise a 
convention that would put into the public view NCPRI’s practice of public 
consultation.  
 
Nikhil further mentioned that the government – predominantly Jairam Ramesh, the 
Minister of Rural Development with whom he had interacted the most – had shown 
receptiveness to the NCPRI approach to the Lokpal and particularly to their proposed 
Grievance Redress Bill. This resonated with a wider sense among NCPRI members, 
as well as in some public settings, that the government evidently favoured NCPRI’s 
approach to the Lokpal over Team Anna’s. Nikhil announced that NCPRI must seize 
                                                 
114 For a definition of ‘base’ and ‘senior’ members, see Chapter Two.  
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such a climate and create wider public awareness on NCPRI’s approach to the 
Lokpal. It was important that NCPRI emerge from its position of re-action to one of 
pro-action.  
 
Although NCPRI’s approach to the Lokpal was a ‘basket of measures’ with five 
concurrent laws to tackle corruption, Nikhil suggested at this meeting that the 
convention should focus only on the Grievance Redress Bill. This was because the 
Grievance Redress Bill was the only one of the basket of measures entirely drafted 
by NCPRI and thus required most deliberation. Indeed among some NCPRI 
members it was said that Nikhil, along with Shekhar, had exclusively drafted the 
Grievance Redress Bill, and it was sometimes referred to endearingly as ‘Nikhil’s 
baby’. On several occasions before, Nikhil had referred to the Grievance Redress Bill 
as the most important anti-corruption measure for the ‘people’, particularly for the 
poor, because this Bill proposed to deal with corruption at the lower levels of the 
bureaucracy, and thus the levels directly encountered by ordinary citizens. Unlike 
Team Anna’s Jan Lokpal Bill that stipulated one ombudsman to deal with all cases of 
corruption, the Grievance Redress Bill would be a separate regulatory body that 
would oversee exclusively the delivery of services and government schemes. 
Through the insistence of some of the senior members present at the meeting, it was 
agreed that the convention must also deal with the Whistleblower’s Protection Act as 
amended by NCPRI. It was decided that the redress of grievances and the protection 
of those who address grievances go hand in hand. 
 
A central point of discussion in this planning meeting, was the importance of public 
consultation. It was argued that Team Anna merely held occasional meetings here 
and there and then called it wide-scale public consultation. One senior member, for 
instance, indicated his disquiet with Team Anna’s notion of ‘public debate’, which 
he described as being reduced to mass SMSs, some Facebook messages and Tweets. 
This rendered their constituency shallow and unrepresentative. Another member 
remarked that Team Anna’s unidirectional mode of communication did not constitute 
informed debate or consultation in any way. Decisions within Team Anna, someone 
else argued, were taken by a very select few and then promoted as being premised on 
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wide public consultation. The consensus amongst the NCPRI members appeared to 
be that Team Anna’s approach was not consultative and that therefore their Jan 
Lokpal Bill could not be presented as a people’s law.  
 
Nikhil reminded the members that through its history in the RTI movement, NCPRI 
was highly experienced in the processes of public consultation. Its campaigning for 
the RTI had taken over nine years, allowing for extensive public consultation. 
NCPRI needed to draw on this experience and make its reputation as being widely 
consultative publicly visible. In recent weeks NCPRI had not had time for this, but it 
needed now to capitalize on the momentary lull in Team Anna’s activities and on the 
receptiveness of their views by the government. NCPRI needed to publicly present 
its commitment to public consultation. 
 
What was not mentioned in this meeting was that, in several instances during the 
previous few weeks, NCPRI had faced internal criticism amongst its own members 
for not being sufficiently consultative. Dispersed members of NCPRI had privately 
or publicly complained that they had not been consulted on the NCPRI approach to 
the Lokpal. The climax of this was when a newspaper reported that a Pune-based 
member of NCPRI, retired Major General S.C.N. Jatar, had been “peeved” about not 
being consulted by NCPRI on its stand on Anna Hazare. “The NCPRI has taken a 
stand on the Jan Lokpal Bill without consulting its members and seeking their 
suggestions” the newspaper quoted his letter to NCPRI.115 On a similar note, a senior 
journalist from the weekly magazine Governance Now, had jokingly sneered in a 
public panel that he had shared with Aruna, that he was a member of NCPRI but that 
he did not know what this membership entailed, as he had never been informed about 
NCPRI’s approach to the Lokpal. This, along with other public and private 
comments along similar lines, had stirred up some alarm in the NCPRI office. In 
semi-private settings, such as over lunch in the NCPRI office, Aruna and Nikhil 
often discussed how to mitigate such disappointment amongst members. Nikhil’s 
decision to organise a public convention can be read as a response to this.  
                                                 








Here we begin to note how the exigencies of the Lokpal agitation forced members of 
NCPRI to modify the identity of their organisation. During the upheavals of the 
Lokpal, NCPRI had been faced with external and internal tensions that demanded 
response and reaction. NCPRI as an organisation was impelled to clarify its positions 
both to an external public as well as internally to its own members. In order to speak 
out on the Lokpal and to be recognised as a contender in the debates over an anti-
corruption ombudsman, NCPRI had to present itself as a legitimate organisation. 
Members themselves needed to be convinced of NCPRI’s consistency of standards, 
as did the broader public. As the account of the preparatory meetings for NCPRI’s 
upcoming public event illustrated, it was public consultation – necessarily with the 
participation of the rural poor – that was identified by members of NCPRI as being 
one of the crucial building blocks constituting civil society engagement. As such, a 
public convention would not only serve as a way of putting into practice processes of 
public consultation, but would furthermore appease the members and the public 
about NCPRI’s credibility. 
 
These endeavours to present NCPRI as an organisation committed to public 
consultation can be understood in terms of Goffman’s dramaturgical analysis of 
social life, which seeks to uncover the norms and meanings that underlie social 
interaction. According to Goffman, everyday life can be likened to a theatre, wherein 
social interaction is between actors playing a variety of roles before an audience. 
Through a ‘performance’, individuals, or actors, deliver impressions and confirm 
their identity to others and thereby give meaning to themselves and to their situation. 
Although the weakness of Goffman’s analysis is that it can evoke the sense of 
duplicity, it nevertheless provides a useful framework with which to organise routine 
elements and dynamics into meaningful schemes. The efforts to present NCPRI’s 
commitment to public consultation can be thought of in terms of Goffman’s notion of 
“impression management”, which understands social actors as crafting and managing 
the modalities of their communication in their performance (Goffman 1990: 203). In 
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other words, in a performance actors present ‘fronts’ that provide the framework that 
enable their impression to be rendered meaningful. Goffman describes a front as the 
projected character traits that are crafted in such manner so as to be made meaningful 
to others. Accordingly, fronts are “expressive equipment of a standard kind 
intentionally or unwittingly employed by the individual during his performance” 
(Goffman 1990: 32). A front establishes normative settings and appearances from 
which the social role of the actor can be convincingly communicated. Crucially, a 
front is constructed for a given audience. Actors deliberately construe a front in order 
to render their identity socially meaningful to a specific audience. It was this front of 





A crucial issue discussed during the planning meeting was the type of audience that 
the upcoming public convention would address. It was very quickly established that 
the key participants of the convention would be marginalised people, or those people 
with the highest stake in grievance redress. With the proposed Grievance Redress 
Bill designed to tackle principally the needs of the poor, it would be the poor who 
should be invited to the public convention. To ensure this, it was decided that 
organisations and campaigns from throughout the country working on issues of 
transparency and accountability at the grassroots level would be asked to send 
representatives from their diverse constituencies. With most of the attendees 
expected to come from low-income backgrounds it was settled in the meeting that the 
budget of the convention must be held at a bare minimum. Not more than 100 rupees 
(£1.2) per person could be charged. 
 
The emphasis on the participation of the rural poor was not least in response to 
NCPRI’s critique of Team Anna. On several occasions, members of NCPRI had 
publicly accused Team Anna of having a largely urban middle-class constituency, 
and of failing to represent the interests of rural populations. In contrast, NCPRI 
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presented itself as a more inclusive organisation that had experience in mobilising 
people from rural areas (principally through the reputation of MKSS). A public 
convention would allow NCPRI to publicly demonstrate its rural constituency. This 
suggests that NCPRI was ultimately competing against Team Anna over a ‘public’. 
Team Anna, with the mass upheaval it had stirred through its demand for a Lokpal, 
was addressing a massive audience. It claimed wide-scale public support and 
consequently representation of ‘the people’. NCPRI, in its attempt to swim against 
this turbulent current, was responding by creating its own audience to address. It too 
needed a ‘public’ to legitimise its engagement in civil society. In this competitive 
climate both organisations were bringing into being their own public.  
 
The endeavour of creating a legitimising audience corresponds to the intrinsic 
processes of a democratic setup. Popular sovereignty, the basic tenet of democracy, 
rests on the principle that political power is positioned in ‘the people’ whose consent 
legitimates the democratic form of government. However, as several political 
theorists have noted, ‘the people’ as a category is inherently contested and divided 
and thus needs to be continuously rearticulated and re-defined for legitimacy to be 
sustained. Lefort for instance, maintains that in a democracy “the locus of power is 
an empty place” (Lefort 1988: 17) implying that a stable category of ‘the people’ 
does not exist, but must be constantly reinvented. He explains this by contrasting 
modern democracy to the premodern monarchic system of rule, which according to 
Lefort, was characterized by the idea of the king as the visible embodiment of the 
‘body politics’.116  
 
The abolition of the king and the emergence of modernity according to Lefort 
signaled the ‘dis-incarnation of society’. By disconnecting power from the king’s 
body that represented the social whole, society’s unity was disembodied, leading to 
the emergence of individuals and split groups. Society in modernity, unlike the pre-
modern, according to Lefort’s analysis, is thus based on an irresolvable division and 
                                                 
116 The mystical body of the king was thought to intertwine the visible and the invisible and to thus 
incarnate the identity of society’s members. In other words, what allowed for pre-modern European 
society to establish its unity was a representation of power embodied in the king, which made it 
possible to understand society as ordered and stable. 
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disjuncture. In a modern democracy power still remains, but its reference is to an 
‘empty place’ that no representation can occupy. In other words, the beheading of a 
king signifies “the dissolution of the markers of certainty” and consequently a 
“political mutation of the symbolic order” (Lefort 1988: 17). In modern democracy, 
society’s unity can no longer be represented by a single figure and so the 
legitimisation of authority is always in question. Lefort is not suggesting that society 
cannot be represented, but rather that all representations of society are imaginative 
and hence disputable. Consequently, modern democracy involves various individuals 
and factions constantly jockeying and competing for power. Lefort thus concludes 
that in a democracy the institutions of society are in a constant legitimation crisis and 
that any representation of society forever begs justification. 
 
Laclau similarly notes that the construction of a ‘people’ is “the political operation 
par excellence” in a democracy (Laclau 2005: 153). Similarly to Lefort, Laclau 
argues that the ‘public’ is indispensable for a democracy to be legitimised, but that 
since the ‘public’ does not exist as a category a priori, it must be called into 
existence. Society is inherently heterogeneous and divided, with diverging and 
conflicting interests, yet for representation to be legitimised, a bounded category of 
‘the people’ must be created. The political logic of populism, according to Laclau, 
functions by attempting to unify and stabilize essentially contested groups and 
disparate demands through the building of ‘chains of equivalence’. Populist 
movements stress equivalence by means of a shared antagonism, whereby ‘the 
people’ is posed against “an institutionalized ‘other’” (Laclau 2005: 117). Through 
the emergence of what Laclau refers to as ‘empty signifiers’, generic and loosely 
defined demands come to stand in for specific demands. It is through such empty 
signifiers that a populist movement can represent ‘the people’ as a whole. Political 
subjects are not given, but are constituted through particular narrative frames and 
modes of rhetoric of the political logic of populism.  
 
These political theories of democracy indicate that NCPRI was grappling with the 
constitutive questions of democracy. Just as in the legitimation processes of a 
democratic system, NCPRI needed a ‘public’ for its legitimacy to be sustained. It 
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needed an audience before whom to present its ideas of civil society engagement. 
Given that a category of a ‘public’ is inherently contested and divided, its audience 
and constituency needed to be continuously rearticulated and re-defined. The 
planning meeting deliberated and re-established the idea that NCPRI’s primary 
public are the poor. Within the context of the Lokpal agitation, faced with a 
contender, NCPRI had to compete for recognition. It was this competitive climate 
that propelled NCPRI to define and summon its audience. Holding a public 
convention was one instance through which NCPRI could bring into being its public. 
 
In order to ensure public attention to NCPRI’s convention, a number of strategic 
decisions were taken in the planning meeting. Although the main invitees would be 
the so-called stakeholders, it was also decided that ‘eminent persons’ would be 
invited. If bureaucrats and representatives of all political parties were invited, as well 
as a famous keynote speaker, journalists would be more likely to attend. A similar 
intention of assuring media coverage underlay the setting of the date of the 
convention. It was determined that the convention could not fall on a Sunday, as 
journalists tend to take the day off unless there is a pressing issue. With NCPRI’s 
convention unlikely to be deemed ‘pressing’, it must be held on a ‘journalist-
friendly’ day. Also, it was decided that it could not overlap with a public event 
organised by Team Anna, as that would be bound to steal media limelight. The 
coverage of NCPRI’s event by the media was crucial in order to present NCPRI as an 





On the day of the public convention, the frames that had been carefully deliberated 
during the planning meetings became the backdrop for the public presentation. The 
public convention was an instance of giving tangible form to the notion of NCPRI as 
an organisation engaged in public consultation with the participation of the rural 
poor. NCPRI’s ideas of civil society could here be enacted and performed. The term 
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‘performance’ is here not to be understood as a contrived, or somehow false 
presentation of the self. Nor is a performance to be thought of as merely a symbolic 
representation of NCPRI’s positions and commitment, removed from the everyday 
working of things. Rather, as the following account will illustrate, the various 
elements of the performance actually bring to life the very positions that NCPRI 
stands for. It is through the acts, symbols, rhetoric and rituals of the performance that 
the core tenets of NCPRI are brought into being. 
 
 
Tangibility of ideals 
 
Posters and banners were hung up in the auditorium and across the halls and 
courtyard of the school that had been chosen as the venue. Apart from some that had 
been especially made for the occasion, most of the banners had been brought from 
Rajasthan by the MKSS team who had arrived in Delhi the previous evening. Hardly 
any public event in which MKSS is involved goes by without the appearance of these 
banners: they are the props that accompany all their public performances. Over the 
years of MKSS’s tireless action and experience in public mobilisation, innumerable 
printed banners have accumulated with a whole range of slogans and messages that 
can be employed depending on the circumstance. For the occasion of the Grievance 
Redress Convention, it was MKSS’s more generic banners that had made it to Delhi. 
Paradigmatic slogans of MKSS such as yeh sarkar hamari aap ki, nahi kisi ki baap ki 
(this government is yours and mine, not somebody’s fiefdom) hung in the 
auditorium. These were interspersed with MKSS’s logo of the emblematic 
revolutionary raised fists.117 Although largely plain – red or black letters and images 
on white canvas material – these banners create a decorative component to any event.  
 
                                                 
117 The fist in the forefront of MKSS’ logo is identifiable as a woman’s hand as it has the bangles 
typically worn by women in rural Rajasthan. The fist in the background does not have such bangles, 








Figure 8 Rozgar mela held by MKSS in Jaipur (author’s own photo) 
 
 





The kits that had been put together by the volunteers (mainly Delhi college students) 
were handed out to the participants as they began to arrive. The kits were simple 
cloth bags stitched together by the ‘craft section’ of SWRC (Social Work and 
Research Centre – more recently renamed the ‘Barefoot College’), as they have done 
on innumerable occasions in the past. SWRC is the well-funded NGO run by 
Aruna’s husband and is also where Aruna’s career in grassroots work began. With 
ties based on kinship and emotional affinity, SWRC is one of MKSS’s closest allies 
in its network of connections. The kits for this convention contained copies of the 
Grievance Redress Bill and Whistleblower’s Protection Act as drafted and amended 
by NCPRI. Each kit also contained a notebook and pen – surplus stationary that had 
been donated to NCPRI for a previous convention they had held. Along with the 
programme for the two-day event, and a booklet with songs and slogans of MKSS, 
there were coupons for tea and meals.  
 
As the participants gathered in the auditorium and found a place to sit on the floor, 
and as some of the speakers for the opening plenary session were still awaited, Nikhil 
spontaneously gave a brief introduction. As a welcome note he listed all the states 
from which the approximately 150 participants had come, including from as far as 
Assam, Orissa, and Andhra Pradesh. The majority of the participants however had 
come from Rajasthan, as is typical for any NCPRI/MKSS organised public event. In 
a mix of English and Hindi because some of the participants present came from non-
Hindi speaking states, Nikhil explained the context of the convention. In simple, non-
technical language, characteristic of Nikhil’s public oratory in events with the aam 
aadmi, and contrary to many other public speakers stemming from a middle-upper 
class background who are largely unable to present their message in simple Hindi, – 
Nikhil delineated the main concerns that NCPRI had with Anna Hazare’s Jan Lokpal 
Bill. The problem with the Jan Lokpal Bill, he explained, was that it was expected to 
deal with all levels of corruption, from the Prime Minister all the way down to the 
village level. Expecting one single institution to deal with all levels of corruption, 
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Nikhil explained to the audience, was unrealistic as it would lead to an utter 
inundation of complaints and grievances.  
 
At this point Nikhil asked everyone in the audience to raise their hand if they had any 
pending grievance regarding a government scheme or service. Everybody’s hand 
went up. Nikhil then pointed out that if one assumed that every citizen has at least 
one grievance against the government, it would amount to 1.2 billion grievances that 
a Lokpal would have to deal with. It was unthinkable, he argued, to expect one single 
Lokpal institution to deal with all of these, as well as with the corruption of all the 
politicians, ministers, bureaucrats, police and judges. Amongst people in the 
audience, heads nodded emphatically in agreement. It was for this reason, Nikhil 
further explained, that NCPRI was proposing separate anti-corruption measures, one 
of which was the Grievance Redress Bill. Following a standard procedure in all 
public events organised by MKSS, Nikhil concluded with a slogan: he shouted “hum 
sab” to which the audience responded in unison “ek hai” (combined they translate to: 
we are all united). 
 
Once all the speakers of the plenary session had arrived, Nikhil handed over. But 
before the microphone was passed to the speakers, Shankar from the MKSS stepped 
in, and in his habitual joking tone said that in good Rajasthani spirit, nothing could 
begin without a song. Accompanied by a dholak (hand drum) and a bankia (trumpet-
like instrument), a group of MKSS members sang one of the many songs written and 
sung by MKSS. I noticed many people in the audience singing along, evidently 
familiar with the lyrics. Many of the people present at the convention, especially 
those from Rajasthan, had attended other similar events organised by MKSS and 
were thus evidently familiar with the elements of the event. Songs, along with 
slogans and puppets, have become the sine qua non of any MKSS event.  
 
The performative aspects of NCPRI began to manifest themselves already at this 
point. By invoking specific symbols and rhetoric, NCPRI’s political identity was 
being performed. In his introduction, Nikhil was not merely stating NCPRI’s position 
on the Lokpal, and their wider views on civil society representation, but was also 
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enacting the very positions NCPRI stands for. He was directly involving the 
audience, thereby giving form to NCPRI’s notion of participation by the rural poor. 
The slogans and songs further served as direct forms of engagement by the 
participants. NCPRI’s commitment to public consultation was simultaneously being 
stated as well as done (Brickell 2005; Butler 1996; Cameron 1997). In this regard, 
NCPRI’s Grievance Redress convention was not merely a spectacle of public 
consultation, but involved the actual bringing into being of their notion of 
consultation. The performance of the norms and ideals of NCPRI and the reiteration 
of slogans and songs by the audience were the very act of consultation itself. The 
signs, symbols and rhetoric of the convention did not just stand as representations of 
NCPRI’s ideas of public consultation, but actually substantiated those very ideals. It 
was in the act of performing, that members of NCPRI rendered meaningful to 
themselves and to others what their positions and commitments were.  
 
This notion of performance as ‘acting upon the world’, rather than being mere 
illustrations or descriptions, is explained by Austin through his work on speech acts. 
Austin identifies ‘performative utterances’ as those that are “doing something rather 
than merely saying something” (Austin 1976: 137). These he contrasts to ‘constative 
utterances’, as considered by traditional philosophy of language, that encompass 
those statements that provide descriptions that can be appraised as either true or 
false. By contrast, performative utterances produce that which they name and 
constitute the reality they describe, rather than describing or reporting on the reality. 
Performative utterances do not have any inherent truth-value, but by being uttered 
perform a particular action. Austin’s archetypal examples of performative utterances 
include pronouncing ‘I do’ in a marriage ceremony; or uttering ‘I name this ship 
Queen Elizabeth’ while smashing a bottle against the stern; or in a bet such as ‘I bet 
you sixpence it will rain tomorrow’. What makes utterances such as these 
performative is that they do not simply describe what is being done, but actually do 
it. In other words, the very act of uttering brings into existence that which is being 
uttered. As applied to the performances in NCPRI’s public consultation, this 
illustrates that performatives are acts that actually bring about practices of public 





Two main plenary sessions were scheduled over the two-day convention. That the 
sessions had ‘important’ people with ‘big’ names, was evident in the many flashes of 
journalists’ cameras that went off during the sessions. The first plenary session had 
Binayak Sen as the key speaker, along with several other veteran activists and 
journalists, including Aruna and Shekhar from the NCPRI.118 The second plenary 
session was with politicians and senior incumbent or ex-bureaucrats, made up mainly 
of ‘old’ friends and associates of NCPRI, who had somehow been involved in the 
RTI movement. Although representatives from all political parties had been invited, 
only Members of Parliament from the two Communist parties – the CPI and the 
CPI(M) – attended. All of the panel speakers, in their own way and with their own 
allegories (and own language, as some spoke in English, others in Hindi, yet others 
in ‘Hinglish’), spoke of the importance of protecting the common man from mal-
governance and from the abuse of power. 119 They all stated their endorsement of a 
separate Grievance Redress Bill and of a strengthened Whistleblower’s Protection 
Act. 
 
After the first plenary session there followed the most entertaining component of the 
convention: a play showcasing the realities of common citizens who attempt to seek 
redress of their grievances. The play had been written and directed specifically for 
this occasion by Tripurari Sharma from the National School of Drama, New Delhi. 
Tripurari has been a long-time associate of MKSS and has directed countless plays 
for them on the various issues they have campaigned for. A group composed mainly 
of members of NCPRI, MKSS and SWRC had spent a three-day workshop in Tilonia 
using the SWRC facilities for rehearsing. The play combined acting, puppets and 
music, and was an entertaining satirical account of the dangers and coercion faced by 
whistle-blowers who attempt to uncover government malpractices and seek the 
redressal of grievances. It was based on recent true stories of two individuals in 
                                                 
118 Binayak Sen is a doctor and human rights activist, extending health care to poor people in the 
rural-tribal areas of the state of Chhattisgarh, North India. In 2010 he was controversially convicted 
for sedition and for allegedly supporting Naxalites.  
119 ‘Hinglish’ is the word given to the mixing of English and Hindi, a ‘language’ that is spoken 
characteristically by middle-class north Indians.  
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Rajasthan, Manglaram and Avdesh Kumar, who risked their lives and livelihoods to 
seek information pertaining to irregularities in the implementation of key 
government programmes. Manglaram, a member from the untouchable caste 
community, after repeatedly seeking information on the implementation of NREGA 
(National Rural Employment Guarantee Act) in his gram panchayat (self-
government institution at the village level), was severely beaten up by the headmen 
of the sarpanch. He only barely survived, but yet, partially paralyzed, he continued 
to demand information and justice in his village. Avdesh Kumar similarly was put 
through endless excruciating processes in his persevering quest for information on 
government projects in his village. Both cases highlighted the layers of oppression 
faced by RTI activists in their struggle to uncover government malpractices. The 
theatre performance was given a final touch when the real Manglaram appeared on 
his crutches and attested the accuracy of the play by giving his version of the story. 
 
Not even half way through the event, and already all the symbols and signs that mark 
a typical MKSS/NCPRI event had surfaced in this convention: the banners and 
slogans, the songs and music, the theatre and puppets, the panels with eminent 
individuals, the rhetorical style of interacting with the audience. Having attended 
countless public events by MKSS/NCPRI, I immediately recognised the repetition 
and reproduction of these symbols. These elements had been developed by MKSS 
over the many years of their engagement with rural populations and were 
characterised by their intelligibility, even for illiterate audiences. The active response 
given by the audience in singing along to songs, cheering the slogans in unison, and 
responding to the oratory style of the presenters also indicated that these elements 
had been performed before and that they formed part of the toolkit of MKSS. Many 
people in the audience, evidently having attended public events of MKSS in the past, 
knew how to play their role within the performance. This suggests that a 
performance is naturalised through the reiteration by the same audiences that sees it 
over and over. A performance constitutes reality by being repeated and reiterated. 
This resonates with Derrida’s (1988) concept of iterability, which suggests that for an 
utterance to be comprehensible, it must be repeatable. An utterance is not a singular 
event but is an effect of ‘citational doubling’. Accordingly, it is through the process 
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of repetition and recitation that a subject is brought into being. Butler (1993) 
famously argued for this notion of recitation by showing that gender identity is 
performed through a similar process of reiteration. So conceived, gender is not an 
innate and natural character of a person, but is essentially a performance, a citation of 
all previous performances of gender.  
 
This notion that through the reiteration of a performance, the subject – in this case, 
the essence of an organisation – comes into being, is germane to the work of MKSS 
(and, consequently, of NCPRI). MKSS exists in and through its staged events 
wherein its characteristic as an organisation that is rooted in the concerns and needs 
of the poor is animated. The ideals it stands for, primarily of being a grassroots 
movement driven by the participation of the rural populations, are enacted and thus 
substantiated in such public performances. The repertoire of symbols, signs and 
rhetoric that MKSS draws on in all its public performances, reify such ideals. While 
the public convention described thus far was in direct reaction to the occurrences 
around the Lokpal agitation, it was nonetheless modelled on public events organised 
by MKSS and NCPRI on countless occasions. In organising this particular public 
convention, members of NCPRI and MKSS could draw on the wealth of experience 
in the field of public organisation that they had accumulated over more than 20 years. 
A description of another public event of MKSS serves to further illustrate the ways 
in which the reiteration and performance of certain signs, symbols and rhetoric, lends 
to the constitution of the essence of MKSS. 
 
On 2 February 2011, to commemorate the fifth  anniversary of the implementation of 
NREGA (National Rural Employment Guarantee Act), MKSS organised a rozgar 
mela (a fair for wage labourers). And quite a fair it was! More than 500 villagers had 
come to Jaipur from all over Rajasthan for a day of talks, exchanges of experiences, 
music and dance. Busloads of people arrived in Statue Circle, a public area in central 
Jaipur designated for protests and public events. Like in most big events organised 
by MKSS, a colourful marquee (as typically used in weddings) had been put up for 
this occasion to provide shade to the participants, which, combined with the posters 
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and banners, lent the scene a festive mood. As the villagers arrived, they huddled 
together on the carpets that had been spread across the dusty ground. 
 
The tone of the mela was festive too. Shankar from MKSS opened up the event with 
his entertaining and charming communication style, welcoming everyone to the 
janmadin (birthday) of NREGA. Standing in front of the crowd, he said through a 
microphone that all the people gathered here today were mazdoor (wage labourers) 
and thus the bache (children) of NREGA, which could be considered everybody’s 
ma-bap (parents). This brought smiles and laughter to the crowds, who were already 
endeared to Shankar’s style, not least because he spoke in the familiar and colloquial 
Marwari (the local dialect of Rajasthan). Most other public speakers (including 
Aruna and Nikhil as well as other invited guests) were not from the area, or had been 
educated in English medium schools, so resorted to Hindi, English or ‘Hinglish’ – 
languages that remained ‘foreign’ to most of the rural participants. As Shankar was 
talking to the audience about the importance of NREGA, a group of approximately 
50 people arrived from Bara district. These people had been bonded labourers who, 
with the support of a Bara-based NGO called Sankalp, had recently been freed, some 
from as long as 20 years of bondage. Through negotiations between Sankalp, MKSS 
and the Rajasthani government, the recently-freed bonded labourers had been 
promised 200 days of guaranteed employment under NREGA, in contrast to the 
stipulated 100 days that a NREGA worker is normally guaranteed. Shankar 
welcomed the group from Bara calling them the most recent bache of NREGA, and 
concluded by shouting with raised fist “hum sab”, to which everyone automatically 
responded raising their own fists “ek hai” (we are all untied). 
 
Next, Nikhil stepped up, calling to the stage representatives from all the districts of 
Rajasthan present that day to share some of their stories of success with NREGA. 
Most of the people who came forward to the microphone to speak of their 
experiences quickly slipped into complaints about the failure with NREGA. They 
complained, amongst other, about not receiving the 100 days of employment due to 
them, or of receiving far less than the stipulated minimum wage, or of having to pay 
for their ‘job card’ that they were supposed to receive for free. Nikhil intervened, 
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reminding the speakers to focus on the positive aspects of NREGA and on the 
benefits that it had brought to them. “Yeh kanun apna hi hai” (this law is our very 
own) and we must make it work, he said. At this point, Nikhil asked the audience to 
raise their hands if they had ever worked under NREGA. Nearly everyone’s hands 
went up. He then asked if people would prefer it if the scheme was scrapped. 
Everybody shook their head in refusal. For this reason, Nikhil emphasised, it was 
important to give attention to the positive aspects of NREGA so as to strengthen the 
scheme. “Did you know that no other country in the world has a scheme as large as 
NREGA?” he asked the crowd. “Let’s ensure it stays strong and that it serves our 
interests” he added to a consenting crowd.  
 
After the testimonial accounts of personal experiences with NREGA, two sarpanches 
were asked to speak to the audience about their efforts in strengthening NREGA in 
their respective gram panchayats. Kalu Ram, for instance, spoke of his efforts in 
preventing corruption from NREGA in his gram panchayat Vijaypura, whereby he 
had painted the details of works under NREGA on the walls of the panchayat office. 
This included information regarding work sanctioned, families to whom work had 
been provided, the amount paid to each worker, and all expenditure details. Being a 
member of MKSS, Kalu Ram was guided by an ethos of transparency, believing that 
access to information would enable greater accountability to the people and thus 
enhance participatory democracy. He proudly told the audience gathered at the mela 
that Rajasthan’s Chief Minister Ashok Gehlot had been so impressed by his idea that 






Figure 10 Sarpanch Kalu Ram in front of one of his ‘transparency walls’ 
 
 
Kalu Ram’s presentation of his work in Vijaypura was followed by several other 
accounts on experiences of strengthening NREGA across Rajasthan. Then Nikhil 
took over again and welcomed the group of workers who had just arrived from 
Godliya village in Tonk district. Months earlier, these villagers had been paid as little 
one rupee for ten days’ worth of hard labour. Members of MKSS, primarily Nikhil, 
had taken up this case and persevered in ensuring that these workers be granted their 
full wages. This had led to wider discussions with the state government – and later, 
the national government – on linking the wages granted to NREGA workers to the 
state stipulated minimum wage. Each of the workers from Godliya village present 
that day told the audience how much – or rather, how little – they had been paid for 
their labour under NREGA. When one woman said she had received five rupees for 
ten days of labour, Nikhil stirred indignation among the audience by asking: “can we 
buy a kilogram of wheat with five rupees?” to which the audience shouted in unison 
“no!” Nikhil continued: “can we buy a kilogram of rice?” with the response being 
again a clear “no!”; “a kilogram of onions?”, “no!”, and in such manner, Nikhil listed 
several food items. He then continued in his inciting tone: “will we accept anything 
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less than the minimum wage?” – again a loud and concerted “no!” Finally, he ended 
with a rallying cry: “ham apne mazdoor ke lie larenge, ham 135 se kam nahi lenge!” 
(we will fight four our wages, we will not accept less than 135 [rupees]).120  
 
Finally, Aruna came to the stage and spoke a few words. In very simple Hindi she 
spoke of the importance of being united and of looking forward to strengthening 
NREGA. She said that the struggle for the Right to Information and the Right to 
Work had begun in Rajasthan, and, turning to the audience, she said: “it is because of 
you and your sustained struggle that the entire country can now benefit from the RTI 
and from NREGA. Let’s not stop here! Let’s continue our struggle and ensure we get 
all our rights and entitlements”. She continued explaining that the democratic 
governance in place meant that people had the right to demand accountability from 
the government; she urged everyone to be active and to strengthen democracy by 
speaking up for their rights. She explained that with every item which people bought 
– from a bar of soap to a light-bulb – people were paying taxes, thus making  the 
government’s money essentially the people’s money. Aruna shouted a slogan often 
repeated in such public events, and therefore known to many in the audience: 
“hamara paisa, hamare hisab!” (our money, our accounts). 
 
After about five hours of speeches and presentations, a ‘delegation’ set off to meet 
the Chief Secretary of State, to talk to him about the points of discussion raised at the 
mela, primarily that of minimum wages in NREGA. The delegation consisted of 
Aruna, Nikhil, a few representatives from the bonded labourers and a few from 
Godliya village. In the meantime, the mela continued with songs, dancing and a few 
more testimonies of people wanting to share their experiences with NREGA over the 
microphone. The songs sung by MKSS were widely known to most of the people in 
the audience, who sang and clapped along jovially. Then, some people stood up and 
began to dance, turning the mela into a large dance gathering. Once the delegation 
had returned and announced that the Chief Minister had agreed to discuss the issue of 
minimum wages with the Prime Minister, as well as other issues raised, the 
                                                 
120 135 rupees was at that point the minimum wage as fixed by the Government of Rajasthan. 
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participants got back into the buses in which they had arrived and travelled back to 
their respective villages across Rajasthan.  
 
While taking place in Jaipur for an entirely different occasion, the rozgar mela 
resembled in many ways the public convention organised by NCPRI in New Delhi.  
Both involved much vibrancy through the music, songs, and dance that accompanied 
the talks and discussions. Both were very colourful and decorative events, with the 
posters and banners making up a familiar setting. Most significantly, both events 
were performed in a participatory manner, whereby the audience was drawn into the 
discussions by being addressed and asked to respond directly. The repetition and 
reiteration of particular signs, symbols and rhetoric suggests that MKSS and NCPRI 
come into being through such performances. MKSS, as we have noted, is an 
organisation reputed for being rooted in the concerns of the rural poor and of being 
participatory and consultative in its approach. This very characteristic is brought to 
life in such public events. MKSS exists less in daily occurrences (see discussion on 
this in the methodology section), as much as in events wherein the ideals it stands for 




After the introductory presentations, the rest of the two days of the convention in 
New Delhi consisted of workshops. The aim was to discuss the mechanisms that 
would be needed to ensure the redress of grievances in particular government 
services and programmes. For this, parallel workshops were set up, each one dealing 
with a separate sector, including, health, education, NREGA (National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Act), panchayati raj (local system of government), PDS 
(Public Distribution System), social security, and ICDS (Integrated Child 
Development Services), amongst others. A coordinator with experience in the sector 
was assigned to each workshop. The participants of the convention split up into the 
different workshops, discussing the mechanisms that could be implemented to 
address the possible grievances pertaining to the specific sector. For instance, the 
participants of the workshop on NREGA agreed that the mechanism of social audits 
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must be strengthened, in a way that would enable the beneficiaries of the 
employment scheme to directly address grievances. The plan was that each workshop 
would come up with key recommendations, which would then be included in 
NCPRI’s Grievance Redress Bill.  
 
 
Ritual of ‘resolutions’ 
 
The final session of the convention was scheduled to be a discussion of the ‘key 
recommendations and resolutions arising out of the workshops’. I had assumed that 
this session would be the final enactment of ‘public consultation’ and thus the 
highlight of the convention. However, the spectacle of collective consultation that I 
had been expecting was somewhat of a let-down. By the time the session was 
scheduled in the afternoon, the attention of most of the participants had dwindled. 
Many of the participants had already left. From those who remained, most seemed 
tired from the previous sessions and apparently more keen to sit and chat in the 
courtyard or on the grass under the warming Delhi sun, than to attend yet another 
discussion. A group of volunteers was sent to urge participants back into the 
auditorium. From amongst the main NCPRI figures, only Shekhar was in the 
auditorium, as Aruna, Nikhil and the others were in the midst of a press conference 
in a different room. In this final round of the performance, there was a conspicuous 
absence of both ‘actors’ and ‘audience’. 
 
Shekhar stood before the audience that had been reduced to approximately 25 people 
and began to read out the ‘resolutions’, point by point. The resolutions were not 
based on recommendations raised in the workshops as had been announced, because 
there had not been sufficient time to compile all the resolutions from the individual 
sector-specific workshops. Instead, the resolutions were based on NCPRI’s pre-
formulated generic demands. These included demands such as: ‘The government is 
urged to put up draft Bills on Grievance Redress for widespread public consultation 
immediately’ or ‘Grievance Redress mechanism must be as decentralized as possible, 
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must be independent, and have an element of people’s support’. After each point, 
Shekhar asked the audience: “ham samit hai?” (are we in agreement?). From the few 
people remaining in the audience, there were only about ten people who were not 
already entirely distracted that raised their hand in agreement. In such manner, 
Shekhar went down the list of nine recommendations. At the end, the resolution was 
declared passed.  
 
This last scene of passing the resolution signals the importance that NCPRI places on 
‘due’ process and procedure in civil society engagement. According to NCPRI, civil 
society derives its legitimacy by being inclusive of the rural poor, such as by 
conducting public consultations. NCPRI defines itself as a civil society organisation 
precisely by conforming to such procedures, which, according to its members, 
amount to democratic processes. The final session of passing the resolution as 
performed by Shekhar was an instance of demonstrating this commitment to 
processes and procedures. The fact that not many people were present to witness this 
act or to participate in it, was less important than the actual process of conducting it. 
This suggests that the form of the public performance of NCPRI is at least as relevant 
as its content and outcome. The commitments that NCPRI stands for came to be 
enacted and renewed through the process of passing the resolution, thus giving 
visible form to NCPRI and its principle of public consultation. The symbolic reading 
out of the resolutions, the raising of hands in agreement and the final passing of the 
resolution, was a ‘dramaturgical display’ through which certain norms that NCPRI 





This chapter has examined the ways in which members of NCPRI enacted their sense 
of ‘civil society’ through a public performance. Their notion of public consultation 
was given tangible form through a public convention. In the planning meeting 
preceding the convention, discussions evolved around the type of organisation that 
NCPRI is and the type of constituency it represents: NCPRI is distinct from Team 
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Anna in terms of its commitment to public consultation and to the participation of the 
rural poor. This was brought into being in the public convention through symbols, 
rhetoric and rituals. Convening a public performance enabled NCPRI to summon an 
audience and to thus bring into being its public. Legitimacy, within a democratic 
framework, is understood to derive from representing a unitary and identifiable 
‘public’. NCPRI’s legitimacy as civil society representatives could be furnished by 
having a public before whom to present its positions and commitments. It was further 
argued in this chapter that NCPRI’s public convention not only served as a display of 
its positions but, furthermore, by being performed, it brought into being the very 
commitments it stands for. Performances, so conceived, are not merely 
representations of political positions but are, as Spencer suggests in the context of the 
performance of elections, “crucial sites for the production and reproduction of the 
political” (Spencer 2007: 78). In other words, a performance is not only an 
emblematic enactment, but actually constitutes and brings into being the very 
commitments and positions.121  
 
The backdrop of the performance of this particular convention was the highly 
charged Lokpal agitation in which NCPRI was competing with Team Anna over civil 
society representation. The Lokpal agitation, and the tensions it engendered among 
civil society, can be read as a type of ‘social drama’ in the field of anti-corruption 
activism. According to Turner, a ‘social drama’ is a moment of interruption of social 
life and of the suspension of normal roles, and thus forces groups to consciously 
reflect upon their values so as to redress the social order. Social dramas “induce and 
contain reflexive processes and generate cultural frames in which reflexivity can find 
a legitimate place” (Turner 1979: 83), thus enabling groups and actors to reflect, 
understand, act and portray themselves in a heightened fashion. Social dramas arouse 
consciousness of the self, or as Myerhoff states: “As heroes in our own dramas, we 
are made self-aware, conscious of our consciousness” (Turner 1980: 156).  
 
                                                 
121 In this it corresponds to so many political rituals – such as the ritual of elections (Banerjee 2007; 
Lukes 1975; Spencer 2007) – that do not just represent the democratic process but actually provide its 
very substance.  
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The social drama around the Lokpal led to the ‘suspension of normal roles’ of 
NCPRI that no longer was at the centre of debates on transparency and accountability 
legislation. This opened up an opportunity for members of NCPRI to reflect on their 
positions as civil society actors, and to identify the centrality of public consultation 
in their ethos. Their understandings of themselves as civil society actors could come 
into being through the processes of the public convention. They were thus acting as 
Homo performans, in that “in performing he reveals himself to himself” (Turner 
1986: 81).  
 
In this context, NCPRI’s notion of what constitutes civil society engagement in law-
making processes, was propelled by its competition with Team Anna and emerged, at 
least in part, through an oppositional stance. The contours of NCPRI were defined 
consciously around the perceived differences and absences of Team Anna, so that the 
identification of Team Anna’s failure to engage in proper public consultation became 
the premise against which NCPRI consolidated its own commitments. This notion 
that identity is constructed through difference resonates again with broader 
conceptions of relationality, a theme that was discussed in the Introduction. A 
relational approach to identity highlights the circumstantial nature of a sense of 
identity that alters according to the context and in relation to others. A sense of 
identity is constituted by being counterposed to others – particularly during a ‘social 
drama’ – resulting in fluid, changing and dynamic identities. In this 
conceptualisation, identities emerge out of dialectic relationships and constellations 
that constantly redefine the substance and structures. 
 
This analytical schema signals that the identity of NCPRI as an organisation is 
premised on similar grounds of relationality. The commitments and positions that 
NCPRI stands for, in terms of what it deemed to be appropriate civil society 
engagement, became salient as it engaged in an antagonistic relation to an opponent. 
By defining the absences of Team Anna, the idea of what NCPRI represents come 
into being. It depended on Team Anna fine-tuning to fine-tune its own commitment 
to public consultation and its understanding of civil society engagement. Through 
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such processes of differentiation, MKSS latently and unwittingly came to embody 
















In the previous chapter I examined how an organisation such as NCPRI establishes 
its credibility as representing civil society through public performance. I explored 
how members of NCPRI enacted and made tangible their ideas of civil society to a 
wider audience. By holding a convention on public consultation they could present 
themselves externally as an organisation committed to what they defined as 
legitimate democratic processes and procedures. This chapter focuses on how 
NCPRI’s organisational credibility is experienced internally. Drawing again on 
Goffman’s terminology from dramaturgical analysis, while the previous chapter 
concerned a ‘front-stage’ public performance, this chapter focuses on the ‘back-
stage’ dynamics within NCPRI. 
 
This chapter is an exploration of ideals and expectations. It is an attempt to 
understand the finer-grained levels of commitment of social activists and the motives 
for their engagement. It is about understanding the ethos of an organisation that is 
committed to transparency and accountability, and to social justice more widely. It is 
about visions of an ideal notion of doing politics. The particular commitments 
expressed by members of NCPRI are about ideals of simplicity, renunciation and 
autonomy. These ideals, it will be demonstrated, are infused with particularly Indian 
notions of authenticity that derive from a Gandhian ethics. 
 
Although seemingly paradoxical, commitment in this chapter is examined through 
the lens of disappointment and critique. It will be shown that acts of doubting and 
criticising are ways in which ideals, commitments and convictions are 
communicated. The various areas of disappointment raised by several members of 
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NCPRI that this chapter deals with, reveal what these members expect an 
organisation committed to transparency and accountability to be. By focusing on 
what NCPRI is not, the members carve out a space from which to restate their search 
for what it ought to be. In other words, their disenchantment, rather than shattering 
their hopes and aspirations, engenders a reaffirmation of their ideals and visions.  
 
The context of this chapter is again the Lokpal agitation. This large-scale agitation 
serves as the framing scheme through which to examine the micro-politics of 
NCPRI. It takes the ‘critical event’ of the Lokpal agitation as the background from 
which to approach the internal dynamics and tensions of NCPRI. While the previous 
two chapters focused principally on public debates and events orchestrated by the 
NCPRI leadership in response to the Lokpal agitation, this chapter shifts attention to 
the experiences of other NCPRI members. As the Lokpal agitation gained 
momentum, and the leadership increased its engagement, several cracks in the nature 
and structure of the organisation began to appear to various members of NCPRI. 
Certain members became increasingly conscious of the leadership not living up to 
the ideal that the organisation supposedly represents. The result of this was a sense of 
disenchantment. 
 
This experience of disappointment by members of NCPRI derives from the 
relationship between MKSS and NCPRI. Many people who had joined NCPRI had 
done so out of a commitment to MKSS. MKSS, as we have seen, is widely renowned 
for being a grassroots organisation, rooted in rural India and with virtuous political 
and ethical positions; for many, NCPRI signified an extension of MKSS and its core 
values. NCPRI and MKSS are typically conflated by their members, by their leaders, 
in media and in public presentations, so that the same high moral ground is expected 
from both organisations. While it is known that NCPRI is Delhi-based and that 
MKSS is based in rural Rajasthan, they are nonetheless expected to stand for similar 
ideals and commitments. That both organisations share the same leadership adds to 
the conflation. NCPRI and MKSS are treated as both distinct and at the same time 




Given this context, this chapter deals with the inherent tension that organisations 
such as MKSS/NCPRI confront. As examined in Chapters One and Two, there is a 
Weberian tension in the political action of MKSS and NCPRI: in order to prompt 
motivation in its cause for transparency and accountability, MKSS has to set an ideal 
of moral and political engagement. High ideals of pure and virtuous social action are 
the fuel for its commitments. However, in order to carry out its ideal, MKSS has to 
engage in mundane and humdrum processes. Its ideal and its actual modes of 
operation are thus in perpetual tension: in order to strive towards its ideal, it needs to 
engage in routine activities; as soon as it engages in these activities, however, its 
ideal gets ‘polluted’. Like a utopia, the realisation of the ideal is always deferred. In 
order to resolve this tension, as noted in Chapter Two, NCPRI was called into 
existence. 
 
With this in mind, this chapter explores some of the ideals of MKSS and the types of 
contradictions and tensions that it confronts in its political engagement. The 
disappointments, as articulated by the members, are here examined as a means to 
understand their commitments to an ideal. The first part of the chapter examines the 
ideal of MKSS as rooted in the village and the appeals it makes to a Gandhian type 
of ethics of swaraj. The second part deals with the morality around funding. Both 
parts indicate the tension between ideals of purity and virtue and the highly complex 
nature of doing politics. As will be concluded, the tension between lofty ideals and 




The Mud Hut 
 
It was another early September afternoon with many of us crowded into the NCPRI 
office. The still ongoing Lokpal agitation was generating continuous intensified 
levels of activity. Anna Hazare had ended his fast, but the Parliamentary Monsoon 
Session was still in progress and NCPRI still needed to make its ‘basket of measures’ 
widely known. Besides attending meetings and conferences, and lobbying among 
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MPs and other government representatives, another way in which NCPRI was 
making its alternative approach to the Jan Lokpal Bill known, was by reaching out to 
the media. For this very reason, on that September afternoon, a journalist from Zee 
TV who had requested to interview Aruna Roy was invited to the NCPRI office.  
 
The journalist was let into the office and sat next to Aruna in one corner of the room. 
While the cameraman was setting up his camera and lights, Aruna and the journalist 
engaged in small talk before the formal interview proceeded. The journalist told 
Aruna that he was grateful to her for the service she had done for the country by 
bringing about the Right to Information. He was not a journalist back then to cover 
the movement himself, he said, but he was familiar with the campaigning carried out 
by MKSS to get the RTI enacted. His tone of reverence was one I had heard on 
countless occasions when strangers met Aruna. In public events she was often 
surrounded by people who wanted to pay their respects, recount their personal 
experiences with corruption, or even, as some college students seemed keen to do, 
ask her for her autograph. 
 
At this point Aruna asked Ushma, who was working on one of the computers, to 
move aside and show the journalist the image on the desktop background.122 The 
image depicted a crumbling stone wall, with a wonky wooden door. Behind this 
decrepit wall, one could just about make out a small house made out of adobe and a 
tiled roof. In the foreground a blossoming bougainvillea crept along the stone wall; 
the background was bare, with only a lone house followed by the Aravalli Hills in 
sight. Combined they evoked an aesthetic allure of a rustic village setting. The photo 
had evidently been taken during the monsoon as the elements contained in the frame 
– the crumbling layer of adobe on the stone wall, the dirt path leading from the 
house, the dazzling red of the bougainvillea – had a crispness and sharpness to them, 
rare in the usually dry desert landscape of Rajasthan.   
 
 
                                                 




Figure 11 The home of MKSS (photo courtesy of MKSS). 
 
 
After pointing out this image to the journalist, Aruna told him that this was where 
MKSS had begun and where her home had been for the past 30 years. She explained 
that life there was simple, but that it was precisely the simplicity that formed a 
crucial aspect of the process and identity of being a people’s organisation. The 
journalist’s reaction was one of discernible awe; he expressed his bewilderment by 
saying that he never expected the architect of the momentous RTI legislation, and 
someone who had once been in the prestigious Indian Administrative Service, to be 
living in quite such humble conditions.  
 
This procedure of showing the desktop image of the house of MKSS in the village of 
Devdungri was repeated many times throughout the Lokpal agitation. Journalists and 
other visitors who flocked into the NCPRI office over these weeks were often 
introduced to a glimpse of the image on the desktop. It was usually described as the 
home and base of MKSS. This routine seemed to be serving as a constant reminder 
that even though NCPRI was now operating out of the office in upscale South Delhi, 
its actual roots were in the mud hut. 
 
The refrain of living in a mud hut and of being rooted in the village cropped up in 
various other ways throughout the Lokpal agitation. At this time, in a concerted 
effort to raise awareness of NCPRI’s position on the Lokpal, Aruna and Nikhil gave 
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many public talks and interviews. Many of these began with an introduction of the 
work of MKSS. Even though they were making statements on the Lokpal under the 
banner of NCPRI, it was their association to MKSS that served as their point of 
introduction. It was MKSS that rooted them in rural India. Typically the scene of 
their public presentations was set by first establishing the grassroots engagement that 
they carried out through MKSS. Only then would NCPRI’s position on the Lokpal 
follow. This introductory tone can be noted in statements such as the following made 
by Aruna: 
 
I moved to Devdungri in 1987 in order to live and work as a people's 
organisation. The MKSS does not accept institutional funds either from 
the government and private institutions or from foreign ones. All its 
members draw minimum wages. We don't have a campus and live in two 
mud huts. We do all the work ourselves – we fetch water, we cook 
together and we campaign. We feel both living and working are political 
statements. We live, perhaps in many ways, the way Gandhi would have 
liked us to live. (Roy, no date)123 
 
The series of tropes contained in this statement found reiteration in many public 
presentations. As the Lokpal agitation picked up in heat, NCPRI received growing 
public attention. This opened up an array of public spaces and platforms including 
conferences, lectures, and panel discussions as well as interviews and TV debates. 
The evocation of the village background of MKSS – encapsulated in the image of a 
mud hut – set the tone of many of these presentations.  
 
 
The myth of the village 
 
All of the members of NCPRI had at some point spent time in the village of 
Devdungri and had participated in some of the earlier campaigns and mobilisations 
by MKSS. Everybody who had come into touch with MKSS’s work on the ‘ground’ 
                                                 
123 “On being ‘ex’ a lot of things, among them an ex-IAS officer…” in infochangeindia [accessed 21 
February 2013] http://infochangeindia.org/other/changemakers/we-have-to-start-the-process-of-
thinking-about-alternatives.html (Original text has no page numbers). 
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had been captivated by this organisation’s active grassroots work. For many of the 
‘base members’ of NCPRI their experience with MKSS in Devdungri had been their 
first encounter with ‘rural India’, where they had learnt about the simplicity but also 
hardship of village life.124 Many of the members spoke enthusiastically about the 
impressions that everyday life in Devdungri had left them with, such as sleeping on 
the ground, fetching water from the well, and making chapatis on the open-fire 
chula.  Beyond these romantic village experiences, they also learnt about the daily 
plight of labourers and farmers. Through the engagement of MKSS, these members 
had come face-to-face with the dire implications of corruption, which left villagers 
largely bereft of their basic entitlements and thus struggling for survival. This insight 
into MKSS as an organisation unwaveringly rooted in the real concerns of the most 
marginalised, was for many precisely what had lead them to join NCPRI, in 
solidarity with MKSS.  
 
Yet, it was this enthusiastic, assumed association of MKSS to rural Rajasthan that 
would become the source of disappointment amongst some members who noted 
MKSS’s increasing distancing from Devdungri. Indeed, the MKSS leadership had 
shifted its work and activities predominantly to New Delhi during the Lokpal 
agitation, with the high-powered nature of engagement that it demanded. Certain 
base members felt uneasy about this shift, since they feared that it indicated a general 
withdrawal from grassroots work to exclusively urban-based policy-making. They 
complained in private that Aruna and Nikhil spent so much of their time in Delhi and 
travelling around the globe to meetings and conferences that hardly any time 
remained to even visit their village. This can be effectively illustrated, for instance, 
by the appointments calendar of Aruna and Nikhil: a lecture at St Xaviers College in 
Mumbai, a meeting with the Chief Minister of Jharkand, a key talk at a seminar in 
Indonesia organised by UNODC, a conference by UNCAC in Morocco, another 
conference by Open Government Partnership in Washington D.C.,all within the span 
of a few weeks. At least to some of the base members, this “jet-setter lifestyle” of 
Aruna and Nikhil invalidated their claims of still being rooted in the mud hut.  
 
                                                 
124 See Chapter Four for a definition of ‘base’ members. 
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During the weeks of the Lokpal agitation, I was privileged to have a fast-developing 
relationship of camaraderie with some of the members of NCPRI.  During the 
countless hours that I spent in the NCPRI office, participating in their routine work 
and their many meetings and public events, I was befriending many of the base 
members of NCPRI. My friendship to these base members gave me entry into some 
of their inner worlds, including their worlds of dismay. Increasingly I heard 
grumblings articulated by these befriended members on the running and the structure 
of NCPRI, particularly on the role played by the leadership. These grumblings came 
to my ears only gradually, after certain levels of trust had been established and, often, 
after some probing on my part. Several members expressed appreciation at being 
able to give vent to their reservations with me, as the general tone through which 
MKSS was typically spoken about was one of reverence.  
 
While the feeling of disenchantment was the dominant sense among several members 
of NCPRI during the Lokpal agitation, they nonetheless continued to express their 
overall conviction in MKSS and NCPRI. In the following sections I explore in closer 
detail the ways in which the doubts and critiques of the members served as inverted 
idioms of their deeply held commitment. Members who complained that Aruna and 
Nikhil no longer spent time in the village, nonetheless expressed their great respect 
for the work done by the leadership. They were in overall awe of the unwavering 
commitments by the MKSS leadership in attending to the needs of the poor. 
However, they were upset that the leadership continued to claim to be based in a mud 
hut in Devdungri, when in fact they were mainly in Delhi or travelling around. This 
disappointment boiled down to a perceived gap between what the leadership was 
claiming and what many of the members felt was actually going on. The 
disappointment seemed to lie in not finding that NCPRI/MKSS represented what it 
was expected to represent. The claim of the mud hut was just one such perceived gap 
between ‘rhetoric’ and ‘reality’. 
 
As will become apparent shortly, this expectation of what MKSS ought to represent 
showed close affinities to particular Indian notions of authenticity that derive from a 
Gandhian ethic of simplicity and renunciation. With their critiques, the disappointed 
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members were making calls for certain notions of purity and virtue, resounding 
strikingly with Gandhi’s philosophy of swaraj.  
 
 
In quest of the Gandhian village 
 
The mud hut as evoked by members of MKSS epitomizes humbleness, rootedness 
and authenticity. In this context, it conjures up the image of a group of social 
activists living in simplicity directly amongst the people they seek to represent. 
Depictions of the mud hut seemed to act as a reminder of the inherently grassroots 
origins of MKSS. They are saying that although their political engagement was 
compelling them to sojourn predominantly in Delhi or to travel around, at the heart 
of it they were still rooted in the village. The mud hut thus was a visual 
representation of the idea of MKSS as a ‘popular grassroots’ organisation. In the 
quotation cited earlier, Aruna made reference to the mud hut as symbolising a 
‘political statement’, in accordance with MKSS’s other life and work commitments.  
 
This political statement is in line with wider views that characterise the village as the 
core of ‘authentic India’ and as being a pure site unblemished by the ‘immorality’ of 
modernity. The trope of the village as a site of virtue finds repetition in much of 
literature on the Indian subcontinent. Indian sociologists, for instance, have described 
the village as a microcosm that permits generalisation of the “social processes and 
problems to be found occurring in great parts of India” (Srinivas 1955, cited in 
Jodhka 2002: 3343) and as having “a design in which [are] reflected the basic values 
of Indian civilisation” (Beteille 1980, cited in Jodhka 2002: 3343). As Jodhka notes, 
the conceptualisation of the village as a “signifier of the authentic native life”, is a 
characteristically Indian phenomenon with historic roots in colonialism (Jodhka 
2002: 3343). The centrality of the village originated under the British, who construed 
India as a ‘village republic’, in order to justify their rule over India. With leaders of 
the nationalist movement adopting colonial categories, the conceptualisation of the 
village as the core of the nation continued post-Independence. For them, the village 
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signified ‘real India’. According to Jodhka, the conceptualisations professed by 
leaders of the nationalist movement have been subsumed in “the Indian common 
sense” (Jodhka 2002: 3344). Writings on the village by nationalists, most notably by 
Gandhi who is known as the ‘ideologue of the village’, have influenced 
contemporary critiques of a corrupt modernity and the elevation of an authentic 
village life.125 
 
Gandhi famously envisioned the village as ‘the essence of Indian civilisation’ when 
he said: “If the village perishes, India will perish too.” 126 For Gandhi the village 
stands for an authentic and pure site that needs to be protected from immoral 
Western influences.  As Jodhka notes, for Gandhi the “Indian village had a design, a 
way of life, which had the potential of becoming an alternative to the city based and 
technology driven capitalist west” (Jodhka 2002: 3346). The village symbolises both 
a political and moral ideal to Gandhi. Politically it represents the ultimate level of 
local self-governance and thus the heart of political decentralisation (we will 
examine Gandhi’s outline of a village government in more detail in the next chapter). 
Morally, the village for Gandhi represents a site of self-organisation where an 
individual can develop his or her full potential. It is the site for the moral 
regeneration of India (Corbridge and Harriss 2000: 25). 
 
This notion of moral advancement of the individual is at the core of Gandhi’s 
principle of gram swaraj (village self-rule). The term swaraj is most commonly used 
in reference to ‘self-rule’ from the British, becoming synonymous with India’s 
Freedom Struggle. However, for Gandhi swaraj has a more spiritual meaning. For 
him it connotes an ethic of moral conduct whereby an individual strives for ‘control 
of the self’. Accordingly, Gandhi postulates that the foundation of a functioning and 
                                                 
125 This emphasis on the ‘village’ resonates with emphasis placed on the ‘local’ in development 
literature. Fisher, for instance, notes that all NGO practices remain discursively constructed through 
reference to the ‘local’, because it is connection to local constituencies that builds up an NGO’s 
legitimacy (Fisher 1997: 454). Yarrow in his ethnography on NGOs in Ghana, similarly notes that 
being able to speak form a ‘local perspective’ confers legitimacy to a development project (Yarrow 
2011: 119).  
126 It is interesting to note that Gandhi’s notion of the village diverged significantly from that held by 
his nationalist contemporaries. While for Gandhi the village represented authenticity, for Nehru the 
village denoted backwardness, while for Abedkar the village signified the site of oppression (Jodhka 
2002: 3343).  
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wholesome community relies on an ethic of self-realisation, whereby all individuals 
work towards a state of self-respect, self-responsibility and self-discipline. “swaraj 
really means self-control” Gandhi asserts; “only he is capable of self-control who 
observes the rules of morality… A state enjoys swaraj if it can boast of a large 
number of such good citizens” (Fox 1989: 45). In other words, the premise for 
political independence is self-liberation through spiritual and moral cleansing.  
 
The MKSS ideal displays several traces of principles of asceticism and of Gandhi’s 
notion of swaraj. This is not to say that this is an explicit aspiration, yet it creeps into 
their ideas of political activism and their ethic of moral conduct. Members of MKSS 
do not ascribe to Gandhi’s philosophy by the book, but it hovers as an ideal over 
their work ethics. It appears in symbolic gestures, such as, for instance, in the 
implicit ‘codes of conduct’ within MKSS and NCPRI that each individual has to 
wash their own plate after a meal. In a hierarchical system where washing dishes is 
considered of lowly status, this act of washing one’s own plate is deemed to be in 
line with a Gandhian virtue of simplicity. Similarly, the non-existence of chairs at 
MKSS in Devdungri was explained to me with a similar Gandhian reasoning: chairs 
are seen to be angrezi (literally ‘English’, usually implying ‘foreign’ in the widest 
sense of the term) imports, that are not only unnecessary in rural India, but, 
furthermore, are markers of hierarchy, for, whoever sits on the chair, has all others 
sitting at their feet. In Devdungri categorically everyone squats on the ground or on 
low stools, as this eliminates visible signs of hierarchy. It is, in a Gandhian way, an 
effort towards self-purification from status and rank. The portrait of Gandhi as the 
sole frame decorating the bare walls of the mud hut in Devdungri, brings to the fore 




Doubt as commitment 
 
As described earlier, several base members expressed their misgivings and doubt 
about the credibility of MKSS living up to a Gandhian ideal. By accusing the MKSS 
leadership of being perpetual jet-setters, some of the base members lamented the 
increased distancing of MKSS from the village. Although such critiques were 
expressions of disappointment and doubt, embedded within the very commitment 
and motivation of the NCPRI members, through questioning aspects of the MKSS 
leadership, these members indirectly articulated their political commitments.  
 
The commitment held by members of NCPRI lay precisely in the Gandhian ideal that 
MKSS supposedly represents. When asked what had made them join NCPRI in the 
first place, the base members unequivocally responded that it was MKSS’s 
authenticity as a social movement. In their varying ways, all members pointed out 
that unlike most organisations and social movements that make up the Indian 
political landscape, MKSS represented to them an organisation truly rooted in rural 
India. Conspicuous in many conversations I had with several of the base members, 
was their emphatic debunking of the world of NGOs. Repeatedly they portrayed 
NGOs as corrupt and aloof entities that serve as mere ‘fronts’ to draw in funds for 
personal gain. India is notoriously swamped with NGOs, all claiming to represent 
some group or cause; yet, according to what I heard from members of NCPRI, only a 
fraction of them are trustworthy. Within such a climate, MKSS represented for these 
members the rare organisation that is authentically committed. Being rooted in the 
village and driven to campaign for policies that have the needs of the marginalised as 
prime objective, convinced many of the members of MKSS’s legitimacy. It is these 
reasons, as well as the lack of credible alternatives, that led many members to join 
NCPRI. With NCPRI being the Delhi-based extension of MKSS, many individuals 
became members of NCPRI, in solidarity to the MKSS cause.  
 
This commitment to an authentic and rooted MKSS became emphatically articulated 
during the Lokpal agitation, which demanded drastic shifts in campaigning and 
operation from NCPRI. The nature of the Lokpal agitation required technical and 
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legal engagement with politicians and bureaucrats in New Delhi, steering NCPRI 
away from grassroots work at the village level. With the Anna Hazare-led Lokpal 
movement erupting with such magnitude, NCPRI had been forced largely into a 
reactive position. This shift in engagement was perceived by some of its members as 
a disappointing departure from the ideal of the authentic and rooted MKSS. Some 
members began to doubt the credibility of the MKSS leadership who now appeared 
more as ‘jet-setters’ and less as grassroots activists. Their lament that MKSS was no 
longer based in the mud hut was an expression of this disappointment and doubt.  
 
By the very act of lamenting, however, these base members were expressing their 
commitment to MKSS. By criticising the recent behaviour of the MKSS leadership, 
members were voicing the ideal type of organisation that they were committed to. 
Their ideal of MKSS as authentic and rooted in rural Rajasthan had been taken for 
granted in the past, but through the shifting nature of the Lokpal agitation it found re-
articulation. By noting its disappearance, members of NCPRI reaffirmed the ideals 
they held about MKSS, and the type of politics that they endorsed.  
 
That critique and doubt is constitutive of commitment, rather than an expression of 
sheer disillusionment, finds evidence in the continuous engagement with NCPRI by 
even the most critical members. Despite being at odds on various issues with the 
leadership during the Lokpal agitation, not one of the members stepped down from 
the organisation at any point. This continued commitment, in spite of the sense of 
disappointment, can be understood through Hirschman’s conception of loyalty. 
According to Hirschman, loyalty by members to an organisation expresses itself in 
attachment, holding them back from ‘exiting’, even if disagreement prevails. Loyalty 
‘neutralizes’ the desire to leave an organisation and thereby serves “the socially 
useful purpose of preventing deterioration from becoming cumulative, as it so often 
does when there is no barrier to exit” (Hirschman 1970: 79). According to 
Hirschman, when an organisation begins to deteriorate, members have either the 
option of ‘exit’ or the option of ‘voice’, whereby the former implies simply choosing 
a different ‘product’, while the latter is more complicated and constitutes “political 
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action par excellence” (Hirschman 1970: 16).  Loyalty to an organisation tends to 
preclude exit and in turn to favour voice.  
 
Hirschman finds that loyalist behaviour amongst members occurs particularly in 
organisations producing ‘public goods’, whereby the commitment to the good binds 
the member to the cause, regardless of the disagreements that may exist. In such 
scenarios, Hirschman notes, the option of exiting the organisation is reduced, as the 
member is committed to prevent the deterioration of the public good. Although 
Hirschman focuses largely on how this theory operates in economic organisations, 
such as firms and businesses, it also applies to non-economic organisations, such as 
NCPRI. Some members of NCPRI are in discord with the running and structure of 
NCPRI, yet their commitment to the cause of transparency and accountability, stops 
them from stepping down. It is through their critiques and reservations that they 
reinforce their commitments to the cause. It is their questioning that keeps the ideal 
continuously alive and dynamic. We will return later to a closer examination of how 
doubts and critiques can be read as expressions of commitment. 
 
 
The Morality of Funding 
 
Another idiom that highlights the expectations made of MKSS and the politics it is 
assumed to represent, and, consequently the disappointments generated by a 
perceived distancing from this ideal, can be found in its position on funding. MKSS 
espouses a specific morality around the sources of its funding and on the ways in 
which it is supposed to be spent. This again points to the expectation of a particularly 
pure and virtuous form of doing politics as held by members of MKSS and NCPRI. 
The idiom here again resonates with a particular Gandhian ethics.  
 
The high moral tone with which funding is discussed within MKSS, reflects broader 
public debates on funding in India. During the peak of the Lokpal agitation a public 
controversy erupted concerning the sources of funding of Team Anna. The themes 
highlighted in this controversy echo in many regards the positions on funding held by 
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MKSS/NCPRI. Both cases point out the morality with which sources of funding are 
assessed and deliberated within political activism in India. This section begins with a 
description of the public debate on funding that flared up during the Lokpal agitation, 
providing a flavour of the overall climate on funding within which MKSS’s positions 
are contextualised. It then moves on to explore the positions on funding as held by 
the variously placed members of MKSS/NCPRI.  
 
 
The Kabir Controversy 
 
One day we were all sitting around the TV in the NCPRI office. With a mood of 
unrest hovering in the air, we were watching IBN Live as Arundhati Roy was 
interviewed on her position on the Lokpal.127 One issue that she picked up on in this 
interview was an article she had written ten days earlier, decrying the sources of 
funding of the Anna Hazare campaign. “The campaign is being handled by people 
who run a clutch of generously funded NGOs whose donors include Coca-Cola and 
the Lehman Brothers,” she had provocatively written (Roy 2011).128 The interviewer 
on IBN Live asked Roy to expand on this view. Roy pointed out that the NGOs run 
by the three core members of the campaign received funding from foreign sources, 
including the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation. In the centre of her 
scrutiny was Kabir, one of the NGOs run by core member of Team Anna, Arvind 
Kejriwal, which allegedly had received large sums of funds from the Ford 
Foundation over the years. Institutions such as the Ford Foundation, according to 
Roy, inject funds into NGOs with the intention of gradually replacing the functions 
and duties of the state. By accepting funds from US-based institutions, Roy 
maintained, Team Anna was reproducing the World Bank’s neo-liberal agenda that 
seeks the gradual displacement of the functions of the state. 
                                                 
127 Arundhati Roy is a well-known Indian author and political activist.  
“Jan Lokpal Bill is very regressive: Arundhati Roy” in IBN Live, 31 August 2011[accessed 24 
February 2013] http://ibnlive.in.com/news/jan-lokpal-bill-is-very-regressive-arundhati-roy/179990-
3.html 
128 Roy, A. (2011) “I’d rather not be Anna” in The Hindu, 2 October 2011 [accessed 24 February 
2013]  http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article2379704.ece?homepage=true (Original text has 




In the weeks following Arundhati Roy’s statements on the sources of funding of 
Team Anna, a whole range of public discussions ensued around this topic. These 
appeared in articles, in editorials and in other public forums. The controversy 
increased when Arvind Kejriwal first denied allegations that Kabir received funding 
from the Ford Foundation, only to admit to it and justify it soon afterwards. This was 
further corroborated by publicized accusations that the website of Kabir had initially 
not made transparent all its funds and had only at a later stage accounted for its 
funding from the Ford Foundation. The issue in all of this was the propriety of a 
national social movement against corruption receiving funding from outside India.  
 
Also at the NCPRI office, the public debates around Kabir’s funding controversy had 
stirred new levels of commotion. Throughout the Lokpal agitation, one of the many 
tasks given to the base members (and one that I often took up in my petty attempts to 
help out with office work) was to track some of the public discussions arising in the 
media. Articles considered of importance, particularly if they contained references to 
the NCPRI approach to the Lokpal, were filed in a designated folder. During the 
weeks around the Kabir funding controversy, the folder grew exponentially. 
Searching the net, we came across a profusion of articles and blogs that took issue 
with the foreign funding received by the NGOs of various members of Team Anna. 
In various blogs the Ford Foundation was decried as having links to the CIA, and 
was thus seen as being part of a ‘foreign hand’, infiltrating Indian domestic politics. 
By accepting funds from big foreign institutions, the Lokpal movement of Team 
Anna was being charged with being taken “hostage to outside interests”.129 A feature 
article published in the weekly English news magazine Outlook similarly contended 
that the recent “closer dialogue of policymakers with civil society groups is 
considered an indirect form of engagement by overseas agencies”.130 
 
                                                 
129 “No clue where donations in the past year came from” in Outlook, 19 September 2011 [accessed 20 
October 2014] http://www.outlookindia.com/printarticle.aspx?278266 
130 “No clue where donations in the past year came from” in Outlook 19 September 2011 [accessed 20 
October 2014] http://www.outlookindia.com/printarticle.aspx?278266 
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This hostility towards foreign funding resonates with particular tropes of ‘impurity’. 
One need not look far afield in anthropology to find accounts of the importance of 
notions of purity and pollution in the maintenance of social order and social 
cohesion. Such studies typically emphasise the rules and practices that exist in a 
society to keep out the polluting in order to maintain internal purity. Accordingly, 
boundaries between purity and impurity need to be demarcated so as to protect social 
cohesion. One notable study is Douglas’s (1966) Purity and Danger in which she 
shows that purity signifies clear boundaries and orders, while pollution is associated 
with unwanted ambiguity and disorder. Societies, Douglas argues, relate pollution to 
their moral values, with rites and practices aimed at reducing risk and danger to their 
people. This ‘politics of pollution’ can help to explain the hostility towards external 
funding in the Indian context: foreign funding is an external intervention, risking the 
contamination of national integrity. Purity here is associated with maintaining clear 
boundaries and with keeping things apart. Jenkins traces this hostility towards 
foreign funding in the NGO sector in India to the early 1980s when sections of the 
Indian left attacked NGOs that receive funding from abroad as “agents of 
imperialism” (Jenkins 2007: 64). 
 
Latour’s (1993) study of modernity similarly helps to explain the hostility toward 
foreign funding in India, by hinting at the importance given to processes of 
purification as demarcators of order. According to Latour, purification is a central 
process of modernity, consisting of the attempted separation of nature from culture, 
science from society, things from subjects, humans from non-humans. While 
according to Latour such discrete separations do not exist because, as he contends, 
everything is hybrid and happens in the ‘Middle Kingdom’, modernity would 
collapse if such separation could not be upheld. It is precisely through the process of 
purification that modernity is distinguishable from premodernity. Thus, the very 
raison d’être of modernity is to repudiate hybrids, and to divide the world into clean 
and discrete entities. Funding from outside of the national borders obscures the 




The ascription of polluting qualities to foreign funding, finds particular pertinence in 
the context of post-colonial India. With its history of foreign domination, there are 
strong hangover resentments in India to dependence on external control. The 
aversion to the ‘foreign hand’ infiltrating domestic politics can be understood as a 
residue of nearly a century of colonialism. Concepts of ‘purity’ as based on dismissal 
of external influences, can be traced back to swadeshi (self-sufficiency) campaigns 
that preceded Independence. For instance, Bayly (1986) recounts how Gandhi’s 
campaigns for swadeshi industry and the boycott of foreign goods were infused with 
notions of purity. Cloth was inscribed with new meanings by the nationalists and 
became an ideological symbol of the freedom struggles against British rule. This 
association of purity in clothing (as discussed for instance by Cohn 1989 and Tarlo 
1996) falls under what Copeman terms “the Indian armamentarium of purification 
techniques” (Copeman 2009: 26). Impurity associated with foreign funding today 






The controversy around Team Anna and the Ford Foundation animated discussions 
within the NCPRI office as to their own position regarding funding. The public 
debates on the perils of receiving institutional funds provided them with a discursive 
platform from which to restate their own long-held views. Since their inception 
nearly two decades earlier, the dictates of both NCPRI and MKSS had been that they 
did not accept institutional and governmental funding, or any funding that could 
jeopardise their independence. The widespread focus on Team Anna’s funding 
controversy created a climate that invigorated MKSS/ NCPRI to publicly present 
their position on funding. 
 
The official stance of MKSS is that it does not take institutional or governmental 
funding, as such funding, it professes, compromises an organisation’s independence 
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and political freedom. During the Lokpal agitation, the MKSS leadership emphasized 
its position on funding in public presentations. For instance, it was in this period that 
MKSS’s website was updated, having been neglected for many years. Some of the 
recently added content elucidated MKSS’s position on foreign funding: 
 
At the theoretical level, it is not acceptable to us to receive foreign funds 
to fight battles with our own governments. There is a complex debate 
regarding the politics of inequality that underlie foreign funding. It is 
sufficient to state that we feel that there is a contradiction in receiving 
money from abroad to conduct political campaigns within our own 
country, when there is a democratic system in existence which we feel 
should be activated to exercise our rights, and influence policy 
formulation.131 
 
Given the context and timing of the website’s updating, this can be read as a direct 
response to the controversy around funding from the Ford Foundation and Team 
Anna. Foreign funding, according to MKSS, not only jeopardizes an organisation’s 
independence, but also has detrimental effects on the essence of democracy. Hereby 
it was making a principled claim that funding relates to questions of equality and 
democracy, and ultimately independence and autonomy.  
 
Here again we find resonance with a Gandhian ethic. For Gandhi, true swaraj begins 
with self-governance, where each individual is responsible for his or her own moral 
project. An individual who masters swaraj and can overcome obstacles, enjoys a 
state of autonomy. The notion of autonomy is at the root of the anti-colonial 
movement. According to Terchek, “autonomy stands at the centre of Gandhi’s 
political philosophy. It is his greatest good and precedes in importance his other 
political and social goals” (Terchek 1998: 21). An autonomous actor must self-
sufficiently contain all virtues within him/herself and must not be affected by 
external obstacles. This notion of the autonomous ‘self’ appears to be in operation in 
the ideal of MKSS in the form of an autonomous ‘collective-self’ that does not 
depend on external funding.  
 
                                                 
131 “About” in Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan – a non party people’s movement [accessed 17 
February 2012] http://www.mkssindia.org/ 
212 
 
MKSS’s clear moral position on foreign funding applies similarly to funding from 
within the national borders. It asserts that it is unacceptable to receive funding from 
any governmental or institutional sources, as this too would lead to a dependence on 
external agendas. Instead, MKSS promulgates the principle of raising funds from 
local residents and individual donations. This proximity of sources of funding, 
according to MKSS, furthers a sense of ownership and participation, preserves 
independence of operation, and ensures a basic accountability to the people. An 
anecdotal reference often repeated by Aruna and Nikhil in public presentations in 
this context, is on the donations in ‘cash and kind’ that MKSS receives from 
villagers: it is the accumulation of the five rupees here, the one kilogramme of grain 
there, and the habitual voluntary labour support from villagers that has significantly 
contributed to MKSS’s sustenance. This form of local support, in MKSS’s logic of 
financial autonomy and morality, does not pose a threat to the autonomy of the 
‘collective self’. In Douglas’s sense, funds from local sources represent a ‘pure’ 





Triggered by the public debates about the Kabir funding controversy, I had many 
conversations with my base member friends of NCPRI about the propriety of the 
sources of funding of MKSS. One concern that featured conspicuously in several of 
these discussions was the perceived conflict of interest in the support that MKSS 
receives from SWRC, the organisation set up and run by Aruna’s husband, and the 
organisation in which Aruna had begun her career in ‘social work’. According to this 
view, SWRC provides MKSS with unaccounted substantial resources, financial, 
material and menial. These resources, as I was told, found evidence in various 
instances: the unrestricted access to SWRC’s jeeps and drivers for the countless 
journeys undertaken by the MKSS leadership between Delhi and Rajasthan; the 
recruitment of SWRC’s ‘communication team’ that, with its puppets and 
instruments, provides ‘entertainment’ at public events organised by MKSS; the loans 
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that SWRC regularly issues to MKSS. Without the support of SWRC, some NCPRI 
members contended, MKSS could not sustain its ideology on funding. 
 
The support which MKSS receives from SWRC was viewed as controversial for two 
reasons. Firstly, SWRC is a registered NGO, drawing funds from a wide range of 
governmental and institutional sources both national and international. Some NCPRI 
members described this as a contradiction of MKSS’s claim of rejecting institutional 
funding. Taking support from SWRC was criticized for being a double standard that 
allowed MKSS to appear as unadulterated by institutional funding, yet indirectly 
sustained by it. The other crucial point of contention was that SWRC is run by 
Aruna’s husband, and that this amounted to a form of nepotism, as one member went 
as far as contending. 
 
It is this ‘kin-based connection’ to a heavily-funded NGO that makes the MKSS 
model non-replicable, according to the critical NCPRI members. It is only because of 
the sustained perks which it receives from SWRC that MKSS can maintain its 
principle of institutional independence. While many members said that they 
respected MKSS’s position regarding institutional funding, and agreed that an 
organisation should not be dependent on funders, they noted that in practice MKSS 
proved that such utter independence could be achieved only under specific, and 
privileged, circumstances. This links to a further concern about the sources of 
funding of MKSS. Several members noted that MKSS’s assertion of refusing foreign 
and institutional funding and accepting only local donations, could be upheld only 
because it has a source of regular and generous donations from Aruna and Nikhil’s 
‘rich friends’. These friends are from the high establishment and are known to Aruna 
and Nikhil through their own elite backgrounds. Without such high-ranking 
connections, some members of NCPRI objected, the MKSS model could not be 
reproduced. The irony of this, as one base member friend mockingly said to me one 
day, is that in order to be grassroots and radical, one has to be connected to the elite 





In quest of frugality 
 
As the controversy over MKSS’s funding suggests, the public discussions on the 
funding of Team Anna were being reproduced at a microcosmic level within NCPRI. 
Certain members of NCPRI expressed their apprehension regarding the sources and 
accountability of funding of MKSS. The theme running through these critiques was 
again the perceived gap between rhetoric and reality. MKSS stood for many of these 
members as symbolising a moral high ground, guided by simple and humble living 
standards, that is, by a certain purity in action and practice. What their 
disappointment was expressing was an abandonment of this moral ground.  
 
Contained within these disappointments regarding the sources of MKSS’s funding 
lay again the commitment of members of NCPRI. It was through their critiques and 
doubts that their commitment was articulated. This commitment was again premised 
on a particular Gandhian ethic of purity and autonomy. By questioning the sources 
and expenditures of funding, members of NCPRI were voicing their expectation that 
an organisation’s funding must not only be transparent and accountable, but also 
unblemished from polluting external sources. An organisation committed to social 
causes was expected to be autonomous from external support, and to rely on local 
sources. The closer the source of funding is, the purer it seems to be considered. 
Through such expectations, members of NCPRI were attempting to maintain the 
purity of MKSS by keeping boundaries between the self and the external. Funding 
thus became another idiom that expressed notions of purity and virtue in political 
commitment.  
 
This expectation of frugal purity and virtue among members of NCPRI, it must be 
noted, is largely a discursive one that does not reflect their own lifestyle. Most 
members of NCPRI are based in Delhi – more specifically, in South Delhi, which is 
the most affluent residential area in the capital. They lead ‘middle-class lifestyles’, in 
so far as this is defined by educational backgrounds, occupational opportunities and 
consumption patterns. Aside from membership in NCPRI, all the base members are 
involved in ‘socially-beneficent’ activities (working in NGOs, as investigative 
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journalists, as academics), without this entailing conspicuous frugality in their 
lifestyles. None of the members themselves live in a place that even remotely 
resembles a mud hut, nor do they draw their funding from local sources. The irony of 
the high expectations held regarding MKSS hit home on occasions when members 
would share with me their disappointment while sipping on a glass of imported wine. 
This indicates that expectations of an ideal of purity and virtue are externalised; it is 
the ‘others’ that must comport to the ideal in order to be credible. MKSS as an 
organisation represents particular ideals for its members, which are the markers that 
convince them to join in the first place. If the leadership of MKSS corrodes these 
ideals, then the organisational integrity is questioned. However, the members’ own 
lifestyle is left out of the equation.  
 
This points to the impossibility of aspiring to a Gandhian ideal. Neither the MKSS 
leadership nor the base members are able to live up to the high ideal of purity and 
virtue. The ‘world out there’ demands engagement and operations that are inherently 
removed from their ideal. In order to engage at the levels that it does, MKSS depends 
on favours and connections. These informal forms of support stem from the social 
location of the leadership, but do not match the ideal of simplicity and renouncement. 
The base members themselves are similarly caught in a tension between their 
externalised expectations and their own lifestyles. Here lies the inherent tension that 
an organisation like MKSS is faced with as it attempts to move between its 
aspirations and objectives while keeping its members on board. In order to give 
meaning to its struggle and cause, such an organisation must set high moral ideals 
and expectations. In the case of MKSS, as with many other social movements in 
India (Copeman 2009), the expectation is of political action and a lifestyle in 
conformity to a Gandhian ethic. Throughout the history of Independent India, many 
social movements have emerged that draw heavily on the theories and symbolism of 
Gandhi.132 
 
Gandhi’s ethics are premised on an attempt to infuse a modernist touch to traditional 
Hindu texts on morality and renunciation. While orthodox Hindu philosophy is 
                                                 
132 See for instance Shah (2004) on the influence of Gandhi in the work of women’s movements. 
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predicated on the idea of a total seclusion from social ties and material desires, 
Gandhi advocates a form of engaged asceticism. For him it is not through 
renunciation from the world, but through engagement in the world, that true swaraj 
and autonomy can be attained. Gandhi’s philosophy thus adapts traditional Hindu 
texts on renunciation and self-purification to the modern political world.  
 
Gandhi’s attempt to adapt Hindu philosophy to contemporary concerns has been 
copied by other modern-day religious reformists. Copeman, in his study of the 
interface between devotional movements and blood donations in India, highlights 
how key religious principles, such as seva (selfless service), sanyas (renunciation) 
and dan (gift/ donation) are being transformed by modern day reformists. While in 
orthodox religious scriptures such principles require total renunciation of the 
individual from society, in the reformist versions they are being directed toward the 
service and “uplift of humanity” (Copeman 2009: 56). That renunciation in India is 
no longer associated exclusively with asceticism but with service to society, is 
encapsulated by Mayer, who notes that “renunciation of selfishness through social 
service has taken the place of traditional forms of renunciation as leading to spiritual 
merit” (Copeman 2009: 56).  
 
It is in the convergence of these contrary moralities between asceticism and political 
action, that the fundamental tension in Gandhi’s philosophy lies: of ascribing to 
‘traditional’ values in a ‘modern’ context; of renouncing yet of being engaged; of 
being spiritual and political at the same time. These nearly saintly characteristics 
propagated by Gandhi become inherently contradictory in practice and impossible to 
live up to. R.K. Narayan (1983), through the narrative figures in his novels, evokes 
the impossibility of embodying a Gandhian morality of purity in the ‘real world’. 
Fictional characters, such as Jagan the sweet vendor and many others, profess to live 
by the principles of the Hindu scriptures and by Gandhi, yet their daily conditions 





For the same reasons, the Gandhian ethic of virtue and purity that MKSS aspires to, 
cannot be implemented in the type of work that it engages in. With the Gandhian 
philosophy itself being contradictory, there is an inherent tension in the expectations 
made of MKSS. Its objective of campaigning and lobbying for social legislation 
forces it to engage regularly at the policy-making level, often through government 
bodies and bureaucratic procedures. To carry out its aspirations, it has to engage with 
the humdrum and prosaic aspects of doing politics. These forms of engagement are 
divorced from the ideal it presents and thus manifest as contradictions and tensions. 
The disappointments of the members of NCPRI illustrate this inherent tension 
between particular notions of authenticity that derive from the gap between Gandhian 
ethics and the actual modes of operation.  
 
 
Cynicism or Commitment? 
 
In criticising the village rootedness and the sources of funding of MKSS, NCPRI 
members are expressing their expectations of what MKSS as an organisation should 
be. They are signalling the values and commitments that they consider to be central 
in political activism for transparency and accountability in governance. This 
commitment, as we saw, revolves around a Gandhian ideal of simplicity and 
authenticity. Thus, by pointing out the separation from village life, and the ‘impure’ 
sources of its funding, members of NCPRI are criticising the MKSS leadership for 
distancing itself from this ideal. Cynicism would at first glance appear to be a useful 
trope through which to examine the critiques by members of NCPRI. By doubting 
the leadership’s village rootedness and objecting to their lifestyle, members are 
indicating their distrust of the workings of MKSS. However, although insightful in 
some regards, the ideas of cynicism as developed by various theorists – most notably 
by Žižek – do not fully grasp the productive work done by the disappointment that 
this chapter deals with. Cynicism denotes an entrapment in critique and a deadlock in 




For Žižek a cynical individual is someone who is fully cognizant of the faults of an 
ideology, yet continues to reproduce it by pretending that the faults do not exist. 
“Cynical reason is no longer naïve, but is a paradox of an enlightened false 
consciousness: one knows the falsehood very well, one is well aware of a particular 
interest hidden behind an ideological universality, but still one does not renounce it” 
(Žižek 1989: 29). Žižek posits this against Marx’s tenets of ideology that presuppose 
actors have a false consciousness, which, according to Marx can be characterised as: 
“sie wissen das nicht, aber sie tun es” (they do not know it, but they are doing it) 
(Žižek 1989: 28). In contrast, following from Sloterdijk’s theory that the dominant 
mode of functioning of ideology is cynicism, Žižek contends that “they know very 
well what they are doing, but still, they are doing it” (Žižek 1989: 29).  
 
Navaro-Yashin’s ethnography of public life in Turkey shows how Žižek’s notion of 
cynicism operates on the ground. Her study focuses on how everyday critiques by 
people of the state in Turkey produce and maintain ‘the political’. Her examples are 
of people who habitually express their cynicism about the state and its ideology, yet 
continue their daily work – often within government jobs itself – as if they were 
unaware (Navaro-Yashin 2002: 170).  While people are highly critical of politics, 
and are aware that the state does not exist as a unity, their cynicism enables the state 
power to regenerate itself. Cynicism, Navaro-Yashin argues, “is part and parcel of a 
practice of keeping the signifiers “Turkey” and “Turkish state” intact” (Navaro-
Yashin 2002: 186). Being conscious of the ‘farce’ of the state, she contends, “does 
not help us achieve emancipation from the chains of statism, but to remain forever 
(foreseeably) locked into it” (Navaro-Yashin 2002: 159).  
 
This deadlock that cynicism leads to is explained by Žižek in terms of a Lacanian 
understanding of the persistence of the psychoanalytic symptomatic (Navaro-Yashin 
2002: 160). According to Lacan, the identification of a symptom, contrary to what 
Freudian psychoanalysis would contend, does not lead to a cure, because the 
individual actually does not want to let go and renounce the symptom. Through the 
concept of jouissance, Lacan explains that the individual enjoys the symptom, 
because it has become part of that person’s mode of identification, characteristic and 
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meaning. Because of this jouissance for the experience of the symptom, an 
individual remains consciously entrapped in the symptom. Žižek applies these 
psychoanalytic processes to the political level (Navaro-Yashin 2002: 161). Even if 
fully conscious of the counterproductive elements of a practice or ideology, a cynical 
individual does not want to transgress these, but prefers to stay trapped in the zone of 
comfort.  
 
It is because of this state of ‘stalemate’ that the concept of cynicism denotes, that the 
members of NCPRI cannot be thought of simply as cynics. Although expressing 
dissatisfaction with various aspects of the organisation, they are not guided by an 
“enlightened false consciousness”, as Sloterdijk defines a cynic (Sloterdijk, cited in 
Žižek 1989: 29). They do not remain stuck in the ‘chains’ of their cynicism. On the 
contrary, their critiques produce a productive process, keeping their commitment in 
motion. By doubting the presumed ideal, these members engage in an internal 
process of moral questioning, reflection and meditation. The act of doubting and 
putting certain aspects into question – even if largely an inward process – opens up 
an opportunity for the members to identify and to rearticulate to themselves what 
they hold to be important. Ethnographic accounts by Yurchak (2003), Hopgood 
(2006) and Kelly (2011) elegantly illustrate the creativity and productivity that can 
emerge out of critique and doubt.  
 
The disappointments of members of NCPRI, rather than being expressions of 
cynicism, may be better understood as articulations of commitment, similar to that 
expressed by the youth under Soviet socialism, as illustrated by Yurchak. Yurchak’s 
study shows that activities that appeared as contradictory to or in divergence from 
Soviet ideology were, in fact, an expression of deep commitment. The various 
examples he draws on illustrate that seemingly anti-state activities by some young 
people, were actually an expression of that very ideology, internalised and made 
meaningful by the actors themselves. People who truly believed in the state ideology 
found creative ways of reinterpreting it and “effectively domesticated it” (Yurchak 
2003: 502) to match their ideas and activities. So, for instance, people like Andrei 
and Nikolai who Yurchak describes, were able to listen to illegally imported Western 
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hard rock music and at the same time sincerely uphold the state ideology that 
denounces Western immoral bourgeois culture. This was possible, according to 
Yurchak, because within the Soviet ideology there was the possibility of 
distinguishing between a literal meaning and a pragmatic interpretation. The latter 
allowed space to render the communist ideology meaningful to suit an individual’s 
own context. Accordingly, for young people such as Andrei and Nikolai, listening to 
music from the ‘bourgeois culture’ was not an act of resistance or an attempt to 
undermine anti-bourgeois Communist ideology. Rather, as his ethnographic material 
shows, acts that seemingly contradicted the system’s official ideology, were an 
expression of deep commitment. “The act of the reproduction of form with the 
reinterpretation of meaning… allowed many Soviet people to continue adhering to 
Communist ideals and to see themselves as good Soviet citizens” (Yurchak 2003: 
504).  
 
In a similar manner, the act of questioning aspects of the MKSS leadership is a way 
in which base members of NCPRI articulate their commitment to the overall cause. 
By accusing the MKSS leadership of being perpetual jet-setters, the disappointed 
members of NCPRI are expressing what they believe MKSS ought to be. It provides 
them with a platform from which to articulate their political commitment. Their 
disappointment in the gradual distancing from the village by the MKSS leadership 
expresses their expectations of a particular rootedness and purity of action. They are 
indicating a commitment to an ideal based on a Gandhian ethic of simplicity. This 
commitment serves as the fuel for their political engagement and motivation.  
 
Hopgood’s ethnographic study of the International Secretariat (IS) of Amnesty 
International, similarly sheds light on the significance of critique in keeping an 
organisation animated. Hopgood examines the internal struggles and contradictions 
that unfold in face of the mounting institutional changes that Amnesty has been 
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undergoing over the previous 15 years.133 His ethnography shows that feelings ‘run 
high’ for people who work in organisations based on ethical and moral values, 
particularly if an organisation undergoes structural and ideological change. The 
motivation and moral altruism of the employees is constantly at stake. However, it is 
precisely the hope for an ideal, a pure form of morality (a type of ‘Disneyland’) that 
creates “fire in the belly”, as Hopgood cites one of his interviewees (Hopgood 2006: 
17). Both disappointment and vision go hand in hand: “Often pained and suffocating, 
it is full of commitment and determination alongside unhappiness and resentment” 
(Hopgood 2006: 17). It is this tension that keeps Amnesty continuously alive. 
 
Kelly, in his study of human rights practitioners as they engage with the UN 
Committee Against Torture, similarly identifies the productivity generated through 
doubt and criticism. The human rights practitioners studied by Kelly are perturbed by 
an underlying “tension between lofty goals and sluggishness of everyday legal and 
bureaucratic toil” (Kelly 2011: 741). The bureaucratic, technical and tedious nature 
of their work in the Committee is at variance with their ideology and their ethical 
commitments towards the eradication of torture. This fissure between routine 
bureaucratic experiences, and commitments and conviction, expresses itself amongst 
the human rights practitioners in doubts: doubts whether the bureaucratic apparatus 
they engage with can be a means towards attaining their ethical aspirations. The 
doubts that Kelly analyses do the productive work of engendering possibilities for 
change.  It is the gaps and inconsistencies experienced by the human rights 
practitioners that open up spaces for them to question and reflect their moral 
commitments. Their doubts spark projections of what ought to be, which in turn 
breathe new life into their aspirations and convictions. Thus, a sense of doubt is not 
burdensome or constraining, but, on the contrary, it “creates a pendulum in perpetual 
motion” which keeps the human rights project animated (Kelly 2011: 742). In this 
light, “the importance of the Committee Against Torture can therefore be found as 
                                                 
133 The struggle is mainly between two fractions that Hopgood presents as the ‘keepers of the flame’ 
and the advocates of reform. The former see themselves as the guardian of the Amnesty ethos and 
attempt to keep true to the original inspiration of focusing mainly on ‘prisoners of conscience’. The 
latter are the reformers – the modernizers and campaigners who want to make Amnesty more up to 
date with contemporary human rights concerns. This divide leads to a messy ‘culture of the IS’ – 
replete with internal conflicts and contradictions.  
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much in what is not there as in what is, and as much in what is not done as in what 
actually takes place, as it is the gap between the two that produces time and space for 
thinking about the possibility of change” (Kelly 2011: 740).  
 
It is precisely such “time and space for thinking about the possibility of change” that 
members of NCRI are creating through their own doubts about MKSS. Whilst the 
doubts of the human rights practitioners discussed by Kelly bring about possibilities 
for change, the process of questioning by members of NCPRI leads to a 
reformulation and reassessment of their commitments and convictions. Rather than 
leading to a stifling impasse, their disappointments open up opportunities to restate 
their aspirations. Like the employees of Amnesty International who infuse life and 
vigour into the human rights project with their internal critiques, so the 
disappointments and reservations of members of NCPRI perpetually and dynamically 





This chapter has examined how the expectations, convictions and commitments of 
members of NCPRI come to be articulated through their disappointment. I have 
suggested that embedded within their critiques of the MKSS leadership, lies an 
exposition of the ideals of the members. By taking their critiques beyond their 
nominal value, one can grasp what members envision an organisation such as MKSS 
to be and what their aspirations for political action are. The doubts and reservations 
expressed in their critiques are an inverted idiom articulating their ideas of what 
ought to be.  
 
In this chapter I showed that the ideal of MKSS held by the leadership and some of 
the members centres on particular Indian notions of authenticity that derive from a 
Gandhian ethics. Idioms of virtue and purity run through the self-presentation of the 
leadership and in the critiques of the members. These idioms are found, for instance, 
in the image of the mud hut. The MKSS leadership, by publicly emphasising that it 
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lives in a mud hut, presents itself as abiding by a particular rooted and authentic 
lifestyle. It echoes the modern Indian imagination of the ‘pure’ village, which 
reflects Gandhi’s ethics of swaraj, which advocates purity of action through 
simplicity and humbleness. The NCPRI members similarly reproduce this Gandhian 
ethics of purity through their critiques. They convey their belief in village rootedness 
by lamenting the gradual distancing from the village by the MKSS leadership.  In 
accusing the leadership of jet-setting and of living largely in the capital city, the 
members communicate, inversely, how they believe a social activist ought to live. A 
similar case runs through the idiom of funding. Unequivocal convictions around 
‘clean’ sources of funding exist among both the leadership and the members, 
indicating a particular morality around funding. By accusing the leadership of 
receiving funding from questionable sources, and of being unaccountable in their 
expenditure, the members of NCPRI are asserting their definitions of ‘clean’ funding 
and their expectation of autonomy.  
 
What the stories in this chapter indicate is that the expectations made of MKSS are 
exceedingly exalted. It is from this platform of lofty ideals that the tension between 
rhetoric and ‘reality’ arises. The virtuous moral standards ascribed to MKSS are 
inherently unattainable in face of its engagement in the ‘real world’ of messy 
politics. The objective of MKSS is to advocate for social transformations by means 
of legal reforms. To do so, it attempts to influence policy-making by engaging with 
the state apparatus, largely under the banner of NCPRI. The type of work that this 
entails, however, necessarily compromises its ideal of moral purity and estranges it 
from its Gandhian ideal. The ideal of simplicity and renunciation cannot be attained 
because of the nature of MKSS’s political engagement, even if it defers these 
political activities to NCPRI, its ‘alter ego’. The expectations of purity and virtue 
continue to be associated with its leadership.  
 
This is the inherent tension that an organisation such as MKSS is confronted with. 
Like the RTI movement as discussed in Chapter Two, we note again the central 
problem of doing politics as identified by Weber: in order to be driven and 
motivated, actors of MKSS/NCPRI need to have a vision for a cause, an ideal of 
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social activism, an ethic of ultimate ends. However, in order to move towards the 
ideal, they need to meander through the muddy exigencies of Realpolitik. They need 
to follow an ethic of responsibility. Members of NCPRI fuse their passion with an 
ethic of responsibility through their doubts and disappointments. Such doubts enable 
them to assert and establish their commitments to the organisation. It is their 
questioning that keeps the MKSS ideal continuously alive and dynamic. 
 
Here we may think of the commitments of the members of NCPRI as part of a 
utopian project, in Mannheim’s sense of the term. Mannheim understood utopia as 
offering a perspective critical of the given reality, exposing the gap between what is 
and an ideal of what should be. A utopian ideal seeks to challenge the status quo 
whereby it “transcends the present and is oriented towards the future.” It differs in 
this from ideology, which, according to Mannheim involves legitimating the status 
quo in that it “conceals the present by attempting to comprehend it in terms of the 
past” (Mannheim 1985: 97). It is a future oriented vision of MKSS that fosters 




6. Agonistic Democracy: 






Does ‘representative’ democracy represent the ‘will of the people’, or should India 
adopt forms of ‘direct’ democracy? Should all decisions be taken at the local level or 
should most decisions be the prerogative of the government? Should there be 
referendums or does this lead to majoritarianism? Should laws be passed through 
parliamentary procedure, or should they be enacted directly if they have wide-scale 
support? Do government schemes alleviate the situation of the poor or do they lead 
to dependency? In what ways and in how far should ordinary citizens be given 
control over governance? Are Gandhi’s notions of swaraj still tenable in today’s 
world?  
 
These were some of the questions that arose amongst members of NCPRI and Team 
Anna in the context of the Lokpal agitation. Parallel to discussions on the Jan Lokpal 
Bill and issues of corruption, a host of related questions were being raised in a range 
of settings during the Lokpal agitation. The competitive relationship between 
members of NCPRI and Team Anna was sparking off disagreements beyond the 
provisions and format of a Lokpal Bill. Each civil society group was marking off its 
ideological distinctiveness by posing its own understandings of the meaning and 
practice of democracy.  
 
This chapter is about conflict and tension over the meaning of democracy. It traces 
ethnographically the playing out of an instance of contestation in the context of 
democratic debate. Specifically, it examines the diverging and conflicting 
understandings of democracy as held by members of NCPRI and Team Anna, and 
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explores how these reflect a wider democratic polemic. The ethnographic material of 
this chapter suggests that democracy, understood broadly as “a type of government, a 
political regime of laws and institutions” (Khilnani 2004: 16), does not exist as a 
singular coherent idea. Rather, it is inherently contested and comes to be articulated 
through particular social imaginaries and historical junctures, making up what Taylor 
calls the “cultures of democracy” (Gaonkar 2007: 16).  
 
The contested nature of democracy in India can be traced back to the early days of 
the Independence struggle against the British – the conjuncture in history when the 
nationalist leaders were already deeply divided on the democratic structures that the 
future Independent India would have. An ethnographic exploration of the diverging 
ideas of democracy as held by members of NCPRI and Team Anna, illustrates that 
they reflect and re-articulate the early debates on the meaning of democracy. It 
suggests that the conflict over the idea of democracy during the time of 
Independence continues to underlie the meaning and practice of democracy today. 
Both the historical and ethnographic examples indicate that ideas of democracy are 
bifurcated, and that no single normative understandings of the nature and practice of 
democracy exist.  
 
It is this bifurcation as set out by India’s nationalist leaders that constitutes the 
distinctive characteristic of India’s democracy. The Indian ‘twist’ in democratic 
meaning and practice in India today, as this chapter will explore, lies in the enduring 
legacy of the conflict between the two main nationalist leaders, Gandhi and Nehru. 
The political ideologies of these powerful symbolic figures are consistently invoked 
and articulated in a diversity of settings and causes. The conflict between Gandhi and 
Nehru over the meaning of democracy and over the ideas of the state continues to 
haunt the political landscape of India.  
 
Although the schism around the figures of Gandhi and Nehru is a characteristic and 
unique feature of democracy as thought of and practised in India, this chapter 
suggests that this fissure reflects a broader tension inherent in democracy generally. 
The conflict over the meaning and practice of democracy as debated by the 
227 
 
nationalist leaders in India, and later by members of NCPRI and of Team Anna, 
mirrors the deep-rooted discord in debates over liberal democracy. This chapter is 
thus an examination of the playing out of the contested nature of liberal democracy 
in the context of India. 
 
The chapter begins with a detailed account of the two principal conceptualisations of 
democracy as conceived by the nationalist leaders during the struggle for India’s 
Independence. It provides an historical overview of the debates on the meaning of 
democracy as India emerged as an independent democratic nation. These 
conceptualisations are then examined in their contemporary articulations through an 
ethnographic account of the political understandings endorsed by members of 
NCPRI and Team Anna. I explore the division and tension between the two main 
civil society contenders around their notions of democracy. Because the meaning and 
practice of democracy is inherently contested, in order to understand democracy in 




The Legacies of Gandhi and Nehru 
 
It is widely argued by historians and other scholars that ‘the idea of India’ was forged 
during the Independence movement against the British by nationalist leaders, who set 
the tone for the future shape and contours of India’s democracy (Khilnani 2004: 5). 
As I shall note, it was these initial debates that shaped the political forms and 
institutions of modern India and that continue to form the premise of understandings 
of democracy today. The nationalist movement was marked by conflicting ideas on 
the future of India, with each of the leaders endorsing “diverse, often contending 
visions of India” (Khilnani 2004: 6).  As Corbridge and Harriss  note in their incisive 
account of the rise of Hindu nationalism and popular democracy, “contradictions of 
‘democratic development’ in India… were latent in the first designs for the post-
colonial state” (Corbridge and Harriss 2000: 234). As they describe, although Indian 
nationalists were unanimous in their struggle against the British, they were guided by 
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different political intentions and agendas for India’s future. The ‘invention of 
Independent India’ was marked by competition, conflict and uncertainty. Each of the 
nationalist leaders, most notably amongst them Nehru and Gandhi, but also others 
such as Patel, Bose and Ambedkar, had their own idea of what the new Indian nation 
should look like. They each entertained their own “imaginaries of India” (Corbridge 
and Harriss 2000: 15). These imaginaries were often in competition with one another 
and it was not self-evident during the nationalist movement which version of 
democracy and nationhood would eventually prevail (Khilnani 2004: 28). 
 
Kaviraj traces the emergence of conflicting political discourses amongst nationalists 
to one particular moment during British rule. In 1829 the colonial state had banned 
sati (the practice in which a recently widowed woman was expected to immolate 
herself on her husband’s funeral pyre). This abolition of the social practice of sati 
was to bifurcate nationalist discourse, giving rise to two strands of nationalists who 
were joined in their objection to the abolition of sati, but split on the reasons for their 
objection. One strand disapproved of the abolition of sati because they saw it as 
interference by the state in the social realm of traditions; the other strand did not 
object to the interference by state powers per se, but objected to the fact that it was a 
foreign power meddling with Indian social rules (Kaviraj 2010: 56-57). These 
strands would become the basis of the split between Gandhi and Nehru: Gandhi who 
endorsed a nationalist discourse that was highly sceptical of the state in general, and 
Nehru who was in favour of a modern state, but one that was not in the hands of alien 
powers. These strands, it will be noted, mirror splits found in most discussions on 
democracy the world over.  
 
It was this conflict on the idea of the state and its role in social affairs that would 
characterise the competitive nationalist discourse (Hansen 1999: 44). Historical 
contingencies made Nehru the Prime Minister of Independent India for nearly two 
decades, enabling him to put into effect many of his political visions. His legacy 
conspicuously affects the political and economic landscape of India today, 
perceivable in its state structures and processes. Gandhi, revered as the ‘Father of the 
Nation’, also holds a significant, if mainly symbolic, imprint on contemporary ideas 
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of India. Yet, in spite of being the two principal figures in the history of modern 
India, the visions of India endorsed by Nehru and Gandhi were in most regards in 
stark contradiction and in conflict with one another. They differed on what would be 
the role of the state, on nationhood and on the meaning of democracy. In the 
following section I examine some of the main aspects that constituted the political 
thought of both Gandhi and Nehru respectively, emphasising the areas of conflict.  
 
 
Gandhi’s imaginary of village India 
 
Representatives will become unnecessary if […] national life becomes so 
perfect as to be self-controlled. It will then be a state of enlightened 
anarchy in which each person will become his own ruler. … In an ideal 
state there will be no political institution and therefore no political power. 
(Gandhi, cited in Chatterjee 1995: 92) 
 
Even before his assassination in 1948, although having been the spearhead of the 
Independence struggle, Gandhi had chosen not to participate in the formation of the 
government. This gesture reflects his opposition to the move India was making 
towards becoming a modern nation-state, and his morally-charged hostility to 
‘modern civilization’. Gandhi opposed state institutions for being a Western import 
that was alien to the traditions of India. He blamed modern civilization – or, ‘a 
civilization only in name’ as he referred to it – for its immoral culture that made 
“man a prisoner of cravings for luxury and self-indulgence” (Chatterjee 1995: 86). 
According to Gandhi, western notions of progress and modernity were inextricably 
tied to industrialisation, consumerism and competition and were thus condemned for 
being the root cause of all the evils in society, such as poverty disease, war and 
suffering.134  
 
                                                 
134 It is important to note that Gandhi’s political reflections had been preceded by other thinkers, such 
as Bhudev Mukhopadhyay, who already at an earlier stage had decried modernity for being 
materialistic and individualistic. As Kaviraj argues, it was Gandhi who had made these thoughts 
internationally known, yet thinkers such as Mukhopadhyay had set the scene for him and his 
philosophy (Kaviraj 2010: 59-64).  
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The enemy that had to be fought, according to Gandhi, was not only the British 
imperialists, but also the ‘enemy within’. Indians, according to Gandhi, had been 
seduced by the ‘razzle-dazzle’ of modern civilization and were being kept under a 
spell of illusion of the progressive qualities of the West. The reason that colonisation 
had been able to take place in the first place was the moral weakness of Indians who 
had been “tempted at the sight of their silver” (Chatterjee 1995: 85). The danger of 
this was that even if the British rulers left, India would still remain “English rule 
without the Englishman” (Chatterjee 1995: 86). Modernity spread “the cancers of 
materialism and envy and excess” and it was these that had to be defeated (Corbridge 
and Harriss 2000: 17). It was the moral integrity of Indians that had to be restored. 
This dual understanding of political self-rule and moral self-purification informed 
Gandhi’s appeal for swaraj (see Chapter Five for a closer examination of swaraj).  
 
Gandhi’s condemnation of modern civilization included a critique of representative 
democracy. According to Gandhi, the Western notion of the people as sovereign is 
deceptive, because under representative democracy people are only sovereign in so 
far that they can vote for a representative every few years. The representative then 
acts as a medium of the sovereignty of the people, leaving them with no power or 
control of their own. Gandhi also criticised modern political institutions as breeding 
grounds for hypocritical, selfish and self-serving politicians. He called parliament a 
‘sterile woman and a prostitute’ on the grounds that, like a sterile woman, it cannot 
enact a law according to its own judgement because it is swayed by external pressure 
and, like a prostitute, it continuously shifts allegiances (Chatterjee 1995: 90). 
 
To protect against the corrupting and immoral perils of modern civilization, Gandhi 
sought a distinctively ‘Indian’ form of government. His alternative vision of India, or 
bharat, was a village republic, whereby governance would be decentralised to the 
most local level. Gandhi idealized a peaceful, non-competitive and moral Indian 
society of the past and made a plea for a return to the simple self-sufficiency of 
traditional village life (Chatterjee 1995: 99, 103). According to this vision, it was 
through village self-governance and rural development that “the moral regeneration 
of India” could take place (Corbridge and Harriss 2000: 25). India, according to 
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Gandhi, could recover its lost self and attain true freedom if its villages were 
reconstructed as harmonious and self-contained (Jodhka 2002: 3351).  
 
In Gandhi’s vision, a village republic would be constituted by a panchayati raj 
system, whereby the village council would have supreme powers, whilst all bodies 
above it would handle only a minimum set of functions. In a panchayati raj system 
villagers would directly elect the village councils while the other bodies of the 
panchayat would only be indirectly elected (Corbridge and Harriss 2000: 26). 
Drawing on Hindu mythology, Gandhi described his political utopia as a ramarajya 
(a place that is not ruled by consensual democracy but by a “patriarchy in which the 
ruler, by his moral quality and habitual adherence to truth, always expresses the 
collective will”) (Chatterjee 1995: 92). 
 
Although Gandhi, with his ability to draw in the masses in support of the nationalist 
movement, was without doubt the pre-eminent figure of the nationalist movement, 
ultimately his historical conservatism failed to capture the dominant public discourse. 
As Kaviraj frames it, Gandhi had been unable to captivate the political imagination 
of Indians who had extensively fallen for “an abiding enchantment by the state” 
(Kaviraj 2010: 67).135 Elites saw the modern state as an instrument to expand their 
own control over society, whilst for subaltern groups the state served as an 
instrument to guarantee their emancipation from traditions of subjugation. The 
seduction of the idea of a modern state, for both subalterns and elites, enabled 
Nehru’s visions to ultimately triumph. According to Kaviraj “Gandhi brought 
Independence to India, but it was Nehru – an entirely unrepentant modernist – who 
obtained the historical opportunity to decide what to do with that independence, and 




                                                 
135 Gandhi’s vision of a panchayati raj democracy was relegated to the Directive Principles of the 
constitution – the provisions of the constitution that are not enforceable by any courts and serve as 
mere ‘guidelines’ in the framing of laws and policies. 
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Nehru’s imaginary of a modern state 
 
It can hardly be challenged that, in the context of the modern world, no 
country can be politically and economically independent, even within the 
framework of international interdependence, unless it is highly 
industrialized and has developed its power resources to the utmost. 
(Nehru, cited in Chatterjee 1995: 144) 
 
In contrast to Gandhi’s political imaginary born out of moral conviction, Nehru’s 
version of nationalism was guided by modern and rational political thought, with a 
clear objective of establishing a sovereign national state. At the heart of Nehru’s 
political vision was the conviction of a path towards modernisation. Gandhi had 
opposed the British on the grounds that they introduced ‘polluting’ values of 
modernisation into India; Nehru, quite on the contrary, opposed British rule because 
he saw it as an obstruction to the realisation of true modernisation (Kaviraj 2010: 
68). Modern institutions and modern values would, according to Nehru, summon 
India out of the poverty and destitution that colonialism had subjected it to. In this 
Nehru was not all that different from nationalist leaders of other recently independent 
countries that were leading their countries out of colonialism and into modern nation 
states. 
 
Central to Nehru’s idea of modern India was the notion of a strong, reformist and 
centralised state that would guide the nation through economic and social 
transformation. Nehru’s state idea envisioned “a vast, bureaucratic instrument of 
collectively-willed, elite-directed social change” (Kaviraj 2010: 68-69), that would 
intervene to reduce social and economic inequalities. This would involve structural 
transformations of the Indian economy that would lead to the reorganisation of 
systems of production, generating enough wealth for distribution and ensuring social 
justice for all (Chatterjee 1995: 133). Such transformations, the new Prime Minister 
held, would uplift the poor and liberate them from the backwardness that kept them 
chained in deprivation. They would become economically atomistic individuals who 
would have the opportunity to work in an open economy and thereby overcome the 




Nehru understood democracy as a system of institutions that would enable the poor 
to assert themselves, while simultaneously preventing the collapse of the existing 
system. According to Manor’s analysis, the strength of Nehru’s idea of democracy 
lay in its balancing act that managed: 
 
to maintain order while enabling new social forces to emerge as serious 
players in the democratic process; to keep prosperous groups happy 
while providing the deprived with at least some opportunities and hope; 
to divert agricultural surplus into the drive for industrialisation without 
alienating hugely important landed groups; and to maintain national unity 
while allowing a baffling diversity of social groups freer play in open, 
competitive politics. (Manor 1996: 90) 
 
Nehru forged his own unique version of socialism that combined economic planning, 
nationalism and development (Sinha 2003: 294). Through state-centred development 
planning he sought to combine economic growth and modernisation with 
redistribution of economic wealth and social justice. The state under Nehru was also 
imbued with the duty of rescuing Indian society from “erroneous” traditions (Kaviraj 
2000: 155). The ethos of a paternalistic responsibility of the state as Nehru 
envisioned it was manifested, for instance, in his first five-year plan that stated: 
“[Certain] conditions have to be fulfilled before the full flow of the people’s energy 
for the task of the national reconstruction can be assured. The ignorance and apathy 
of large numbers have to be overcome” (Hansen 1999: 47). Kaviraj notes that the 
state under Nehru emerged out of his philosophical thoughts and contemplations, and 
did not reflect the collective will and support of the people (Kaviraj 2010: 68). 
Similarly, Khilnani points out that democracy in India was introduced by the political 
choice of an intellectual elite rather than emerging out of popular pressure (Khilnani 
2004: 34).  
 
Underlying Nehru’s political philosophy was a spirit of reason and progress, 
whereby he saw it as being within the state’s purview, through the institutionalisation 
of education and health, for instance, to heal society from ‘social evils’ such as 
casteism and communalism. Nehru’s ideas of the future of India were heavily 
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influenced by European Enlightenment thought, which held as sacred pillars notions 
of rationality and progress, reason and universality, democracy and the ‘will of the 
people’ (Chatterjee 2009; Corbridge and Harriss 2000; Kaviraj 1988). Nonetheless, 
Nehru practised a very particular ‘Indianised’ version of democracy and modernity 
that was infused with notions of social justice. As Khilnani notes, although Nehru 
was the most ‘anglicized’ of all nationalist leaders, he retained a profound sense of 
India’s past and integrity (Khilnani 2004: 8). 
 
Although Nehru’s political imaginary faced initial contestation by other nationalist 
leaders, it was Nehru who eventually became the principal political architect of 
India’s modern nation-state. By becoming the first Prime Minister of Independent 
India, Nehru became the central figure of the newly formed government and could 
gradually give flesh to his political visions. During his early years in power, Nehru 
set up crucial institutions that would help him in his endeavours to modernize India. 
Most of these institutions, such as the All India Services, the Planning Commission, 
the practice of regular elections, a Supreme Court, respect for a free press, and 
reserved jobs for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, remain to this day. Thus, 
Nehru’s democratic ideas did not remain mere idealism or platitudes, but were 
entrenched through state institutions into the core of India’s society. Nehru’s legacy 
was to lead the state to inscribe itself “into the imaginations of Indians in a way that 
no previous political agency had ever done” (Khilnani 2004: 41).   
 
 
Gandhi and Nehru in contemporary India 
 
These early debates and deliberations by the two political figureheads of post-
colonial India do not exist simply as bygone accounts or as historical anecdotes. 
They continue to be very much alive and to continuously inform debates on 
questions of India as a state and as a democracy. Kaviraj argues that discussions on 
the meaning of ‘Indian democracy’ continue to be bifurcated along the visions of 
India as upheld by either Nehru or Gandhi, as revamped versions adapted to “the 
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current generation’s new meanings and desires” (Kaviraj 2010: 13). He further states 
that:  
 
While there is no doubt that [Nehru’s] state-centered view gradually 
‘won’, [Gandhi’s] theories offered dense, intricate, considerably detailed, 
and subtle ideas on thinking about the modern state, and many of these 
‘elements’ are in constant circulation. They provide, in a certain sense, 
the underlying repertoire – of concepts and arguments – by which 
Indians have thought about the state for nearly two centuries. (Kaviraj 
2010: 43) 
 
Kaviraj is pointing out the sheer force of the personalities of Gandhi and Nehru, 
whose ideas on the state and on democracy continue to make a significant imprint on 
the political landscape. Particularly the political class and intellectuals in India 
continue to articulate their ideas and demands through the ideologies of these two 
powerful and symbolic figures. Moreover, Gandhi and Nehru can be said to act as 
‘empty signifiers’, whereby they are materialised in a diversity of contexts and 
deployed for a wide range of causes. Like Ataturk in Turkey as Navaro-Yashin’s 
ethnography shows, Nehru and Gandhi have a public ‘aura’ around them, making 
them into almost cultish figures (Navaro-Yashin 2002: 188). Navaro-Yashin shows 
that, although being the figurehead of secularism in Turkey, Ataturk manifests in 
public life in magical and ritualistic forms. Accordingly, it is through the 
manifestation of the figure of Ataturk that the state in Turkey is personified and 
fetishized (Navaro-Yashin 2002: 191-198). Similarly, the employment of the figures 
of Nehru and Gandhi in a diversity of settings in India allows the ideas of the state 
and democracy to materialise in people’s consciousness.  
 
The difference between Gandhi and Nehru can be broadly classified as being a 
difference between appeals to a traditional authenticity and an embrace of modernity. 
Herewith Gandhi and Nehru symbolically embody a dualism that resonates with 
broader Indian imaginings. Chatterjee (1993), in his famous account of the Nation 
and its Fragments, notes this conflicting and paradoxical dualism when he traces 
how the notion of India as a sovereign nation emerged. The colonial encounter 
forced anti-colonial nationalists to frame their assertions for a nation in Western 
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terms. In order to struggle against the colonial domination, the colonized had to 
accept the logic of modernity of the colonizers. For instance, in order to make claims 
for a nation they had to do so exclusively through political action in the public 
sphere. However, this meant that they were subjugating themselves and conforming 
to an ‘alien culture’. Thus, as Chatterjee explains elsewhere, in order to avoid losing 
their own distinctive identity, nationalists had to find ways to furnish their own ideas 
of nationalism. This process, according to Chatterjee, was deeply contradictory for: 
 
It is both imitative and hostile to the models it imitates… It is imitative in 
that it accepts the value of the standards set by the alien culture. But it 
also involves a rejection: ‘in fact, two rejections, both of them 
ambivalent: rejection of the alien intruder and dominator who is 
nevertheless to be imitated and surpassed by his own standards, and 
rejection of ancestral ways which are seen as obstacles to progress and 
yet also cherished as marks of identity’. This contradictory process is 
therefore deeply disturbing as well. (Chatterjee 1995: 2) 
 
The anti-colonial nationalists had to find ways to assert their difference. They 
emphasized this difference, for instance, by constituting the intimate realm of the 
family as the ‘authentic’ Indian space. This space was posited as being autonomous 
from the discursive regulations of the political domain as demarcated by the 
colonizers, and provided the nationalists with their own political nationalism. The 
outcome of this was a notion of nationalism that was premised not on identity but on 
difference whereby the Indian nation was defined against the Western counterpart. 
This resulted in a split between two discursive spheres: a split between the intimate 
and the public, between the inner/spiritual and the outer/material, between the 
universal and the particular. Herein, according Chatterjee, lies the predicament of the 
post-colonial state. It is this split in Indian nationalism that finds resonance with the 
conflicting colonial ideologies of Gandhi and Nehru. If we take Chattejee’s notion of 
the predicament of the post-colonial state seriously, it becomes apparent why the 
divide between Gandhi and Nehru looms so large. It explains why so much public 
discourse continues to be shaped around the ideas of these two figures.  
 
The manifestation of the ideas of Nehru and Gandhi for different causes can be 
noted, for instance, in Klenk’s (2003) study on the contemporary educational system 
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in India. Her ethnography provides an example of how Gandhi’s and Nehru’s 
competing visions for a postcolonial state continue to fuel debates in Independent 
India. The National Education Committee, Klenk finds, identifies education as the 
site where the idea of a unified India and the national culture of its citizens are 
shaped. School syllabi devised under Nehru were designed according to the state’s 
plans, articulating the developmentalist agenda of industrialisation. However, as 
Klenk notes, such education syllabi do not cater to the realities and needs of rural 
people. In response, local initiatives and NGOs introduced systems of education 
based on Gandhi’s naii taaliim (literally ‘new education’; used by Gandhi to mean 
‘basic education’) scheme, which envisioned education as located in rural daily life 
outside of the classroom and outside of textbooks. Such a split between systems of 
education as promoted by the state Education Committee, and the experiments with 
local educational methods, parallels, according to Klenk, the competing visions of 
the Indian nation as posed by Nehru and Gandhi. This reflects the split between 
Nehru’s vision of industrialisation and a developmentalist state, versus Gandhi’s 
vision of revived village-level economies.  
 
The conflicting political visions of Nehru and Gandhi are also found reflected in the 
competing imaginaries of NCPRI and Team Anna. As the following section will 
examine, the competition between NCPRI and Team Anna finds expression, amongst 
other things, in their diverging understandings of democracy. Each of the two civil 
society organisations endorses a different conception and relation to state institutions 
and consequently, a different notion of what democracy means. While members of 
NCPRI advocate for transparent and accountable forms of state institutions and 
governance, Team Anna endorse the idea of decentralised and direct democracy. The 
ideological divide between the two teams that became manifest through the 
competitive playing field of the Lokpal agitation, parallels to a significant degree the 
split between Nehru’s idea of the radical expansion of state powers, versus Gandhi’s 
notion that the state’s outreach must be limited. These continuous debates are 
evidence that democracy in India is still framed around normative political 





The Gandhi and Nehru Comeback 
 
Before expounding on the different understandings of democracy as endorsed by 
members of NCPRI and Team Anna, a brief note must be made on the contextual 
nature of these views. Although each civil society group reproduces the split between 
Nehru and Gandhi in their own ideas of democracy, this divide is more blurry than 
may at first appear. What may seem as clear-cut divisions between the two groups on 
what constitutes democracy, at closer inspection turn out to be ambiguous. The 
boundaries are not so much shaped around actual differences, as much as they 
emerge and acquire form in relation and in opposition to the other team. 
 
This notion, that boundaries are shaped in relation to an opponent, echoes the theme 
running throughout this thesis that emphasises the politics of relationality in the 
construction of identity. In earlier chapters it was noted that the sense of being of an 
individual, group or organisation is solidified by being confronted with an 
opposition. We saw that members of NCPRI positioned themselves in the field of 
anti-corruption activism, by differentiating themselves from the positions of Team 
Anna.  
 
The standpoint that members of NCPRI and Team Anna take on the meaning of 
democracy is also similarly relational. Although the two civil society organisations 
are evidently split on their positions on what constitutes democratic practice, there is 
no single or clear-cut way to demarcate their two camps.  The categories that they 
employ to define their political positions are relational, in that they shift in 
confrontation to the positions of the other. This indicates that symbols of 
identification do not exist as neat stables, but that they emerge out of messy 
relationships of competition. For instance, the identification with the symbolic figure 
of Gandhi is not absolute or constant, but shifts according to context. While in some 
contexts Gandhi’s ethics may be a point of association for MKSS/NCPRI (as we saw 
in the previous chapter with reference to the ideals of simplicity and authenticity), in 
other contexts there is a deliberate effort to dissociate from this very figure. This shift 
239 
 
emerges out of the competitive relationship between NCPRI and Team Anna, where 
difference to the other becomes the main point of identification. A similar process 
can be observed with the notion of ‘participatory democracy’. While members of 
NCPRI may be guided by the notion of ‘participatory democracy’, the term becomes 
unstable to them through its espousal by Team Anna. The split between NCPRI and 
Team Anna on conceptualisations of the meaning of democracy is thus largely 
relational rather than substantial. 
 
This is evidence of the notorious messiness of politics. Symbolic markers and 
categories are not absolute but are transformed and employed to meet particular ends. 
In the case of NCPRI and Team Anna, both groups are working in the same 
ideological field, with the same points of reference and language, yet they each 
accentuate particular aspects to mark their difference. In other words, both NCPRI 
and Team Anna share the same rhetoric, yet differ in their projects. The difference 
emerges out of their relational relationship. Let us now examine what these different 
views on the meaning and practice of democracy as endorsed by NCPRI and Team 
Anna entail.  
 
 
Team Anna and the ‘neo-Gandhians’ 
 
Meandering through the winding and chaotic streets of East Delhi, I found the office 
of Kabir on the third floor of a dark and grimy building. Amongst piles of books, 
pamphlets, documents and DVDs scattered throughout the small office space, young 
volunteers were squatting over laptops or sorting through documents on the floor. I 
was led to a small room in the back where Manish Sisodia sat cross-legged on the 
floor with two elderly men from Haryana. They were discussing the public action 
these gentlemen would take in their area on 5 April 2011 when Anna Hazare was to 




I had met Sisodia a week earlier at a national convention on the Right to Information 
convened by NCPRI in Shillong. Amongst the dozens of parallel workshops running 
during the convention, Sisodia had screened a short video clip in which an elderly 
man dressed in white and clad with a Gandhian hat called to the nation to support 
him in his struggle against corruption. This man called Anna Hazare declared that he 
would start a fast on 5 April 2011, demanding that the government adopt the Jan 
Lokpal Bill. Intrigued by this anti-corruption legislation that I had thus far not heard 
of, after the screening I sought Sisodia in the booth that represented both the NGOs 
Kabir and Parivartan that had been set up on the convention grounds.136 I found him 
and Arvind Kejriwal there distributing pamphlets, leaflets and DVDs on their work 
with the RTI. We had a brief chat and arranged to continue our conversation with 
more calm in Delhi after the convention. Since the beginning of fieldwork I had 
come across Parivartan and Kabir and had heard of Arvind Kejriwal and Manish 
Sisodia on several occasions, and had been intending to visit them, as I knew that 
through their common work on the RTI they were somehow related to MKSS. I thus 
greeted favourably the impromptu opportunity that arose in Shillong. 
 
After the men from Haryana left the Kabir office, Sisodia and I continued our 
conversation started in Shillong. He told me that he had great respect for the work of 
MKSS but that he did not agree with all of their approaches. He explained that one of 
his main disagreements lay with MKSS’s endeavours in advocating government 
schemes such as the NREGA. The organisations of Parivartan and Kabir, Sisodia 
continued to explain, do not believe in government schemes, for these are top-down 
approaches that lead to dependency. Government schemes turn citizens into beggars, 
whereby they passively rely on the government dole and fail to take charge of their 
own lives. Instead, Parivaratan and Kabir, he explained, believe in a system of local 
self-governance whereby the people themselves become masters of their destiny. 
Citizens must have control over governance and not depend on political leaders or 
government officials to meet their demands. Democracy must be decentralised and 
participatory whereby local assemblies, such as gram sabhas (committees comprised 
of all the adult citizen voters of the village) in rural areas and mohalla sabhas in 
                                                 
136 Both Kabir and Parivartan were NGOs set up by Arvind Kejriwal dedicated to strengthening the 
Right to Information.  
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urban areas, take decisions on matters concerning their affairs. Only when power is 
directly in the hands of the people, Sisodia told me, will there be true democracy in 
India. Through this short initial exposé, the influence of Gandhi’s political thought 
on Sisodia’s visions for democracy in India, began to emerge. Gandhi too would 
have been highly sceptical of centralised government schemes and he too would have 
made a plea for gram sabhas and mohalla sabhas.  
 
In order to clarify his understanding of self-governance, Sisodia showed me a 
documentary film which he had made on Hiware Bazar, a village he deemed to be an 
exemplary model of swaraj. This village, he told me, comes very close to 
representing a village of Gandhi’s dreams and is a model village that Kabir wishes to 
see replicated throughout the country. He had screened the film in numerous villages 
around India, holding discussions with villagers on their views of it.  
 
The film began with a quote by Gandhi, who said that true democracy begins when 
villagers at the grassroots level govern themselves, and not when representatives in 
the central government take decisions on their behalf. The film then zoomed in to a 
village in the state of Maharashtra that was described as a place where the 
governments of Delhi and Mumbai have become irrelevant as it is the villagers of 
this village themselves who form the government. The viewer was then shown the 
gram sansad (village parliament) – the place where people themselves plan the 
welfare and development of the village. Villagers supposedly meet here once a 
month and collectively decide on all matters ranging from education, health, and 
ration distribution to land allotment or disputes that may arise. A narrator (the voice 
of Sisodia) told us that in Hiware Bazar the government is never formed nor 
removed, for the villagers form the permanent government. Popatrao Pawar, the only 
graduate of the village, was elected as sarpanch in 1989; ever since, panchayat 
elections have no longer been held and Pawar remains in the position of sarpanch.  
 
We were told that before 1989 Hiware Bazar, like all villages in the severely 
drought-prone area, had suffered acute deprivation. This had led to the migration of 
masses of villagers to urban areas; those who remained turned to alcohol as the 
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panacea for their despondency and hopelessness. When Pawar was elected sarpanch, 
he succeeded in getting the 22 illicit liquor shops in the village closed down and 
concentrated his energies on irrigation systems and water conversation and 
management programmes. Through a system of shramdan (voluntary work) and dan 
(gift/donations), the villagers collectively participated in regenerating the village. 
Today Hiware Bazar is considered a shining example of sustainable development and 
has received several awards.  
 
The film ended with a close up of Arvind Kejriwal who made a proclamation that 
Hiware Bazar is a live example that ought to be replicated throughout the country. 
He appealed to the viewers to follow the Hiware Bazar model in their own villages. 
If such model villages get replicated, Kejriwal professed, true democracy would 




Ten days after meeting Sisodia in his Kabir office, Anna Hazare began his first 
hunger strike for a Jan Lokpal Bill. From then on for several months to follow, much 
public attention was galvanized around this anti-corruption campaign. Anna Hazare 
was the conspicuous public face of the campaign, yet other core members of Team 
Anna also made their public appearances. Although the evident cornerstone of their 
discussions in this period was their Jan Lokpal Bill, over time the positions on swaraj 
by several of the core members of Team Anna occasionally trickled through. Many 
of these were caught by members of NCPRI and become topics of conversation in 
the NCPRI office. For instance, Prashant Bhushan was quoted in national 
newspapers as saying that the real issue emerging from the campaign for a Jan 
Lokpal Bill was not corruption but direct democracy.137 He endorsed a system in 
which all public issues are discussed at the local level throughout the country, and in 
which collective decisions are taken through a system of weekly voting or 
referendums. Representative democracy, which Bhushan (2012) held to be entirely 
                                                 
137 “Biggest challenge for India is participatory democracy: Prashant Bhushan” in DNA, 18 July 2011, 




defunct in India, must be replaced with a model of direct democracy.138 Here 
Bhushan was directly echoing Gandhi, who had been explicit on his aversion to a 
system of representative democracy and who made pleas for power to be entirely 
decentralised.  
 
The association of Anna Hazare with Gandhi had been established from the onset of 
the anti-corruption movement. At first this largely took a ‘visual’ element, where he 
was lauded for being the ‘new Gandhi’, made symbolically visible by his Ghandian 
attire. However, it took some time before Anna Hazare made direct reference to the 
Gandhian politics of direct democracy. Days after completing his second hunger fast, 
he declared that his new line of action after the Jan Lokpal Bill had been passed 
would be electoral reforms, namely the ‘Right to Recall’ and the ‘Right to Reject’. 
The Right to Recall would enable the recorded disapproval of a certain minimum 
section of the electorate to recall an elected candidate. This could be done through 
plebiscite or referendums, or through petitions signed by a minimum percentage of 
the electorate. The Right to Reject would allow voters to reject all candidates in the 
ballot paper. The Right to Recall and the Right to Reject would hand over more 
power to the people and would give them direct control over their representatives. It 
was what Gandhi had in mind when he said that the people should be the masters 
over politicians, who are but their slaves.  
 
As already examined in Chapter Three, Anna Hazare was an object of scorn amongst 
NCPRI members. His naivety in matters of politics was at best ridiculed and at worst 
treated as deeply problematic. When Anna Hazare came out with announcements on 
the Right to Recall and the Right to Reject, there were many discussions at the 
NCPRI office on Anna Hazare’s ‘twisted’ relationship to politics. In this context, I 
repeatedly heard accounts by different members of NCPRI on Anna Hazare’s 
background in Ralegan Sidhi. I was to hear that before entering the limelight as the 
face of the Lokpal agitation, Hazare was most widely known for his work in 
environmental conservation and social reforms in his village of Ralegan Siddhhi in 
                                                 
138 Bhushan, P., “The Saga of the Lokpal Bill” in The Hindu, January 2, 2012 [accessed 17 June 2013] 
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/the-saga-of-the-lokpal-bill/article2766561.ece (Original text 
has no page numbers) 
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Maharashtra. He is applauded for transforming a village ridden by drought, poverty, 
unemployment and alcoholism into one that is economically and environmentally 
thriving. Ralegan Siddhi has been widely acclaimed as a ‘success story’ and as a 
‘model village’, not least by international organisations such as the FAO or the 
World Bank.  
 
One day during the hype of the Lokpal agitation, I joined several members of NCPRI 
to attend a weekly seminar at the Nehru Memorial Library given by the social 
scientist Mukul Sharma who presented his work on the politics of Anna Hazare. 
Based on extensive fieldwork in Ralegan Siddhi, Sharma (2012b) presented to us the 
findings of his soon-to-be published book entitled Green and Saffron: Hindu 
Nationalism and Indian Environmental Politics. According to Sharma, Hazare’s 
work in rural environmentalism is a window onto his overall political vision and 
ideology. Sharma recognised the environmental and economic success that Ralegan 
Siddhi is acclaimed for, yet he questions the means of attaining it. According to 
Sharma, Hazare holds absolute power and command in his village and is driven by a 
moral zeal in enforcing his objectives. He has set strict environmental and socio-
political rules and norms to govern the conduct of his fellow villagers. For instance, 
he has banned alcohol and the sale of tobacco; satellite TV and the playing of film 
songs are prohibited (even on festive occasions, such as weddings, only Hindu 
religious bhajans are permitted); the village is declared vegetarian and Hazare has 
prohibited low-maintenance crops, such as sugar cane, on the grounds that these 
deplete ground water and make farmers lazy; further, according to Sharma’s 
findings, people are ‘forced’ into family planning. The rules that govern conduct in 
Ralegan Siddhi are infused with a desire to purify the village from immoral 
behaviour and toxic ‘Western’ influences. It seems to reflect a ‘stern’ version of 
Gandhi’s vision of a pure and harmonious village.  
 
Sharma recounts that Hazare is not reluctant to use force and coercion if rules are 
transgressed. For instance, anyone caught drinking alcohol in Ralegan Siddhi is tied 
to a tree and publicly flogged. Hazare, Sharma writes, likens his authority to that of a 
mother who is entitled to slap her child, and whose right to use coercive means is 
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unquestionable for it is done out of good heart. Similarly according to Hazare, a 
social activist or an environmental authority has to use force to implement rules and 
laws, as long as he is guided by good intentions for the people. As Sharma writes 
elsewhere, Hazare’s legitimacy and authority, like that of an archetypal village 
patriarch, derives from an overall belief system, “where the people following him 
consider it their natural duty to obey, and the exercising person thinks it a natural 
right to rule” (Sharma 2011).139 Hazare’s ideological framework is based on 
‘common moral values’ that “become the structures of governance, and work as 
normative regulations” (Sharma 2011). In theoretical terms, Hazare’s Ralegan Siddhi 
approaches Gandhi’s ramarajya.  
 
Another area in which Hazare can be seen to display Gandhian political philosophy 
is in stressing ‘village unity’. Jodkhka in his detailed examination of Gandhi’s village 
politics notes a populist streak in Gandhi’s depiction of the village in terms of a 
‘unit’ and of a ‘unity of interests’ (Jodkhka 2002: 3359). Similarly, Hazare’s rhetoric, 
according to Sharma, emphasises village unity as being above all other political 
institutions. A crucial political implication of this is the dismissal of the worth of 
electoral democracy and any formal structures of democracy. In fact, under Hazare’s 
leadership “elections are not welcomed”, and instead, representatives of the 
panchayat and village societies are nominated ‘through consensus’. There have been 
no elections to the gram panchayat in Ralegan Siddhi in over 24 years. Hazare’s 
logic is that elections “bring party politics and divide the people” and that the village 
must be kept clean from dirty politics. In the village, no poster or pamphlet is 
permitted during the state/national elections and political parties are not allowed to 
set up their units in the village. The association of party-politics as dirty and 
corrupting is not all that far from Gandhi’s vision of an ideal state, in which “there 
will be no political institution and therefore no political power” (Chatterjee 1995: 
92). 
 
                                                 
139 Sharma, M. (2011) “The Making of an Authority: Anna Hazare in Ralegan Siddhi” in Kafila 14 
April 2011 [accessed 4 October 2013] http://kafila.org/2011/04/14/the-making-of-an-authority-anna-
hazare-in-ralegan-siddhi/ (Original text has no page number). 
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Sharma also notes the dangerously anti-democratic Hindutva ethos in Hazare’s 
political philosophy. His morals and beliefs are guided by a conspicuously 
Brahminical worldview, noticeable for instance in Hazare’s residence in the Hindu 
village temple, which serves as the centre of his activities. This has repercussions not 
least on people of the lower castes of Ralegan Siddhi, whose role and occupation in 
the caste system is treated by Hazare as unquestionable and as ‘natural’. Gandhi, as 
noted above, was similarly sympathetic in conserving the status quo of the caste 
system. Sharma concludes that “authority and its legitimacy is the key to Anna 
Hazare. Not only is this authority deeply rooted in the dominant socio-political 
tradition of the region; it is often blind to many basic and universal issues of rights, 
democracy and justice” (Sharma 2011). 
 
 
NCPRI and the ‘neo-Nehruvians’ 
 
The public statements made by members of Team Anna on their understanding of 
direct democracy did not go unnoticed amongst members of NCPRI. Along with the 
critiques of Team Anna’s modes of protest and the content of their Jan Lokpal Bill 
(see Chapter Three), members of NCPRI expressed concern with the political 
motives of Team Anna. In closed meetings, they discussed what they repeatedly 
referred to as Team Anna’s naïve and even dangerous political positions. Besides 
scorning Anna Hazare’s announcement of campaigning for the Right to Recall and 
the Right to Reject as being guided by populist motives, the other members of Team 
Anna and their calls for direct democracy were also heavily criticised. For instance, 
Prashant Bhushan’s appeal for referendums was challenged in conversations amongst 
members of NCPRI as falling under a simplistic and reductionist politics of 
majoritarianism. 
 
Members of NCPRI rejected the politics of direct democracy and swaraj as being 
politically and socially untenable. Bhanwar, the ‘intellectual’ Dalit member of 
MKSS, was particularly vocal in expressing his concern with Team Anna’s notion of 
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swaraj. With society’s deeply divisive hierarchical structures, he explained to me, 
the removal of a system of representative democracy would indubitably imply that 
the most marginalised sectors of society would get even further marginalised. Lower 
castes have historically been silenced and it is only through a politics of 
representation that some degree of voice and protection has been granted to them. If 
governance were entirely decentralised, as Team Anna seemed to be suggesting with 
their appeal to swaraj, lower castes would fall prey to entrenched exploitative power 
structures. This did not mean that MKSS/NCPRI did not itself endorse ideas of 
participatory democracy – in fact, they also stand for the strengthening of gram 
sabhas as a way of strengthening the participation of rural populations in 
governance. However, as Bhanwar and other members of MKSS and NCPRI 
repeatedly emphasised, this must be done within the ambit of the constitution and 
state institutions. In this context, Bhanwar often cited Dr Ambedkar, the principal 
architect of Indian’s constitution, who, in contrast to Gandhi, was highly sceptical of 
institutionalising village panchayats and any forms of direct democracy. Handing 
over powers to the panchayat, according to Amdedkar, would infringe on the 
constitution:  
 
A population which is hidebound by caste; a population which is infected 
by ancient prejudices; a population which flouts equality of status and is 
dominated by notions of gradations in life; a population which thinks that 
some are high and some are low — can it be expected to have the right 
notions even to discharge bare justice? Sir, I deny that proposition, and I 
submit that it is not proper to expect us to submit our life, and our liberty, 
and our property to the hands of these Panchas. (Bombay Legislative 
Council debates, 6 October 1932)140 
 
MKSS’s reservations on a politics of decentralisation mirrored in many regards 
Nehru’s understandings of democracy. Nehru stood for a strong and centralised state 
that distributed wealth and ensured social justice for all. What Bhanwar, along with 
other members of MKSS was espousing, was a degree of centralisation, whereby an 
overarching institution protects the interests of the marginalised. Without an external 
                                                 
140 Quote by Ambedkar found in: “Selling women’s rights short” in The Hindu, January 24, 2014 




guarantor, the weak would fall prey to traditional structures of power that would 
keep their subjugation cemented. Nehru had expressed similar criticisms of Gandhi’s 
idea of a village republic, when he contended that until people had been liberated 
from their traditional modes of thinking, patterns of oppression would continue. 
Members of MKSS, like Nehru, believed in the strengthening of state institutions so 
that the principles contained in the Indian constitution could be guaranteed.  
 
A critique of Team Anna’s political ideology allowed members of NCPRI to 
elaborate and define their own positions. For instance, in reaction to Team Anna’s 
demand that their own version of the Lokpal Bill be passed regardless of 
parliamentary procedures, members of NCPRI issued public statements defending 
democratic institutions as sacrosanct. Echoing Gandhi’s declaration that parliament 
is a ‘sterile woman and prostitute’, members of Team Anna made known their 
disdain for parliament: they stated publicly their view that passing their Jan Lokpal 
Bill through the parliamentary procedure was a waste of time. In response, members 
of NCPRI made public statements in the English-language national media, urging 
Team Anna not to derail the parliamentary institutions.141 Repeatedly members of 
NCPRI declared that bypassing democratic institutions was not the solution, but that 
instead they must be made to work in the interest of the people; the state serves as a 
form of protection for the poor against vested interests such as corporate groups or 
village landlords. At the peak of the agitation, Aruna, for instance, told me: “The 
government is not supreme, but it is an institution that we have created, or that the 
constitution has created. We must make it work for us, so ultimately we have to 
follow certain procedures”. 
 
Particularly when it came to campaigning and lobbying for laws, members of NCPRI 
expressed their clear understandings of what constitutes legitimate democratic 
process. Team Anna’s form of protesting through hunger strikes and mass agitations 
was deemed as adversarial and as disdainful to the democratic process. In contrast, 
members of NCPRI emphatically emphasised their own compliance to democratic 
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processes and institutions in their own form of campaigning for laws. The 
parliamentary Standing Committee, for instance, was portrayed by members of 
NCPRI as a crucial institution in India’s democracy that serves as a platform from 
which civil society can continue lobbying for a given legislation, even when the 
legislation has already been tabled before parliament.  
 
In order to reinforce their faith in the Standing Committee, members of NCPRI often 
publicly narrated their past experience with the parliamentary institution. An 
anecdote recounted repeatedly derived from their campaign for the RTI Act: after 
years of people’s struggles and an enormous range of consultations, civil society had 
drafted a strong RTI draft bill. Yet, in spite of this, the draft introduced by the 
government in parliament was a very weak one. However, civil society could 
continue campaigning through the parliamentary Standing Committee, whereby as 
many as 153 amendments were re-introduced into the final RTI Act. The result was 
one of the most powerful right to information laws in the world (Mander 2011).  
 
Given such effective experience with the Standing Committee, NCPRI was of the 
position that the parliamentary process must be used as a democratic means to push 
for civil society’s demands. State institutions are in place to serve the interest of the 
people and they must be put to use. Members of NCPRI shared Nehru’s optimistic 
faith in the state. On these grounds, as Team Anna was conducting its hunger strike, 
members of NCPRI announced that they would present their own version of the 




Swaraj becomes official 
 
Nearly a year after Anna Hazare’s second hunger fast, with attention on the Jan 
Lokpal Bill significantly declining, what had until then been a murmuring about the 
true political motive for swaraj by certain members of Team Anna, was made 
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concrete: Arwind Kejriwal (2012) who was unmistakably the most influential force 
behind Team Anna, launched his book Swaraj: Power to People. In direct 
accordance with Gandhi’s political philosophy, the overall tenet of the book was that 
“only when power comes directly in the hands of the people, will true democracy 
dawn in the country” (Kejriwal 2012: 34). The book was written as a type of manual 
on how to restore true democracy in India by making citizens “partners in the sharing 
of power”. 
  
In Swaraj: Power to People, Kejriwal contextualises democracy within a particular 
Indian history, arguing that “democratic traditions are ingrained in our psyche” 
(Kejriwal 2012: 18). Accordingly, he claims that democracy in India was not 
introduced by the West, but existed already during the period of Gautam the Buddha. 
Kejriwal describes the times prior to the arrival of the British as being strongly 
democratic ages, when kings ruled through the dictate of the people. According to 
Kerjiwal, although kings were not elected, they did not have absolute power as 
decisions were taken by the gram sabha. The king had to accede to the wishes of his 
people. The British Raj, according to Kejriwal’s account, abolished the system of 
gram sabhas, removing once and for all the true participation of the people.  
 
Just as Gandhi blamed colonialism for the corruption of Indian minds, so too 
Kejriwal remarks on the continued mentalities of foreign rule in Independent India. 
Although democracy was reinstituted with Independence, the new rulers, Kejriwal 
argues in his book, “kept all the paraphernalia of the British government as it is: its 
arrogance, its unapproachability, its mentality of being a ruler” (Kejriwal 2012: 19). 
Throughout the book, Kejriwal refers to politicians as ‘greedy’, ‘arrogant’, ‘selfish’ 
and ‘autocratic’ amongst other vices, mirroring Gandhi’s deep apprehension with the 
realm of politics.  
 
In his book Kejriwal emphasises the role of gram sabhas and thereby expands 
Gandhi’s notion of the reinstitution of village republics as the key instrument toward 
swaraj. Gram sabhas, according to Kejriwal, should have the power to decide on all 
matters regarding local affairs. Even on issues such as land acquisition by 
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corporations or the government, decisions should be taken exclusively by the gram 
sabha. Rather than receiving funds for specified government schemes and 
programmes as in the current state system, villages should be allotted ‘free funds’. 
Villagers will ensure the appropriate and fair spending of the funds, because they 
have their village’s best interest at heart. This is demonstrated by Kejriwal’s 
rhetorical question: “Who loves child more, mother or secretary of education?” 
(Kejriwal 2012: 30). 
 
The conspicuous moral tone running through Gandhi’s writings is discernible also in 
Kejriwal’s Swaraj: Power to People. Towards the end of the book, Kejriwal 
correlates the virtues of honesty and justice with the improvement of the political 
system. According to this understanding, what is needed for good models of 
governance to develop is the building of the character of people. This resonates with 
the countless appeals made by Gandhi for restoring moral integrity as the vehicle 
towards attaining true liberation and freedom. As has been noted, swaraj to Gandhi 
entailed both self-rule from foreign domination, as well as self-purification at the 
individual level. Politics and morality are inextricably linked in the thoughts of both 
Gandhi and Kejriwal.  
 
What is also linked in the equation of politics and morality of both Gandhi and 
Kejriwal is their employment of religious terminology. Both infuse their politics with 
Hindu symbolism and sentiments. Gandhi’s vision of a legendary political utopia, 
ramarajya, as noted earlier, is steeped in Hindu cultural iconography. He drew on 
other themes from Hinduism, such as his defence of varnashrama dharma (the 
teachings in Hindu texts that maintain that the caste system is a natural classification 
of society). Misra notes that the strong Hindu framework running through Gandhi’s 
politics is epitomised in his famous salt march:142 for one thing, the march was called 
a yatra, which denotes a religious pilgrimage undertaken by Hindus, with the aim of 
freeing Mother India; secondly, like a Brahmin priest or a pious Hindu, Gandhi wore 
a tilak on his forehead (a mark worn by Hindus) and religious bhajans (Hindu 
                                                 
142 The Salt March, which took place from March to April 1930 was an act of civil disobedience led 
by Gandhi to protest against British rule. It was a campaign of tax resistance and non-violent protest 
against the British salt monopoly. 
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devotional songs) were played as the march proceeded (Misra 2004: 98). In a similar 
manner, Kejriwal frames his political convictions with religious idioms. The ultimate 
aim, writes Kejriwal in his political ‘manifesto’, is the attainment of nirvana (a 
spiritual place of perfect peace and happiness) because “to move towards perfection 
is the aim of life and the universe” (Kejriwal 2012: 30). In order to move in the 
direction of a sound system of governance, actions must be “in consonance with the 
path of Dharma” and “the path of righteousness” must be followed (Kejriwal 2012: 
50).143  
 
Since writing his book, Kejriwal has advanced sensationally in his endeavour to 
establish his political dream of swaraj. On 2 October 2012, the birth anniversary of 
Mahatma Gandhi, he announced that he would form a political party. On 26 
November 2012 the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) was formally launched.144 The vision 
of AAP, as its official website states, is “to realise the dream of Swaraj that Gandhiji 
had envisaged for a free India – where the power of governance and rights of 
democracy will be in the hands of the people of India”.145 One year into its existence, 
as I explored in the introduction of this thesis, the AAP won a landslide victory in the 
2013 Delhi assembly elections and Avrind Kejriwal became Chief Minister of Delhi. 
At the time of writing this, AAP is contending in the national elections.   
 
 
The Democratic Paradox and Agonistic Pluralism 
 
The above ethnographic accounts have explored some of the practices and discourses 
through which the ideas of democracy as conceptualised by members of NCPRI and 
Team Anna come to expression. What emerges out of these accounts is the 
conspicuous resemblance of the positions held by NCRPI and Team Anna to the 
                                                 
143 Dharma, in the Indian religion, can be broadly defined as the eternal law of the cosmos, inherent in 
the very nature of things. 
144 Throughout the Lokpal agitation Kejriwal had refuted the idea of having any political motives. 
Members of NCPRI, however, had voiced their suspicion that Kejriwal’s hidden agenda behind the 
demand for a Jan Lokpal Bill was to enter party politics. 




ideas of democracy as endorsed by Nehru and Gandhi respectively. In this, NCRPI 
and Team Anna fall neatly into the categories of what Joseph calls the ‘neo-
Nehruvians’ and the ‘neo-Gandhians’. According to Joseph, these two groups arise in 
contemporary India in response to the overall disappointments with the failures of 
India’s democratic institutions. The ‘neo-Nehruvians’ attribute the unsuccessful 
development of India to the failures of political leadership and to vested interests that 
stand in the way of sound governance. They propose to solve the problems of 
development by restoring the autonomous functioning of state institutions, by 
improving the implementation of policies, and by establishing institutionalised links 
with interests in civil society (Joseph 2002: 299). The ‘neo-Gandhians’, by contrast, 
question the very model of representative democracy and argue that it is 
inappropriate in a plural society like India’s. They instead lay emphasis on the non-
state sector – or what might be called ‘political society’ – as a means to regenerate 
Indian democracy. Neo-Gandhians appeal to ‘the masses’ and ‘the people’ by calling 
for a form of radical democracy (Joseph 2002: 299). This finds striking resonance 
with the politics of the Aam Aadmi Party that, as a people-centred political party, 
seeks to shift away from representative democracy, as discussed in the introduction 
of this thesis.  
 
The split between the neo-Nehruvians and the neo-Gandhians that Joseph describes 
suggests, as does the above ethnographic material, that Gandhian and Nehruvian 
thought continuously informs significant areas of public discourse in India. 
Questions of development, democracy and the state are still largely framed along the 
competing frameworks as set by the two founding fathers of the Indian nation. This 
division is principally around the duty and function of state institutions, the idea of 
representative democracy, the degree of sovereignty to the people, and the role of 
civil or political society. This signals that the two most revered nationalist heroes 
continue to haunt contemporary political thought. We saw this through the diverging 
views of NCPRI and Team Anna, and we see this, as suggested by Joseph, in other 




While it is a distinctly ‘Indian’ characteristic that this division in ideas of democracy 
gets expressed through the figures and rhetoric of Gandhi and Nehru, it nonetheless 
expresses a tension at work in broader conceptions of democracy. The political 
visions of Gandhi and Nehru (as well as of their contemporary avatars) can be 
broadly classified as falling under the categories of ‘direct democracy’ and 
‘representative democracy’ respectively. This division extends beyond the context of 
India and finds wide reiteration in much of contemporary democratic debate. One of 
the perpetual questions dominating democratic discourses and the key divider 
marking all party politics is: should there be more or less government in the running 
of things? Should state institutions intervene in the welfare of society and act as 
guarantor of the common good, or should individuals be given responsibility and 
rights over their own affairs? Accordingly, the fissure between the ‘neo-Nehruvians’ 
and the ‘neo-Gandhians’ suggests that political life in India grapples with the same 
divisions and conflicts that underlie democratic discussions elsewhere.  
 
Mouffe explains this inherent conflict within modern democracy through what she 
calls the ‘democratic paradox’. Tracing historically the advent of liberal democracy, 
Mouffe finds that it was constituted by the merging of two separate traditions and 
strands of thought: the democratic tradition with its principles of popular sovereignty 
and equality, and the tradition of liberalism that emphasises individual liberty, human 
rights and the rule of law. The paradox of modern liberal democracy is that it 
articulates two distinct traditions that are incompatible and in conflict with one 
another. In other words, perfect liberty and perfect equality can never coincide. The 
merging of these two traditions did not emerge out of ideological consonance, 
according to Mouffe’s argument, but out of historical contingency (Mouffe 2000: 2-
3). Given this contingency, the model of ‘liberal’ democracy is not a unitary given, 
holding absolute sway. Conflict and contestation is inherent, even in a liberal 
democracy.  
 
However, as Mouffe explains elsewhere, such conflict ought not be thought of as 
destructive or stifling, but, quite the contrary, as something highly constructive. In 
fact, it is out of conflict that true democratic debate emerges and ‘agonistic 
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pluralism’ arises. ‘Agonistic pluralism’, as proposed by Mouffe (1999) in her paper 
‘Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism?’ is a method for envisioning an 
extensive and radical form of democracy. At the heart of Mouffe’s vision of 
antagonistic pluralism, is the acknowledgement that radical difference and 
contentious expression are present, and even necessary, in the practice of democracy. 
Agonistic pluralism is a model of democracy grounded in productive conflict or 
contest.  
 
Even though, in proposing a conception of democracy that acknowledges 
contestation as an inherent aspect of democracy, Mouffe is making a normatively 
loaded claim, it is nonetheless insightful in understanding the conflict over 
democratic conceptions between NCPRI and Team Anna. For my purpose, the notion 
of agonistic pluralism serves as an analytic tool with which to understand the conflict 
between the two anti-corruption groups. I draw on the work of Mouffe by 
‘suspending’ the normative dimension of her theory – an approach inspired by the 
work of Spencer. Spencer proposes that ‘theory-in-general’, such as the normative 
concept of agonistic pluralism, can be used as a tool to “illuminate some very 
specific processes” (Spencer 2012: 730). While anthropologists tend to criticise 
political theories for being abstract and therefore blind to empirical processes, 
Spencer notes “an unexpected affinity” between political theories and local 
expressions of the political (Spencer 2012: 730). In other words, abstract theories can 
be used to explain empirical practices and processes, as long as the normative is put 
on hold. It is with this in mind that I draw on Mouffe’s theory of agonistic pluralism 
in helping me to understand the dynamics between NCPRI and Team Anna and their 
relationship and contribution to broader ideas of democracy. 
 
Mouffe sets her theory of agonistic pluralism against liberal models of democracy, 
particularly ‘deliberative democracy’ as upheld by Habermas and Rawls. Proponents 
of deliberative democracy contend that the ultimate aim of democracy is to create 
consensus, which is attainable through process of rational deliberation and reason. It 
is believed that collective decision-making, in which all individuals are taken as free 
and equal, leads to the articulation of the common good. This is based on the premise 
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that impartiality, equality, openness, lack of coercion and unanimity are guaranteed. 
What such a model assumes is that power does not exist, and where it does, it has the 
best interest of all in mind, which justifies its legitimacy. 
 
Drawing on Wittgenstein’s concept of ‘form of life’ (Lebensform) and Lacan’s 
notion of the ‘master signifier’, Mouffe undermines the conception of rational 
dialogue as held by proponents of deliberative democracy. Accordingly, she 
underlines the ‘rhetorical dimension’ and the inescapably authoritarian structure 
inherent in deliberation as endorsed by Habermas, challenging thereby his “dream of 
a rational consensus” (Mouffe 1999: 750). As she notes:  
 
[T]he impediments to the free and unconstrained public deliberation of 
all on matters of common concern is a conceptual impossibility because, 
without those so-called impediments, no communication, no deliberation 
could ever take place. (Mouffe 1999: 751) 
 
It is here that pluralistic antagonism enters. According to this understanding of 
democracy, the so-called fiction of perfect harmony and transparency is replaced by 
the recognition that “there can never be total emancipation but only partial ones” 
(Mouffe 1999: 752). Power and conflict are indispensable in Mouffe’s formulation of 
democratic practice. In fact, “the workings of power constitute the very identities 
around which political competition works” (paraphrased in Spencer 2012: 729; 
(italics in original)). By denying that power and conflict exist, proponents of 
deliberative democracy disconnect ‘the political’ from democracy. The point at 
which democracy becomes radical and plural, according to Mouffe, is when this 
power is acknowledged and transformed and channelled to become compatible with 
democratic values.  
 
What significantly distinguishes pluralist democracy from deliberative democracy is 
that while the latter attempts to eradicate all difference and ‘otherness’, the former 
embraces antagonism. Under agonistic pluralism, an enemy is transformed into an 
‘adversary’ and a relationship of ‘antagonism’ is transformed into one of ‘agonism’. 
What this entails is the recognition that differences and conflict with the enemy will 
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always remain, but that the “adversary is a legitimate enemy, an enemy with whom 
we have in common a shared adhesion to the ethico-political principles of 
democracy” (Mouffe 1999: 755). In this conceptualisation, democracy consists of a 
mutually tolerant contest among people who disagree on views but are united by 
shared identifications. 
 
By accepting disagreement and conflict with the adversary and by recognising the 
inherent power in all social relations, a truly democratic politics can be achieved. As 
Mouffe maintains:  
 
The prime task of democratic politics is not to eliminate passions nor to 
relegate them to the private sphere in order to render rational consensus 
possible, but to mobilise those passions towards the promotion of 
democratic designs. Far from jeopardizing democracy, agonistic 
confrontation is in fact its very condition of existence. (Mouffe 1999: 
755-756) 
 
In order for the multiplicity of voices in any society to be respected, what is needed 
is “awareness that difference allows us to constitute unity and totality while 
simultaneously providing essential limits” (Mouffe 1999: 757). Radical democracy 
can be approached, as Laclau and Mouffe note elsewhere, when there is acceptance 
of the “polyphony of voices, each of which constitutes its own irreducible discursive 





This chapter has emphasised the constructive aspect of disagreement and the 
constitutive effect of conflict. It argued that the competition over normative 
conceptions of democracy, as laid out by members of NCPRI and Team Anna, 
reflects the inherent tension in democracy. By being split over which version of 
democracy is the legitimate one – the Gandhian or the Nehruvian version – members 
of each of the civil society groups are bringing to light the essence of democracy. As 
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Mouffe’s notion of agonistic pluralism suggests, conflict is at the core of politics. In 
this conceptualisation, it is precisely the disagreement between members of NCPRI 
and Team Anna on what constitutes democratic practice in campaigning and in 
overall governance that deepens democratic practice. Through their contestation, 
they opened up discursive spaces in which the idea of democracy was deliberated 
and discussed, consequently animating and contributing to democratic debates. This 
accentuation on the affirmative dimension of contestation draws on Arendt’s ideas of 
an agonistic public space.   
 
According to Arendt (1972), in an ‘agonistic public space’ rich debate is constituted 
through difference and conflict. As a response to totalitarianism, which Arendt 
accounted to the ‘human condition’ that induces unreflective behaviour and 
conformity, she conceived of a public space that would be constituted by ‘agonistic 
rhetoric’: rhetoric and discussions that are fruitful precisely because they are 
confrontational and adversarial. Habermas (1974) famously conceptualised the 
public sphere as a discursive space guided by reason and rational deliberation; by 
contrast, Arendt’s public space envisioned people arguing with each other with 
passion, vehemence and integrity (Benhabib 1993). ‘Agonism’, in contrast to 
antagonism, is productive and creative, bringing about intensified critical 
reflection.146 In this logic it is precisely a passion for ideas and politics that drives 
people into action and from where competition stems. As Roberts-Miller notes in her 
account of Arendt’s (1972) polemical agonism, a “situation is agonistic, not because 
the participants manufacture or seek conflict, but because conflict is a necessary 
consequence of difference” Roberts-Miller 2002: 589). It is when a diversity of 
interlocutors brings together diverging ideas and standpoints, without aiming for 
consensus or agreement, that critical thinking comes into being and the risk of 
totalitarianism is uprooted. 147  
                                                 
146 Chambers, in a similar discussion on agonistic public space, notes that ‘agonism’ derives from the 
Greek word ‘agon’ that refers to an athletic contest in which the struggle, and not the victory, is the 
aim. Such a contest requires the existence of opponents that are worthy of each other to compete, with 
agonism implying “deep respect and concern for the other” (Chambers 2003: 96). 
147 Other distinguished theorists on agonistic pluralism include Honig (1993) on the politics of 
agonism; and Connolly (1995) on democratic pluralism. All pick up on different points of 





As we have examined in this chapter, Indian democracy is inherently constituted by 
conflict. The independent nation was shaped around the competing political 
imaginaries of Gandhi and Nehru, and it is these discourses that continue to inform 
the meaning and practice of democracy in India today. No single idea of democracy 
exists in India and it is precisely the diverging conceptualisations that feed and 
sustain democratic debate. The reproduction of Gandhi and Nehru’s conflicting ideas 
of democracy in various social and political fields, contributes to attaining truly 
democratic politics. In such a light, the differences between NCPRI and Team Anna 
can be considered as opening up opportunities for the deepening of democracy and 
the emergence of agonistic public spaces.  
 
The ramifications of the agonistic public space created by members of NCPRI and 
Team Anna through their different views on democracy have come to fruition in 
recent months, with the phenomenon of the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP). The recent rise 
to power of AAP can be thought of as a result of the productive avenues created by 
tension and conflict over the meaning of democracy. Arvind Kejriwal, who was 
ostensibly the ‘master mind’ behind Team Anna, set up AAP. When the government 
failed to meet the demands of the Lokpal campaign, Kejriwal and Hazare parted 
ways, with the former starting a political party and the latter shunning any 
association with party politics. AAP thus was born out of the heated discussions, 
disagreements and conflicts that the Lokpal campaign had given rise to.  
 
AAP’s short stint in power in the Delhi government, and its current campaigning for 
the upcoming general elections, has brought fundamental questions about India’s 
political makeup and its democratic tradition to the surface. As explored in the 
introduction of this thesis, it gave rise to a heated polemic debate in public discourse 
as to what constitutes democratic meaning and practice. While some celebrated AAP 
for being a ‘maverick force’ that was challenging the established political institutions 
and reanimating democracy, others saw in AAP a populist tendency that posed a 
threat to India’s democracy. AAP emerged out of zealous conflict on what the 
meaning and practice of democracy is, and, once in power, in turn fuelled a 
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continuous debate on the idea of democracy. Whether for the supporters or the critics 
of AAP’s form of politics, what stood unquestioned was that the new party of the 
‘common man’ had reinvigorated the ways in which democracy is discussed in 
public discourse in India. In such manner, the ongoing conflicting understandings 
and interpretations of democracy expand the experience of democratisation in India.  









In this thesis I have explored the aspirations and the tensions in anti-corruption 
activism in India. Focusing on social movements demanding transparency and 
accountability laws, I examined how civil society actors committed to combating 
corruption can take opposed political routings and positions, even though they are 
ultimately driven by similar aspirations to improve state governance structures and to 
deepen democracy. I asked how the multi-layered ideas of democracy and the state 
so prevalent in Indian political discourse come to be reproduced, interpreted and 
internalised by anti-corruption civil society actors.  
 
This thesis explored the ideals and aspirations of anti-corruption activists largely 
through conflict and competition. It observed that divisions and tensions run through 
anti-corruption activism – between organisations and among actors, notwithstanding 
their ultimately similar objectives and aspirations. Drawing on the concept of 
relationality, I have argued that the political positions and commitments of the actors 
involved were shaped and consolidated largely in relation, and in reaction, to each 
other. A relational approach to identity highlights the circumstantial nature of a sense 
of identity, emphasising that it is constituted by being counterposed to others. In 
other words, both the individual and likewise the collective identity depend on the 
internalised existence of ‘the other’. What such conceptualisation points out, is that 
‘the other’ is a subjectively configurated mirror image of one’s own identity.  Hence, 
all identity in essence emerges out of dialectic relationships and constellations, and 
thus results in fluidly changing forms.  
 
The notion of relationality suggests that tension is affirmative and constructive. 
Conflict, so conceived, is a productive and constitutive force, in that it enables the 
consolidation of identities. As my ethnography corroborates, a competitive playing 
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field provides opportunities for the reinforcement of political positions and 
commitments. Such a setting brings together conflicting opponents who contend with 
one another for recognition, enabling their respective ideals and norms to be 
fashioned and rearticulated. It was thus the competitive landscape of the Lokpal 
agitation that provided the opportunity for the anti-corruption activists to enrich their 
respective positions and commitments mutually. This resonates with concepts of 
agonism that postulate that conflict and difference must be at the heart of critical 
thinking. According to Arendt’s (1972) conceptualisation of ‘agonistic public space’, 
rich debate emerges not through consensus, but through confrontational and 
adversarial engagement. Applied to democratic debate, Mouffe (1999) makes the 
normative claim that political conflict is integral for democracy to be truly deepened.  
  
That tension ran through anti-corruption activism and that, moreover, it constituted a 
dynamic and constructive force came to expression in all the chapters. Throughout 
this thesis, I explored the multiple levels and the different historical conjunctions in 
which the tension experienced by actors engaged in transparency and accountability 
campaigns played out. In the following, I recapitulate some of the main articulations 
of tension and the productive avenues that it opened up. I then turn to a brief 
discussion on how these findings reflect and contribute to political debates on the 
idea of democracy and the state in India. 
 
The presence of tension became apparent already in the historical Right to 
Information movement as explored in Chapters One and Two.  As shown, the 
enactment of the Right to Information Act is widely accredited to MKSS and to its 
grassroots forms of protest; still, there was also necessarily another, more technical 
aspect to its campaigning. On the one hand, MKSS is an organisation that is rooted in 
rural India and that is constituted by poor labourers and farmers.  Yet on the other, 
this ideal alone could not bring into being MKSS’s commitment to transparency and 
accountability laws and policies, which demanded bureaucratic procedures and 
technical expertise. NCPRI was brought about in order to address such technical and 
‘unauthentic’ needs. By being constituted by influential members that had bargaining 
power over crucial decision-makers, NCPRI represented the other side of MKSS. 
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Both organisations were interdependent whereby the grassroots demands of MKSS 
depended on the social networks of NCPRI, while simultaneously NCPRI’s social 
networks attained force and recognition because of MKSS’s work on the ground. 
However, the dialectic dynamics of two heterogeneous organisations, though 
dedicated to the same cause, inevitably led to tensions; these very tensions, in turn, 
resolved the very conflict immanent in the RTI movement, and were thus conductive 
to its overall success.  
 
The main context framing this thesis, and the event in which tension among civil 
society became most conspicuously expressed, was the Lokpal agitation. This 
agitation for an anti-corruption ombudsman legislation gave rise to divisions among 
actors who were split on how civil society should engage in law-making processes. 
While they were united in their aspiration of making governance transparent and 
accountable, they were divided on the means of getting there. Both MKSS and Team 
Anna shared the persuasion that anti-corruption legislation was crucial to improving 
the practice of statecraft, and that through civil society activism the experience of 
democracy in India could be deepened. However, they were in ideological 
disagreement on what democracy means and on what civil society’s role should be in 
advancing the democratic process. Consequently, the Lokpal agitation caused deep 
tensions both within the public discourse and within the several fractions of anti-
corruption activists. Although stemming from a similar political class and having 
overlaps in terms of history, membership and objectives, the  civil society actors 
involved  had to reposition themselves unequivocally in their allegiance.  
 
Expanding on the notion of agonism, I showed that the tension between MKSS and 
Team Anna did not lead to stifling impasses, but, on the contrary, opened up 
opportunities for productive reaffirmation and consolidation of positions and 
commitments. By accusing Team Anna of being undemocratic in its form of protest 
and in the content of its demands, members of MKSS could articulate and fashion 
their own position as democratic civil society representatives. Informed by the notion 
of relationality, I argued that MKSS’s positions on democratic process and procedure 
was shaped in large part in confrontation to the politics of Team Anna. Chapter Four, 
264 
 
for instance, explored a particular instance in which MKSS enacted its sense of 
appropriate civil society engagement. In opposition to Team Anna that was accused 
of failing to incorporate public opinion into its drafted Jan Lokpal bill, MKSS 
identified public consultation and participation of the poor as a crucial component of 
democratic civil society engagement. By performing an event of public consultation, 
members of MKSS thus positioned themselves as legitimate civil society actors. In 
this manner, it was the tensions underlying the Lokpal agitation that opened up an 
opportunity for MKSS’s ideal of public consultation to be reaffirmed and enacted.  
 
A similarly productive ramification to emerge out of the tension between MKSS and 
Team Anna was explored in Chapter Six in relation to their understandings of 
democracy. Reproducing the competing political imaginaries of Gandhi and Nehru, 
MKSS and Team Anna disagreed on what constitutes democratic processes and 
procedures. While one group endorsed ideas corresponding to direct democracy, 
whereby decision-making powers are directly in the hands of the people, the other 
group advocated abidance to the processes and procedures of representative 
democracy. Borrowing Mouffe’s normative notion of agonistic pluralism and 
applying it to my empirical setting, I argued that it was precisely the diverging 
conceptualisations as endorsed by the contending anti-corruption activists that 
deepened democratic debate. By being divided over what constitutes democratic 
practice and meaning, the two groups animated and strengthened debates over 
democracy. They hereby contributed to expanding political debates in India that, as 
we explored, is constituted by such conflict and tension. 
 
I also explored tension at the intra-organisational level, that is, among members of 
NCPRI themselves. During the Lokpal agitation, MKSS and NCPRI were positioned 
outwardly as a homogenous whole; however, internal divisions and tensions 
characterised these organisations. Certain members of NCPRI expressed 
disappointment in the workings of MKSS, particularly of its leadership, lamenting an 
increased distancing from the village-based ideal. However, as explored in Chapter 
Five, these critiques were not expressions of cynicism, but rather, re-articulations of 
a deeply held commitment to MKSS. The disappointments of certain members of 
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NCPRI served as inverted assertions of their expectations and ideals of anti-
corruption activism. Thus, through an exploration of their critiques and the areas of 
their disappointment, we could comprehend the finer-grained levels of commitment 
of these activists and the motives of their engagement. 
 
The various expressions of tension in civil society activism as explored in this thesis 
– within NCPRI, among MKSS and Team Anna, between MKSS and NCPRI – 
resonate with the tension in the recent discussions around the Aam Aadmi Party with 
which we began the introduction. AAP’s experiments with governance during its 
brief stint in power in Delhi, we noted, unleashed a polemic on what the meaning and 
practice of democracy is in India. Public discourse was divided between those who 
celebrated AAP for challenging the established political institutions, and those who 
contended that AAP derailed democratic procedures. This tension emanated 
ultimately from conflicting expectation of the political modes and processes required 
to restore democratic practice in India.  
 
It was precisely this tension over the procedural means required to attain the ends of 
anti-corruption that characterised also the sets of tension as explored in this thesis. 
This type of tension came out in the following: 1. the tension in the RTI movement 
between an idealised authentic social movement that exerted pressure on the 
government through collective citizen action, and an organisation that was well 
connected in the state system and familiarized with technical, bureaucratic and 
legalistic proceedings; 2. the tension between MKSS and Team Anna  emergent from  
different understandings of the democratic processes and procedures required for 
civil society engagement in anti-corruption law-making; 3. the tension within NCPRI  
around expectations of a social movement that adhered to pure and authentic forms 
of politics. All of these expressions of tension signalled the importance given to 
particular understandings and ideals of democratic process and procedure among 
anti-corruption civil society. Each indicated the overall commitment to strengthening 
democracy by campaigning for transparency and accountability laws, yet tension 
arose out of disagreement of what means to employ to advance the democratic 
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process. They show that democracy is a contested terrain that is constituted by 
disagreement and conflict. 
 
The recurrence of a certain type of tension among actors committed to anti-
corruption suggests that it bespeaks the broader contemporary political discourses in 
India. As has been examined extensively by scholars of Indian politics, the ideas of 
democracy and the state constitute the central imperatives of modern India. Not only 
do these ideas have wide currency and salience, but, moreover, they are said to have 
been internalised and vernacularised by ordinary citizens. The findings of this thesis 
similarly illustrate the centrality of these ideas, whereby a faith in the idea of 
democracy and a commitment to improving the functioning of the state were shown 
to be deeply embedded in anti-corruption activism.  Additionally, my findings 
expand this engaged discursive trend on India’s democracy and state, by 
demonstrating that it is characterised by tension and conflict.  As my ethnographic 
material suggests, conflict and competition enrich in multiple ways in which 
democracy and the state come to be imagined in India. By exploring the playing out 
of friction in the field of anti-corruption activism, I have proposed that the 
metanarrative through which Indian politics is framed, is  characterised by a widely 
held faith in the idea of democracy, which simultaneously coexists with a polemic 
fissure on what democratic processes and procedures exactly is. It is this polemic that 
sustains rich democratic debate. 
 
Tensions and aspirations are in this regard mutually constitutive. For action and 
commitment to be prompted, aspirations need to be tied to lofty expectations. 
Accordingly, ideals and expectations are the driving force of the engagement of anti-
corruption activists. However, ingrained in such expectations lies tension and 
contradiction, for – like in a utopia – the realisation of an ideal is unattainable and is 
always deferred. This, as Weber (1919) already pointed out in the early twentieth 
century, is the fundamental tension in politics. Politicians, according to Weber, are 
faced with an immanent dilemma: they need to combine an ethic of ultimate ends – a 
faith-based conviction that holds absolute and unambiguous positions, with pure 
intentions as the ultimate end – with an ethic of responsibility – a sense of proportion 
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and a measurement of the possible consequences that one’s actions have. Without 
passion and a vision for an ultimate end, a politician lacks charisma and devotion for 
a cause. At the same time, without a sense of proportion and responsibility, he risks 
acting blindly and sentimentally. Only a person with a true calling for politics will 
recognise that an ethic of ultimate ends and an ethic of responsibility are mutually 
constitutive and dialectically intertwined, and that they must be brought together 
through “a strong and slow boring of hard boards”.  
 
Drawing and expanding on Weber’s theory of ‘Politics as Vocation’, in this thesis I 
have shown how the tension inherent in political practice plays a constructive and 
constitutive role. Arguing along these lines, this thesis showed that it was the tension 
and competition between MKSS and Team Anna that enhanced their commitments 
and positions. Team Anna challenged members of MKSS to set themselves apart 
from them, and to thereby reflect about their own positioning. Triggered by 
perceived confrontation, the ensuing space of reflection enabled MKSS to enrich its 
own commitments to democratic processes. The ‘identity’ of MKSS was thus 
sharpened against and through Team Anna. This implies that, while the two groups 
ideologically seemed more adversaries than just competitors, essentially they re-
affirmed each other as the prototypical protagonists of ‘Politics as Vocation’. They 
were the exemplary ‘siamese twins’ that in their very polarity contained each other 
within themselves. It is in this light that through the Lokpal agitation both MKSS and 
Team Anna consolidated – even if only marginally and possibly only temporarily – 
India’s democracy.  
 
In such conceptualisation, conflict is at the heart of modern politics and constitutes a 
productive force. Here we may draw on Tsing’s metaphor of ‘friction’ that postulates 
that difference and disparity is what produces movement, action and effect: “A wheel 
turns because of its encounter with the surface of the road; spinning in the air it goes 
nowhere. Rubbing two sticks together produces heat and light; one stick alone is just 
a stick” (Tsing 2005: 5). Similarly, aspirations for transparency and accountability in 






With India representing the largest democracy in the world, these ethnographic 
findings on the playing out of ideas of democracy in civil society activism prove 
particularly insightful. Understanding that conflict and tension is at the heart of the 
idea of democracy, enables the enrichment and deepening of the debate on civil 
society’s role in it. This thesis gains all the more pertinence in the current political 
conjuncture, as India is in the midst of staging the biggest voting event in human 
history.148 What characterises the general elections of 2014 is the appearance of the 
Aam Aadmi Party as a major contender, fielding candidates to contest in many of the 
seats up for election to the lok sabha (lower house of parliament). Many political 
commentators are presenting AAP as promising to break the mould of Indian politics 
by challenging the existing parties (BJP and Congress) with a popular campaign. The 
emergence of AAP in the political scene is argued by many to be a turning point for 
Indian democracy.  
 
As observed in this thesis, AAP is a direct effect of the tensions and frictions in anti-
corruption activism: it emerged out of the heated conflict and debates on what civil 
society engagement entails. The very existence of AAP can thus be concluded to be 
an outcome and development of productive tension. These current political 
occurrences support the overall argument of this thesis that postulates that conflict 
lies at the heart of politics, and that such conflict is not constraining as would 
intuitively appear, but, on the contrary, it constitutes the substance out of which 
dynamic productivity emerges.  
 
 
                                                 
148 This conclusion is being written three weeks into the start of India’s 2014 lok sabha elections that 
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